Diasporic interventions : state-building in Iraq following the 2003 Iraq war by Kadhum, Oula







A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/93250  
 
Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 




























Diasporic	  interventions:	  State-­‐building	  in	  










A	  dissertation	  submitted	  in	  partial	  fulfilment	  of	  

























ii	  	   	  
CONTENTS	  PAGE	  
-­‐	  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   IV	  
-­‐	  ABSTRACT	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   VI	  
-­‐	  LIST	  OF	  ABBREVIATION	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   VIII	  
CHAPTER	  1	  –	  INTRODUCTION	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1	  
-­‐	  THE	  PUZZLE	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   4	  
-­‐	  ARGUMENT	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   6	  
-­‐	  SETTING	  THE	  SCENE	  -­‐	  BACKGROUND	  TO	  THE	  2003	  INTERVENTION	  OF	  IRAQ	   	   	   9	  
-­‐	  THE	  CONTRIBUTION	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   12	  
-­‐	  STRUCTURE	  OF	  THE	  RESEARCH	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   14	  
	  
CHAPTER	  2	  –	  CONCEPTS	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   19	  
-­‐	  DIASPORA,	  DIASPORA	  WHEREFORE	  ART	  THOU	  DIASPORA?	   	   	   	   	   19	  
-­‐	  CONFLICT-­‐GENERATED	  DIASPORA	   	   	   	   	   	   	   22	  
-­‐	  DEFINING	  DIASPORA	  IN	  THIS	  STUDY	   	   	   	   	   	   	   23	  
-­‐	  TRANSNATIONALISM	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   24	  
-­‐	  DIASPORA	  MOBILISATION	  PAST	  AND	  PRESENT	   	   	   	   	   	   26	  
-­‐	  THE	  STATE	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   30	  
-­‐	  STATE-­‐BUILDING	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   35	  
-­‐	  DEFINING	  STATE-­‐BUILDING	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   44	  
	  
CHAPTER	  3	  –	  DIASPORA	  MOBILISATION	  FOR	  STATE-­‐BUILDING	   	   	   47	  	  
-­‐	  DIASPORA	  MOBILISATION	  FOR	  STATE-­‐BUILDING	  –	  THE	  STATUS	  QUO	   	   	   47	  
-­‐	  EXPLANATORY	  FACTORS	  AND	  HYPOTHESES	   	   	   	   	   	   55	  
	   -­‐	  DIASPORA	  PROFILES	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   56	  
	   -­‐HOSTLAND	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	   	   	   	   	   	   	   63	  
	   -­‐	  LINKS	  TO	  ETHNO-­‐SECTARIAN	  PARTIES	   	   	   	   	   	   68	  
-­‐	  ALTERNATIVE	  EXPLANATIONS	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   72	  
-­‐	  DEFINING	  THE	  INDEPENDENT	  VARIABLES	   	   	   	   	   	   	   74	  
	  
CHAPTER	  4	  –	  METHODOLOGY	   	   	   	   	   	   	   82	  
-­‐	  SMALL-­‐	  N	  COMPARATIVE	  METHOD	   	   	   	   	   	   	   82	  
-­‐	  THE	  COMPARATIVE	  METHOD	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   84	  
-­‐	  CASE	  SELECTION	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   86	  
-­‐	  DATA	  GATHERING	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   88	  
-­‐	  PARTICIPANT	  SELECTION	  AND	  ETHICS	   	   	   	   	   	   	   89	  
-­‐DATA	  ANALYSIS	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   92	  
-­‐	  CODING	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   93	  
-­‐	  ANALYSING	  THE	  DATA	  WITH	  PROCESS	  TRACING	   	   	   	   	   	   94	  
-­‐	  POSITIONALITY	  AND	  REFLEXIVITY	   	   	   	   	   	   	   97	  
	  
CHAPTER	  5	  –	  THE	  IRAQI	  DIASPORA	  IN	  THE	  UK	   	   	   	   	   104	  
-­‐	  THE	  UK	  IRAQI	  DIASPORA	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   105	  
-­‐	  IRAQI	  DIASPORA	  POLITICAL	  ACTIVITY	  IN	  THE	  1980S	  AND	  1990S	   	   	   	   110	  
-­‐	  IRAQI	  OPPOSITION	  IN	  LONDON	  –	  PUSHING	  FOR	  REGIME	  CHANGE	   	   	   	   112	  
-­‐	  THE	  LEAD	  UP	  TO	  MILITARY	  INTERVENTION	   	   	   	   	   	   118	  
-­‐	  THE	  IRAQI	  DIASPORA	  AND	  STATE-­‐BUILDING	  FOLLOWING	  MILITARY	  INTERVENTION	   	   125	  
-­‐	  SUPPORTING	  THE	  STATE	  THROUGH	  CIVIL	  SOCIETY	   	   	   	   	   	   134	  
-­‐	  ASSESSING	  DIASPORIC	  INTERVENTIONS	  IN	  IRAQ	  2003-­‐2005	  	   	   	   	   137	  
-­‐	  IRAQ’S	  2005	  ELECTIONS	  AND	  BEYOND	   	   	   	   	   	   	   143	  
-­‐	  ASSESSING	  DIASPORIC	  INTERVENTIONS	  FOLLOWING	  THE	  2005	  ELECTIONS	   	   	   155	  
-­‐CONCLUSION	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   157	  
	  
CHAPTER	  6	  –	  THE	  IRAQI	  DIASPORA	  IN	  SWEDEN	   	   	   	   	   159	  
iii	  	   	  
-­‐	  THE	  IRAQI	  DIASPORA	  IN	  SWEDEN	   	   	   	   	   	   	   160	  
-­‐	  THE	  IRAQI	  DIASPORA	  IN	  SWEDEN	  AND	  POLITICAL	  ACTIVITY	  BEFORE	  2003	   	   	   166	  
-­‐	  POLITICAL	  ACTIVITY	  FOLLOWING	  THE	  FIRST	  GULF	  WAR	   	   	   	   	   169	  
-­‐	  SWEDEN’S	  FOREIGN	  POLICY	  AND	  DIASPORA	  POLITICAL	  ACTIVITY	  DURING	  OCCUPATION	   174	  
-­‐	  SWEDISH	  POLITICAL	  ACTIVITY	  FROM	  2004	  TO	  2008	   	   	   	   	   178	  
-­‐ASSESSING	  DIASPORA	  MOBILISATION	  FOR	  STATE-­‐BUILDING	  FROM	  2005	  TO	  2008	   	   186	  	  
-­‐	  DIASPORA	  MOBILISATION	  FOR	  STATE-­‐BUILDING	  SINCE	  2008	   	   	   	   191	  
-­‐CONCLUSION	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   204	  
	  
CHAPTER	  7	  –	  CONCLUSION	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   207	  
-­‐	  THEORETICAL	  AND	  METHODOLOGICAL	  IMPLICATIONS	   	   	   	   	   	   218	  
-­‐	  POLICY	  IMPLICATIONS	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   228	  
-­‐	  REFLECTIONS	  ON	  THIS	  STUDY	  AND	  ITS	  LIMITATIONS	   	   	   	   	   230	  
-­‐	  FUTURE	  RESEARCH	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   231	  
	  
PRIMARY	  SOURCES	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   233	  
	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   236	  
	  

































iv	  	   	  
	  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	  	  	  
Throughout	  this	  PhD	  journey	  I	  often	  daydreamed	  about	  the	  moment	  when	  all	  
there	  was	   left	   to	  do	  was	  write	  my	  acknowledgements.	   In	  my	  mind	  it	  signified	  
the	  end	  of	  a	  Kafkaesque	  journey	  that	  can	  best	  be	  described	  as	  a	  deconstruction	  
of	  self.	  Part	  of	  why	  this	  was	  the	  case	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  PhD	  
was	  not	  only	  driven	  by	  an	  academic	  curiosity	  but	  also	  a	  personal	  ambition	  to	  
connect	  and	  get	  to	  know	  Iraq	  outside	  the	  parameters	  of	  my	  family’s	  diasporic	  
memories.	  That	  journey	  inspired	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  emotions	  that	  have	  challenged	  
and	   confronted	  my	   thoughts	   and	   feelings	   about	   how	   I	   think	   about	   Iraq,	   but	  
also	   who	   I	   am.	   Ultimately,	   I	   emerge	   a	   different	   person	   with	   new	   ideas,	   and	  
more	  importantly,	  new	  questions	  about	  the	  world	  around	  me.	  	  
	  
Throughout	   this	   study,	   there	   have	   been	   numerous	   individuals	   who	   have	  
guided,	  supported	  and	  encouraged	  my	  research.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  let	  me	  start	  
by	   thanking	   my	   supervisors	   at	   Warwick	   University,	   Maria	   Koinova,	   Renske	  
Doorenspleet	  and	  Nicola	  Pratt.	  Maria,	  thank	  you	  for	  selecting	  me	  for	  the	  ERC	  
project,	   it	   has	   certainly	   been	   an	   unforgettable	   experience.	   Thank	   you	   for	  
continuing	  to	  set	  the	  bar	  higher	  and	  higher,	  you	  have	  made	  me	  a	  more	  resilient	  
person.	  Renske	  and	  Nicola,	  not	  only	  did	  your	  sharp	  intellect	  and	  critique	  of	  my	  
work	   challenge	   me	   and	   make	   me	   a	   better	   academic,	   but	   your	   kindness,	  
generosity	   and	   unflinching	   support	   kept	   me	   going	   through	   some	   difficult	  
moments.	  I	  feel	  immensely	  lucky	  to	  have	  had	  you	  both	  as	  my	  supervisors.	  I	  also	  
want	   to	   thank	   my	   Head	   of	   Department,	   Nick	   Vaughan-­‐Williams,	   for	   the	  
wisdoms	  he	  shared,	  and	  support	  throughout.	  Nick,	  your	  positivity,	  sage	  advice	  
and	  belief	  in	  me	  meant	  a	  great	  deal.	  
	  
This	  PhD	  would	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  without	  the	  kindness	  of	  participants	  in	  
the	  UK	   and	   Sweden,	   who	   often	  welcomed	  me	   into	   their	   homes,	   fed	  me	   and	  
looked	   after	   me	   during	   my	   fieldwork	   in	   London	   and	   Stockholm.	   Their	  
generosity	  was	  matched	  by	   the	   time	   they	   took	   to	  educate	  me	  and	  share	   their	  
stories	   about	   Iraq	   and	   life	   in	   the	   diaspora.	   I	   have	   learnt	   so	   much	   and	   feel	  
honoured	  to	  have	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  hear	  about	  your	  lives,	  your	  work	  and	  
your	  Iraq.	  	  
	  
To	  my	  dear	  friends,	  my	  SOAS	  crew:	  Elina	  Konstantinou,	  Sheilla	  Patel,	  Marcus	  
Mason,	  Naveed	  Somani,	  and	  Jen	  Roberts,	  I	  have	  loved	  our	  lively	  discussions	  on	  
politics	   and	   life	   that	   have	   intellectually	   stimulated	   me,	   challenged	   me	   and	  
spurred	  me	  on	  throughout	  my	  PhD.	  You	  are	  all	  so	  special	  to	  me	  and	  inspire	  me	  
greatly.	   I	   look	   forward	   to	   many	   more	   passionate	   exchanges	   over	   brunches,	  
lunches	  and	  dinners!	  
	  
To	  my	  ladies,	  Marilyn	  Perdomo,	  Lucy	  Rohr	  and	  Olivia	  Thompson.	  Each	  one	  of	  
you	   has	   made	   a	   difference	   during	   this	   time.	   Marilyn,	   thanks	   for	   the	   chats,	  
dinners	   and	   many	   Negronis!	   Your	   continuous	   ridicule	   of	   me	   keeps	   me	  
grounded	  and	  the	  laughter	  we	  share	  is	  priceless.	  Liv,	  my	  companion	  in	  avocado	  
v	  	   	  
and	   crisps	   and	   so	   much	   more!	   Thanks	   for	   the	   continuous	   support;	   the	   eye	  
watering	   laughter	   and	   the	   unforgettable	   PhD	   care	   pack!	   Luce,	   your	   love,	  
wisdoms	  and	  care,	  the	  wine	  that	  always	  flowed,	  our	  cackling	  together	  and	  your	  
belief	   in	  me.	   To	   Yasmine	   Ahmed,	   Dania	   Qatarneh,	   Rohan	   Talbot,	   and	   Yann	  
Bary	  for	  continuing	  to	  ask	  about	  my	  PhD	  and	  your	  encouragement.	  	  
	  
Also	  a	  big	  thanks	  to	  my	  PhD	  colleagues	  at	  Warwick	  and	  elsewhere	  who	  shared	  
this	   time	  with	  me,	   and	   the	  highs	   and	   lows	  of	  PhD	   life.	   Pablo	  Adriano,	  Bahar	  
Baser,	   Emmanuelle	   Degli	   Esposti,	   Johanna	   Bergstrom,	   Carlos	   Jolon,	   Dzeneta	  
Karabegovic,	  and	  Lisa	  Tilley.	  
	  
To	  my	  beautiful	   family,	  who	  were	   always	   there,	   like	   a	   solid	   rock	   through	   the	  
many	   moments	   of	   doubt,	   moans	   and	   groans.	   Mama	   and	   Baba,	   you	   have	  
inspired	  me	  throughout	  and	  taught	  me	  so	  much	  about	  the	  hope	  of	  life,	  and	  the	  
need	  for	  continued	  positivity,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  tragedy	  and	  pain.	  Both	  of	  you	  
have	  pushed	  me	  forward	  in	  life	  and	  I	  am	  so	  grateful	   for	  all	  you	  have	  done	  for	  
me.	  To	  my	  amazing	  brothers	  Nash,	  Hassan	  and	  Medyen	  and	  my	  gorgeous	  sister	  
Rafeef,	   I	   love	   you	   guys	   so	   much.	   Thank	   you	   for	   the	   pep	   talks,	   the	   hilarious	  
Zamunda	   whatsapp	   exchanges,	   the	   unremitting	   encouragement,	   and	   your	  
unconditional	  love	  and	  belief	  in	  me.	  You	  are	  the	  best	  brothers	  and	  sister	  a	  girl	  
could	  have.	  	  
	  
To	   my	  musical	   family,	   Johan	   Sebastian	   Bach,	   Antonio	   Vivaldi,	   Pat	   Metheny,	  
Paco	  de	  Lucia,	  John	  Coltrane,	  Nina	  Simone,	  Ella	  Fitzgerald,	  Tupac	  Shakur,	  Neil	  
Young,	   Joan	   Baez,	   Vicente	   Amigo,	   Santana,	   Bob	  Marley	   and	  Miles	   Davis	   for	  
their	  exquisite	  company.	  
	  
Finally,	  to	  my	  partner	  in	  crime,	  my	  media	  naranja,	  my	  habibi	  and	  my	  wonderful	  
husband,	  Fabio	  Diu.	  Thank	  you	  for	  the	  walks,	  the	  talks,	  the	  delicious	  dinners,	  
and	  all	  the	  love,	  care,	  advice	  and	  wisdom	  you	  shared	  with	  me	  throughout	  this	  
time.	  You	  were	  there	  for	  me	  day	  and	  night.	  You	  understood	  me,	  and	  what	  I	  was	  
doing;	   sometimes	   better	   than	   I	   understood	  myself.	   None	   of	   this	   would	   have	  



















This	   study	   addresses	   how	   the	   UK	   and	   the	   Swedish	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   mobilised	  
towards	   state-­‐building	   in	   Iraq	   following	   the	   2003	   US	   led	   intervention.	   It	  
explores	   why	   some	   diaspora	   mobilised	   towards	   state-­‐building	   processes	  
through	  institution-­‐building	  and	  governance	  while	  others	  through	  civil	  society.	  	  
	  
While	  the	  literature	  has	  explored	  diasporic	  development	  and	  peace-­‐building,	  it	  
has	   not	   systematically	   addressed	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐building.	  
Neither	   has	   it	   paid	   sufficient	   attention	   to	   the	   factors	   that	   shape	   diasporic	  
political	  choices	  in	  intervention	  and	  conflict	  settings.	  	  
	  
My	  thesis	  contributes	  to	  this	  body	  of	  literature	  and	  argues	  that	  an	  overlooked	  
dimension	  of	  state-­‐building,	  is	  that	  of	  civil	  society.	  State-­‐building	  involves	  top-­‐
down	   approaches	   of	   institution-­‐building	   but	   also	   bottom-­‐up	   approaches	   of	  
participatory	  politics	  that	  encourage	  democratic	  practices.	  I	  thus	  develop	  a	  new	  
two-­‐category	  operationalization	  of	   state-­‐building	   to	   capture	   the	   interventions	  
and	  transnational	  fields	  of	  different	  diaspora	  groups	  and	  individuals.	  	  
	  
My	  findings	  show	  that	  during	  different	  time	  periods,	  three	  factors	  have	  shaped	  
the	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  UK	  and	  Swedish	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  towards	  state-­‐building;	  
diaspora	  profiles,	  hostland	  foreign	  policies	  towards	  the	  homeland	  and	  links	  to	  
homeland	   political	   parties	   in	   Iraq.	   Theoretically	   these	   findings	   demonstrate	  
that	  diaspora’s	  socio-­‐economic	  profiles	  and	  networks	  are	  key	  to	  understanding	  
the	   type	  of	   politics	   that	  diaspora	   can	   engage	   in.	  Meanwhile,	   hostland	   foreign	  
policies	   can	   shape	   diasporic	   interventions	   by	   creating	   different	   relationships	  
with	  homelands	  and	  thus	  different	  opportunities	  for	  engagement.	  Furthermore,	  
in	   divided	   societies,	   diaspora	   connected	   to	   homeland	   political	   parties,	   or	  
represented	   by	   them,	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   the	   apparatus	   of	   the	  
state,	  where	  as	  those	  excluded	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  engage	  outside	  the	  structures	  
of	   power	   through	   civil	   society.	   Finally,	  my	   study	   demonstrates	   that	   temporal	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dimensions	   are	   crucial	   for	   understanding,	   which	   factors	  mattered,	   when	   and	  
why.	  
	  
Empirically,	   this	   thesis	  also	  contributes	  original	  knowledge	  about	   the	  UK	  and	  
Swedish	  Iraqi	  diaspora.	  It	  sheds	  new	  light	  into	  the	  myriad	  ways	  that	  diaspora	  in	  
these	  two	  countries	  have	  been	  attempting	  to	  rebuild	  the	  country	  after	  the	  2003	  
intervention	   by	   illustrating	   their	   efforts	   and	   experiences,	   and	   how	   it	   has	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  OF	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ADM	  –	  Assyrian	  Democratic	  Movement	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  -­‐	  Committee	  Against	  repression	  and	  for	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  –	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DFID	  –	  Department	  for	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DOD	  –	  Department	  of	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EU	  –	  European	  Union	  
FCO	  –	  Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Office	  
FIA	  –	  Federation	  of	  Iraqi	  Associations	  
HDF	  –	  Humanitarian	  Dialogue	  Foundation	  
IAEA	  -­‐	  International	  Atomic	  Energy	  Authority	  	  
ICP	  –	  Iraqi	  Communist	  Party	  
IDM	  –	  Iraqi	  Democratic	  Movement	  
IGC	  –	  Iraqi	  Governing	  Council	  
ILA	  –	  Iraq	  Liberation	  Act	  
INA	  –	  Iraqi	  National	  Accord	  
INC	  –	  Iraqi	  National	  Congress	  
IRDC	  -­‐	  Iraqi	  Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  Council	  
ISCI	  –	  Islamic	  Supreme	  Council	  of	  Iraq	  
ISIL	  –	  Islamic	  State	  of	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Levant	  	  
IWL	  –	  Iraqi	  Women’s	  League	  
KDP	  –	  Kurdistan	  Democratic	  Party	  
KRG	  –	  Kurdish	  Regional	  Government	  
LC	  –	  Leadership	  Council	  
MFA	  –	  Swedish	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  
NDA	  –	  National	  Democratic	  Alliance	  
NED	  -­‐	  The	  National	  Endowment	  for	  Democracy	  	  
NGO	  –	  Non-­‐governmental	  Organisation	  
OFCOM	  –	  The	  Office	  of	  Communications	  
OPIC	  –	  Olaf	  Palme	  International	  Center	  
ORHA	  -­‐	  Office	  of	  Reconstruction	  and	  Humanitarian	  Assistance	  
PUK	  –	  Patriotic	  Union	  of	  Kurdistan	  
SCIRI	  –	  Supreme	  Council	  for	  Islamic	  Revolution	  in	  Iraq	  
SFI	  	  -­‐	  Swedish	  for	  Immigrants	  
SIDA	  –	  Swedish	  International	  Development	  Agency	  
UN	  –	  United	  Nations	  
UNAMI	  –	  United	  Nations	  Assistance	  Mission	  for	  Iraq	  	  
UNHCR	  –	  United	  Nations	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Refugees	  
UNMOVIC	  -­‐	  United	  Nations	  Monitoring,	  Verification	  and	  Inspection	  
Commission	  
USAID	  -­‐	  United	  States	  Agency	  for	  International	  Development	  
USIP	  -­‐	  The	  United	  States	  Institute	  for	  Peace
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CHAPTER	  1	  -­‐	  INTRODUCTION	  
	  
Since	   the	   2003	   intervention	   of	   Iraq	   scholarly	   literature	   has	   focussed	   its	  
attention	  on	  assessing	   the	  US	   led	   intervention	  and	  occupation	  with	  countless	  
books	  dedicated	  to	  the	  task	  of	  unpicking	  ‘what	  went	  wrong?’	  (See	  for	  instance	  
Lake,	  2010;	  Chesterman,	  2004;	  Chandler	  and	  Sisk,	  2013;	  Diamond,	  2006;	  Herring	  
and	   Rangwala,	   2006;	   Ismael	   and	   Ismael,	   2015;	   Allawi,	   2007;	   Packer,	   2003;	  
Dodge,	   2006,	   2003;	   War	   and	   Occupation	   in	   Iraq,	   2007;	   Luckham,	   2004).	  	  
Meanwhile	   in	   the	   media,	   Iraqis	   have	   been	   depicted	   as	   either	   victims	   or	  
perpetrators	   of	   sectarianism,	   terrorism	   or	   corruption.	   Images	   of	   dusty	   black	  
clad	   women	   wailing	   at	   the	   scene	   of	   a	   bomb	   explosion	   have	   dominated	   our	  
screens,	  as	  have	  Iraqi	  men	  in	  suits,	  in	  marble	  surroundings	  shaking	  hands	  with	  
international	   leaders,	   smiling	   for	   the	   camera	   next	   to	   an	   Iraqi	   flag.	   These	  
polarised	   images	   have	   not	   only	   dehumanised	   Iraqis	   under	   a	   cloak	   of	  
victimhood	  or	  corruption	  but	  have	  denied	  Iraqis	  everywhere	  the	  telling	  of	  their	  
own	  stories	  and	  efforts	  to	  rebuild	  their	  country	  following	  intervention.	  	  
	  
For	  the	  first	  time	  in	  decades,	   the	  removal	  of	  Saddam	  Hussein	   in	  2003	  and	  his	  
Baathist	   regime,	   signified	   a	   possible	   return	   for	   millions	   of	   Iraqis	   around	   the	  
world	  who	  migrated	   or	  were	   forced	   to	  migrate	   due	   to	   political	   conditions	   or	  
persecution.	   From	   the	   1950s	   to	   our	   present	   day,	   millions	   of	   Iraqis	   of	   all	  
backgrounds	  including	  Monarchists,	  Jews,	  Assyrians	  linked	  to	  the	  British	  Royal	  
Air	   Force,	   Communists,	   Kurds,	   Islamists,	   those	   accused	   of	   having	   Persian	  
descent,	  and	  various	  ethnic	  minorities	  have	  found	  new	  homes	  in	  neighbouring	  
countries	  and	  Western	  hostlands	  (Sassoon,	  2009).	  From	  this	  landscape	  of	  Iraq’s	  
social	   history	   a	   diaspora	   emerged,	   creating	   social	   and	   cultural	   associations,	  
charitable	  organisations,	   and	  political	  party	  branches	  with	   transnational	   links	  
to	  their	  former	  country	  of	  origin.	  Far	  from	  being	  victims	  of	  circumstance,	  Iraqis	  
in	   the	   diaspora	   have	   been	   contributing	   in	   myriad	   ways	   to	   rebuilding	   their	  
country	  of	  origin	  in	  spite	  of	  intervention,	  occupation	  and	  continued	  violence.	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So	   far	   this	   picture	   has	   remained	   hidden	   behind	   the	   headlines	   obscuring	   the	  
reality	   on	   the	   ground	   of	   how	   transnational	   links	   and	   networks	   between	   the	  
diaspora,	   the	   hostland	   and	   the	   homeland	   have	   contributed	   to	   building	   state	  
and	  society	  in	  the	  modern	  state	  of	  Iraq.	  Whereas	  the	  contributions	  of	  elites	  to	  
positions	   of	   power	   in	   the	   homeland	   have	   featured	   in	   critical	   analyses	   of	   the	  
post-­‐intervention	  period	   (Allawi,	  2007;	  Bremer	  and	  McConnell,	  2006;	  Herring	  
and	   Rangwala,	   2006;	   Barakat,	   2008),	   very	   little	   is	   known	   about	   the	  
contributions	  of	  Iraqis	  in	  the	  diaspora	  who	  have	  also	  attempted	  to	  rebuild	  the	  
country,	  albeit	  in	  different	  ways.	  	  
	  
While	   the	   diaspora	   literature	   has	   looked	   at	   the	   ways	   that	   diaspora	   have	  
mobilised	  towards	  their	  countries	  of	  origin	  and	  provides	  us	  with	  rich	  empirical	  
case	  studies	  of	  national	  struggles	  (Shain,	  2002a;	  Sheffer,	  2003,	  1986,	  Shain,	  2007,	  
2002a,	   1994,	   Tölölyan,	   2000,	   1991;	   Safran,	   1991;	   Bruinessen,	   1998;	   Hassanpour	  
and	  Mojab,	  2005;	  Khayati	  and	  Dahlstedt,	  2014;	  Baser,	  2012;	  Koinova,	  2011)	  and	  in	  
times	  of	  conflict	  (Abdile,	  2014;	  Turner,	  2008a;	  Fair,	  2007;	  Dahre,	  2007;	  Khoser,	  
2007;	  Smith	  and	  Stares,	  2007),	  very	  little	  empirical	  work	  deals	  exclusively	  with	  
diasporic	   state-­‐building	   following	   foreign	   intervention	   and	   in	   times	   of	  
occupation.	  Though	  there	  are	  references	  to	  the	  intervention	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  
the	   diaspora’s	   involvement	   in	   rebuilding	   the	   country	   following	   intervention	  
(Brinkerhoff,	  2008;	  Turner,	  2008a;	  Kouser,	  2014;	  Siegel	  and	  Kuschminder,	  2012;	  
Oeppen	  and	  Schlenkhoff,	  2010),	  a	  comprehensive	  investigation	  into	  the	  role	  of	  
diaspora	   mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐building	   following	   foreign	   intervention	   and	  
their	   approach	   to	   that	   political	   process	   has	   not	   been	   studied.	   Furthermore,	  
there	   is	   very	   little	   academic	   empirical	   work	   on	   the	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   and	   their	  
political	  transnationalism	  following	  the	  2003	  war,	  with	  a	  few	  exceptions	  related	  
to	  Iraqi	  Kurds	  (Khayati	  and	  Dahlstedt,	  2014;	  Natali,	  2007)	  and	  Iraqi	  women	  in	  
the	  diaspora	  (Al-­‐Ali	  and	  Pratt,	  2009,	  2010;	  N.	  Al-­‐Ali,	  2007).	  
	  
Just	   as	   the	   diaspora	   literature	   has	   not	   addressed	   the	   state-­‐building	   literature	  
directly,	   the	   state-­‐building	   literature	   has	   been	   fixated	   with	   the	   foreign	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interventions	   of	   powerful	   states	   and	   intergovernmental	   organisations,	   usually	  
in	  developing	  countries;	   it	  pays	  scant	  attention	  to	  diasporic	   interventions	  and	  
their	  contributions	  to	  state-­‐building	  processes.	  	  
	  
This	   thesis	   views	  diasporic	   state-­‐building	   as	   comprised	  of	   two	   important	   and	  
necessary	   categories.	  The	   first	   relates	   to	  building	   the	   institutional	   capacity	   of	  
the	  state,	  its	  institutions,	  and	  instruments	  of	  governance,	  which	  allow	  the	  state	  
to	  perform	  state	  functions	  such	  as	  laying	  down	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  providing	  public	  
services,	   enacting	   policies,	   providing	   security	   and	   generally	   providing	   for	   the	  
infrastructure	  and	  development	  of	  the	  state.	  This	  approach	  may	  be	  classified	  as	  
a	   top-­‐down	   approach	  where	   the	   state	   apparatus	   sets	   out	   laws,	   policies,	   rules	  
and	  privileges	  to	  its	  citizens.	  The	  second	  category	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  reverse,	  where	  the	  
citizenry,	   through	   civil	   society	   groups,	   grass-­‐roots	   associations,	   and	  
movements,	   support	  or	  challenge	  the	  state.	   In	  doing	  so,	  civil	   society	  becomes	  
another	   important	   arena	   for	   state-­‐building	   as	   the	   interaction	   with	   the	   state	  
informs	   state	   policies,	   holds	   the	   state	   to	   account,	   challenges	   its	   policies	   and	  
thus	  evolves	   its	  practices,	  meanings	  and	  values	   (Migdal,	  2001).	  As	  such	  this	   is	  
classified	  as	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  approach	  where	  civil	  society	  actors	  (peaceful	  or	  non-­‐
peaceful)	   inform	   or	   influence	   state	   practices.	   Both	   top-­‐down	   and	   bottom-­‐up	  
approaches	   have	   been	   witnessed	   in	   Iraqi	   diasporic	   mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐
building	  following	  the	  2003	  intervention,	  where	  diaspora	  from	  both	  the	  UK	  and	  
Sweden	  have	   responded	   in	   varying	  ways	   in	   their	   attempt	   to	   help	   rebuild	   the	  
country.	  	  
	  
This	   new	   two-­‐category	   understanding	   of	   state-­‐building	   is	   particularly	  
important	   for	   recognising	   that	   in	   states	   transitioning	   to	   democracy,	   or	   have	  
undergone	  regime	  change,	   there	   is	  an	  exchange	  between	  state	  and	  society	   for	  
the	  kind	  of	  state	  that	  is	  being	  built.	  While	  traditionally	  states	  have	  been	  viewed	  
through	  Max	  Weber’s	  static	  “monopoly	  of	  the	  legitimate	  use	  of	  force”,	  states	  are	  
in	  actual	   fact	  built	   through	  a	  negotiation	  between	  state	   institutions	  and	  rules	  
and	  the	  civil	  society	  actors	  that	  these	  rules	  and	  institutions	  inspire.	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While	   this	   understanding	   of	   state-­‐building	   underlines	   the	   dual	   process	   of	  
building	   states,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   underline	   that	   diasporic	   interventions	   into	  
state-­‐building	  do	  not	  always	  reveal	  a	  unified	  approach	  or	  goal	  for	  the	  country.	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  Iraq,	  where	  there	  has	  been	  conflict,	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  divisions	  
and	  consequently	  fragmentation	  (Herring	  and	  Rangwala,	  2006),	  state-­‐building	  
has	  not	  meant	  a	  unified	  project	  towards	  re-­‐building	  the	  country	  but	  rather	  has	  
reflected	   the	   deep	   divisions,	   imaginations	   and	   idealised	   conceptions	   of	   what	  
the	   Iraqi	   state	   should	   look	   like.	  Where	   the	  Shia	  political	  parties	  have	  wanted	  
dominance	   for	   the	   long	   oppressed	   Shia	   population,	   the	   Kurds	   have	   wanted	  
independence	   from	   Baghdad	   or	   complete	   secession.	   Meanwhile,	   others	   have	  
wanted	  representation	  and	  rights	  for	  their	  ethnic	  minorities,	  while	  others	  have	  
fought	   for	   a	   democratic	   conception	   of	   the	   state	   founded	   on	   secular	   and	  
humanitarian	  values.	  	  
	  
As	  such,	  diasporic	  state-­‐building,	  whilst	  undeniably	  occurring	  among	  disparate	  
groups,	   who	   have	   been	   supporting	   communities	   translocally	   by	   providing	  
services	  otherwise	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  state,	  or	  transnationally	  by	  championing	  
and	   defending	   minority	   rights	   when	   the	   government	   has	   been	   seen	   to	  
contravene	   human	   rights,	   has	   simultaneously	   reflected	   the	   polarised	   and	  
broken	  vision	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  nation.	  This	  has	  meant	  that	  the	  diaspora	  have	  largely	  
mobilised	  through	  their	  ethnic,	  political	  or	  sectarian	  groups,	  which	  has	  further	  
entrenched	  divisions	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.	  Diasporic	  state-­‐building	  in	  Iraq	  
has	  thus	  not	  contributed	  to	  a	  united	  project	  for	  the	  country,	  but	  rather	  has	  led	  
to	   a	   fragmented	   state-­‐building	   that	   serves	   sectarian,	   ethnic,	   political	   and	  
ideological	  interests,	  reflecting	  the	  splintered	  Iraqi	  state.	  	  
	  
The	  Puzzle	  
With	  the	  rise	  of	  civil	  wars	  and	  unrest	  across	  the	  globe	  (Kaldor,	   1999)	  scholars	  
have	  become	  interested	  in	  analysing	  the	  role	  of	  diaspora	  as	  non-­‐state	  political	  
actors	   in	   conflict	   states	   (Shain,	   2002b;	   Adamson,	   2002;	   Collier	   and	   Hoeffler,	  
2004;	  Adamson,	  2005;	  Lyons,	  2006;	  Smith	  and	  Stares,	  2007;	  Esman,	  2009;	  Lyons	  
and	  Mandaville,	   2012;	   Baser,	   2009).	   Some	   scholars	   have	   underlined	   the	   ways	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they	  prolong	  and	  exacerbate	  conflicts,	  while	  others	  have	  promoted	  their	  peace-­‐
making	  and	  development	  potential	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  contexts	  (Mohamoud,	  2006;	  
Galipo,	   2011;	   Pirkkalainen,	   2009;	  Weiss,	   2009;	   Lyons,	   2007;	   Feyissa,	   2014;	  Van	  
Houte	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Koser,	  2007;	  Kleist,	  2008;	  Cochrane,	  2007;	  Baser,	  2009;	  Smith	  
and	   Stares,	   2007;	   Lubkemann,	   2008;	   Fair,	   2007;	   Baser,	   2009;	   Cochrane,	   2007;	  
Wayland,	  2004;	  Collier	  and	  Hoeffler,	  2004).	  	  
	  
Diasporas	  are	  also	  contributing	  to	  state-­‐building	  processes	  in	  conflict	  and	  post-­‐
conflict	  states.	  Case	  studies	  largely	  from	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  region	  and	  the	  Horn	  of	  
Africa	  have	  highlighted	  the	  ways	  diaspora	  mobilise	  to	  support,	  challenge	  or	  re-­‐
shape	   the	   state	   through	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance	   or	   through	   civil	  
society.	   For	   instance,	   we	   know	   that	   diaspora	   have	   mobilised	   towards	  
institution-­‐building	   through	   diaspora	   returnees	   taking	   up	   political	   or	  
ministerial	   positions	   and	   helping	   to	   build	   state	   capacities,	   or	   informing	   state	  
policies	   (Antwi-­‐Boateng,	   2012,	   2011;	   Mohamoud,	   2006;	   Galipo,	   2011;	  
Pirkkalainen,	   2009;	  Weiss,	   2009;	  Lyons,	   2007;	  Feyissa,	   2014;	  Van	  Houte	  et	   al.,	  
2013;	  Koser,	  2007;	  Kleist,	  2008;	  Lampert,	  2009;	  Brinkerhoff,	  2016;	  Turner,	  2008b;	  
Natali,	   2007).	   Similarly,	   we	   know	   that	   diaspora	   have	   also	   mobilised	   through	  
civil	   society	   to	   support	   the	   state	   by	   promoting	   democratic	   governance	   and	  
liberal	  norms,	  providing	   services	   that	   states	  normally	  provide	   	   	   their	   citizens,	  
contesting	   the	   state	   or	   informing	   the	   state	   (Mohamoud,	   2006;	   Galipo,	   2011;	  
Pirkkalainen,	   2009;	  Weiss,	   2009;	   Feyissa,	   2014;	   Laakso	   and	  Hautaniemi,	   2014;	  
Van	  Houte	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Koser,	  2007;	  Kleist,	  2008;	  Koinova,	  2010;	  Turner,	  2008b;	  
Dahre,	  2007).	  	  
	  
Yet	  why	  do	   some	  diaspora	  mobilise	   towards	   state-­‐building	  processes	   through	  
institution-­‐building	   and	   governance	  while	   others	   through	   civil	   society?	  What	  
factors	   influence	   the	   choices	   of	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   when	   contributing	   to	  
state-­‐building	  processes?	  	  
	  
Research	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Sweden	  has	  revealed	  that	  while	  
the	   UK	   diaspora	   had	   more	   opportunities	   to	   mobilise	   towards	   institution-­‐
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building	  directly	  as	  returnee	  politicians,	  ministers,	  policy	  advisors	  and	  capacity-­‐
builders	   (Allawi,	   2007;	   Bremer	   and	   McConnell,	   2006;	   Bonin,	   2011;	   Roston,	  
2008),	   individuals	   and	   groups	   from	   within	   the	   Swedish	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   were	  
mobilised	   in	   a	   very	   different	   way.	   Instead	   of	   mobilising	   towards	   institution-­‐
building	   and	   governance	   they	   worked	   through	   civil	   society	   organisations	   to	  
support	   Iraq’s	   state-­‐building	   process.	   What	   accounts	   for	   this	   variation	   in	  
mobilisation?	   Why	   did	   one	   diaspora	   contribute	   towards	   building	   the	   state	  
through	  state	  institutions	  whereas	  the	  other	  through	  civil	  society?	  The	  primary	  
research	  questions	  this	  study	  seeks	  to	  answers	  are:	  
1.	   How	   have	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   in	   Sweden	   and	   the	   UK	   mobilised	   towards	  
state-­‐building	  following	  the	  2003	  intervention?	  
And	  	  
2.	  Why	  was	  the	  UK	  diaspora	  able	  to	  contribute	  more	  to	  institution-­‐
building	  and	  governance	  while	  the	  Swedish	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  contributed	  
more	  to	  supporting	  Iraq’s	  new	  state	  through	  civil	  society?	  
	  
This	   thesis	   thus	   brings	   the	   story	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   into	   focus.	   It	   looks	  
comparatively	   at	   the	  mobilisation	   efforts	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   in	   the	  UK	   and	  
Sweden.	  It	  asks	  how	  individuals	  and	  groups	  within	  the	  two	  hostlands	  have	  been	  
contributing	   towards	   this	   political	   process.	   It	   also	   questions	   why	   there	   were	  
differences	   in	   the	   way	   individuals	   and	   groups	   within	   the	   two	   diasporic	  
communities	   reacted	   to	   and	   engaged	   towards	   Iraq’s	   state-­‐building	   project	   in	  
the	  lead	  up	  to	  and	  following	  intervention	  in	  2003.	  	  
	  
Argument	  
The	   act	   of	   state-­‐building	   is	   not	   only	   limited	   to	   states,	   but	   is	   a	   process	   that	  
involves	   multiple	   actors	   including,	   as	   will	   be	   demonstrated	   by	   this	   thesis,	  
diasporic	  actors.	  The	  case	  studies	  of	   the	  UK	  and	  Swedish	   Iraqi	  diaspora	  show	  
that	   following	   intervention	   in	   2003,	   there	  have	  been	  many	  attempts	   to	   shape	  
the	   state	   by	   various	   diasporic	   individuals	   and	   groups	   in	  myriad	   ways.	   There	  
have	  been	  two	  approaches	  to	  state-­‐building,	  which	  I	  argue	  incorporate	  aspects	  
7	  	   	  
of	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	  
supporting/challenging	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  former	  
relates	   to	   building	   state	   institutions,	   governance,	   and	   involvement	   in	   the	  
political	   apparatus	   of	   the	   state.	   As	   much	   of	   the	   state-­‐building	   literature	   has	  
emphasised,	  this	  requires	  building	  the	  institutional	  capacity	  of	  the	  state	  so	  that	  
the	  rule	  of	   law	  can	  be	  enacted,	  authority	  can	  be	  imposed	  and	  governance	  can	  
take	   place	   (Fukuyama,	   2004,	   2005;	   Chesterman	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   Sisk,	   2013).	   The	  
latter	   refers	   to	   a	  much-­‐neglected	   aspect	   of	   this	   process	   in	   the	   state-­‐building	  
literature,	   which	   is	   the	   role	   of	   civil	   society	   in	   state-­‐building.	   While	   gaining	  
legitimacy	   is	   emphasised	   through	   local	   ownership	   and	   security	   provision	  
(Diamond,	  2005;	  Chesterman,	  2004;	  Lake,	  2010),	   little	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  
to	  the	  bottom-­‐up	  approaches	  related	  to	  the	  political	  participation	  of	  citizens	  in	  
contributing	   to	   state	   policy	   through	   democratic	   governance	   (Andersen,	   2012;	  
Paris	  and	  Sisk,	  2009).	  	  I	  therefore	  propose	  a	  second	  category	  of	  state-­‐building,	  
which	   addresses	   supporting/challenging	   the	   state	   through	   civil	   society.	   Civil	  
society	   as	   argued	   is	   necessary	   for	   holding	   governments	   accountable,	   giving	   a	  
political	   voice	   to	   citizens	   and	   providing	   quasi-­‐state	   services,	   which	   are	   often	  
lacking	  in	  weak	  or	  post	  conflict	  states.	  
	  
By	  comparing	  the	  two	  case	  studies	  and	  their	  mobilisation,	  I	  show	  how	  and	  why	  
different	   variables	   affected	   differences	   in	   the	   way	   that	   the	   UK	   and	   Swedish	  
diaspora	   groups	   and	   individuals	   were	   able	   to	   engage	   in	   Iraq’s	   state-­‐building	  
political	  process	  both	  before	  intervention,	  during	  intervention	  and	  occupation	  
and	   following	   Iraq’s	   first	   democratic	   elections.	   I	   argue	   what	   has	   shaped	   the	  
capabilities	  of	   the	   Iraqi	  diaspora	   in	   the	  UK	  and	  Sweden	   to	  mobilise	   for	   state-­‐
building	  during	  different	  time	  periods	  has	  been	  three	  major	  factors	  relating	  to	  
diaspora	  profiles,	  hostland	  foreign	  policies	  towards	  the	  homeland	  and	  links	  to	  
homeland	  political	  parties	  in	  Iraq.	  	  
	  
Leading	  up	  to	  the	  Iraq	  war	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  in	  the	  UK	  were	  more	  
able	   to	   contribute	   towards	   Iraq’s	   state-­‐building	   plans	   due	   to	   their	   specific	  
profile.	  The	  UK	   Iraqi	  diaspora	  was	  older,	   from	  prominent	  wealthy	   families	   in	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Iraq,	  educated	  and	  skilled	  and	  their	  political	  connections	  both	  in	  the	  homeland	  
and	   hostland	   were	   connected	   to	   allies	   in	   power	   both	   in	   the	   homeland	   and	  
hostland.	  They	  therefore	  had	  the	  material	  resources	  to	  create	  an	  opposition	  in	  
the	   UK,	   lobby	   foreign	   governments	   and	   eventually	   form	   part	   of	   Iraq’s	   state-­‐
building	  process	  by	  presenting	  themselves	  as	  potential	  political	  leaders	  for	  the	  
country	  to	  US	  and	  UK	  governments.	  	  
	  
Meanwhile	   in	   Sweden,	   the	   profile	   of	   the	   diaspora	   differs	   markedly.	   The	  
majority	  of	  Iraqis	  in	  Sweden	  were	  refugees,	  impoverished	  individuals	  with	  low	  
education	   and	   skills.	   They	  were	   also	   a	  new	  diaspora	  having	   arrived	   en	  masse	  
only	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  following	  the	  2003	  Iraq	  war.	  In	  this	  respect	  they	  did	  not	  
have	  the	  material	  resources	  or	  networks,	  or	  understanding	  of	  their	  hostland	  to	  
launch	  an	  effective	  opposition	  and	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  pre-­‐war	  planning.	  	  
	  
Later	  when	  intervention	  took	  place	  in	  2003,	  the	  UK’s	  foreign	  policy	  to	  militarily	  
intervene	   in	   Iraq	   with	   the	   US	   created	   opportunities	   for	   the	   diaspora	   to	   be	  
involved	   as	   they	   already	   had	   links	   to	   British	   and	   US	   officials	   during	   the	  
opposition	   years	   and	   in	   preparation	   for	   the	   war.	   Military	   intervention	   thus	  
created	   an	   opening	   for	   specific	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   individuals	   to	   be	   involved	   in	  
Iraq’s	  state-­‐building	  future.	  This	  was	  especially	  the	  case	  as	  intervention	  turned	  
to	   occupation	   and	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   coalition	   needed	   Iraqi	   leaders	   to	  
govern,	  lead	  ministries	  and	  generally	  re-­‐build	  the	  country.	  	  
	  
In	  contrast,	  during	  this	  time	  in	  Sweden,	  formal	  opposition	  to	  the	  Iraq	  war	  did	  
not	  give	  individuals	  in	  the	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  an	  opportunity	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  Iraq’s	  
first	   state-­‐building	   phase	   during	   occupation.	   Since	   their	   government	  was	   not	  
part	  of	  the	  occupying	  coalition	  and	  largely	  did	  not	  want	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  
it,	  the	  diaspora	  had	  no	  access	  to	  positions	  of	  power	  inside	  the	  country	  during	  
this	   time.	   As	   a	   consequence	   of	   this	   reality,	   the	   diaspora	   involved	   itself	   in	  
mobilising	   towards	   state-­‐building	   through	   bottom-­‐up	   approaches,	   mainly	  
through	   grass-­‐roots	   organisation,	   through	   their	   own	   efforts	   and	   with	   the	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Swedish	   Foreign	   Ministry,	   whose	   foreign	   policy	   towards	   Iraq	   was	   oriented	  
towards	  development	  and	  helping	  to	  re-­‐build	  the	  country.	  	  
	  
Following	   Iraq’s	   first	   elections	   in	   2005,	   however	   and	   once	   an	   ethno-­‐sectarian	  
system	   was	   effectively	   institutionalised	   in	   Iraq,	   Iraq’s	   internal	   state-­‐building	  
phase	  was	  affected	  by	  a	  different	  dynamic.	  The	  profiles	  of	  individuals	  mattered	  
little	   unless	   they	   were	   connected	   and	   supported	   the	   state-­‐building	   plans	   of	  
ethno-­‐sectarian	  ruling	  parties	   in	   Iraq.	  Those	   in	   the	  diaspora	  connected	  to	   the	  
largely	  Shi’a	  Islamic	  or	  Kurdish	  ruling	  parties	  were	  able	  to	  join	  in	  state-­‐building	  
processes	   related	   to	   both	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance,	   and	   through	  
civil	  society	  directly	  and	  from	  afar.	  Meanwhile	  those	  not	  linked	  to	  Iraq’s	  ruling	  
elites	   were	   excluded	   from	   positions	   of	   power	   and	   from	   participating	   in	  
institution-­‐building	  and	  governance	  but	  directed	  towards	  challenging	  the	  state	  
through	   civil	   society,	   acting	   as	   a	   transnational	   civil	   society.	   By	   holding	   the	  
government	   to	   account,	   protesting	   in	   solidarity	   with	   organisations	   in	   Iraq,	  
defending	  and	  championing	  minority,	  women,	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  Iraq,	  they	  
have	   also	   been	   attempting	   to	   shift	   Iraq’s	   state-­‐building	   project	   towards	  more	  
democratic	  means	  as	  will	  be	  shown.	  	  
	  
Setting	  the	  Scene	  -­‐	  Background	  to	  the	  2003	  Intervention	  of	  Iraq	  	  
The	  prelude	  to	  the	  military	  intervention	  against	  Iraq	  can	  be	  traced	  as	  far	  back	  
as	   the	   early	   1990s	   following	   the	   first	   Gulf	   War,	   when	   the	   International	  
community	  decided	  it	  could	  no	  longer	  ignore	  the	  brutality	  of	  Saddam’s	  Baathist	  
regime.	  Records	  of	  his	  human	  rights	  abuses	  began	  to	  emerge	  publicly	  both	  in	  
Whitehall	   and	  Washington	   and	   foreign	   policy	   towards	   the	   country	   began	   to	  
shift.	  Yet	  it	  was	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  UN	  sanctions	  regime,	  placed	  on	  the	  country	  
in	  1991,	  to	  curb	  Saddam	  Hussein’s	  ability	  to	  build	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction,	  
which	   eventually	   tipped	   things	   over	   the	   edge.	   For	   the	  United	   States	   the	  only	  
solution	  to	  the	   ‘problem	  of	  Iraq’	  was	  to	  overthrow	  the	  regime	  and	  re-­‐instate	  a	  
more	  friendly,	  pro-­‐US	  government	  into	  the	  world	  order	  (Tripp,	  2007).	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The	   culmination	   of	   this	   was	   the	   1998	   Iraq	   Liberation	   Act,	   whose	   explicit	  
purpose	  was	  the	  over	  throw	  of	  the	  Baathist	  regime.	  The	  act	  stated,	  “It	  should	  be	  
the	  policy	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  support	  efforts	  to	  remove	  the	  regime	  headed	  
by	   Saddam	  Hussein	   from	   power	   in	   Iraq	   and	   to	   promote	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	  
democratic	   government	   to	   replace	   that	   regime.”(cited	   in	   Allawi,	   2007,	   p.62)	  
This	  document	  effectively	  provided	  justification	  for	  regime	  change	  in	  Iraq	  and	  
set	  forth	  a	  programme	  towards	  military	  intervention	  and	  the	  ousting	  of	  Saddam	  
Hussein	  from	  power.	  	  
	  
In	  2001,	  under	  the	  new	  presidency	  and	  administration	  of	  George	  W	  Bush,	  many	  
neo-­‐conservatives	   in	   Washington	   saw	   an	   opportunity	   to	   push	   for	   a	   more	  
aggressive	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  Iraq	  in	  reaction	  to	  failed	  attempts	  by	  the	  UN	  
to	  tighten	  the	  sanctions	  regime	  and	  get	  weapons	  inspectors	  back	  in	  the	  country	  
(Tripp,	   2007).	   This	   line	   of	   policy	   was	   precipitated	   following	   the	   Al	   -­‐Qaida	  
September	   11	   attacks,	  which	   shook	  US	   policy	  makers,	   dealing	   a	   hand	   to	   neo-­‐
conservatives,	   Paul	  Wolfowitz,	   Richard	   Perle,	   Donald	   Rumsfeld	   and	   Douglas	  
Feith,	  who	  had	  been	  championing	  a	  strategy	  to	  intervene	  in	  Iraq	  since	  the	  late	  
1990s	  (Bonin,	  2011)	  .	  Under	  a	  climate	  of	  fear	  and	  insecurity,	  states	  perceived	  to	  
be	  a	  threat	  to	  US	  interests	  were	  targeted	  as	  part	  of	  the	  ‘War	  on	  Terror’.	  For	  Iraq,	  
this	  meant	  a	  refocus	  on	  its	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  programme.	  The	  neo-­‐
conservatives	   in	  Capitol	  Hill	  attempted	  to	   link	   Iraq	   to	  Al-­‐Qaida	  claiming	  that	  
Iraq	  had	  sponsored	  Islamic	  terrorism	  (Ismael	  and	  Ismael,	  2015).	  	  
	  
The	  obsession	  with	  Iraq	  only	  intensified	  following	  the	  9/11	  attacks	  and	  as	  early	  
as	   December	   2001	   plans	   were	   being	   drawn	   up	   in	   the	   Pentagon	   for	   regime	  
change	  (Tripp,	  2007;	  Ismael	  and	  Ismael,	  2015).	  Plans	  slowly	  turned	  into	  reality	  
as	  Saddam	  was	  proving	   to	  be	  deliberately	  uncooperative	  with	  United	  Nations	  
Monitoring,	  Verification	  and	  Inspection	  Commission	  (UNMOVIC).	  Meanwhile,	  
the	   UK	   government	   grossly	   overstated	   Iraq’s	   WMD	   capabilities	   (The	   Iraq	  
Inquiry,	  2016),	  while	  Dr	  Hans	  Blix,	  the	  Head	  of	  the	  UN	  Inspection	  team	  ahead	  
of	  the	  invasion	  stated	  that	  Tony	  Blair	  had	  ‘misrepresented’	  what	  they	  found	  to	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push	   the	   case	   for	   war	   (Oborne,	   2015).	   	   In	   a	   Joint	   Intelligence	   Committee	  
assessment	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  draft	  stated:	  
Iraq	   has	   probably	   dispersed	   its	   special	   weapons,	  
including	   its	   CBW	   [chemical	   and	   biological	   warfare]	  
weapons.	   Intelligence	   also	   indicates	   that	   from	   forward-­‐
deployed	   storage	   sites,	   chemical	   and	   biological	  
munitions	   could	   be	   with	   military	   units	   and	   ready	   for	  
firing	   within	   45	   minutes.	   (‘Timeline:	   the	   45	   minute	  
claim’,	  2004)	  
	  
Saddam,	  however,	  did	  not	  possess	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  nor	  had	  plans	  
for	  their	  re-­‐production.	  	  
	  
The	  UK	  and	  US	  had,	  however,	  made	  their	  minds	  up	  and	  were	  joined	  by	  other	  
coalition	  partners	   including	  Australia,	   Italy,	  Spain,	  and	  Poland.	  By	  early	  2003,	  
troops	  were	  stationed	   in	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  and	  elsewhere.	   It	  was	  clear	   that	   the	  
US	   led	  coalition	  was	  no	   longer	   interested	   in	  diplomacy	  with	  Saddam	  Hussein	  
despite	   the	   final	   reports	   from	   UNMOVIC	   and	   International	   Atomic	   Energy	  
Authority	   (IAEA)	   stating	   that	   Iraqis	   had	   cooperated	   and	   that	   there	   were	   no	  
signs	  or	  evidence	  of	  prohibited	  weapons	  (Tripp,	  2007).	  	  
	  
On	   March	   19th	   2003,	   the	   US-­‐led	   coalition	   invaded	   Iraq	   after	   giving	   Saddam	  
Hussein	  an	  ultimatum	  to	  leave	  on	  the	  17th	  of	  March,	  which	  he	  refused.	  Therein	  
commenced	  “Operation	  Iraqi	  Freedom”	  with	  aerial	  bombardments,	  followed	  by	  
troops	  on	  the	  ground	  who	  fought	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  and	  Saddam’s	  notorious	  
Fedayeen	  paramilitary	   forces	   (Allawi,	  2007).	  Within	  three	  weeks	  however,	   the	  
US	  and	  its	  allies	  had	  captured	  Baghdad,	  Basra,	  Kirkuk	  and	  Mosul	  and	  became	  
the	  occupiers	  of	  Iraq.	  	  	  
Since	   2003	   there	   have	   been	   a	   plethora	   of	   academic,	   media	   and	   official	   texts	  
denouncing	   the	   intervention	  of	   Iraq	  as	   a	   failure	   citing	  a	  multitude	  of	   reasons	  
including	  a	  lack	  of	  post-­‐war	  planning,	  insufficient	  resources	  and	  troops	  on	  the	  
12	  	   	  
ground,	   imperial	   ambitions	   and	   lack	  of	   true	  will,	   a	   lack	  understanding	  of	   the	  
society	  and	  politics	  of	  Iraq	  as	  well	  as	  a	  tragic	  post-­‐intervention	  policies	  (Lake,	  
2010;	  Chesterman,	  2004;	  Chandler	  and	  Sisk,	  2013;	  Diamond,	  2006;	  Herring	  and	  
Rangwala,	   2006;	   Ismael	   and	   Ismael,	   2015;	   Allawi,	   2007;	   Packer,	   2003;	   Dodge,	  
2006,	  2003;	  War	  and	  Occupation	  in	  Iraq,	  2007;	  Luckham,	  2004)1.	  	  
There	   have	   also	   been	   critical	   voices	   from	   global	   civil	   society	   with	   protest	  
marches	  against	  the	  war	  held	  all	  over	  the	  world	  on	  15	  February	  2003,	  and	  whose	  
impact	  has	  been	  captured	  by	  Amir	  Amirani’s	  captivating	  documentary	  film	  ‘We	  
are	  many’2.	  	  Kofi	  Annan,	  the	  UN	  General	  Secretary,	  who	  stated	  that	  it	  was	  “not	  
in	  conformity	  with	  the	  UN	  charter,	  also	  denounced	  the	  war	  as	  illegal.	  From	  our	  
point	  of	  view,	   from	  the	  charter	  point	  of	  view,	   it	  was	   illegal."	   (‘Iraq	  war	   illegal,	  
says	  Annan’,	  2004).	  	  More	  recently	  the	  long-­‐awaited	  Iraq	  Inquiry	  in	  the	  UK,	  led	  
by	   Sir	   John	   Chilcot	   provided	   damning	   evidence	   against	   the	   Iraq	   war.	   The	  
Inquiry’s	   ultimate	   conclusion	  was	   that	   “the	  UK	   chose	   to	   join	   the	   invasion	   of	  
Iraq	  before	  the	  peaceful	  options	  for	  disarmament	  had	  been	  exhausted.	  Military	  
action	  at	  that	  time	  was	  not	  a	  last	  resort.”	  (The	  Iraq	  Inquiry,	  2016).	  
Unpacking	   the	   failures	   of	   intervention	   in	   Iraq	   however	   is	   not	   the	   focus	   or	  
within	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  research.	  However,	  what	  is	  important	  at	  this	  point	  is	  to	  
understand	  the	  context	  from	  which	  Iraq’s	  state-­‐building	  future	  commenced	  so	  
that	  we	  can	  better	  place	  diaspora’s	  political	  engagement	  towards	  this	  process.	  	  
	  
The	  Contribution	  of	  my	  Study	  
The	  goal	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  provide	  new	  empirical	  knowledge	  of	  how	  Iraqis	   in	  
the	   UK	   and	   Swedish	   diaspora	   have	   informed	   part	   of	   Iraq’s	   state-­‐building	  
process	   and	   how	   this	   has	   been	   approached	   through	   different	   arenas	   of	   the	  
state.	   Through	   the	   case	   studies	   of	   the	   UK	   and	   Swedish	   diasporas	   and	   their	  
comparative	   analysis	   it	   also	   provides	   theoretical	   explanations	   for	   variation	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  There	  is	  a	  vast	  literature	  on	  the	  failures	  of	  state-­‐building	  in	  Iraq.	  The	  references	  quoted	  here	  
2	  ‘We	  are	  Many’	  was	  released	  in	  2014	  http://wearemany.com	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the	   ways	   that	   diasporas	   from	   the	   same	   country	   of	   origin	   have	   contributed	  
towards	  state-­‐building	  processes	  over	  time.	  
	  
While	   the	  state-­‐building	   literature	   is	  dominated	  by	  the	  actions	  and	  rationales	  
of	   state	   interventions,	   this	   thesis	   shows	   that	   the	   actions	   of	   diaspora	   in	   state-­‐
building	  processes	  have	  been	  much	  neglected	  in	  academic	  analyses.	  Non-­‐state	  
actors,	  like	  diaspora,	  are	  also	  shaping	  state-­‐building	  practices	  and	  processes	  in	  
intervention	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  settings.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	   a	   new	   two-­‐category	   operationalization	   of	   state-­‐building	   is	  
developed	   in	   this	   study,	   which	   advances	   the	   state-­‐building	   literature	   by	  
drawing	   attention	   to	   a	  much	   overlooked	   dimension	   of	   state-­‐building,	   that	   of	  
civil	   society.	  This	  underlines	  how	   state-­‐building	   is	   formed	  not	   solely	   through	  
top-­‐down	   approaches	   of	   institution-­‐building,	   but	   also	   that	   of	   bottom-­‐up	  
approaches	  of	  participatory	  politics	  that	  encourage	  more	  democratic	  practices.	  
This	   two-­‐category	   operationalization	   of	   the	   definition	   is	   beneficial	   for	  
capturing	   the	   state-­‐building	  contributions	  and	   transnational	   links	  of	  different	  
groups	   and	   individuals	  who	   are	   connected	   to	   varying	   social	   fields	   in	   sending	  
and	   receiving	   states.	   Ordinary	   citizens	   through	   their	   transnational	   links	   and	  
networks	  are	  also	  driving	  the	  politics	  of	  state	  formation.	  	  	  
	  
With	  regards	  to	  the	  diaspora	  literature,	  this	  thesis	  advances	  our	  understanding	  
of	  diasporic	  actors	  and	  how	  their	  political	  actions	  are	  shaped	  by	  both	  structural	  
and	   agent	   based	   factors.	   Indeed,	   beyond	   understanding	   who	   mobilises,	   how	  
and	  for	  what	  reasons,	  this	  thesis	  emphasises	  how	  diasporic	  political	  choices	  are	  
shaped.	  While	  the	  diaspora	  studies	   literature	  has	  emphasised	  hostland	  factors	  
such	   as	   citizenship	   and	   integration	   regimes	   (Koopmans	   and	   Statham,	   2001;	  
Odmalm,	   2009;	   Wayland,	   2004;	   Van	   Houte	   et	   al.,	   2013)	   	   or	   foreign	   policy	  
alignments	   between	   diaspora	   and	   hostland	   policy	   makers	   (Rubenzer,	   2008;	  
Haney	  and	  Vanderbush,	  1999;	  Mearsheimer	  and	  Walt,	  2008)	  	  it	  has	  overlooked	  
how	   the	   profile	   of	   diaspora	   is	   a	   factor	   in	   and	   of	   itself	   that	   can	   shape	   how	  
14	  	   	  
diaspora	   mobilise	   and	   the	   transnational	   links	   that	   they	   have	   with	   their	  
countries	  of	  origin.	  	  
	  
Similarly,	   more	   neglected	   still	   is	   the	   homeland-­‐diaspora	   relationship	   where	  
diaspora	  groups	  and	  individuals	  are	  positioned	  unevenly	  in	  homelands	  that	  are	  
ethnically,	  religiously	  or	  tribally	  divided.	  While	  some	  are	  privileged,	  others	  may	  
be	   excluded	   from	   political	   representation.	   These	   realities	   may	   lead	   to	  
disengagement	  or	  diversion	  into	  other	  forms	  of	  politics	  that	  may	  be	  peaceful	  or	  
extremist	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Islamic	  State	  of	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Levant	  (ISIL).	  Diaspora’s	  
transnational	  links	  to	  the	  homeland	  is	  thus	  explored	  in	  depth	  in	  this	  study,	  and	  
raises	   important	   theoretical	   implications	   for	   the	   type	   of	   politics	   they	  become	  
involved	  in,	  and	  why	  there	  may	  be	  differences	  even	  within	  the	  same	  diasporic	  
community.	  Diaspora	  may	  be	  inhibited	  from	  mobilising	  in	  the	  homeland	  if	  they	  
are	   a	   marginalised	   community,	   or	   if	   they	   are	   a	   political,	   ethnic	   or	   sexual	  
minority	   that	   is	  not	  considered	  or	  accepted	  as	   forming	  part	  of	   the	  nation.	  As	  
such,	   understanding	   diaspora	   politics	   requires	   us	   to	   look	   closer	   at	   who	   is	  
mobilising	  but	  also	  who	  is	  not	  and	  why.	  
	  
For	   the	   broader	   discipline	   of	   political	   science	   this	   thesis	   also	   provides	   an	  
interesting	   case	   study	   of	   the	  ways	   that	   power	   is	   constituted	   among	   diaspora	  
groups	  and	  how	  this	  has	  affected	  politics	  in	  Iraq.	  Simultaneously	  it	  shows	  how	  
even	  those	  who	  are	  limited	  in	  their	  power	  or	  constrained	  by	  their	  positionality	  
can	   still	   find	  alternative	  avenues	   that	  are	   shaping	  domestic	   and	   transnational	  
politics.	   Political	   power,	   as	   this	   thesis	   demonstrates,	   is	   hierarchical,	   but	   not	  
limited	   to	   the	   purview	   of	   states,	   and	   is	   also	   derived	   from	   people	   and	   their	  
collective	  actions.	  Simultaneously	  it	  also	  shows	  how	  long-­‐distance	  nationalists,	  
who	   can	   simultaneously	   entrench	   ethnic	   and	   sectarian	   divisions	   or	   challenge	  
them,	  are	  also	  shaping	  weak	  states.	  	  
	  
	  
Structure	  of	  the	  Research	  	  
The	  study	  is	  structured	  as	  follows:	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In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  define	  the	  concept	  of	  diaspora,	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
After	   exploring	   its	   historical	   use	   in	   the	   literature	   and	   more	   modern	  
understandings	   of	   diaspora,	   I	   stress	   why	   it	   is	   important	   to	   consider	   the	  
imaginations	  of	  diaspora	   for	  understanding	   their	  political	  actions	  and	  stances	  
towards	   their	   homelands.	   I	   then	   discuss	   the	   optic	   of	   transnationalism,	   the	  
process	  that	  connects	  diaspora	  in	  hostlands	  to	  their	  countries	  of	  origin,	  with	  a	  
particular	  focus	  on	  political	  transnationalism	  and	  how	  it	  is	  being	  shaped	  and	  is	  
shaping	   state	   policies.	   In	   the	   section	   that	   followed	   I	   discuss	   diaspora	  
mobilisation	  past	  and	  present	  drawing	  attention	  to	  how	  this	  topic	  has	  thus	  far	  
been	  approached	  in	  the	  diaspora	  politics	   literature.	  This	   is	  then	  followed	  by	  a	  
definition	  of	  diaspora	  mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐building	  where	  I	  draw	  on	  the	  state-­‐
building	   and	   civil	   society	   literature	   to	   emphasise	   the	   two	   necessary	  
components	   of	   building	   states	   in	   our	  modern	   times;	   institution-­‐building	   and	  
governance	  as	  well	  as	  state	  support	  and	  contestation	  through	  civil	  society.	  	  
	  
In	  Chapter	   3,	   I	   survey	   the	   diaspora	   politics	   literature,	   for	   how	   it	   has	   thus	   far	  
approached	   the	   study	  of	  diaspora	  mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐building.	   I	   show	   that	  
analyses	   of	   state-­‐building	   have	   predominantly	   approached	   through	   the	  
concepts	  of	  peace-­‐building	  and	  development.	  Through	  this	  body	  of	  work	  I	  draw	  
attention	   to	   the	   ways	   that	   diaspora	   have	   also	   contributed	   to	   state-­‐building	  
processes,	  though	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  lack	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  definition	  or	  study	  of	  
diaspora	   mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐building	   in	   the	   literature,	   a	   gap	   this	   study	  
addresses.	   I	   later	  draw	  on	  the	   limited	  diaspora	   literature,	  but	  also	  extrapolate	  
from	  the	  case	  of	  Iraq;	  to	  both	  inductively	  and	  deductively	  draw	  out	  explanatory	  
factors	  that	  may	  elucidate	  this	  study’s	  research	  puzzle	  for	  why	  the	  two	  diaspora	  
case	  studies	  might	  have	  contributed	  to	  state-­‐building	   in	  different	  ways.	  Using	  
the	  two-­‐tier	  state-­‐building	  category	  proposed	  I	  put	  forward	  my	  hypotheses	  for	  
why	  there	  were	  divergences	  in	  the	  way	  the	  two	  diaspora	  case	  studies	  engaged	  in	  
state-­‐building	   in	   Iraq.	   These	   include,	   the	   profile	   of	   the	   diaspora,	   the	   foreign	  
policy	  of	  the	  hostland	  towards	  the	  homeland	  and	  the	   links	  to	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  
homeland	  political	  parties.	   	  Finally	   I	  define	  my	   independent	  variables	   for	   this	  
study.	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In	  Chapter	  4,	  I	  discuss	  the	  methodology	  used	  to	  carry	  out	  my	  investigation.	  	  I	  
discuss	   the	  comparative	  method	  and	  why	   it	   is	   fitting	   for	  my	  research	  and	  the	  
particular	   comparative	   model	   I	   use	   to	   investigate	   variation	   in	   outcomes	  
between	  the	  two	  cases.	  I	  outline	  why	  the	  cases	  were	  selected	  for	  this	  study,	  the	  
qualitative	   method	   used	   for	   gathering	   the	   data,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   coding	   and	  
process	   tracing	  method	   used	   for	   analysing	   and	   uncovering	   the	   variables	   that	  
mattered	   over	   time.	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	   also	   discuss	   ethics	   of	   carrying	   out	   this	  
investigation.	   I	   also	   reflect	   on	  my	  positionality	   as	   a	   researcher	   of	   Iraqi	   origin	  
conducting	   research	   with	   Iraqis	   in	   the	   diaspora	   and	   how	   this	   affected	   my	  
research	  and	  findings.	  	  
	  
In	  Chapters	   5	   and	   6,	   I	   analyse	   the	   empirical	   findings	   of	   the	  UK	   and	   Swedish	  
diaspora	   case	   studies	   respectively	   during	   the	   period	   2003	   to	   2013.	   As	   part	   of	  
telling	   the	   story	   of	   the	   two	   case	   studies	   I	   relate	   the	   migrations	   of	   the	   two	  
communities	  and	  their	  reasons	  for	  leaving	  Iraq.	  	  Whereas	  the	  Iraqis	  in	  the	  UK	  
were	  an	  older	  diaspora	  whose	  migrations	  commenced	  in	  the	  1950s,	  the	  Swedish	  
Iraqi	  diaspora	  had	  a	  much	  later	  genesis	   in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s.	  While	  the	  UK	  
migrations	  included	  wealthy,	  middle	  class	  individuals	  from	  prominent	  families	  
in	  Iraq	  who	  were	  able	  to	  leave	  voluntarily,	  the	  latter	  were	  largely	  refugees	  who	  
escaped	  persecution	  or	  escaped	  to	  find	  a	  better	  life	  for	  their	  families.	   	  The	  in-­‐
depth	   case	   studies	   show	   that	   the	   profiles	   of	   Iraqis	   in	   both	   contexts	   affected	  
both	   their	   relationships	   to	   their	   countries	   of	   origin,	   their	   connections	   and	  
consequently	   what	   they	   were	   able	   to	   contribute	   back	   to	   their	   countries	   of	  
origin.	   The	   transnational	   social	   fields	   they	   encompassed	   varied	   significantly,	  
which	  affected	  the	  politics	  they	  could	  contribute	  to	  after	  intervention.	  	  
	  
The	  case	  studies	  also	  reveal	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  hostland	  
towards	   the	   homeland	   during	   the	   intervention	   and	   occupation	   phase.	   In	   the	  
case	  of	  intervention	  in	  Iraq	  it	  proves	  to	  be	  an	  important	  variable	  that	  affected	  
the	   type	  of	   state-­‐building	   in	  which	   they	  could	   involve	   themselves.	  Given	   that	  
the	   UK	   was	   involved	   militarily	   and	   formed	   part	   of	   the	   Coalition	   Provisional	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Authority	   (CPA)	   alongside	   the	   Americans,	   the	   UK	   diaspora	   had	   more	  
opportunities	  both	  prior	  and	  during	   intervention	  to	   involve	  themselves	   in	  the	  
future	   state-­‐building	   process.	   This	   opened	   up	   further	   opportunities	   for	   the	  
diaspora	   as	   friends,	   party	  members	   and	   transnational	   networks	   created	  more	  
opportunities	   to	   recruit	   from	   the	  diaspora	   as	   the	  political	   process	  proceeded.	  	  
Meanwhile	  in	  Sweden,	  the	  government	  opposed	  the	  war	  and	  did	  not	  want	  to	  be	  
involved	  with	  the	  CPA,	  which	  meant	  that	  the	  diaspora	  was	  limited	  during	  this	  
period	  and	  could	  only	   involve	   itself	   in	   the	   state-­‐building	  process	  once	   formal	  
sovereignty	   was	   handed	   back	   to	   the	   Iraqis.	   Later,	   Sweden’s	   foreign	   policy	  
towards	   Iraq	   was	   oriented	   towards	   development	   and	   democracy	   building,	  
which	  directed	  diaspora’s	  state-­‐building	  towards	  grass-­‐roots	  organisations.	  	  
	  
In	   the	  period	   following	   Iraq’s	   first	   democratic	   elections,	  however,	   the	   type	  of	  
state-­‐building	  that	  diaspora	  could	  engage	  in	  was	  very	  much	  dependent	  on	  their	  
links	  to	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  parties	   in	  Iraq.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	   formal	  occupation	  
once	  Iraqis	  took	  hold	  of	  power,	  and	  an	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  system	  was	  put	  in	  place,	  
only	  those	  connected	  to	  the	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  political	  parties	   in	  Iraq	  were	  able	  
to	   contribute	   to	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance,	   while	   those	   excluded	  
from	   power	   or	   representation	   were	   driven	   towards	   challenging	   the	   state	  
through	  civil	  society.	  	  
	  
In	  Chapter	  7,	  which	  is	  the	  concluding	  chapter,	  I	  summarise	  the	  findings	  of	  my	  
research	  by	  exploring	  how	  the	  hypotheses	  proposed	  affected	  the	  state-­‐building	  
contributions	  of	  the	  UK	  and	  Swedish	  Iraqi	  diaspora.	  In	  discussing	  the	  findings,	  
I	   outline	   their	   theoretical	   contributions	   to	   the	   development	   of	   the	   study	   of	  
diaspora	   and	   political	   transnationalism,	   state-­‐building,	   and	   political	   science	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CHAPTER	  2-­‐	  CONCEPTS	  
	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  define	  how	  I	  use	  the	  concept	  of	  diaspora,	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  
this	   thesis,	   as	   well	   as	   draw	   attention	   to	   the	   optic	   of	   transnationalism	   for	  
understanding	   their	   cross-­‐border	   connections.	   This	   is	   then	   followed	   by	   a	  
discussion	   of	   diaspora	   mobilisation,	   before	   a	   definition	   of	   the	   dependent	  
variable	   of	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐building	   is	   drawn	   from	   the	   state-­‐
building	   and	   civil	   society	   literature	   that	   operationally	   captures	   the	   two	  
categories	  associated	  with	  building	  a	  state.	  	  
	  
Diaspora,	  Diaspora	  wherefore	  art	  thou	  diaspora?	  
What	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  diaspora	  and	  a	  refugee?	  Are	  diaspora	  created	  
by	   dispersal	   from	   a	   territorial	   homeland	   or	   are	   they	   socially	   constructed	  
entities?	   The	   concept	   of	   diaspora	   remains	   a	   heavily	   debated	   subject	   in	   the	  
diaspora	  literature.	  Definitions	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  diaspora	  are	  so	  contested	  
and	  conflated	  with	  other	  migrant	  groups	  that	  Rainer	  Bauböck	  has	  declared	  the	  
concept	   “notoriously	   vague	   and	   overstretched.”(Bauböck,	   2010:	   313).	   Defining	  
the	  concept	  of	  diaspora	  is	  therefore	  crucial	  for	  clarifying	  and	  limiting	  the	  scope	  
of	  this	  research.	  	  
	  
It	   is	   not	   hard	   to	   see	   why	   Bauböck	   has	   been	   frustrated	   by	   the	   definitional	  
dilution	   that	   the	  concept	  of	  diaspora	  has	  been	  subjected	   to.	  Since	   its	  popular	  
emergence	   over	   two	   decades	   ago,	   the	   concept	   has	   been	   defined	   and	   used	   in	  
countless	   ways	   to	   describe	   virtually	   any	   “population	   which	   is	   considered	  
‘deterritorialized’	  or	  ‘transnational’”.	  (Vertovec	  1999:	  277).	  	  Nearly	  two	  decades	  
ago	  scholars	  attempted	  to	  delineate	  who	  constitutes	  a	  diaspora	  by	   identifying	  
and	   listing	   common	   attributes	   of	   classical	   diasporas,	   stressing	   their	   ethnic	  
collectivities	  and	  myth	  of	   return	   to	   the	  homeland.	  Meanwhile,	  others	   created	  
diaspora	   typologies	   such	   as	   victim,	   labour,	   trade,	   imperial	   and	   cultural	  
diaspora,	  depicting	  the	  initial	  reason	  for	  their	  migrations	  (Cohen	  1997).	  Others	  
still	   have	   focused	   on	   ethno-­‐national	   diasporas	   and	   how	   they	   differ	   to	   other	  
transnational	  groupings	  (Sheffer,	  2003).	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While	   these	   broad	   typologies	   have	   been	   useful	   for	   our	   understanding	   of	  
diaspora	   histories,	   they	   have	   failed	   to	   capture	   the	   complexity	   and	   reality	   of	  
contemporary	   diaspora.	   Firstly,	   speaking	   of	   diaspora	   in	   this	  way	   essentialises	  
migrant	   groups’	   ethnic	   identities	   depicting	   them	   as	   unified	   groups	   with	   a	  
common	   and	   shared	   identity	   (Brubaker,	   2005).	   Secondly,	   not	   all	   diaspora	  
migrations	  have	  necessarily	  been	   rooted	   in	  dispersal.	  Diaspora	   can	  emerge	  as	  
much	   from	   labour	   migrants	   such	   as	   the	   Kashmiri	   community	   in	   the	   UK	   or	  
refugees	   from	   Eritrea	   or	   Bosnia	   (Al-­‐Ali	   and	   Koser,	   2002).	   Thirdly,	   not	   all	  
diaspora	   are	   marked	   by	   a	   real	   desire	   to	   return	   to	   the	   homeland.	   For	   some	  
diaspora	  this	   is	  neither	  possible	  nor	  sought	  (Clifford,	   1994),	  while	  for	  others	  a	  
cultural	  identification	  with	  the	  homeland	  is	  enough	  (Brah,	  1996).	  	  
This	   older	   and	   now	   much	   critiqued	   essentialist	   literature	   on	   diaspora	   often	  
depicted	  diaspora	  identities	  as	  fixed,	  homogenous	  and	  continuous	  rather	  than	  
susceptible	  to	  change	  and	  multiplicity.	  Indeed,	  objectively	  and	  discursively	  we	  
may	  talk	  of	  a	  “diaspora”,	  yet	  to	  what	  extent	  do	  fractions	  of	  any	  community	  see	  
themselves	  as	  belonging	  to	  one,	  and	  under	  which	  conditions?	  	  
In	   response	   to	   this	   archaic	   essentialist	   view	   of	   diaspora,	   Rogers	   Brubaker’s	  
memorable	   piece	   on	   the	   “Diaspora”	   Diaspora”	   challenges	   the	   diaspora	  
literature’s	   emphasis	   on	   diaspora	   qualities,	   namely	   dispersal,	   homeland-­‐
orientation	  and	  boundary	  maintenance	  (Brubaker	  2005).	  Through	  appraisal	  of	  
these	   three	   categorises	   Brubaker	   problematizes	   issues	   related	   to	   distinctions	  
between	  dispersal	  and	  division,	  the	  pertinence	  of	  a	  teleology	  of	  return	  and	  the	  
conflicting	   literature	   that	   emphasises	   boundary	   maintenance	   while	  
simultaneously	   extolling	   hybridity	   and	   heterogeneity.	   In	   this	   way	   Brubaker	  
exposes	  the	  analytical	  traps	  of	  classifying	  diaspora	  in	  fixed	  terms	  that	  often	  do	  
not	   capture	   their	   reality.	   While	   the	   literature	   often	   talks	   about	   a	   diasporic	  
community,	   it	   is	   argued	   here	   that	   there	   is	   no	   such	   thing.	   There	   are	  
heterogeneous	  voices,	  identifications	  and	  senses	  of	  belonging	  that	  lead	  to	  what	  
Brubaker	   convincingly	   argues	  we	   should	   term	   as	   diasporic	   “stances,	   projects,	  
claims,	  idioms,	  practices,	  and	  so	  on.”	  (2005:	  13).	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Understood	  in	  this	  way	  constructivists	  have	  supported	  Brubaker’s	  proposal	  that	  
diaspora	   are	   created	  when	  mobilisation	   towards	   a	   specific	   political	   stance	   or	  
goal	   occurs,	   and	   not	   from	   a	   presupposed	   bounded	   group.Fiona	   Adamson	  
(Adamson,	   2008)	   and	   Rainer	   Bauböck	   (Bauböck,	   2010)	   argue	   that	   far	   from	  
being	   “natural”,	   diasporas	   are	   discursively	   constructed	   and	   mobilised	   for	  
strategic	   outcomes.	   Lyons	   and	  Mandeville	   join	   Adamson’s	   assertion	   and	   add	  
that	   diaspora	   are	   the	   outcome	   of	   transnational	   political	   mobilisation	   by	   the	  
“activities	   of	   transnational	   political	   entrepreneurs	   engaged	   in	   strategic	   social	  
identity	   construction	   in	   order	   to	   influence	   politics	   in	   the	   homeland.”	   (Lyons	  
and	  Mandaville,	  2010:15).	  What	  these	  scholars	  have	  rightfully	  stressed	  is	  the	  act	  
of	  imagination	  and	  mobilisation	  for	  diaspora	  to	  come	  into	  existence	  (Bauböck	  
2010:	  315).	  As	  such,	  identity	  is	  not	  seen	  in	  primordialist	  ethnic	  terms	  but	  rather	  
it	   functions	   as	   a	   master	   frame	   in	   the	   same	   way	   that	   social	   movements	   are	  
created	  and	  from	  which	  mobilisation	  is	  shaped	  (Ibid.,	  2006).	  
By	   concentrating	   on	   their	   political	   mobilisation	   the	   constructivist	   shift	   has	  
allowed	  us	   to	  go	  beyond	  essentialist	   ideas	  about	   identity,	   that	  are	  rooted	   in	  a	  
territorially	  fixed	  place,	  to	  understanding	  how	  identity	  frames	  are	  constructed	  
by	  diaspora	  to	  propel	  action.	  By	  creating	  imaginations	  of	  community,	  senses	  of	  
belonging	   are	   strengthened	   to	   what	   Martin	   Sökefeld	   terms	   ‘an	   imagined	  
transnational	  community’,	  which	  then	  spurs	  action	  (Sökefeld,	  2006:	  267).	  The	  
important	   thing	   to	   stress	   here	   is	   that	   diaspora	   continue	   to	   see	   themselves	   as	  
forming	  part	  of	  the	  imagined	  community,	  even	  though	  each	  member	  may	  have	  
a	  very	  different	   imagination	  of	  what	   that	  community	  symbolises	  or	  means.	   In	  
mobilising	  towards	  their	   imagined	  community	  however,	  they	  can	  influence	  or	  
shape	   their	   homelands	   much	   like	   other	   societal	   domestic	   non-­‐state	   actors.	  
Consequently,	  diaspora	  not	  only	  view	  themselves	  as	  citizens	  who	  have	  a	  stake	  
in	   their	   homeland’s	   politics,	   but	   tangibly	   exercise	   their	   citizenship,	   whether	  
they	  are	  dual	  citizens	  or	  not,	  by	  influencing	  their	  homeland	  states	  and	  societies	  
through	  various	  means.	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This	   understanding	   of	   diaspora	   allows	   us	   to	   see	   the	   remaining	   gaps	   in	   the	  
literature,	  such	  as	   those	  tackled	   in	  this	   thesis,	   including	  comparative	  analyses	  
of	   diasporic	   stances	   under	   specific	   political	   circumstances	   such	   as	   foreign	  
intervention.	   How	   do	   diasporas	   contribute	   to	   state-­‐building	   processes?	   what	  
are	  the	  factors	  and	  contexts	  that	  shape	  their	  mobilisation	  practices	  and	  choices,	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  obstacles	  that	  diaspora	  face	  in	  achieving	  their	  goals?	  	  
	  
Conflict	  generated	  diaspora	  
Another	  defining	   feature	  of	   this	   thesis’s	  conception	  of	  diaspora	   is	   that	  related	  
to	   conflict-­‐generated	   diaspora,	   a	   particular	   sub-­‐group	   of	   diaspora	   whose	  
migration	   was	   instigated	   by	   conflict.	   In	   recent	   years	   there	   has	   been	   an	  
emphasis	  on	   the	  underlying	   forces	   that	  motivate	   the	  mobilisation	  of	   conflict-­‐
generated	  diasporas	  (Lyons,	  2006).	  Terrence	  Lyons	  has	  drawn	  attention	  to	  the	  
ways	  conflict	  shapes	  the	  identities	  of	  conflict-­‐generated	  diaspora,	  which	  in	  turn	  
motivate	  political	  action	  (Lyons,	  2007:532).	  Other	  scholars	  have	  supported	  this	  
thesis	   and	   found	   a	   strong	   relationship	   between	   conflict-­‐generated	   diasporas	  
and	  political	  transnational	  activities	  as	  opposed	  to	  economic	  migrants	  (Portes,	  
1999;	  Lyons,	  2007;	  Bloch,	  2008).	  Though	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  research	  
suggests	   there	   is	   a	   link	   between	   conflict	   as	   the	   instigator	   of	   migration	   and	  
diasporic	   political	   action,	   Nadje	   Al	   Ali’s	   work	   has	   drawn	   attention	   to	   the	  
gendered	   dynamics	   of	   this	   claim	   by	   offering	   a	  more	   nuanced	   examination	   of	  
how	  conflict	  can	  motivate	  or	  discourage	  political	  action	  in	  diaspora	  (N.	  Al-­‐Ali,	  
2007).	  	  
	  
These	  findings	  are	  pertinent	  for	  my	  study	  as	  many	  Iraqis	  in	  the	  diaspora	  faced	  
forced	   migration	   due	   to	   political	   reasons.	   These	   findings	   will	   be	   tested	  
empirically	   in	   this	   study	   but	   suggest	   that	   amongst	   the	  majority	   of	   politically	  
active	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   members	   one	   would	   expect	   to	   find	   many	   who	   left	   for	  
political	   or	   conflict	   reasons.	   Yet	   what	   this	   literature	   does	   not	   address	   is	   a	  
distinction	   between	   leaving	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   due	   to	   political	   conflict	   and	  
leaving	  due	  to	  political	  persecution	  on	  the	  other.	  Being	  personally	  persecuted	  
for	  political	  reasons	  in	  the	  homeland	  may	  generate	  emotional	  attachments	  of	  a	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very	  different	  scale	  and	  nature.	  This	  difference	  needs	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  if	  
we	   are	   truly	   to	   understand	   the	   link	   between	   motivations	   for	   migration	   and	  
political	   behaviour	   in	   the	   hostland.	   Furthermore,	   the	   concept	   of	   conflict-­‐
generated	  diaspora	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  problematized	  further	  when	  one	  considers	  
that	   even	   those	   individuals	   whose	   initial	   migrations	   were	   voluntary	   and	   not	  
forced	  may	  have	  later	  become	  a	  conflict-­‐generated	  diaspora	  due	  to	  an	  inability	  
to	   return	  due	   to	  conflict	   in	   their	  homelands	  or	   in	  depth	  conflict	   socialisation	  
(Koinova,	  2013).	  This	   study	   thus	  hopes	   to	  elaborate	  on	   the	  dynamics	  between	  
conflict-­‐generated	   diaspora	   amongst	   the	   Iraqi	   communities	   of	   the	   UK	   and	  
Sweden	  and	  their	  mobilisation	  towards	  Iraq.	  	  
	  
Defining	  diaspora	  in	  this	  study	  
This	   study	   can	   now	   define	   diaspora	   as	   conflict-­‐generated	   individuals	   and	  
groups	   who	   continue	   to	   see	   themselves	   as	   belonging	   to	   an	   ‘imagined	  
transnational	   community’	   and	   who	   are	   mobilised	   politically	   through	   various	  	  
“stances,	  projects,	   claims,	   idioms,	  practices,”	   (Brubaker,	   2005,	  p.13)	   to	  defend,	  
change	  or	  challenge	  domestic	  politics	  in	  the	  ‘homeland’.	  
	  
What	  does	  this	  understanding	  of	  diaspora	  offer	  the	  study	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  
and	  its	  mobilisation?	  In	  understanding	  the	  constructed	  nature	  of	  diaspora	  and	  
how	   this	   is	   tied	   to	   heterogeneous	   imaginations	   of	   community	   and	   senses	   of	  
belonging	  to	  the	  homeland,	  the	  process	  of	  diaspora’s	  political	  construction	  can	  
then	   be	   examined	   empirically	   for	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   “stances,	  
projects,	   claims,	   idioms,	   practices,”	   of	   particular	   individuals	   and	   groups	  
(Brubaker,	   2005).	   It	   also	   allows	   us	   to	   observe	   how	   diaspora	   are	   shaping	  
homeland	  states;	  whether	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  challenge	  the	  state	  (Koinova,	  2013;	  
Alinia	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Natali,	  2007;	  Wayland,	  2004);	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  homeland	  
state	  (Haney	  and	  Vanderbush,	  1999;	  Rytz,	  2013;	  Vanderbush,	  2009;	  Shain,	  1999,	  
1994;	   Shain	   and	   Barth,	   2003;	   Shain,	   2007;	   Mearsheimer	   and	  Walt,	   2008);	   or	  
perhaps	   support	   or	   defend	   minorities	   from	   discrimination	   in	   the	   homeland	  
state	   (Adamson	   and	   Demetriou,	   2007;	   Alinia	   et	   al.,	   2014;	   Baser,	   2012;	   Doraï,	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2002a;	   Feyissa,	   2014).	   In	   other	  words,	   diaspora’s	  material	   stances	   and	   actions	  
influence	   state	   formation	   and	   development	   because	   they	   are	   also	   non-­‐state	  
transnational	   actors	   that	   have	   the	   power	   to	   contest,	   challenge,	   support	   or	  
inform	  homeland	  states	  and	  societies.	  	  
	  
Transnationalism	  	  
This	   thesis	  uses	   the	   concept	  of	   transnationalism	   for	  understanding	   the	   cross-­‐
border	  political	   linkages	  that	  diaspora	  maintain	  with	  their	  countries	  of	  origin.	  	  
Transnationalism	   offers	   an	   optic	   or	   a	   lens	   for	   viewing	   diaspora	   mobilisation	  
(Faist,	  2004)	  and	  for	  appreciating	  how	  nation	  state	  contexts	  shape	  mobilisation	  
practices.	  	  
In	  the	  last	  few	  decades	  the	  concept	  of	  transnationalism	  entered	  the	  lexicon	  of	  
various	  disciplines	  to	  describe	  broadly	  the	  activities	  and	  links	  of	  individuals	  and	  
organisations	   across	   state	   borders	   (cf.	   Nye	   and	   Keohane	   1971).	   As	   Vertovec	  
rightly	  points	  out,	   the	  notion	  of	   transnationalism	  has	  been	  applied	   to	  various	  
phenomena	   including,	   transnational	   communities,	   citizenship,	   social	  
movements,	   families,	   identities	   and	   politics	   to	   name	   but	   a	   few	   (1999:	   2).	  
Vertovec	   identifies	   six	   clear	   varieties	   of	   transnationalism	   that	   have	   been	  
conceptually	   conflated	   in	   the	   literature,	   1)	   Social	   formations	   across	   borders,	  
which	   include	   diasporas	   and	   networks	   2)	   Type	   of	   consciousness	   marked	   by	  
duality	   or	   multiple	   identifications	   3)	   Mode	   of	   cultural	   production,	   through	  
fashion,	  music	  and	  film	  for	  example	  4)	  Avenue	  of	  capital,	  such	  as	  transnational	  
corporations	   and	   global	   remittances	   5)	   Political	   engagement	   of	   transnational	  
communities,	  and	  6)	  Reconstruction	  of	  place	  and	  locality	  (1999:	  2-­‐13).	  	  
While	  the	  study	  of	  diaspora	  partially	  draws	  on	  all	  of	   the	  above	  varieties,	   I	  am	  
only	   interested	   in	   the	   first	   and	   fifth	   type	   that	   relates	   to	   diaspora	   political	  
formations	  across	  borders.	  Transnationalism,	  as	  I	  use	  it	  in	  this	  study,	  refers	  to	  
links,	  activities	  and	  networks	  by	  diasporic	  actors	  that	  cross	  borders.	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Migrant	   transnationalism	   is	   not	   a	   new	   phenomenon.	   Historical	   connections	  
across	   states	   by	   individuals	   and	   groups	   have	   long	   existed	   in	   opposition	  
movements,	   nation	   building	   projects	   and	   remittances	   (Shain	   1999,	   Portes,	  
Guarnizo	   and	   Haller	   2002).	   However,	   what	   marks	   the	   difference	   between	  
todays’	  transnationalism	  is	  the	  speed,	  extensiveness,	  and	  sustained	  and	  intense	  
exchanges	   across	   borders	   (Portes	   2002,	  Vertovec	   2004,	   Lyons	   and	  Mandaville	  
2010).	  Globalisation	  therefore	  has	  facilitated	  migrant	  mobility	  due	  to	  advances	  
in	   telecommunications	   and	   transport.	   Yet	   transnationalism	   should	   be	  
distinguished	   from	   a	   flow	   of	   information	   and	   goods	   or	   globalising	   processes	  
that	  transcend	  state	  territories	  (Faist	  2004).	  Transnationalism	  is	  instead	  located	  
in	   specific	   places	   between	   nation	   states.	   Fundamentally	   this	   has	   altered	   the	  
boundaries	   of	   social,	   economic	   and	   political	   life,	   calling	   us	   to	   examine	   the	  
“actual	  topography	  of	  social	  life”	  (Levitt	  and	  Khagram	  2007:	  12).	  	  	  
So	  what	  exactly	  does	  contemporary	  transnationalism	  allow	  us	  to	  observe?	  And	  
in	   what	   ways	   has	   it	   altered	   our	   social	   and	   political	   formations?	   In	   the	   first	  
place,	   transnationalism	   allows	   us	   to	   observe	   the	   nature	   of	   contemporary	  
migration,	   where	   migrant	   life	   is	   not	   so	   much	   uprooted	   as	   transnationally	  
constituted	  between	  homelands	  and	  hostlands	  (Glick-­‐Schiller	  et.	  al,	  1992).	  This	  
triadic	  relationship	  between	  diaspora/homeland	  and	  hostland	  has	  lead	  to	  vastly	  
different	  migration	   experiences	   forming	   transnational	   social	   fields	   of	   familial,	  
economic,	   social	   and	   political	   relations	   that	   connect	   countries	   of	   settlement	  
and	  origin	  (Basch	  et	  al.,	  1994).	  	  
The	  process	  of	  transnationalism	  therefore	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  how	  the	  geography	  
of	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   is	   composed	   through	   a	   triadic	   connection	   between	  
hostland-­‐diaspora-­‐homeland.	   In	   this	   way	   transnationalism	   has	   moved	   the	  
study	   of	   migration	   beyond	   fixations	   with	   assimilation	   and	   immigrant	  
incorporation	   in	  host	   states,	  or	   the	  ubiquitous	   “myth	  of	   return”	   to	  what	  Faist	  
refers	  to	  as	  “circular	  exchange	  and	  transnational	  mobility”	  (2010:13).	  	  
	  
A	  transnational	  perspective	  allows	  us	  to	  look	  at	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  political	  
life	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  as	  life	  worlds	  are	  no	  longer	  limited	  by	  time	  or	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space	  (Faist,	  2004).	  	  Social	  worlds	  can	  now	  be	  found	  online	  or	  over	  the	  phone	  
(Brinkerhoff,	   2006,	   2009;	   Graziano,	   2012;	   Everett,	   2009).	   Money	   can	   be	  
transferred	   through	   online	   money	   transfer	   accounts	   and	   politics	   can	   be	  
exercised	   from	  abroad.	  Consequently,	   this	  has	  contributed	   to	   transformations	  
in	   the	   social,	   economic	   and	   political	   organisation	   of	   groups	   and	   individuals	  
(Vertovec,	  2004).	  
	  
As	   globalisation	   processes	   have	   developed	   and	   facilitated	   human	   mobility	  
between	   far-­‐flung	   places,	   new	   political	   actors	   have	   been	   able	   to	   connect	  
transnationally	  and	  change	  the	  nature	  of	  conflict	  and	  wars	  (Kaldor,	  1999;	  Smith	  
and	  Stares,	  2007).	  Today’s	  globalised	  transnationalism	  has	  therefore	  opened	  up	  
opportunities	   for	   political	   actors	   like	   diaspora	   to	   mobilise	   and	   take	   on	  
transnational	   roles.	   Local	   struggles	   are	   taken	   up	   globally	   (Lyons	   and	  
Mandaville,	   2010)	   creating	   a	   “globalisation	   of	   domestic	   politics”	   (Koslowski,	  
2005)	  .	  	  
	  
Diaspora	  mobilisation	  past	  and	  present	  
The	  flourishing	  diaspora	  politics	   literature	  has	  been	  successful	   in	  highlighting	  
the	  significant	  impact	  and	  contributions	  of	  diaspora	  to	  the	  domestic	  politics	  of	  
their	  countries	  of	  origin.	  Indeed	  amidst	  global	  technological	  advances	  in	  travel	  
and	   communication,	   and	  mass	  migrations	   due	   to	   old	   and	  new	   civil	   conflicts,	  
contemporary	   diasporas	   have	   emerged	   as	   new	   political	   actors	   on	   the	   world	  
stage	  (Esman,	  2009).	  	  
A	  review	  of	  the	  diaspora	  politics	  literature	  reveals	  a	  wealth	  of	  knowledge	  about	  
diaspora	  mobilisation	   and	   its	   impact	   on	   homeland	   states.	   The	   early	   diaspora	  
politics	  literature,	  which	  largely	  spawned	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  highlighted	  the	  
powerful	   draw	   of	   ethno-­‐nationalism	   amongst	   diaspora	   communities	   (Sheffer,	  
1986;	  Cohen	  and	  Cohen,	  2008;	  Safran,	   1991;	   Sheffer,	   2003)	  and	   their	   influence	  
on	  the	  foreign	  policies	  of	  the	  Unites	  States.	  Pioneering	  amongst	  these	  was	  the	  
work	  of	  Yossi	  Shain	  and	  his	  analyses	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Jewish	  lobby	  in	  America	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and	   their	   impact	  on	  US	   foreign	  policy	   towards	   Israel	   (Shain,	   2007;	   Shain	   and	  
Barth,	  2003;	  Shain,	  1994,	  1999).	  This	  influential	  literature	  illustrated	  the	  power	  
of	  diaspora	  in	  permeable	  political	  systems,	  where	  the	  political	  decision-­‐making	  
process	  can	  be	  swayed	  by	  the	  interests	  of	  powerful	  lobby	  groups	  (Shain,	  2007;	  
Koinova,	  2013;	  Ambrosio,	  2002;	  Mearsheimer	  and	  Walt,	  2008;	  Shain	  and	  Barth,	  
2003).	   The	   most	   successful	   groups	   were	   said	   to	   be	   those	   who	   had	   the	  
organization	  and	   level	  of	  political	  activity	  needed	  to	   influence	  political	  events	  
(Rubenzer,	   2008).	   Or	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Cuban	   American	   lobby,	   those	   who	  
enjoyed	   a	   symbiotic	   relationship	   with	   policy	   makers,	   which	   fomented	   the	  
grounds	  for	  policy	  change	  (Haney	  and	  Vanderbush,	  1999)	  
	  
While	  the	  above	  literature	  often	  looked	  at	  the	  role	  of	  diasporic	  elites	  or	  highly	  
organised	  groups,	   another	   strand	   in	   the	  diaspora	  mobilisation	   literature	  drew	  
attention	   to	   a	   transnationalism	   from	   below	   (Al-­‐Ali	   and	   Koser,	   2002).	   This	  
literature	   captured	   the	   everyday	   transnational	   links	   that	   transmigrants	  
continued	   to	   have	   with	   their	   former	   homelands	   (Portes,	   2001;	   Portes	   and	  
Rumbaut,	  2006;	  Portes	  et	  al.,	  1999;	  Guarnizo	  and	  Smith,	  1998).	  	  A	  focus	  on	  their	  
transnational	   political	   practices	   soon	   ensued	   and	   their	   contributions	   to	  
external	   voting,	   home-­‐town	   associations,	   remittances,	   and	   advocacy	  work	   for	  
women’s	   rights,	   and	   human	   rights	   (Schiller	   et	   al.,	   1995;	   Basch	   et	   al.,	   1994;	  
Fouron	   and	   Glick	   Schiller,	   1998;	   Levitt,	   2001;	   Charles,	   1995;	   Orozco	   and	  
Lapointe,	  2004).	  Though	  this	   literature	  had	   its	  roots	   in	  American	  scholarship,	  
European	   scholars	   soon	   followed	   with	   their	   own	   empirical	   case	   studies	   of	  
migrant	  organisations	  (MOs)	  and	  the	  development	  and	  advocacy	  work	  of	  their	  
migrant	   communities	   (Nijenhuis	   and	  Broekhuis,	   2010;	  Van	  Houte	   et	   al.,	   2013;	  
Morales	   and	   Jorba,	   2010;	  Mügge,	   2012b;	   Schrover	   and	  Vermeulen,	   2005;	  Halm	  
and	   Sezgin,	   2013;	   Østergaard-­‐Nielsen,	   2001;	   Fennema	   and	   Tillie,	   1999;	  
Østergaard-­‐Nielsen,	  2003;	  Salih,	  2001).	  	  
	  
Diaspora	  were	  now	  hailed	  as	  development	  agents	  (Faist,	  2008a),	  as	  actors	  that	  
could	  mobilise	  to	  redress	  global	  developmental	  inequalities	  through	  brain	  gain	  
(Patterson,	  2006),	  remittances	  (Kapur,	  2009;	  De	  Haas,	  2007;	  Lubkemann,	  2008)	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and	   investments	   (Kapur,	   2010;	   Sidel,	   2007)	   to	   name	   a	   few.	   More	   recent	  
scholarship	   has	   addressed	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	  
homeland	   governments	   and	   their	   diaspora	   policies	   and	   institutions	   to	  
encourage	   development	   and	   economic	   growth	   (Gamlen	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Ragazzi,	  
2014;	  Mügge,	  2012a).	  	  
	  
With	  the	  rise	  of	  civil	  wars	  and	  unrest	  across	  the	  globe	  (Kaldor,	  1999)	  scholars’	  
attention	  soon	  shifted	  to	  analysing	  their	  roles	  in	  conflict	  states.	  Were	  diaspora	  
a	   force	   for	   good	  or	  bad?	  Some	   reported	   the	  deleterious	   effects	   that	  diasporas	  
incurred	   on	   their	   countries	   of	   origin	   by	   exacerbating	   conflicts	   or	   prolonging	  
them	  (Wayland,	  2004;	  Collier	  and	  Hoeffler,	  2004;	  Adamson,	  2005;	  Lyons,	  2006;	  
Smith	   and	   Stares,	   2007;	   Fair,	   2007).	   Diasporas,	   as	   Terence	   Lyons	   argued,	   are	  
more	  emotive	  and	  less	   inclined	  to	  compromise	  due	  to	  their	  close	  connections	  
to	   homeland	   struggles	   (Lyons	   and	   Mandaville,	   2008).	   Others	   meanwhile	  
promulgated	   their	   peace-­‐building	   initiatives	   in	   conflict	   and	   post-­‐conflict	  
settings.	   This	   was	   particularly	   stressed	   in	   reference	   to	   supporting	   peace	   and	  
reconciliation	  initiatives,	  helping	  with	  negotiations	  and	  peace	  treatise,	  lobbying	  
for	   peace	   settlements	   and	   supporting	   livelihoods	   during	   state	   collapse	  
(Mohamoud,	  2006;	  Galipo,	  2011;	  Pirkkalainen,	  2009;	  Weiss,	  2009;	  Lyons,	  2007;	  
Feyissa,	  2014;	  Van	  Houte	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Koser,	  2007;	  Kleist,	  2008;	  Cochrane,	  2007;	  
Baser,	   2009;	   Smith	   and	   Stares,	   2007;	   Lubkemann,	   2008).	   Ultimately	   the	  
literature	  reconciled	  that	  the	  real	  question	  was	  not	  so	  much	  whether	  diaspora	  
were	   peace-­‐wreckers	   or	   peace-­‐makers,	   as	   they	   could	   be	   both	   dependent	   on	  
timing,	  conflict	  conditions	  (Smith	  and	  Stares,	  2007)	  and	  positionality	  (Koinova,	  
2012).	  	  
	  
The	   diaspora	   literatures’	   now	   empirically	   rich	   database	   has	   allowed	   us	   to	   go	  
beyond	   looking	   at	   the	   issues	   that	   diaspora	   engage	   in	  but	   to	   ask	  why	   there	   is	  
variation	   in	   the	   ways	   that	   diaspora	   mobilise.	   Comparative	   case	   studies	   have	  
therefore	   began	   to	   emerge	   within	   the	   field	   to	   account	   for	   variations	   of	  
mobilisation	  behaviours	  based	  on	  a	  plethora	  of	  hostland	  and	  homeland	  factors.	  
Focussing	   on	   the	   hostland,	   Koinova’s	   research	   for	   example	   reveals	   that	   the	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Albanian	  diaspora	  had	  more	  opportunities	  to	  engage	  in	  Kosovo’s	  independence	  
struggle	  in	  the	  US	  than	  in	  the	  UK	  due	  to	  the	  permeable	  political	  system	  in	  the	  
US,	   highlighting	   the	   importance	   of	   hostland	   political	   contexts	   for	   successful	  
lobbying	   (Koinova,	   2013).	   Her	   more	   recent	   work	   has	   elucidated	   some	   of	   the	  
dynamics	   of	   why	   diasporas	   choose	   different	  mobilisation	   channels	   to	   pursue	  
sovereignty-­‐based	  claims	  (Koinova,	  2014).	  Liza	  Mügge,	  meanwhile	  has	  looked	  at	  
why	  Surinamese	   and	  Turkish	  governments	  have	  differed	   in	   their	   approach	   to	  
their	  diasporas	  abroad	  due	  to	  different	  ideas	  of	  nationhood	  (Mügge,	  2012a).	  	  	  
	  
Others	   have	   addressed	   hostland	   institutional	   factors	   such	   as	   citizenship	   and	  
incorporation	  regimes	  that	  encourage	  or	  discourage	  mobilisation	  depending	  on	  
the	  political	  and	  discursive	  opportunity	  structures	  that	  they	  evoke	  (Koopmans,	  
2004;	   Koopmans	   and	   Statham,	   2001;	   Odmalm,	   2009;	   Marco	   Giugni,	   2004).	  
Meanwhile	  Bahar	  Baser	  has	   looked	  at	   the	  discursive	  and	  political	  opportunity	  
structures	   between	   Germany	   and	   Sweden,	   which	   have	   yielded	   variation	   in	  
mobilisation	  strategies	  amidst	  second	  generation	  Kurds	  and	  Turks	  (Baser,	  2012,	  
2009).	  	  
	  
To	   summarise,	   it	   is	   clear	   to	   see	   from	   the	   above	   review	   that	   the	   concept	   of	  
diaspora	   mobilisation	   has	   developed	   to	   include	   various	   diasporic	   stances,	  
actors,	  projects	  and	  actions	  to	  quote	  Brubaker	  (Brubaker,	  2005).	  As	  presented	  
above,	   these	   have	   included	   homeland	   struggles,	   secessionist	   claims,	  
development,	   and	   peace-­‐building	   amongst	   others.	  Diasporic	  mobilisation	   has	  
been	  mobilised	  through	  elites,	  others	  through	  grass-­‐roots	  initiatives	  and	  there	  
have	   been	   many	   channels	   adopted	   including	   national,	   transnational	   and	  
supranational	   (Koinova,	   2014).	   These	   studies	   have	   greatly	   informed	   our	  
understanding	   of	   diaspora	   and	   the	   factors	   that	   influence	   their	   behaviours,	  
capabilities,	  successes,	  strategies	  and	  levels	  of	  engagement.	  	  
	  
My	   study	   adds	   to	   this	  body	  of	   literature	  by	   looking	   comparatively	   at	   another	  
aspect	   less	   explored	   in	   the	   diaspora	   literature	   related	   to	   diaspora	  
mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐building,	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  Before	  exploring	  the	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diaspora	   and	   state-­‐building	   literature,	   it	   is	   first	   necessary	   to	   delineate	   this	  
study’s	  definition	  of	  diaspora	  mobilisation	   for	  state-­‐building	  by	   firstly	   looking	  
at	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  the	  state	  and	  thus	  state-­‐building.	  	  
	  
The	  State	  
Although	  a	  full	  account	  of	  the	  historical	  developments	  and	  conceptualisation	  of	  
the	   state	   is	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   research,	   I	   refer	   to	   important	  
developments	  within	  the	  study	  of	  the	  state	  in	  order	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  
state	  and	  nation	  and	  to	  advance	  my	  argument	  in	  this	  study.	  	  
	  
The	   concept	   of	   the	   modern	   European	   state	   was	   born	   from	   the	   institutional	  
changes	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  medieval	  period	  that	  saw	  the	  sovereign	  state	  
trump	   other	   political	   organisations,	   including	   the	   Hanseatic	   League	   and	   the	  
Italian	   city-­‐states	  once	   the	   feudal	   system	  gave	  way	   (Spruyt,	   1996).	  By	   the	   19th	  
century	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  territorial	  state	  expanded	  and	  today	  we	  live	  wholly	  in	  an	  
international	  system	  of	  states.	  	  
	  
Yet	  not	  all	  states	  are	  the	  same	  in	  our	  international	  system.	  They	  have	  developed	  
in	   different	   social,	   cultural,	   economic	   and	   political	   contexts,	   leading	   to	  
variations	  in	  their	  compositions,	  regimes,	  politics,	  and	  practices.	  Not	  all	  states	  
for	   example	   are	   democracies,	   have	   parliamentary	   systems,	   or	   have	   liberal	  
economic	  policies.	  The	  variation	  among	  states	  must	  therefore	  be	  placed	  within	  
their	  socio-­‐historical	  context.	  	  
	  
We	  know	  from	  the	  body	  of	  work	  by	  Charles	  Tilly,	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  modern	  
state	   form	  was	   conceived	   in	  Western	  Europe	  due	   to	  war	  making	  by	   states	   in	  
their	   struggle	   for	   dominance	   over	   territory.	   This	   led	   to	   the	   need	   for	   coercive	  
exploitation	  for	  capital	  accumulation	  in	  order	  to	  compete	  for	  dominance	  with	  
other	   leaders	   or	   rulers	   over	   a	   given	   territory,	   	   created	  differing	  bureaucracies	  
and	  political	  institutions	  to	  support	  the	  capitalist	  state	  (Tilly,	  1990).	  Meanwhile,	  
for	  post-­‐colonial	  states	  emerging	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  colonial	  borders	  
and	  legacies	  have	  disrupted	  their	  social	  structures	  and	  hampered	  their	  political	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evolution	  (Mayall,	  2005).	  	  
	  
So	  how	  do	  we	  understand	  the	  concept	  of	   the	  state	   in	  our	  modern	  times?	  The	  
definition	  proposed	  by	  Max	  Weber	  is	  still	  widely	  used	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  for	  
distinguishing	   the	   defining	   features	   of	   the	   state.	  Weber’s	   preoccupation	  with	  
the	  relationship	  between	  domination	  and	  obedience	   led	  to	  a	  definition	  of	   the	  
state	  that	  captures	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  dominator	  and	  dominated.	  For	  
Weber,	   the	   state	   is	   an	   organization	   of	   political	   domination,	   which	   has	   been	  
able	  to	  expropriate	  all	  the	  material	  means	  of	  organization	  and	  thus	  be	  placed	  at	  
the	  top	  of	  the	  power	  pecking	  order.	  Obedience	  to	  the	  power	  holder	  thus	  grants	  
the	  state	  authority,	  which	  in	  turn	  legitimates	  their	  monopoly	  of	  the	  use	  of	  force	  
(Gerth	  et	  al.,	  1997).	  Weber	  thus	  defined	  the	  state	  as	  a	  “human	  community	  that	  
(successfully)	   claims	   the	   monopoly	   of	   the	   legitimate	   use	   of	   physical	   force	  
within	  a	  given	  territory”	  (Ibid.,	  1997,	  p.78).	  	  	  
	  
In	  our	  modern	  world,	  however,	  we	  know	  that	  Weber’s	  ideal-­‐type	  is	  not	  always	  
lived	  up	   to	  by	   states,	   some	  of	  which	  do	  not	  have	   the	  monopoly	  of	   force	  over	  
their	   territory	   or	   legitimacy	   from	   their	   people.	   Iraq	   being	   a	   prime	   example,	  
where	  militias	  also	  exercise	  force	  and	  terrorist	  groups	  such	  as	  ISIS	  also	  act	  as	  a	  
morality-­‐imposing	  force	  and	  have	  occupied	  and	  waged	  horrific	  acts	  of	  violence	  
on	  the	  population.	  	  
	  
Does	   Weber’s	   definition	   suggest	   that	   Iraq	   is	   not	   a	   state?	   Considering	   the	  
interconnectedness	  of	  states	  on	  matters	  of	  security	  and	  defence,	  NATO	  being	  a	  
prime	  example,	  it	  is	  clear	  to	  see	  that	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  sovereignty	  has	  shifted	  
in	   certain	   domains	   previously	   only	   occupied	   by	   the	   state.	   While	   territorial	  
sovereignty	  might	  not	  be	  monopolised	  by	  the	  state	  other	  aspects	  related	  to	  the	  
flow	   of	   goods	   and	   services,	   or	   formal	   recognition	   and	   juridical	   independence	  
may	   exist,	   rendering	   a	   state	   like	   Iraq	   weak	   in	   domestic	   and	   Westphalian	  
sovereignty	   but	   stronger	   in	   other	   aspects	   related	   to	   interdependence	   and	  
International	  legal	  sovereignty	  (Krasner,	  1999).	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At	   the	   same	   time,	  Weber’s	  definition	  only	   allows	  us	   to	   see	   variation	  between	  
states	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  it	  measures	  against	  this	  ideal-­‐type.	  This	  static	  definition	  
thus	  can	  only	  lead	  us	  to	  comparative	  enquiries	  of	  state’s	  strengths	  or	  weakness,	  
or	   capacities	   that	   deviate	   from	   this	   model	   (Migdal,	   2001).	   Furthermore,	   this	  
definition	  sees	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  dominated	  and	  the	  dominator	  as	  
that	  of	  passive	  acquiescence,	  as	   though	  the	  societies	  of	  which	  states	  rule	  over	  
have	  no	  say	  in	  the	  rules,	  policies,	  and	  practices	  of	  states.	  In	  effect,	  it	  positions	  
the	  state	  as	  the	  only	  autonomous	  actor	  and	  agent	  of	  change.	  	  
	  
Yet	   the	   state	   does	   not	   govern	   in	   a	   world	   of	   docility,	   but	   rather	   within	   its	  
territory	  is	  a	  locus	  of	  social	  actors	  with	  competing	  interests.	  It	  is	  the	  very	  inter-­‐
relationship	   between	   society	   and	   the	   state’s	   apparatus	   of	   governmentality,	   to	  
use	  a	  Foucauldian	  term	  (Foucault	  et	  al.,	  1991)	  that	  has	  shaped	  the	  evolution	  and	  
trajectory	   of	   states	   and	   their	   politics	   (Tilly	   and	  Wood,	   2003;	   Tilly,	   2010).	   The	  
apparatus	  of	  government	  may	  be	  the	  police,	  the	  army,	  the	  judicial	  courts,	  state	  
policies,	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   etc.	   Meanwhile	   societal	   interactions	   may	   include	  
meetings	   with	   individuals,	   non-­‐governmental	   organisations,	   interest	   groups,	  
militias,	  associations,	  social	  movements	  and	  other	  actors	  found	  in	  civil	  society.	  	  
	  
As	  such,	  the	  state	  must	  not	  be	  seen	  in	  isolation	  of	  the	  society	  in	  whose	  name	  it	  
purportedly	   acts.	  Rather,	   using	  Migdal’s	   state	   in	   society	   approach,	   it	  must	  be	  
seen	  as	  a	  dynamic	  process,	  where	  the	  interaction	  of	  the	  two,	  the	  struggle	  of	  that	  
interaction,	  leads	  to	  changes	  both	  to	  the	  actors	  involved	  and	  also	  to	  the	  state’s	  
organization,	  rules,	  meanings	  and	  partners	  (Migdal,	  2001).	  	  
	  
Migdal	  defines	   the	  state	  as	   “a	   field	  of	  power	  marked	  by	   the	  use	  and	   threat	  of	  
violence	  and	  shaped	  by	  (1)	  the	  image	  of	  a	  coherent,	  controlling	  organization	  in	  
a	   territory,	  which	   is	  a	   representation	  of	   the	  people	  bounded	  by	   that	   territory,	  
and	  (2)	  the	  actual	  practices	  of	  its	  multiple	  parts	  (Ibid.,	  2001,p.16).	  Migdal	  points	  
to	   two	   important	   elements,	   the	   image	   of	   the	   state,	   and	   the	   practices	   of	   the	  
state.	  The	   image	  of	   the	   state	   is	   important	   for	  holding	   the	   idea	  of	   the	   state	  as	  
dominant,	   organized,	   autonomous,	   controlling	   within	   its	   territory	   all	   rule	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making	  (Ibid.,	  2001,	  p.16).	  	  
	  
The	  image	  also	  maintains	  the	  bounded	  lines	  between	  the	  state	  and	  other	  states	  
in	   the	   international	   system,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   boundary	   between	   the	   state	   and	  
society.	  Meanwhile	  the	  practices	  of	  the	  state	  can	  either	  validate	  or	  nullify	  these	  
distinctions.	  For	  example,	  the	  state’s	  ability	  to	  quash	  other	  non-­‐state	  groups	  by	  
force	   and	  maintain	   authority	   over	   its	   territory	   can	   strengthen	   its	   image	   as	   a	  
sovereign	   and	   dominant	   state	   (Krasner,	   2004).	   Similarly,	   the	   interaction	   of	  
multiple	   state	   institutions	   and	   resistance	   from	  social	  movements	  may	   lead	   to	  
different	  outcomes	  for	  the	  movement	  and	  the	  state’s	  future	  policies	  (Kitschelt,	  
1986).	  These	   fragmented	   interactions	  between	  the	  state	  and	   its	  multiple	  parts	  
in	  society	  may	  change	  its	  rules,	  create	  new	  meanings	  and	  thus	  shape	  its	  values	  
and	  identity.	  	  	  
	  
Seen	  in	  this	  way,	  states	  are	  the	  product	  of	  the	  instruments	  of	  government	  and	  
their	   interactions	   with	   society.	   The	   inter-­‐relationship	   between	   the	   two	  
therefore	  accounts	   for	  variation	  amongst	   states,	   their	  politics,	  challenges,	  and	  
capacity.	  Without	  reducing	  the	  state	  to	  a	  normative	  or	  static	  ideal,	  we	  can	  now	  
inspect	   the	   practices,	   institutions,	   tools	   of	   government	   and	   their	   interactions	  
with	   society	   for	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   actors,	   meanings	   and	   challenges	  
shaping	  state-­‐building	  processes.	  	  	  
	  
If	  states	  can	  now	  be	  characterized	  as	  evolving	  political	  organizations	  in	  a	  given	  
territory,	   what	   then	   are	   nations?	   For	   Smith,	   nations	   are	   a	   ‘named	   human	  
population	   which	   share	   myths	   and	   memories,	   a	   mass	   public	   culture,	   a	  
designated	   homeland,	   economic	   unity	   and	   equal	   rights	   and	   duties	   for	   all	  
members’(Smith,	  2013,	  pp.56–57).	  Whereas	  states	  dominate	  and	  operate	  within	  
a	  given	  territory,	  nations	  can	  span	  many	  states	  and	  are	  held	  together	  by	  their	  
cultural	   commonality.	  The	   source	  of	   their	   commonality	   is	  often	  ethnic,	  being	  
passed	   down	   from	   former	   ethnies	   i.e.	   ethnic	   groups	   or	   communities	   (Smith,	  
2013).	   Enduring	   cultural	   traditions,	   rituals,	   values,	   myths	   and	  memories	   that	  
may	  have	  been	  passed	  down	  over	  generations,	  supports	  the	  continuing	  lineage	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of	   the	   ethnic	   group.	   Nations	   according	   to	   Smith	   then	   are	   formed	   from	   the	  
meeting	  of	  ethnicity	  and	  symbolic	  commonality,	  which	  he	   refers	   to	  as	  ethno-­‐
symbolic	  myths	  (Smith,	  2009).	  	  
	  
For	   others,	   the	   nation	   is	   a	   modern	   phenomenon	   that	   has	   been	   constructed	  
from	   cultural	   artefacts	   including	   print,	   education	   and	   other	   media	   forms	  
(Anderson,	  2006;	  Gellner,	  1998).	  For	  Benedict	  Anderson,	  nations	  are	  bound	  by	  
their	   collective	   consciousness,	   where	   they	   imagine	   their	   belonging	   to	   a	  
community	  even	  though,	  as	  he	  reminds	  us	  “the	  members	  of	  even	  the	  smallest	  
nation	  will	  never	  know	  most	  of	  their	  fellow-­‐members,	  meet	  them,	  or	  even	  hear	  
of	   them,	   yet	   in	   the	   minds	   of	   each	   lives	   the	   image	   of	   their	   communion”	  
(Anderson,	   2006,	   p.6).	   Their	   belonging	   is	   thus	   predicated	   on	   the	   fact	   that	  
members	  of	  the	  same	  nation	  recognize	  rights	  and	  duties	  to	  each	  other	  by	  virtue	  
of	  their	  shared	  membership	  to	  it	  (Gellner,	  1998,	  p.7).	  	  
	  
Stressing	  cultural	  commonality	  as	  well	  as	  an	  ethno-­‐symbolic	  approach	  used	  by	  
Smith,	  Guibernau	  offers	  a	  helpful	  definition	  of	  the	  nation	  that	  excludes	  Smith’s	  
political	   functions,	   which	   are	  more	   in	   line	   with	   the	   state.	   She	   draws	   on	   the	  
cultural	   commonality	   of	  members	   stressed	  by	  Anderson	   and	  Gellner	   but	   also	  
highlights	   their	   claims	   for	   self-­‐rule.	   She	   sees	   nations	   as	   a	   “human	   group	  
conscious	  of	   forming	   a	   community,	   sharing	   a	   common	  culture,	   attached	   to	   a	  
clearly	  demarcated	  territory,	  having	  a	  common	  past	  and	  a	  common	  project	  for	  
the	  future	  and	  claiming	  the	  right	  to	  rule	  itself	  (Guibernau	  1996:47–48).	  	  
	  
Guibernau’s	   definition	   underlines	   the	   difference	   thus	   between	   nations	   as	  
cultural	   communities,	   and	   states	   as	   political	   institutions	   (Guibernau,	   2004).	  
Nations	  may	   exist	   without	   states,	   just	   as	   states	   have	   not	   needed	   nations	   for	  
their	   emergence	   (Gellner,	   1998).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   Guibernau’s	   definition	   is	  
helpful	   for	   highlighting	   the	   political	   claims	   and	   legitimacy	   that	   nations	   hold	  
and	   why	   states	   may	   be	   interested	   in	   utilizing	   its	   cultural	   capital	   for	   nation-­‐
building	  purposes.	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Diaspora	   also	   see	   themselves	   as	   forming	   part	   of	   the	   homeland	   nation	   (Shain	  
and	   Barth,	   2003;	   Sökefeld,	   2006)	   and	   many	   are	   members	   of	   their	   homeland	  
states	   through	   their	   dual	   citizenships.	   They	   can	   therefore	   also	   affect	   the	  
evolution	   of	   homeland	   states	   through	   their	  mobilisation	   practices	   that	   target	  
homeland	  states	  and	  societies.	  
	  
However,	   the	   state-­‐building	   literature	   has	   paid	   little	   attention	   to	   the	  
independent	   role	   of	   non-­‐state	   actors	   towards	   state-­‐building	   processes,	  
especially	  that	  of	  diaspora.	  Academic	  studies	  have	  been	  dominated	  by	  research	  
into	   the	   foreign	   interventions	   and	   agendas	   of	   powerful	   state	   actors	   or	   inter-­‐
governmental	   agencies	   in	  weak	   or	   developing	   states.	   This	   has	   predominantly	  
meant	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  foreign	  interventions	  of	  the	  United	  States	  or	  the	  United	  
Nations	   (Fukuyama,	   2004;	   Chesterman,	   2004;	   Chesterman	   et	   al.,	   2005;	  
Chandler	  and	  Sisk,	  2013;	  Sisk,	  2013).	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	   while	   the	   state	   is	   a	   product	   of	   the	   interactions	   of	   state	  
institutions	   and	   society,	   the	   literature	   has	   focused	   largely	   on	   institution-­‐
building,	  neglecting	   the	  other	   side	  of	   the	   state	   in	   society	   approach	   related	   to	  
civil	   society’s	   role	   in	   state	   formation.	   In	   the	  next	   section,	   I	   draw	  attention	   to	  
these	   dual	   aspects	   of	   state-­‐building	   drawn	   from	   the	   state-­‐building	   and	   civil	  
society	  literature	  before	  defining	  the	  dependent	  variable	  of	  this	  study.	  
	  
State-­‐building	  
Using	  Migdal’s	  state	  in	  society	  approach,	  the	  state	  is	  conceptualised	  as	  both	  a	  
controlling	  organisation	  as	  well	  as	  its	  meeting	  with	  its	  multiple	  parts.	  It	  follows	  
then	  that	  if	  we	  adapt	  this	  definition	  to	  state-­‐building,	  there	  are	  two	  arenas	  that	  
this	   relates	   to:	   building	   state	   institutions	   and	   interactions	   with	   civil	   society.	  
State-­‐building	   thus	   is	   the	   confluence	   of	   the	   building	   of	   the	   instruments	   of	  
government	  and	  their	  meeting	  with	  societal	  actors.	  How	  does	  this	   inform	  our	  
understanding	  of	  diaspora	  mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐building?	  	  
	  
As	   stated	   above,	   state-­‐building	   is	   largely	   seen	   to	   be	   the	   purview	   of	   states	   or	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International	   Governmental	   Organisations,	   where	   foreign	   states	   intervene	   to	  
re-­‐build	  or	  re-­‐model	  failing	  or	  failed	  states.	  According	  to	  David	  Lake	  there	  have	  
been	  three	  state-­‐building	  models	  in	  recent	  history,	  version	  1.0,	  2.0	  and	  3.0,	  each	  
guided	  by	  its	  particular	  political	  theory,	  policy	  focus,	  weaknesses	  and	  strengths	  
(Lake,	  2010).	  State-­‐building	  1.0	  occurred	  from	  1890	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  
where	  great	  power	  rivalry	  was	  pursued	  through	  realpolitik.	  From	  the	  Caribbean	  
to	  Europe	  and	  South	  Asia,	  US	  influence	  and	  interventions	  took	  place	  with	  the	  
purpose	  of	  pursuing	  America’s	   interests	  abroad,	  maintaining	  its	  hierarchy	  and	  
hegemony	   in	   the	   international	   system	   and	   for	   creating	   the	   economic	   and	  
political	  conditions	  that	  worked	  in	  its	  favour.	  Democracy	  was	  not	  a	  priority	  and	  
only	  pursued	  when	  it	  helped	  US	  interests	  (Ibid.,	  2010).	  	  
	  
In	   contrast	   state-­‐building	   2.0	  moved	   from	   building	   loyal	   states	   to	   legitimate	  
ones.	   Underlining	   this	   legitimacy	   was	   a	   liberal	   agenda	   marked	   by	  
democratization	   and	   economic	   reform	   (Lake,	   2010).	   This	   phase	   in	   state-­‐
building	   history	   commenced	   in	   the	   1990s	  when	   civil	   conflicts	   and	   the	   fragile	  
societies	  they	  created	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  war	  era	  led	  to	  a	  multitude	  of	  
international	  interventions	  (Fukuyama,	  2004).	  Humanitarian	  emergencies,	  fatal	  
diseases	  and	  genocide	  were	  no	  longer	  seen	  as	  problems	  affecting	  only	  the	  states	  
involved	   but	   also	   as	   posing	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   international	   communities’	   peace	  
and,	  indirectly,	  to	  its	  security	  (Sisk,	  2013).	  As	  such	  the	  international	  community	  
prioritized	   post-­‐civil	   war	   state-­‐building	   at	   the	   top	   of	   both	   the	   international	  
peace,	  security	  and	  global	  development	  agenda	  (Ibid.,	  2013).	  	  
	  
Meanwhile	   version	   3.0,	   focussed	   on	   legitimacy	   but	   this	   time	   in	   the	   form	   of	  
bringing	   security	  and	  services	   to	   the	  host	  population.	  The	   focus	  of	   this	   state-­‐
building	   phase	   was	   to	   create	   legitimate	   states	   that	   could	   function	   and	  
independently	   govern	   their	   people	   (Lake,	   2010:273).	   Whereas	   version	   2.0	  
focussed	  on	  legitimacy	  through	  liberal	  democracy	  that	  would	  provide	  services	  
for	  its	  citizens,	  legitimacy	  in	  version	  3.0	  was	  reversed	  so	  that	  services	  would	  be	  
provided	  first	  legitimating	  the	  state	  (Ibid.,	  274).	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Lake’s	   historical	   account	   of	   state-­‐building	   is	   impressive	   and	   useful	   for	  
understanding	   state-­‐building	   attempts	   by	   powerful	   states	   and	   their	   methods	  
throughout	  history.	  However,	  yet	  his	  analysis	  neglects	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  states	  
built	   under	   the	   mandate	   system.	   For	   post-­‐colonial	   states	   such	   as	   Iraq	   the	  
concept	  of	  the	  state	  itself	  was	  a	  colonial	  export	  (Mayall,	  2005:37).	  State-­‐building	  
therefore	  also	  raises	  issues	  of	   imperial	  domination	  (Diamond,	  2005)	  especially	  
in	   cases	   of	   foreign	   intervention,	   which	   are	   defined	   by	   their	   transgression	   of	  
state	  sovereignty	  (Reus-­‐Smit,	  2013).	  
	  
In	  any	  case,	  since	  versions	  2	  and	  3	  the	  state-­‐building	  literature	  has	  focussed	  on	  
two	  major	  areas	  relating	  to	  institution-­‐building	  and	  governance.	  Indeed,	  state-­‐
building	  theory	  heralded	  a	  triumph	  for	  institutionalism.	  Institutions	  were	  seen	  
as	  the	  crux	  of	  professionalizing	  public	  administration	  so	  that	  various	  aspects	  of	  
governability	   related	   to	   elections,	   parliamentary	   politics,	   and	   development	  
could	   take	   place	   (Sisk,	   2013;	   Paris	   and	   Sisk,	   2009;	   Chesterman,	   2004).	   In	   the	  
1990s	   it	   entailed	   two	   features	   related	   to	   democratisation	   and	   economic	  
liberalisation	  (Berger,	  2006;	  Lake,	  2010).	  Democratisation	  was	  pursued	  through	  
the	   creation	   of	   a	   democratic	   political	   system	   and	   institutions,	   writing	   a	  
constitution	   and	   usually	   and	   within	   the	   space	   of	   two	   years	   holding	   national	  
elections.	  Secondly,	  economic	   liberalisation	  meant	   implementing	  Washington	  
Consensus	  policies,	   privatisation,	   reducing	  barriers	   to	   international	   trade	   and	  
investment	  (Lake,	  2010:266).	  	  
	  
The	   ideas	   behind	   these	   policies	   were	   rooted	   in	   the	   democratic	   peace	   thesis,	  
which	   stated	   that	  democratic	   states	   tend	   to	  be	  more	  peaceful	   towards	  others	  
and	   domestically.	   The	   post-­‐Cold	  War	   era	   thus	   saw	   a	   number	   of	   liberalising	  
missions	   taken	  on	  by	   international	   agencies,	   often	  with	   the	   leadership	  of	   the	  
US,	   to	  areas	  experiencing	  civil	   conflict,	   ranging	   from	  short	   term	  to	   long-­‐term	  
missions	   performed	  with	   a	   range	   of	   functions	  with	   the	   aim	  of	   fomenting	   the	  
conditions	  for	  a	  lasting	  peace.	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However,	  there	  has	  been	  much	  critique	  of	  these	  endeavours	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  
the	  international	  communities’	  efforts	  to	  transform	  developing	  countries	  facing	  
conflict	   took	   on	   an	   imposition	   of	  Western	   values	   and	   ideologies	   (Lake,	   2010;	  
Fukuyama,	  2004;	  Diamond,	  2005).	  Unfortunately	  the	  one-­‐size	  fits	  all	  approach	  
lacked	   sensitivity	   to	   the	   historical,	   social	   and	   economic	   conditions	   of	   local	  
contexts	  and	  were	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  speed	  in	  which	  these	  policies	  took	  place.	  	  
For	  many	  war-­‐torn	  post-­‐colonial	  states,	  introducing	  liberalisation	  amidst	  a	  lack	  
of	   efficient	   state	   institutions	   and	   institutional	   know-­‐how,	   led	   to	   worsening	  
social	  and	  political	  conditions	  (Paris,	  2004).	  	  
	  
In	  response,	  Paris	  advocated	  “Institutionalization	  Before	  Liberalization”	  (Paris,	  
2004:	   7),	   while	   Fukuyama	   stressed	   the	   need	   to	   create	   	   “stateness”	   before	  
economic	   development	   and	   democracy	   could	   take	   hold	   successfully	  
(Fukuyama,	  2005).	  As	  such	  state-­‐building	  theory	  did	  not	  reject	  democratisation	  
and	   economic	   liberalisation	   as	   such	   but	   rather	   stressed	   the	   a	   priori	   need	   for	  
effective	  institutions	  for	  their	  implementation	  (Fukuyama,	  2004).	  	  
	  
Still	   the	   institutional	   approach	   of	   version	   2.0	   faced	   several	   obstacles.	  Despite	  
knowing	   that	   institutions	   mattered,	   there	   was	   still	   the	   task	   of	   determining	  
which	   institutions,	   and	   in	   which	   order.	   Fukuyama	   and	   others	   have	   drawn	  
attention	  to	  a	  sequencing	  problem	  by	  highlighting	  the	  need	  for	  effective	  state	  
institutions	  before	  democratisation	  can	  occur	  (Fukuyama,	  2004;	  Mansfield	  and	  
Snyder,	  2007).	  Others	  meanwhile	  have	  been	  critical	  of	  democratic	  sequencing	  
(Berman,	  2007)	  preferring	  a	  gradual	  approach	  that	  incorporates	  all	  dimensions	  
slowly	  but	  holistically	  (Carothers,	  2007).	  
	  
It	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   recent	   literature	   has	   approached	   state-­‐building	   from	   a	  
Weberian	   understanding	   of	   the	   state	   as	   the	   focus	   has	   been	   the	   provision	   of	  
security	   (Weber’s	   monopoly	   of	   the	   legitimate	   use	   of	   physical	   force	   within	   a	  
given	   territory),	   but	   also	   respect	   for	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   (authority)	   through	  
political,	   social	   and	   economic	   institutions	   of	   governance,	   (Sisk,	   2013).	   Yet	  
legitimacy	  cannot	  be	  imposed	  on	  a	  population,	  it	  must	  be	  earned.	  Furthermore	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where	  can	  legitimacy	  reside	  when	  law	  and	  order	  are	  built	  through	  violence	  and	  
force?	  This	   is	   the	  Catch-­‐22	  of	   state-­‐building;	   imposing	   law	  and	  order	   through	  
military	   occupation,	   while	   simultaneously	   bringing	   freedom	   and	   democracy,	  
which	  is	  the	  purported	  overall	  goal	  of	  the	  state-­‐building	  venture3	  (Chesterman,	  
2004).	  	  
	  
State-­‐building	   is	  an	  enterprise	   that	  requires	   the	  political	  participation	  of	  both	  
governments	   and	   citizens.	  Using	  Migdal’s	   state	   in	   society	   approach	  we	   know	  
that	   the	   state	   is	  not	   a	   static	   force	   that	  works	   in	   isolation	   (Migdal,	   2001).	   It	   is	  
built	  from	  its	  interactions	  with	  its	  multiple	  parts.	  The	  state-­‐building	  literature	  
has	   not	   paid	   sufficient	   attention	   to	   this	   very	   important	   dimension	   of	   state-­‐
building	   linked	   to	   civil	   society’s	   role	   in	   supporting	   the	   state,	  which	   is	   key	   to	  
propagating	   legitimacy	   for	   the	   state	   through	   civic	   participation,	   which	  
strengthen	  state-­‐society	  relations	  (Manning,	  2005)	  and	  legitimacy.	  	  
	  
Legitimacy	  therefore	  is	  not	  gained	  solely	  by	  being	  the	  only	  licensed	  arbiter	  of	  
force,	  but	  also	  about	  empirical	  legitimacy	  as	  seen	  and	  experienced	  by	  local	  
partners	  and	  citizens	  (Andersen,	  2012).	  This	  refers	  to	  political	  participation	  of	  
citizens,	  where	  civil	  society	  can	  inform,	  contest	  and	  challenge	  the	  state,	  
allowing	  for	  legitimacy	  through	  peaceful	  contention.	  	  
	  
The	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  resurfaced	  in	  more	  recent	  history	  following	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  democratic	  states	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  
(Keane,	  1988).	  The	  instability	  of	  transitioning	  into	  democracy	  thus	  created	  an	  
opportunity	  for	  the	  international	  community	  to	  intervene	  and	  to	  mediate	  for	  
newly	  emerging	  states.	  	  
	  
Strengthening	   civil	   society	   and	   its	   relations	   with	   the	   state	   were	   seen	   as	  
fundamental	   for	   preventing,	   reducing	   or	   even	   resolving	   such	   conflicts	   by	  
international	   agencies,	   NGOS,	   and	   academics	   alike	   (Cochrane,	   2007).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  purported	  goal	  may	  in	  deed	  be	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  “liberal	  peace’	  to	  a	  country,	  though	  
security	  interests	  of	  states	  may	  also	  motivate	  military	  interventions	  (Paris	  and	  Sisk,	  2009).	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Consequently	  the	  concept	  of	  developing	  and	  strengthening	  civil	  society	  was	  to	  
form	   part	   of	   the	   broader	   framework	   of	   peace-­‐building	   that	   was	   prevalent	  
during	   the	   1990s.	   Peace-­‐building,	   understood	   as	   the	   prevention	   of	   the	  
recurrence	  of	  violence,	  or	  creating	  the	  conditions,	  which	  encourage	  sustainable	  
peace	   in	  war-­‐torn	  societies	  was	   the	  buzzword	  of	   the	  day	  (Paris,	  2004).	  Peace-­‐
building	  was	   not	   only	   about	   supporting	   a	   ceasefire	   between	  warring	   factions	  
but	  also	  identifying	  and	  supporting	  local	  structures	  that	  would	  strengthen	  and	  
consolidate	   peace	   and	   avert	   a	   relapse	   into	   conflict	   (Boutros-­‐Ghali,	   1992).	   	   As	  
such	  international	  actors	  took	  more	  interest	  in	  the	  civil	  society	  of	  conflict	  states	  
who	   they	   saw	  as	  a	  bridge	   for	  connecting	  grass	   roots	  movements	  and	  political	  
elites	   to	   consolidate	   political	   negotiations	   and	   peace	   settlements	   (Cochrane,	  
2007).	  	  
	  
Scholars	  have	  debated	  at	  length	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  pointing	  to	  at	  least	  
three	  strands	  related	  to	  a)	  A	  normative	  ideal	  type.	  A	  transparent,	  tolerant	  and	  
democratic	   ‘good	   society’	   to	   aspire	   to	   with	   positive	   norms	   and	   values.	   b)	  
voluntary	  associational	  life	  that	  acts	  as	  a	  counterweight	  to	  states	  and	  corporate	  
power	   and	   c)	   a	   public	   sphere	   where	   “societal	   differences,	   social	   problems,	  
public	   policy,	   government	   action	   and	   matters	   of	   community	   and	   cultural	  
identity	  are	  developed	  and	  debated”	  (Edwards,	  2004,	  p.55).	  	  
	  
Philosophers	   such	   as	   Alexis	   de	   Tocqueville,	   Karl	  Marx,	   Antonio	  Gramsci	   and	  
Jürgen	   Habermas,	   to	   name	   a	   few	   scholars	   in	   history,	   have	   differed	   in	   their	  
interpretations	  and	  ideas	  about	  civil	  society,	  as	  do	  more	  contemporary	  scholars.	  
Yet	   one	   of	   the	   important	   features	   that	   all	   scholars	   cannot	   escape	   is	   the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   state	   and	   civil	   society.	  Whether	   civil	   society	   is	   best	  
seen	  as	  separate	  from	  the	  state	  (Gellner,	  1994),	  as	  supporting	  the	  state	  to	  foster	  
social	  capital	  and	  democratic	  governance	  (Putnam	  et	  al.,	  1994),	  or	  challenging	  
and	   contesting	   the	   state	   through	   non-­‐violent	  means	   (Keane,	   1988,	   2003),	   the	  
concept	  has	  been	  fundamental	  to	  the	  making	  of	  states	  and	  their	  politics.	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Undergirding	  this	  argument	  is	  the	  important	  work	  by	  Robert	  Putnam,	  Making	  
Democracy	  Work,	  which	  shows	  the	  importance	  of	  civic	  community	  for	  building	  
effective	   governments	   (Putnam	   et	   al.,	   1994).	   Civic	   associations	   and	   civic	  
engagement	   contribute	   to	   the	   effectiveness	   and	   stability	   of	   democratic	  
governance,	   because	   they	   create	   internal	   effects	   for	  members	   of	   associations	  
and	  external	  effects	  for	  society	  at	  large.	  Internally,	  civic	  associations	  help	  foster	  
norms	  of	  cooperation,	  trust,	  and	  tolerance,	  while	  externally	  they	  help	  support	  
collaboration	  to	  address	  civil	  matters	  collectively.	  	  Putnam	  stressed	  that	  in	  civic	  
associations	   relationships	  were	  horizontal	   that	  help	   to	  engender	   co-­‐operation	  
and	   reciprocity	   in	   contrast	   to	   vertical	   relations	   of	   authority	   and	   dependency	  
(Putnam	  et	  al.,	   1994,	  p.88).	  Instead	  of	  encouraging	  relationships	  of	  patronage,	  
civic	   communities	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   work	   together	   to	   resolve	   community	  
problems	   or	   address	   policy	   issues.	   They	   are	   also	   more	   likely	   to	   hold	   their	  
politicians	  to	  account	  and	  create	  what	  Paul	  Hirst	  has	  referred	  to	  as	  “democratic	  
public	  governance”	  (Hirst,	  2012,	  p.16).	  
	  
A	  vibrant	  civil	  society	  creates	  the	  space	  for	  representation	  and	  participation	  in	  
various	   interest	   groups.	   It	   therefore	   promotes	   cross-­‐cutting	   cleavages,	   which	  
expand	   memberships	   and	   identifications	   beyond	   primordial	   kin	   or	   ethnic	  
groups	   (Manning,	   2005).	   Simultaneously,	   the	   horizontal	   structure	   of	   civil	  
society	   minimizes	   political	   polarization	   and	   thus	   builds	   norms	   of	   tolerance	  
through	  peaceful	  disagreement.	  This	  point	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  the	  case	  of	  
Iraq,	  where	  ethno-­‐sectarianism	  has	  dominated	  Iraqi	  politics	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  
the	  Iraq	  war.	  This	  reality	  has	  undermined	  the	  growth	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  thus	  
the	   possibility	   of	   forming	   membership	   in	   different	   groups,	   a	   necessary	  
precursor	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   crosscutting	   cleavages	   (Truman,	   1951	   quoted	   in	  
Manning,	   2005).	   Building	   civil	   society	   in	   divided	   societies	   is	   therefore	  
paramount	   for	   countering	   ethnic	   cleavages,	   providing	   citizens	   an	   alternative	  
source	   of	   power	   through	   interest	   group	   collective	   action,	   as	   shall	   be	  
demonstrated	  in	  the	  empirical	  chapters.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Middle	  East,	  understanding	  the	  state	  means	  also	  considering	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civil	   society	   (Norton,	   2005).	   In	   the	   face	   of	  weak	   states	   and	   authoritarian	   rule	  
civil	   society	   can	   often	   be	   the	   only	   place	   for	   participatory	   politics	   for	   the	  
disenfranchised,	   a	   place	   for	   advocacy,	   contestation	   and	   representation.	   Civil	  
society	   thus	   informs	   state	   practices	   and	   policies	   by	   holding	   governments	   to	  
account,	  challenging	  clientelism	  and	  corruption,	  calling	   for	  human	  rights	  and	  
democratisation,	  as	  has	  been	  witnessed	  through	  a	  politics	  of	  resistance	  across	  
the	  Middle	  East	   that	  goes	  beyond	   the	  Arab	  uprisings	   (Tripp,	  2013).	  This	   is	   an	  
important	   element	   of	   state-­‐building	   related	   to	   the	   relationship	  between	   state	  
institutions	  and	  civil	  society,	  where	  actors’	  perception	  of	  the	  state,	  its	  image	  in	  
Migdal’s	  language,	  legitimates	  rules	  and	  institutions	  (Hurd,	  1999).	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	   civil	   society	   provides	   services	   that	  weak	   states	   cannot	   perform.	  
This	  fact	  has	  been	  corroborated	  by	  international	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  World	  
Bank	   and	   the	   OSCE,	   who	   have	   expounded	   the	   importance	   of	   a	   strong	   civil	  
society	   for	   good	   governance,	   development	   and	   democratisation	   (Cochrane,	  
2007).	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  there	  is	  often	  an	  interdependent	  relationship	  
where	   the	   state	   needs	   civil	   society	   to	   provide	   state	   services	   and	   civil	   society	  
needs	   the	  state	   to	  carry	  out	  particular	  state	   functions.	  For	  example	   in	   Jordan,	  
professional	   associations	   are	   performing	   quasi-­‐state	   functions	   providing	   a	  
necessary	   service	   for	   the	   Jordanian	   government	   in	   the	   forms	   of	   licensing,	  
salaries	  and	  pensions	  (Clark,	  2013).	  In	  Lebanon,	  the	  Amel	  association	  provides	  
various	   state	   services	   in	   the	   form	   of	   healthcare,	   education	   and	   assistance	   to	  
refugees4.	  This	  can	  take	  on	  further	  salience	  in	  conflict	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  settings	  
where	   transnational	   civil	   society	   initiatives	   can	   take	   on	   important	   functions	  
such	   as	   protecting	   those	   who	   are	   vulnerable	   from	   poverty	   or	   repairing	  
infrastructure	  (Lubkemann,	  2008;	  Laakso	  and	  Hautaniemi,	  2014).	  	  
	  
For	  weak	  states,	  such	  as	  Iraq,	  the	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  is	  not	  only	  important	  but	  
also	  necessary	  for	  political	  reform	  and	  re-­‐building	  a	  new	  state.	  This	  is	  because	  it	  
is	   civil	   society	   that	   ultimately	   tests	   the	   limits	   of	   political	   contestation,	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Amel	  Association	  http://amelinternational.com/en/home/	  [Last	  accessed	  15	  June	  2016].	  
43	  	   	  
provoke	  or	  revive	  collective	  identifications	  and	  collective	  actions	  (O’Donnell	  et	  
al.,	  2013,	  p.49).	  As	  such	  political	  reform	  demands	  the	  political	  participation	  of	  
civil	  society	  organisations	  for	  holding	  governments	  to	  account	  and	  maintaining	  
pressure	  to	  deliver	  on	  its	  word.	  There	  is	  therefore	  a	  co-­‐dependent	  relationship	  
between	  civil	  society	  and	  the	  state	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  state.	  	  Rules	  and	  
laws	   can	   only	   be	   followed	   once	   society	   feels	   them	   to	   be	   just	   and	  when	   they	  
trust	   that	   the	   law	   will	   protect	   them.	   Likewise	   a	   state	   can	   only	   protect	   its	  
citizens	  if	  rules	  are	  followed.	  	  	  
The	  concept	  of	  civil	   society	   thus	  encapsulates	  within	   it	  an	  a	  priori	   link	  to	  the	  
state	  as	  several	  scholars	  have	  argued	  throughout	  history.	  Marx	  proposed	  that	  it	  
was	  a	  means	  of	  promoting	  the	  economic	  interests	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie,	  whereas	  
Antonio	  Gramsci	  saw	  it	  as	  a	  form	  of	  domination	  and	  control	  through	  cultural	  
and	   ideological	  hegemony	   (Schwedler,	   2006,	  p.81;	  Edwards,	   2004,	  p.8).	   It	  was	  
Jürgen	  Habermas,	  who	  would	  change	  our	  ideas	  of	  the	  “public	  sphere’	  by	  taking	  
the	   arguments	   made	   by	   Marx	   but	   applying	   the	   idea	   of	   contestation	   to	   the	  
liberal	  tradition,	  where	  members	  of	  society	  could	  critique	  and	  debate	  issues	  of	  
shared	  public	  concern	  (Ibid.2006;	  Ibid.,	  2004).	  This	  idea	  of	  civil	  society	  saw	  the	  
role	  of	  civil	  society	  as	  constraining	  the	  power	  of	  the	  state	  whilst	  simultaneously	  
being	  protected	  by	  it	  (Schwedler,	  2006).	  	  
	  
In	   today’s	   understanding,	   civil	   society	   and	   its	   relationship	   with	   the	   state	  
remains	  heavily	  debated.	  However	  what	   is	   certainly	  hard	   to	   ignore	   is	   the	   fact	  
that	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  form	  of	  state	  control,	  a	  quasi	  state	  tool,	  a	  public	  sphere	  for	  
contestation,	  or	  a	  means	  for	  citizens	  to	  address	  issues	  in	  the	  public	  sphere,	  it	  is	  
an	  arena	  where	  the	  disenfranchised	  and	  the	  underrepresented	  can	  mobilise	  to	  
advocate	  for	  their	  rights,	  and	  draw	  attention	  to	  their	  needs.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  words	  of	  
Michael	  Edwards	  ‘people	  power’	  (Edwards,	  2004).	  	  
	  
Therefore	   in	   agreement	   with	   Paris	   and	   Sisk,	   state-­‐building	   is	   not	   “limited	   to	  
“top	   down”	   approaches	   of	   institution	   strengthening	   (i.e.,	   those	   focusing	   on	  
national	   elites),	   nor	   does	   it	   preclude	   “	   bottom-­‐up”	   approaches	   (i.e.,	   working	  
44	  	   	  
through	   civil-­‐society	   groups,	   or	   promoting	   measures	   to	   facilitate	   the	  
accountability	  of	   state	   structures	   to	   their	   societies)”	   (Paris	   and	  Sisk,	   2009:14).	  
State-­‐building	   is	   therefore	  defined	  by	   its	  ability	   to	  address	  both	  dimension	  of	  
the	  state	  and	  society	  through	  institution-­‐building	  and	  governance	  (top-­‐down),	  




As	  such	  adapting	  Migdal’s	  state	  in	  society	  approach	  and	  building	  on	  the	  state-­‐
building	  and	  civil	  society	  literature	  above,	  I	  thus	  propose	  a	  definition	  of	  state-­‐
building	  that	  operationally	  incorporates	  two	  categories	  to	  be	  used	  for	  analysing	  
the	   diaspora	   literature	   in	   the	   next	   chapter.	   Diaspora	   mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐
building	   thus	   refers	   to	   1)	   political	   institution-­‐building	   and	  governance	   and	   2)	  
supporting/challenging	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society.	  
	  
Institution-­‐building	  and	  state	  governance	  refers	  to	  diaspora	  mobilisation	  to	  
build	   or	   strengthen	   state	   capacity	   or	   create	   new	   institutions	   of	   governance.	  
This	  may	  refer	  to	  constitution	  building,	  forming	  ministries,	  forming	  policies	  or	  
political	   institutions	   of	   the	   state	   that	   help	   governments	   to	   effectively	  
administer	  their	  states.	  	  
	  
Supporting/Challenging	   the	   state	   through	   civil	   society	   refers	  to	  diaspora	  
mobilisation	   that	   supports	   civil	   society	   groups	   in	   the	   homeland	   that	   support	  
the	   state	   such	   as	   strengthening	   participatory	   governance,	   developing	   human	  
rights	  initiatives,	  the	  promotion	  of	  labour	  rights,	  minority	  rights,	  and	  women’s	  
rights,	   as	   well	   as	   providing	   quasi-­‐state	   services.	   Simultaneously	   these	   also	  
include	  aspects	  related	  to	  challenging	  the	  state,	  which	  also	  strengthen	  the	  state	  
through	   engendering	   accountability,	   transparency	   and	   building	   legitimacy.	  
Development	  projects	  may	  also	  be	  included	  here	  if	  they	  play	  a	  role	  in	  shaping	  
state	   practices	   or	   policies.	   These	   are	   not	   limited	   to	  Western	   ideals	   but	   also	  
include	  initiatives	  that	  resonate	  with	  local	  audiences	  and	  practices.	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It	  is	  important	  to	  mention	  here	  that	  the	  two	  categories	  in	  no	  way	  connote	  that	  
these	  two	  approaches	  to	  state-­‐building	  are	  separate	  processes.	  As	  shown	  above,	  
there	  is	  a	  relational	  quality	  between	  building	  state	  institutions	  and	  civil	  society.	  
Thus	   it	   is	   important	   to	   stress	   that	   these	   dimensions	   of	   state-­‐building	   do	   not	  
occur	   in	   isolation	   but	   should	   be	   mutually	   reinforcing	   processes,	   working	   in	  
tandem	  to	  reinforce	  one	  another.	  The	  two	  categories	  however	  draw	  attention	  to	  
two	  distinct	  categories	  of	  state-­‐building	  that	  diasporas	  engage	  in	  and	  serves	  as	  
a	   heuristic	   tool	   for	   understanding	   the	   two	   approaches	   to	   state-­‐building	   that	  
work	  to	  strengthen	  both.	  	  
	  
To	   summarise,	   in	   this	   chapter	   I	   have	   delineated	   the	   subject	   matter	   of	   this	  
thesis;	  diaspora.	  Following	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  who	  constitutes	  a	  diaspora	  I	  
have	  underlined	   the	   importance	  of	  having	   an	   imagination	  of	   community	   and	  
mobilisation	   towards	   specific	   goals,	   actions	   and	   stances	   for	   diaspora	   to	   come	  
into	  existence.	  Simultaneously,	  I	  have	  showcased	  the	  many	  ways	  that	  diaspora	  
can	   and	   have	   mobilised	   towards	   their	   countries	   of	   origin,	   while	   drawing	  
attention	   to	   the	   specific	   focus	   of	   this	   study,	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐
building.	  	  
	  
Finally	   I	   demonstrated	   that	   state-­‐building	   is	   operationally	   comprised	   of	   two	  
categories,	   to	   include	   building	   state-­‐institutions	   and	   supporting/challenging	  
the	  state	  through	  civil	  society,	  that	  have	  neither	  been	  seriously	  addressed	  in	  the	  
state-­‐building	   or	   diaspora	   literature.	   In	   establishing	   how	   the	   two	   approaches	  
are	  interlinked	  and	  work	  in	  tandem	  to	  evolve	  the	  state,	  I	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  
two	  categories	  that	  define	  state-­‐building	  in	  this	  thesis	  and	  that	  will	  be	  used	  to	  
investigate	   the	   diaspora	   literature	   in	   the	   next	   chapter	   but	   also	   the	   empirical	  
evidence	  in	  chapters	  5	  and	  6.	  	  
	  
In	   the	  next	  section	  diaspora	  mobilisation	   for	  state-­‐building	   is	   reviewed	  where	  
attention	   is	   drawn	   to	   the	   gap	   in	   the	   literature..	   Following	   this	   I	   put	   forward	  
explanatory	  factors	  that	  may	  account	  for	  why	  there	  were	  divergences	  between	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the	  state-­‐building	  contributions	  of	  the	  UK	  and	  Swedish	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  and	  set	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CHAPTER	  3	  -­‐	  	  DIASPORA	  MOBILISATION	  FOR	  STATE-­‐BUILDING	  
	  
	  
In	   the	   last	   chapter,	   the	   concepts	   of	   diaspora,	   transnationalism	   and	   diaspora	  
mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐building	  were	  defined	  so	  as	  to	  outline	  the	  subject	  matter	  
of	   this	   study	   as	   well	   as	   the	   research	   question	   under	   investigation.	   I	   have	  
operationalized	  diaspora	  mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐building	  in	  this	  study	  under	  two	  
categories	   1)	   Institution-­‐building	   and	   governance	   and	   2)	  
supporting/challenging	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society.	  	  
	  
This	   chapter	   is	   divided	   into	   three	   sections.	   In	   the	   first	   section	   I	   review	   the	  
diaspora	  literature	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  diaspora	  mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐
building	  has	  been	  approached	  and	  what	  we	  know	  so	  far.	  I	  then	  identify	  the	  gaps	  
in	  this	  field	  that	  this	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  address	  and	  develop	  through	  the	  case	  study	  
of	   Iraq.	   In	   the	   second	   section,	   I	   address	   the	   second	   research	  question	  of	   this	  
thesis	  by	  probing	  the	  literature	  for	  factors	  that	  may	  account	  for	  variation	  in	  the	  
ways	  that	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  Swedish	  diaspora	  approached	  state-­‐building	  in	  Iraq.	  
The	  diaspora	  literature	  can	  only	  partially	  help	  my	  investigation,	  therefore,	  I	  use	  
both	  an	  inductive	  approach	  by	  drawing	  on	  the	  diaspora	  literature	  for	  guidance,	  
but	  also	  adopt	  a	  deductive	  approach	  extrapolating	  from	  the	  case	  of	  Iraq	  to	  draw	  
out	  explanatory	  factors.	  In	  the	  final	  section,	  I	  explore	  alternative	  factors,	  lay	  out	  




Diaspora	  mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐building	  –	  the	  status	  quo	  
There	   has	   been	   very	   little	   systematic	   research	   of	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   for	  
state–building	   processes	   in	   the	   diaspora	   literature	   (Laakso	   and	   Hautaniemi,	  
2014).	   At	   first	   glance	   it	   would	   appear	   that	   the	   diaspora	   literature	   has	   been	  
reluctant	   to	   address	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐building,	   since	   very	   few	  
mentions	  of	   the	  word	   in	  diaspora	   case	   studies	   exist	   and	   even	   fewer	   explicitly	  
analyse	  state-­‐building	  processes	  in	  diaspora-­‐homeland	  analyses.	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Part	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  apparent	  absence	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	   concept	   of	   state-­‐building	   has	   been	   conflated	   with	   concepts	   of	   peace-­‐
building	   and	   development.	  Often	   these	   are	   used	   interchangeably	   to	   depict	   a	  
plethora	  of	  activities	  without	  delineating	  definitions	  of	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  each.	  
At	   times	  anything	  supporting	   local	  communities	   is	  deemed	  a	  development	  or	  
peace-­‐building	  initiative	  so	  that	  the	  concepts	  of	  state-­‐building,	  peace-­‐building	  
and	  development	  have	   lost	   their	  analytical	   rigour.	  Peace-­‐building	  as	   stated	   in	  
the	  previous	  chapter	  refers	  to	  the	  prevention	  of	  the	  recurrence	  of	  violence,	  or	  
creating	   the	   conditions,	   which	   encourage	   sustainable	   peace	   in	   war-­‐torn	  
societies	  (Paris,	  2004).	  Meanwhile	  development	  broadly	  speaking	  refers	  to	  the	  
improvement	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  conditions	  in	  the	  homeland.	  	  
Yet	  deeper	  explorations	  into	  the	  peace-­‐building	  and	  development	  fields	  within	  
the	   diaspora	   literature	   reveal	   that	  multiple	   diasporas	   are	   not	   only	   informing	  
peace-­‐building	   and	   development	   processes	   in	   the	   homeland,	   but	   also	   state-­‐
building	  processes	  as	  defined	   in	   this	   study	   related	   to	   institution-­‐building	  and	  
governance	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   supporting/challenging	   the	   state	   through	  
civil	  society	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  majority	  of	  what	  we	  have	  learned	  in	  this	  respect	  
derives	   from	  African	   case	   studies	   under	   the	  paradigms	  of	   peace-­‐building	   and	  
development	  initiatives	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  societies.	  	  
Diasporas	   have	   been	   involved	   in	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance	   in	  
countries	  of	  origin	  by	  returning	  to	  their	  countries	  of	  origin	  to	  take	  up	  political	  
positions	   in	   ministries,	   as	   new	   presidents	   or	   they	   may	   inform	   governance	  
procedures	   through	   training	   and	   capacity-­‐building,	   as	   well	   as	   strengthening	  
state	   policies	   and	   institutions	   though	   their	   expertise	   and	   knowledge	   (Antwi-­‐
Boateng,	  2012,	  2011;	  Mohamoud,	  2006;	  Galipo,	  2011;	  Pirkkalainen,	  2009;	  Weiss,	  
2009;	   Lyons,	   2007;	   Feyissa,	   2014;	   Van	   Houte	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Koser,	   2007;	   Kleist,	  
2008;	   Lampert,	   2009;	   Brinkerhoff,	   2016;	   Turner,	   2008b;	   Natali,	   2007).Two	  
prominent	   examples	   of	   diaspora	   figures	   who	   returned	   to	   their	   countries	   of	  
origin	   to	   take	   up	   leadership	   positions	   are	   Ellen	   Johnson-­‐Sirleaf,	   a	   former	  
member	   of	   the	   US	   Liberian	   diaspora	   who	   eventually	   went	   on	   to	   become	  
President	  of	  Liberia	  in	  2006	  (Antwi-­‐Boateng,	  2011)	  and	  Ahmed	  Chalabi	  the	  Iraqi	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pro-­‐intervention	   lobbyist	   who	   would	   go	   on	   to	   become	   Iraq’s	   Deputy	   Prime	  
Minister	  in	  2005	  (Bonin,	  2011).	  	  
Returnees	   may	   initiate	   their	   own	   return	   or	   be	   called	   upon	   by	   homeland	  
governments	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   country’s	   state-­‐building	   process.	   This	  
phenomenon	  has	  been	  witnessed	   in	  war-­‐ravaged	  societies	  where	   failing	  states	  
or	  weak	  governments	  are	  lacking	  in	  educated,	  professional	  and	  skilled	  diaspora	  
(Mohamoud,	  2005).	  For	  instance,	  in	  Somaliland,	  one	  third	  of	  ministers	  are	  from	  
the	  diaspora,	  as	  well	  as	  two	  out	  of	  three	  political	  parties	  in	  Somaliland	  are	  led	  
by	  diaspora	  (Galipo,	  2011).	  	  
Returnees	  can	  bring	  much	  needed	  brain	  gain	  and	  skills	  to	  weak	  and	  contested	  
states	   through	   the	   expertise	   and	   skills	   gained	   in	   Western	   hostlands	   and	  
transporting	   them	   to	   their	   countries	   of	   origin.	   	   A	   good	   example	   is	   Djimé	  
Adoum,	   a	   diaspora	   from	   Chad	   living	   in	   America	   who	   was	   able	   to	   directly	  
inform	   good	   governance	   in	   his	   country	   of	   origin	   (Brinkerhoff,	   2016).	   At	   the	  
invite	  of	  President	  Déby	  in	  2010,	  Adoum’s	  technical	  expertise5	  would	  lead	  to	  his	  
appointment	  firstly	  as	  a	  Technical	  Advisor	  on	  Rural	  Development,	  and	  then	  as	  
Minister	  of	  Agriculture	  and	  Irrigation	  to	  address	  issues	  of	  food	  security.	  In	  his	  
post	  as	  Minister	  Adoum	  tackled	  issues	  of	  governance	  by	  working	  with	  multiple	  
local	  stakeholders	  as	  well	  as	  US,	  EU	  and	  international	  donors,	  emphasising	  and	  
encouraging	   the	   local	   ownership	   dimension	   stressed	   by	   the	   state-­‐building	  
literature	   (Chesterman,	   2004).	   Governance	   reforms	   initiated	   by	   Adoum	  
included,	   “the	   modernization	   of	   administrative,	   financial,	   accounting	   and	  
human	  resource	  management	  tools,	  as	  well	  as	  financial	  and	  accounting	  audits,	  
amongst	  many	  others	  (Ibid,	  2016).	  	  
Diaspora	  with	  skills	  and	  expertise	  can	  contribute	  their	  knowledge	  to	  homeland	  
governments	   by	   addressing	   the	   shortage	   of	   state	   personnel	   and	   kick-­‐start	  
democratic	   and	   governance	   programmes	   (Turner,	   2008:	   181).	   Diasporic	  
interventions	  into	  state-­‐building	  can	  include	  providing	  advice	  on	  various	  policy	  
areas,	  rehabilitating	  political	  institutions,	  or	  writing	  treatise	  and	  constitutions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Applying	  his	  PhD	  training	  as	  an	  agricultural	  economist.	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For	  example,	  the	  Eritrean	  diaspora	  helped	  draft	  the	  country’s	  first	  constitution	  
after	   its	   separation	   from	   Ethiopia	   in	   1993	   (Mohamoud,	   2006;	   Koser,	   2007;	  
Mohamoud,	  2005).	  Similarly	   the	  Kurdish	  diaspora	  have	  been	  extremely	  active	  
in	   supporting	   the	   Kurdish	   Quasi-­‐State	   through	   democratic	   norms.	   After	   the	  
Iraq	   war	   in	   2003	   for	   instance,	   a	   group	   of	   Kurdish	   lawyers	   prepared	   a	  
constitution	   and	   institutional	   guidelines	   to	   support	   a	   modern	   parliamentary	  
political	   system,	   which	   included	   ‘a	   speaker	   of	   the	   house,	   president	   of	   the	  
Kurdistan	  National	  Assembly	   (KNA),	  and	  expanded	   the	  ministerial	   cabinet	   to	  
include	   four	   newly	   created	   ministries:	   reconstruction	   and	   development,	  
humanitarian	  aid	  and	  cooperation,	  peshmerga’	  affairs,	  and	  culture	  (Natali,	  2010,	  
p.33).	  	  
	  
Diasporas	   are	   also	   constituent	   actors	   in	   homeland	   civil	   societies	   (Cochrane,	  
2007)	   and	   just	   as	   they	   have	   been	   contributing	   to	   state-­‐building	   processes	  
through	   institution-­‐building	   and	   state	   governance,	   they	   have	   also	   been	  
supporting	   the	   state	   through	   civil	   society.	   It	   is	   argued	   in	   this	   thesis	   that	  
diaspora	   as	   another	   civil	   society	   actor	   in	   homeland	   states	   can	   also	   act	   to	  
challenge	  or	  support	  state	  policies	  and	  institutions	  that	  transform	  or	  alter	  the	  
state.	   This	   is	   especially	   relevant	   in	   war-­‐torn	   countries	   or	   in	   weak	   or	   fragile	  
states	  where	   the	  role	  of	  civil	   society	  can	  be	  crucial	   in	  supporting	   the	  political	  
stability	  of	   the	   state	   (Mohamoud,	  2005;	  Laakso	  and	  Hautaniemi,	   2014;	  Dahre,	  
2007;	  Galipo,	   2011;	  Cochrane,	   2007;	   Smith	   and	   Stares,	   2007;	  Al-­‐Ali	   and	  Koser,	  
2002;	  Basch	  and	  Glick-­‐Schiller,	  1995;	  Mohamoud,	  2006;	  Baser,	  2009).	  	  
	  
Diasporas	  can	  support	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society	  in	  two	  fundamental	  ways.	  
Firstly	  they	  can	  help	  through	  the	  transfer	  of	  social	  remittances,	  which	  can	  help	  
develop	   liberal	  norms,	  values,	   ideas	  and	  social	  capital	   (Levitt,	  2001;	  Levitt	  and	  
Lamba-­‐Nieves,	   2011;	   Laakso	   and	   Hautaniemi,	   2014).	   Levitt	   coined	   the	   term	  
social	  remittances	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  norms,	  practices,	  identities	  and	  social	  capital	  
that	  migrants	  send	  back	  to	  their	  countries	  of	  origin,	  a	  distinction	  from	  financial	  
remittances	  related	  to	  money	  (2001).	  	  Levitt’s	  study	  of	  the	  Dominican	  diaspora	  
showed	  that	  the	  ideas	  and	  behaviours	  that	  Dominicans	  brought	  with	  them	  such	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as	   community	   organization	   and	   social	   responsibility	  were	   transformed	   in	   the	  
US	   as	   they	   met	   with	   a	   legal	   framework	   that	   demanded	   accountability	   and	  
contractual	   agreements.	   In	   turn	   legal	  norms,	   accountability	   and	   transparency	  
were	  some	  of	  the	  social	  remittances	  that	  diaspora	  leaders	  remitted	  back	  to	  the	  
country	  of	  origin	  when	  dealing	  with	  community	  projects	  back	  home	  (Levitt	  and	  
Lamba-­‐Nieves	   2011).	   As	   the	   Dominican	   community	   leaders’	   organizational	  
capacity	   and	   ideas	   about	   public	   services	   fomented	   in	   the	   host	   country,	   they	  
were	  able	  to	  further	  institutionalize	  these	  in	  their	  hometowns.	  	  
	  
Similarly	   the	  Liberian	  diaspora	   in	   the	  US	  have	   attempted	   to	   spread	  norms	  of	  
pluralism,	   rule	   of	   law,	   human	   rights,	   anti-­‐corruption	   and	   democracy	   in	   their	  
home	   country	   to	   support	   peace-­‐building	   processes	   in	   Liberia,	   which	   are	   also	  
relevant	   for	   state-­‐building	   processes	   (Antwi-­‐Boateng,	   2012).	   Consequently	  
diaspora	  have	  been	  labelled	  norm	  entrepreneurs	  and	  have	  been	  hailed	  as	  agents	  
of	   the	   liberal	   peace	   (Turner,	   2008b),	   though	   others	   are	  more	   sceptical	   about	  
their	  liberalising	  language	  that	  can	  often	  be	  used	  to	  advance	  nationalistic	  goals	  
(Koinova,	  2010).	  	  
	  
Beyond	  norms,	  diaspora	  can	  also	  support	  civil	  society	  materially.	  Diaspora	  can	  
often	  perform	  quasi-­‐state	  services	   in	  weak	  states	  where	  governments	  may	  not	  
have	  the	  capabilities	  or	  resources	  to	  do	  so.	  For	  example	  in	  Morocco,	  a	  group	  of	  
diasporic	  labour	  workers	  in	  France	  helped	  set	  up	  an	  electricity	  grid	  to	  provide	  
electricity	   for	   rural	   villagers	   in	   Souss,	   using	   their	   transnational	   networks	   and	  
labour	  organisation	  experience	  (Iskander,	  2008).	  Health-­‐care	  workers	  from	  the	  
Somali-­‐Finnish	   diaspora	   meanwhile	   have	   helped	   strengthen	   and	   reconstruct	  
the	  healthcare	  sector	  in	  Somalia	  and	  Puntland	  through	  collaboration	  with	  the	  
International	   Organisation	   for	   Migration	   (Weiss,	   2009).	   Others	   meanwhile,	  
have	  contributed	  to	  developing	  the	  education	  sector	  by	  funding	  the	  creation	  of	  
universities	  and	  other	  education	  projects	   (Hoehne	  and	   Ibrahim,	  2014;	  Orozco	  
and	  Lapointe,	  2004).	  	  
	  
The	   above	   case	   studies	   demonstrate	   how	   diaspora’s	   experiences	   in	   Western	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hostlands	   and	   the	   skills	   they	   gain	   can	   be	   transferred	   to	   their	   homelands	   to	  
strengthen	  or	  transform	  state	  institutions.	  Indeed,	  some	  initiatives	  can	  inform	  
state	  practices	  and	  help	  develop	  new	  state	  policies	  and	   initiatives.	  One	  of	   the	  
most	  prominent	  examples	  of	  this	  occurred	  in	  Mexico.	  Seeing	  the	  development	  
potential	   of	   links	   between	   diasporic	   hometown	   association	   and	   their	  
counterparts	  in	  Mexico	  the	  government	  created	  Mexico’s	  3x1	  programme	  where	  
home	   town	   associations	   investments	   are	   matched	   by	   the	   government	   and	  
scaled	  up	  to	  local,	  state	  and	  national	  levels	  (Orozco	  and	  Lapointe,	  2004).	  	  
	  
On	   the	   other	   hand	   diasporic	   intervention	   can	   also	   raise	   suspicions	   in	   deeply	  
divided	   or	   conflicting	   societies,	   and	   can	   be	   undermined	   by	   government	  
institutional	  weakness	  (Hoehne	  and	  Ibrahim,	  2014).	  Nonetheless	  whether	  these	  
supportive	   initiatives	   conflict	   with	   states	   or	   not	   they	   are	   shaping	   the	   state	  
through	  their	  interactions	  with	  local	  populations,	  changing	  mind-­‐sets	  for	  better	  
or	   worse,	   and	   providing	   new	   opportunities	   and	   horizons	   that	   are	   ultimately	  
shaping	  the	  evolution	  of	  states.	  	  
	  
Diaspora	   can	   also	   challenge	   the	   type	   of	   state	   being	   built	   by	   contesting	   state	  
policies,	   advocating	   for	   human	   rights,	   minority	   rights	   and	   women’s	   rights	  
amongst	  others.	  Using	  the	  political	  spaces	  open	  to	  them	  in	  the	  hostland,	  that	  
are	  often	  prohibited	  to	  them	  in	  the	  homeland,	  diaspora	  can	  mount	  pressure	  on	  
homeland	  governments	  acting	  much	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  transnational	  advocacy	  
networks	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	   1998).	   In	  doing	  so	   they	  are	  shaping	  state-­‐society	  
not	   only	   on	   universal	   issues	   but	   also	   those	   particular	   to	   the	   homeland	   in	  
question	  (Lyons	  and	  Mandaville,	  2010).	  
	  
Diaspora	   activism	   in	   this	   regard	  may	   lead	   to	   a	   state	   altering	   its	   stances	   and	  
policies.	  For	  example,	  diaspora	  Kurds	  across	  Europe	  have	  been	  able	  to	  socially	  
construct	   a	   collective	   Kurdish	   identity	   against	   Turkish	   nationalism	   through	  
cultural,	   social	   and	   political	   practices	   in	   the	   liberal	   space	   of	   their	   western	  
hostlands.	   	   Kurdish	   transnational	   practices	   and	   actions	   eventually	   led	   to	   a	  
change	   in	   policy	   in	   Turkey	   when	   previously	   prohibited	   Kurdish	   language	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broadcasts	  were	  legalized	  in	  Turkey	  in	  2001	  (Adamson	  and	  Demetriou,	  2007).	  	  
	  
Similarly	   religious	  rights	  have	  also	  been	  championed	  by	  diaspora	  where	   there	  
has	  been	  discrimination	  in	  homelands	  against	  a	  religious	  minority.	  The	  Muslim	  
Ethiopian	   diaspora,	   for	   example,	   have	   been	   very	   active	   in	   advocating	   for	  
legislative	  and	  public	  policies	   for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  civil	  and	  humanitarian	  
rights	  of	  Ethiopian	  Muslims	  (Feyissa,	  2014).	  Using	  a	  rights-­‐based	  and	  pluralistic	  
approach	   learnt	   in	   the	  diaspora	   the	  Ethiopian	  migrant	  organisations	  based	   in	  
the	   US	   and	   Sweden	   have	   been	   able	   to	   effectively	   target	   the	   Ethiopian	  
government.	  Meeting	  with	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Christian	  leaders	  they	  have	  
attempted	   to	   alter	   the	   conception	   of	   the	   Ethiopian	   state	   by	   challenging	   its	  
Christian	  heritage	  and	  advocating	  for	  a	  more	  secular	  state	  (Ibid.,	  2014).	  	  
	  
There	  is	  nothing	  to	  suggest	  that	  diaspora	  may	  act	  in	  a	  peaceful	  way	  to	  alter	  or	  
fight	   their	   homeland	   states.	  Diasporas	  working	   through	   civil	   society	   can	   also	  
challenge	  the	  state	  by	  supporting	  more	  violent	  groups	  in	  the	  homeland	  battling	  
for	  independence	  or	  secession	  (Skrbiš,	  1999;	  Orjuela,	  2008;	  Baser,	  2009;	  Smith	  
and	  Stares,	  2007;	  Collier	  and	  Hoeffler,	  2004;	  Koinova,	  2011;	  Casier,	  2010;	  Eliassi,	  
2016;	   Natali,	   2007;	   Østergaard-­‐Nielsen,	   2003;	   Wayland,	   2004;	   Fair,	   2007).	  
Diaspora	   can	   support	   militant	   groups	   fighting	   the	   government	   through	  
remittances,	   funding	   for	   weapons	   and	   training	   (Orjuela,	   2008).	   They	   may	  
alternatively	   work	   to	   topple	   governments	   by	   supporting	   opposition	  
governments	  abroad	  in	  exile	  (Shain,	  1994;	  Lyons	  and	  Mandaville,	  2010;	  Antwi-­‐
Boateng,	  2011).	  Diaspora	  support	  for	  violent	  groups	  is	  thus	  contributing	  to	  the	  
evolution	  and	  process	  of	  state-­‐building	  in	  homeland	  states	  through	  their	  funds,	  
support	   and	   clashes	   with	   homeland	   governments.	   This	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   the	  
evolution	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   state	   where	   war	   and	   competition	   for	   power	  
developed	  the	  sovereign	  state	  (Tilly,	  1990).	  The	  difference	  today	  however	  is	  the	  
struggle	   and	  competition	   for	  power	  exists	   to	  determine	   the	  kind	   of	   state	   that	  
diaspora	  and	  homeland	  groups	  are	  struggling	  for.	  	  
	  
The	   literature	   review	   above	   has	   revealed	   the	   myriad	   ways	   that	   diaspora	   are	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mobilising	   towards	   state-­‐building	   processes	   through	   institution-­‐building	   and	  
governance,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  as	  well	  as	  supporting	  or	  challenging	  the	  state	  on	  
the	  other	  in	  countries	  of	  origin.	  However	  it	  has	  also	  exposed	  a	  number	  of	  gaps	  
within	   the	   literature	   that	   this	   study	   would	   like	   to	   address.	   Firstly,	   the	   case	  
studies	   informing	   this	  political	  process	  have	  been	  predominantly	  drawn	   from	  
the	  peace-­‐building	  and	  development	  case	  studies	  within	  the	  diaspora	  literature.	  
There	   is	   yet	   to	   emerge	   a	   distinct	   and	   clear	   sub-­‐category	   within	   the	   diaspora	  
literature	  that	  addresses	  directly	  diaspora	  mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐building.	  Case	  
studies	   of	   diaspora’s	   mobilisation	   towards	   political	   institution-­‐building	   and	  
governance	  remain	  patchy	  and	  sparse,	  and	  though	  case	  studies	  within	  the	  civil	  
society	   literature	   are	   numerous,	   very	   few	   address	   directly	   how	   diasporas	   are	  
working	  through	  civil	  society	  to	  contribute	  to	  state-­‐building	  processes	  (Laakso	  
and	   Hautaniemi,	   2014).	   Addressing	   this	   gap	   is	   important	   as	   diaspora	  
mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐building,	   as	   defined	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   is	   distinct	  
from	   both	   peace-­‐building	   and	   development	   as	   shown.	   Yet	   diaspora’s	  
contribution	   towards	   this	   distinct	   political	   process	   remains	   an	   area	   under-­‐
investigated	  in	  the	  diaspora	  literature.	  
	  
Secondly,	  the	  case	  studies	  presented	  above	  reference	  largely	  case	  studies	  from	  
the	  African	  continent	  and	  depict	  the	  experiences	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  societies	  and	  
states.	  Though	  there	  are	  certainly	  similarities	  between	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  states	  
in	  Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  East,	  each	  region	  and	  country	  has	  its	  particular	  post-­‐
colonial	  legacies,	  socio-­‐cultural	  dynamics,	  obstacles,	  and	  levels	  of	  development	  
that	   inform	  their	  state-­‐building	  evolution.	  With	  some	  exceptions	   from	  largely	  
Turkish	   and	   Kurdish	   diaspora	   case	   studies,	   very	   little	   work	   has	   dealt	   with	  
diaspora	   mobilization	   for	   state-­‐building	   in	   the	   Middle	   East,	   a	   generally	  
neglected	  region	   in	  the	  diaspora	   literature.	  My	  study	  would	  build	  on	  the	  case	  
studies	   from	   the	   African	   continent	   and	   offer	   new	   insights	   from	   a	   lesser-­‐
explored	  diaspora	  and	  part	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
	  
Thirdly,	  with	   a	   few	  minor	   exceptions	   from	  Kurdish	   and	  Afghani	   case	   studies	  
(Khayati	   and	   Dahlstedt,	   2014;	   Natali,	   2007;	   Kouser,	   2014;	   Brinkerhoff	   and	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Taddesse,	   2008;	   Shultz	   and	  Merril,	   2006;	   Brinkerhoff,	   2006)	   few	   studies	   have	  
comprehensively	  researched	  diaspora	  mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐building	  following	  
military	  intervention	  and	  occupation.	  Those	  that	  have,	  have	  looked	  at	  lobbying	  
efforts	   of	   diaspora	   groups	   to	   influence	   foreign	   governments	   to	   intervene	   in	  
countries	  of	  origin	  (Moss,	  2016;	  Koinova,	  2013).	  Yet,	  these	  studies	  do	  not	  discuss	  
diaspora	   mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐building	   following	   intervention	   and	   the	   ways	  
diaspora	  incorporate	  themselves	  in	  this	  process.	  
	  
In	   contexts	   where	   military-­‐intervention	   and	   occupation	   have	   occurred,	  
diaspora	   are	   not	   only	   dealing	   with	   homeland	   governments/leaders	   but	   also	  
foreign	   states.	   These	   lend	   a	   different	   dynamic	   to	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   for	  
state-­‐building,	   especially	   where	   an	   incumbent	   regime	   has	   been	   ousted,	   as	   in	  
the	  case	  of	  Iraq,	  and	  a	  new	  state	  is	  being	  re-­‐built	  by	  foreign	  interveners.	  How	  
do	  diaspora	  mobilise	  for	  state-­‐building	  under	  these	  circumstances?	  What	  kind	  
of	   state	   are	   they	   trying	   to	   build?	  And	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   study	  why	   are	  
there	  variations	   in	   the	  ways	   that	  diaspora	  contribute	   to	   this	  political	  process?	  
These	  are	  the	  gaps	  in	  the	  literature	  I	  would	  like	  to	  address	  in	  this	  study	  using	  
the	  case	  study	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  diaspora.	  	  
	  
Explanatory	  Factors	  and	  Hypotheses	  
Now	  that	  we	  have	  looked	  at	  how	  diasporas	  can	  mobilise	  for	  state-­‐building	  and	  
we	  have	  laid	  the	  grounds	  for	  investigating	  how	  the	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  
Sweden	  mobilised	  towards	  state-­‐building	  in	  Iraq	  in	  the	  post	  2003	  period,	  let	  us	  
turn	  our	  attention	  to	  exploring	  the	  second	  research	  question	  of	  this	  study:	  Why	  
did	   the	   UK	   based	   diaspora	   have	   more	   opportunities	   to	   contribute	   to	  
institution-­‐building	   and	   governance,	   while	   the	   Swedish	   diaspora	   had	   more	  
opportunities	  to	  mobilise	  towards	  supporting	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society?	  In	  
other	   words,	   what	   factors	   determine	   the	   types	   of	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   for	  
state-­‐building	  that	  diasporas	  engage	  in?	  
	  
The	  diaspora	   literature	  offers	  only	  partial	   indications	   in	   this	   less–investigated	  
area.	  Therefore	  using	  both	  inductive	  and	  deductive	  research	  methods,	  I	  explore	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this	   subject	  matter	   using	   the	   limited	   diaspora	   literature	   as	   a	   guide,	   but	   also	  
extrapolate	  from	  the	  case	  of	  Iraq	  for	  addressing	  the	  main	  research	  question	  of	  
this	  study.	  I	  put	  forward	  three	  possible	  factors	  that	  may	  account	  for	  this	  puzzle:	  
the	  profile	  of	  the	  diaspora	  in	  each	  host	  state,	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  hostland	  
towards	   Iraq	   in	   2003,	   and	  a	  new	  hypothesis	  drawn	   from	   the	   Iraqi	   case	   study;	  
links	  to	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  parties.	  	  
	  
Diaspora	  Profiles	  
The	  profile	  of	  diaspora	  is	  an	  important	  factor	  that	  may	  account	  for	  differences	  
in	   the	  behaviour	  of	  groups	  and	  why	   they	  may	  mobilise	  politically	   in	  different	  
ways.	   The	   literature	   has	   approached	   the	   study	   of	   diaspora	   profiles	   and	   their	  
impact	   on	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   in	   two	   distinct	   ways.	   The	   first	   relates	   to	  
attributes	   of	   the	   collective	   community	   including	   size,	   unity,	   and	   ethnicity,	   ,	  
while	  the	  second	  references	  individual	  backgrounds	  related	  to	  education	  levels,	  
prior	   social	   and	   political	   experiences	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   status.	   I	   argue	   that	  
the	   former	   is	  unhelpful	   in	   informing	   this	   study’s	   research	  question,	  while	   the	  
latter	   is	   partial	   and	  neglects	   the	   historical	   dimensions	   of	   diaspora	  waves	   and	  
profiles	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  diaspora	  mobilisation.	  	  
	  
Collective	  diaspora	  profiles	  
There	  are	  several	  collective	  attribute-­‐based	  factors	  that	  can	  shape	  the	  political	  
transnationalism	  of	  diaspora.	  One	  of	  the	  important	  features	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  the	  
size	   of	   the	   diaspora.	   As	   Shain	   asserts,	   ‘the	   nature	   and	   range	   of	   diasporic	  
involvement	   in	   the	   home	   country's	   affairs	   depend	   largely	   upon	   the	   size	   and	  
diversity	  of	  the	  overseas	  community	  …”	  (Shain	  1994:	  815).	  Size	  matters	  because	  
with	   a	   larger	   constituency	   there	   are	   more	   human,	   knowledge-­‐based	   and	  
monetary	  resources	   to	  be	  pooled,	  utilized	  and	  mobilized	  on	  homeland	   issues.	  	  
Size	   is	   also	   important	   for	  mobilization	  purposes	  because	  a	   considerably	   sized	  
and	  organized	  diaspora	  can	  pose	  an	  electoral	  threat	  to	  presidential	  candidates	  
as	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Cuban	  diaspora	  and	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  demonstrates	  
in	   the	   United	   States	   (Shain,	   1994).	   Governments	   with	   large	   ethnic	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constituencies	  cannot	  ignore	  their	  power,	  nor	  the	  transnational	  potential	  they	  
may	  wield	  both	  diplomatically	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  trade	  (Rao,	  2011).	  Furthermore,	  
the	  larger	  the	  diaspora,	  the	  more	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  create	  ethnic,	  cultural	  and	  social	  
organisations	   that	  help	  continue	   its	  homeland	  attachments	   (Safran,	   1991)	   and	  
thus	   continue	   its	   powerbase.	   However,	   while	   size	   is	   important	   for	  
understanding	   the	   scale,	   variety	   and	   impact	   of	   collective	   action,	   it	   cannot	  
account	  for	  why	  there	  may	  be	  variation	  in	  the	  types	  of	  state-­‐building	  that	  the	  
Iraqi	   diaspora	   in	   each	   host	   state	   engaged	   in,	   especially	   as	   both	   the	   UK	   and	  
Sweden	  have	  large	  Iraqi	  communities	  (Sassoon,	  2009).	  	  
	  
While	   the	   literature	   recognises	   that	   diasporas	   are	   a	   heterogeneous	   mix	   of	  
people	  with	  varying	  socio-­‐economic	  backgrounds,	  religions,	  ethnicities	  beliefs,	  
aspirations	   and	   interests,	   an	   important	   factor	   for	   political	  mobilisation	   is	   the	  
level	  of	  unity	  among	  diaspora	  members.	  Gabriel	  Sheffer	  argues	   that	  diasporas	  
must	   overcome	   generational,	   social	   and	   ideological	   differences	   if	   they	   are	   to	  
survive,	   and	   strongly	   asserts,	   “without	   a	   significant	   degree	   of	   solidarity,	   any	  
domestic	   and	   trans-­‐state	   activities	   will	   be	   almost	   impossible	   (2006:	   88).	  
Meanwhile	  Haney	  and	  Vanderbush	  claim,	  “a	  group	  will	  be	  more	  influential	  to	  
the	  extent	  that	  it	  enjoys	  a	  large	  and	  unified	  base	  of	  politically	  active	  members	  
who	  vote	  in	  a	  concentrated	  bloc”	  (1999:	  344).	  	  
In	  this	  respect,	  ethnicity	  and	  religion	  can	  act	  as	  a	  unifying	  force	  in	  response	  to	  
homeland	   claims,	   struggles	   and	   threats.	  As	   the	   bountiful	   literature	   on	   ethnic	  
interest	   groups	   and	   ethno-­‐nationalism	   attests,	   ethnic	   identifications	   are	  
powerful	   modalities	   for	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   (Shain,	   1994,	   2007;	   Shain	   and	  
Barth,	   2003;	   Sheffer,	   2003,	   1986).	   This	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   various	   empirical	   case	  
studies	   where	   the	   diaspora	   has	   had	   very	   clear	   political	   aims	   such	   as	   the	  
Kosovans	   pursuing	   sovereign	   independence	   (Koinova,	   2012),	   Kurds	  
campaigning	  for	  Kurdish	  rights	   in	  Turkey	  (Adamson	  and	  Demetriou	  2007),	  or	  
the	   Jewish	   diaspora	   lobbying	   against	   existential	   threats	   facing	   Israel	   (Shain,	  
2002).	  What	  this	  literature	  proves	  is	  that	  the	  more	  fragmented	  a	  diaspora,	  the	  
less	  salience	  it	  will	  have	  politically	  as	  collective	  action	  is	  forestalled,	  as	  the	  case	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of	  the	  Arab-­‐American	  diaspora	  in	  the	  United	  States	  demonstrates	  (Shain,	  1996).	  	  
However,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   diaspora,	   the	   diaspora	   is	   fragmented	   along	  
multiple	  lines	  related	  to	  ethnicity,	  sect,	  class,	  and	  waves	  of	  migration,	  to	  name	  
a	  few.	  While	  there	  is	  unity	  amongst	  different	  groups,	  these	  divisions	  and	  unities	  
are	  found	  in	  both	  the	  UK	  and	  Sweden,	  which	  therefore	  rules	  out	  this	  variable	  as	  
a	  factor	  in	  our	  analysis.	  	  Furthermore,	  while	  an	  understanding	  of	  unity/disunity	  
of	   diaspora	  may	   shed	   light	   into	   the	  motives,	   issues	   and	  obstacles	   of	   diaspora	  
mobilisation	  it	  does	  not	  inform	  our	  puzzle	  or	  shed	  light	  into	  why	  there	  might	  
be	  differences	  in	  the	  type	  of	  mobilisation	  that	  diaspora	  engage	  in.	  
The	  literature	  focusing	  on	  collective	  attribute-­‐based	  qualities	  has	  also	  stressed	  
the	  role	  of	  partial	  assimilation	  in	  the	  hostland	  for	  mobilising	  towards	  homeland	  
affairs	   (Rubenzer,	   2008).	  The	   argument	  here	   relates	   to	   the	   group	   in	  question	  
being	   seen	   and	   accepted	   as	   a	   political	   player	   in	   domestic	   affairs	   (Ibid.,2008).	  
Other	   scholars	   have	   supported	   this	   finding	   by	   stressing	   that	   as	   immigrants	  
become	  more	  integrated	  their	  transnational	  political	  activities	  increase	  as	  they	  
become	   more	   familiar	   with	   the	   political	   institutions	   of	   the	   sending	   country	  
(Guarnizo	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  de	  Haas,	  2006;	  Baser,	  2012).	  Once	  again	  however,	  partial-­‐
assimilation	   may	   account	   for	   different	   levels	   of	   political	   transnationalism	  
between	  diaspora	  who	  may	  be	  more	  or	  less	  assimilated,	  but	  the	  question	  here	  is	  
to	   what	   extent	   assimilation	   affects	   the	   types	   of	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   that	  
diaspora	  engage	  in?	  In	  this	  regard,	  assimilation	  may	  account	  for	  differences	  in	  
what	  diaspora	  can	  do	  in	  the	  country	  of	  settlement,	  however	  this	  has	  no	  bearing	  
on	  what	  diaspora	  can	  do	   in	  the	  country	  of	  origin.	   In	  this	  respect	   this	  variable	  
also	  holds	  no	  explanatory	  power	  for	  this	  study’s	  research	  question.	  	  
As	   has	   been	   documented	   in	   the	   literature	   review	   above,	   collective	   diaspora	  
attributes	  can	  have	  a	  significant	  bearing	  on	  diaspora	  mobilisation	  in	  countries	  
of	  settlement.	  However,	  as	  demonstrated	  these	  studies	  have	  largely	  focussed	  on	  
how	  diasporic	   attribute-­‐based	  qualities	   affect	   the	   scale	  of	   transnationalism	  or	  
which	   groups	   are	  more	   successful	   at	  mobilising	   towards	   transnational	   issues.	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These	   studies,	   therefore,	   fall	   short	   of	   informing	   how	   diaspora	   profiles	   affect	  
types	  of	  diaspora	  mobilisation,	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
	  
Individual	  diaspora	  profiles	  
More	  informative	  for	  this	  study	  are	  diaspora’s	  individual	  attributes,	  which	  may	  
shed	  light	  into	  why	  some	  diaspora	  were	  able	  to	  become	  involved	  in	  institution-­‐
building	  and	  governance	  and	  why	  others	  may	  have	  been	  directed	  to	  supporting	  
the	  state	  through	  civil	  society.	  	  
	  
One	   important	   factor	   relates	   to	   education.	   Contradicting	   much	   of	   the	  
assimilation	   literature	   that	  suggests	   that	   the	  more	   immigrants	  are	  assimilated	  
the	   less	   they	   will	   maintain	   homeland	   links	   (Portes	   and	   Rumbaut,	   1996)	  
Guarnizo	   and	   colleagues’	   findings	   instead	   suggest	   that	   transnational	   political	  
activities	  are	  not	  restricted	  to	  marginalised	  or	  poorly	  educated	  migrants,	  but	  in	  
fact	   those	   who	  were	   better	   educated	   and	   have	   been	   in	   the	   host	   country	   the	  
longest	  (2003:	  1238-­‐1239).	  This	  finding	  is	  supported	  in	  the	  diaspora	  case	  studies	  
with	   those	  most	   likely	   to	   return,	  help	   in	  capacity	  building	  or	   initiate	  projects	  
have	  been	  largely	  educated	  diaspora,	  who	  have	  gained	  skills	  in	  their	  hostlands	  
and	   thus	   have	   been	   able	   to	   give	   back	   more	   to	   their	   countries	   of	   origin	  
(Brinkerhoff,	   2005,	   2016).	   Education	   is	   an	   important	   factor	   for	   diaspora’s	  
involvement	   in	   political	   transnationalism,	   however,	   it	   does	   not	   hold	  
explanatory	  power	  for	  this	  study	  as	  we	  know	  from	  the	  literature	  review	  above	  
that	   educated	  diaspora	  may	  act	   in	  different	  ways	   to	   support	   state-­‐building	   in	  
countries	   of	   origin.	   Some	   may	   work	   towards	   institution-­‐building	   and	  
governance,	  while	  others	  may	  wish	   to	   support	   their	  homeland	   states	   through	  
civil	  society.	  As	  such	  education	  levels	  while	  important	  for	  understanding	  who	  is	  
more	   likely	   to	  mobilise	   towards	   the	   homeland,	   cannot	   explain	   the	   puzzle	   of	  
how	  diaspora	  profiles	  influence	  the	  types	  of	  state-­‐building	  that	  diaspora	  engage	  
in.	  	  
	  
Another	   set	   of	   literature	   has	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   prior	   social	   and	  
political	  experiences.	  According	  to	  Levitt	  and	  Lamba-­‐Nieves,	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   “People’s	  experiences	  prior	  to	  migration	  strongly	  influence	  what	  they	  do	  
in	  the	  countries	  where	  they	  settle;	  this,	  in	  turn,	  affects	  what	  they	  remit	  back	  to	  
their	   homelands,	  which	   becomes	   clear	  when	  we	   analyse	  migration	   through	   a	  
transnational	   lens.	  The	   ideas	  and	  practices	  migrants	  bring	  with	   them	  actively	  
shape	  who	  and	  what	  they	  encounter	  in	  the	  countries	  where	  they	  move,	  which	  
then	  shapes	  what	  they	  send	  back.”	  (Levitt	  and	  Lamba-­‐Nieves,	  2011,	  p.2)	  
Levitt’s	  study	  of	  the	  Dominican	  diaspora	  showed	  that	  the	  ideas	  and	  behaviours	  
that	   Dominicans	   brought	   with	   them	   such	   as	   community	   organization	   and	  
social	   responsibility	   were	   those	   that	   were	   practices	   and	   further	   developed	   in	  
the	  US	  as	  they	  met	  with	  a	   legal	  framework	  that	  demanded	  accountability	  and	  
contractual	   agreements.	   In	   turn	   legal	  norms,	   accountability	   and	   transparency	  
were	  some	  of	  the	  social	  remittances	  that	  diaspora	  leaders	  then	  remitted	  back	  to	  
their	   country	   of	   origin	   when	   dealing	   with	   community	   projects	   back	   home	  
(Levitt	  and	  Lamba-­‐Nieves	  2011).	  	  
	  
Similar	   to	   Levitt	   and	   Lamba-­‐Nieves’	   social	   remittances’	   argument,	   other	  
scholars	   have	   underlined	   the	   relationship	   between	   migrants’	   prior	   political	  
experiences	   and	   their	   political	   transnationalism.	   Guarnizo	   et.al	   found	   that	  
individuals	   who	  were	   already	   politically	   active	   in	   their	   homelands	   continued	  
these	   interests	  after	  emigrating	  (2003:	   1216).	  Furthermore	  a	  comparative	  study	  
of	  the	  political	  participation	  of	  Turks,	  Moroccans,	  Surinamese	  and	  Antilleans	  in	  
the	  Netherlands	  revealed	  that	  Turks	  who	  were	  more	  politically	  involved,	  often	  
had	   prior	   political	   participation	   in	   their	   country	   of	   origin	  where	   “civic	   virtue	  
and	   social	   capital	   seem	   to	   have	   migrated	   together	   with	   the	   ethnic	   groups”	  
(Fenemma	  and	  Tillie	  2001:	  37).	  	  
	  
If	   the	   literature	   is	   correct	   than	  we	  would	  expect	   that	  diaspora	  who	  may	  have	  
been	  involved	  in	  civic	  associations	  to	  continue	  their	  political	  trajectory	  in	  this	  
way	   following	  migration,	   just	  as	  we	  would	  expect	   those	  who	  were	   involved	   in	  
formal	  politics	  to	  continue	  their	  engagement	  directly	  through	  state	  structures.	  
There	   is	   certainly	   some	   truth	   to	   this	   statement	   as	   within	   the	   Iraqi	   diaspora	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many	  homeland	  political	  and	  social	  organisations	  have	  been	  replicated	   in	   the	  
diaspora	   such	   as	   the	   Iraqi	   Women’s	   League	   or	   the	   Iraqi	   Communist	   Party.	  
However,	  opportunities	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  formal	  politics	  were	  limited	  for	  Iraqis	  
unless	   they	   were	   members	   of	   the	   Baathist	   party	   who	   constitute	   a	   minority	  
within	  the	  UK	  and	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  and	  who	  are	  not	  included	  in	  this	  study.	  	  
	  
More	  relevant	  for	  this	  study’s	  research	  question	  is	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  profile	  of	  
diaspora	   for	   understanding	   the	   types	   of	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   they	   can	   and	  
cannot	   engage	   in.	   The	   literature	   has	   documented	   some	   of	   the	   differences	  
between	  diaspora	   elites,	   those	  who	  occupy	   a	  higher	   socio-­‐economic	   status	   in	  
society	   and	   those	   that	   Dorai	   refers	   to	   as	   the	   rank	   and	   file	   of	   political	  
transnational	  activities	  found	  amongst	  the	  majority	  diaspora	  population	  (Doraï,	  
2002a).	  There	   are	   two	   important	   factors	   that	  may	   account	   for	  why	   these	   two	  
socio-­‐economic	   groups	  might	   engage	   in	   different	  ways.	   Firstly,	   elites	   have	   at	  
their	   disposal	   monetary	   resources,	   which	   grant	   them	   the	   power	   to	   lobby,	  
execute	  political	  campaigns	  and	  build	  political	  networks	  in	  both	  the	  homeland	  
and	   hostland.	   For	   example,	   the	   American	   Israeli	   Public	   Affairs	   Committee	  
(AIPAC),	  which	  is	  often	  cited	  as	  the	  exemplar	  diasporic	  political	  organisation	  in	  
America,	  has	  the	  monetary	  resources,	  networks	  and	  support,	  which	  have	  built	  
its	   organisational	   strength	   and	   led	   it	   to	   become	   the	   most	   successful	   ethnic	  
interest	   group	   lobby	   in	  America	   (Haney	   and	  Vanderbush,	   1999;	  Mearsheimer	  
and	  Walt,	  2008;	  Rubenzer,	  2008).	  	  
	  
Non-­‐elites	   do	   not	   have	   at	   their	   disposal	   financial	   resources	   to	   set	   up	  
organisationally	   strong	   political	   organizations,	   a	   prerequisite	   found	   to	   be	  
important	   for	   effective	   lobbying	   and	   political	   influence	   (Rubenzer,	   2008).	  
Therefore	   their	   engagement	   will	   more	   likely	   be	   in	   the	   form	   of	   independent	  
initiatives	  or	  grass-­‐roots	  activity	  more	  in	  line	  with	  supporting	  the	  state	  through	  
civil	  society	  where	  financial	  resources	  can	  be	  fundraised	  collectively	  or	  acquired	  
through	   grants.	  Monetary	   resources	  may	   therefore	   partially	   explain	   who	  was	  
able	   to	   return	   to	   Iraq	   and	   become	   involved	   in	   institution-­‐building,	   and	   why	  
others	  without	  financial	  capital	  were	  directed	  to	  civil	  society.	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Yet	  monetary	  resources	  on	  their	  own	  cannot	  fully	  explain	  why	  some	  diasporic	  
elites	  were	  able	  to	  become	  involved	   in	   institution-­‐building	  and	  governance	   in	  
Iraq.	   Clearly	   along	   with	   monetary	   resources	   to	   effectively	   carry	   out	   political	  
campaigns,	  diaspora	  also	  need	  to	  be	  connected	  to	  the	  right	  political	  networks.	  
Another	   big	   difference	   between	   elites	   and	   ordinary	   diaspora	   actors	   are	   their	  
networks.	  While	   elites	   are	   connected	   to	   powerful	   socio-­‐political	   networks	   in	  
the	  homeland	   and	  hostland,	   ordinary	  diaspora	   citizens	   are	   connected	   to	   “kin	  
and	   friendship	   ties”	   (Guarnizo	   et	   al.,	   2003,	   p.1232).	   As	   such	   the	   transnational	  
networks	   they	   are	   linked	   to	   are	   often	   familial	   and	   local	   (Basch	   and	   Glick-­‐
Schiller,	   1995;	   Schiller	   et	   al.,	   1995;	   Al-­‐Ali	   and	   Koser,	   2002;	   Halm	   and	   Sezgin,	  
2013;	  Karabegovic,	  2016).	  	  
Transnational	   activities	   therefore	   cut	   across	   class	   lines,	   and	   tap	   into	  different	  
transnational	   networks	   and	   encourage	   alternative	   political	   activities.	   This	   is	  
especially	   the	  case	   for	  diaspora	   form	   the	   same	  country	  who	  have	  migrated	  at	  
different	   times	   and	   in	   different	   periods	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   diaspora.	  
These	  	  “vintages	  and	  patterns	  of	  migration”	  may	  contribute	  to	  what	  Pasura	  has	  
termed	   a	   “fractured	   transnational	   formation”(Pasura,	   2012,	   p.153),	   which	  
effectively	  leads	  to	  different	  political	  transnationalisms	  based	  on	  the	  historical	  
contexts,	   status,	   socio-­‐economic	   profiles	   and	   reasons	   for	   migrating	   from	   the	  
original	  homeland.	  	  
Just	   as	   the	   literature	   on	   social	   remittances	   has	   argued	   that	   migrants’	   prior	  
experiences	   influence	   their	   transnational	   practices	   (Levitt,	   2001;	   Levitt	   and	  
Lamba-­‐Nieves,	   2011),	   I	   argue	   that	   prior	   social	   and	   political	   networks	   are	   also	  
important	  for	  influencing	  the	  types	  of	  mobilisation	  that	  diaspora	  engage	  in.	  Yet	  
with	   few	   exceptions	   (Mcgregor,	   2009;	  McGregor	   and	   Pasura,	   2014),	   historical	  
networks	   have	   not	   been	   adequately	   explored	   in	   the	   diaspora	   literature.	   The	  
social	   and	   political	   networks	   that	   diaspora	   had	   upon	   exiting	   their	   country	   of	  
origin	   links	   them	  to	   specific	   socio-­‐economic	  groups	  and	  political	  networks	   in	  
the	  homeland.	  So	  diaspora	  from	  prominent	  or	  wealthy	  families	  are	  often	  linked	  
to	   more	   elite	   socio-­‐political	   networks,	   while	   those	   who	   are	   connected	   to	   a	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lower	   social	   status	   are	   more	   likely	   linked	   to	   grass-­‐roots	   socio-­‐political	  
networks.	  	  
Similarly	   in	   the	  hostland	  diaspora’s	   socio-­‐economic	  profile	  will	   likely	   connect	  
them	   to	   different	   socio-­‐political	   networks.	   These	   networks	   also	   provide	  
diaspora	   with	   further	   capital	   to	   engage	   in	   political	   transnational	   activities	  
(Weiss,	  2009).	  For	  elites,	  financial	  resources	  can	  also	  provide	  them	  with	  access	  
to	   powerful	   networks	   (Shain	   and	   Barth,	   2003;	  Mearsheimer	   and	  Walt,	   2008),	  
where	  as	  ordinary	  diaspora	  may	  be	  limited	  in	  their	  reach	  or	  ability	  to	  effectively	  
lobby	  hostland	  politicians	  and	  government.	  	  	  
This	  argument	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  profiles	  of	  Iraq’s	  diasporic	  returnees	  in	  2003	  
and	   those	   who	   would	   become	   Iraq’s	   first	   state-­‐builders.	   The	   majority	   were	  
those	  who	  formed	  part	  of	  Iraqi’s	  diasporic	  elite	  socio-­‐political	  network,	  whether	  
religious,	   political	   or	   professional,	   many	   of	   whom	   had	   relationships	   with	  
political	   elites	   in	   Washington	   and	   Whitehall	   (Allawi,	   2007).	   I	   therefore	  
hypothesize	   that	   diaspora	   with	   monetary	   resources	   and	   those	   connected	   to	  
elite	  socio-­‐political	  networks	  had	  more	  opportunities	  for	  becoming	  involved	  in	  
state	  institution-­‐building	  and	  governance	  once	  intervention	  took	  place	  than	  for	  
Iraqis	  who	  were	   limited	   financially	   and	   not	   connected	   to	   powerful	   groups	   in	  
the	   country	   of	   origin	   or	   hostland.	   This	   study’s	   first	   hypothesis	   states:	   H1:	  
Diaspora	  who	  were	  connected	  to	  elite	  socio-­‐political	  networks	  in	  2003	  and	  had	  
monetary	   resources	   had	   more	   opportunities	   to	   engage	   in	   state-­‐building	  
through	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance,	   while	   those	   who	   were	   not	  
connected	   to	   elite	   political	   networks	   and	   had	   insufficient	   resources	   were	  
directed	  to	  supporting	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society.	  	  
	  
Hostland	  foreign	  policy	  
For	   this	   study’s	   purposes	   hostland	   foreign	   policy	   positions	   towards	   Iraq	   are	  
fundamental	   for	   understanding	   the	   political	   relationship	   that	   each	   host	   state	  
had	   with	   the	   diaspora	   homeland	   and	   how	   this	   affected	   the	   type	   of	   state-­‐
building	  that	  diasporas	  were	  able	  to	  engage	  in	  following	  the	  2003	  intervention	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and	  occupation.	  	  
	  
Hostland	  foreign	  policies	  and	  their	  alignment	  with	  diaspora’s	  goals	  have	  been	  
suggested	  to	  increase	  the	  opportunities	  for	  diaspora	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  politics	  
of	  the	  hostland.	  This	  wide	  literature	  has	  been	  advanced	  within	  the	  US	  context	  
where	   the	   openness	   of	   the	   American	   political	   system	   has	   allowed	   ethnic	  
diasporas	   to	  have	  a	  voice	   in	  US	   foreign	  policy	   (Shain,	   2007,	   1999,	   1994;	  Shain	  
and	   Barth,	   2003;	   Rytz,	   2013;	   Haney	   and	   Vanderbush,	   1999;	   Koinova,	   2013;	  
Vanderbush,	  2009;	  King	  and	  Melvin,	  2006).	  Examples	  from	  the	  Israel	  lobby	  and	  
the	  Cuban	  lobby	  abound,	  demonstrating	  the	  power	  of	  diasporic	  interest	  groups,	  
especially	  when	   their	   goals	   and	  hostland	   foreign	   policies	   align	   (Shain,	   2002a,	  
2007,	   1994;	   Shain	   and	   Barth,	   2003;	  Mearsheimer	   and	  Walt,	   2008;	  Haney	   and	  
Vanderbush,	  1999;	  Vanderbush,	  2009;	  Rytz,	  2013;	  Ogelman	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  	  
	  
Yet	  while	   there	  are	  abundant	  case	  studies	  of	   the	  affect	  of	  diaspora	   lobbies	  on	  
US	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  literature,	  there	  is	  little	  work	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  hostland	  
foreign	  policy	  positions	  and	  their	   impact	  on	  the	  type	  of	  diaspora	  mobilisation	  
that	  diaspora	  engage	  in	  (for	  exceptions	  (Baser,	  2012,	  2014,	  Koinova,	  2013,	  2014).	  
More	   specifically,	   empirical	   evidence	   relating	   to	   a	   foreign	   policy	   of	   military	  
intervention	  and	  occupation	  by	  a	  host	  state	  against	  a	  diaspora	  homeland,	  and	  
the	   effects	   of	   this	   on	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   in	   the	   hostland	   are	   few	   and	   far	  
between	  (Koinova,	  2013;	  Moss,	  2016).	  Yet	  the	  effects	  in	  the	  homeland	  have	  not	  
been	  systematically	  or	  comparatively	  explored	  as	  I	  do	  in	  this	  study.	  	  
	  
The	   Iraq	   war	   was	   an	   exogenous	   intervention,	  marked	   by	   a	   desire	   for	   regime	  
change	  and	  transformation	  (Reus-­‐Smit,	  2013).	  In	  choosing	  to	  intervene,	  the	  UK	  
hostland	  was	  committed	  alongside	  the	  US	  senior	  partner	  to	  depose	  the	  ancien	  
regime	   and	   in	   its	   place	   plant	   a	   new	   democratic	   and	   liberal	   political	   system	  
(Synnott,	  2008;	  Stewart,	  2006).	  This	  long-­‐term	  mission	  would	  require	  the	  help	  
of	  Iraqis	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  political	   leaders	  to	  replace	  Saddam’s	  government.	  
Indeed	  we	  know	  that	  the	  coalition	  worked	  with	  UK	  diaspora	  leaders	  in	  the	  run	  
up	  to	  intervention,	  and	  the	  US	  had	  been	  financing	  the	  opposition	  overtly	  ever	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since	   their	   foreign	   policy	   position	   changed	   towards	   the	   country	   with	   the	  
introduction	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   Liberation	   Act	   in	   1997	   (Allawi,	   2007;	   Tripp,	   2007;	  
Herring	   and	   Rangwala,	   2006).	   This	   relationship	   paved	   the	   way	   for	   the	   Iraqi	  
opposition	   leaders	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   this	   once	   intervention	   had	   occurred	  
and	   secure	   a	   political	   position	   inside	   the	   country	   (Bonin,	   2011;	   Allawi,	   2007;	  
Herring	  and	  Rangwala,	  2006;	  Tripp,	  2007;	  Dodge,	  2005).	  	  
	  
In	  Iraq	  we	  also	  know	  that	  during	  occupation,	  the	  US	  government	  used	  US	  Iraqi	  
diaspora	   to	   support	   governance	   programmes	   in	   the	   country.	   In	   one	   of	   the	  
limited	  academic	  studies	  of	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  involvement	  during	  occupation,	  Iraqi	  
diaspora	  members	   in	   the	   US	   were	   hired	   by	   the	   US	   Agency	   for	   International	  
Development	   to	   help	   restore	   public	   and	   local	   administration	   services	   that	  
supported	   democratic	   governance	   mechanisms	   (Brinkerhoff	   and	   Taddesse,	  
2008).	   The	   Local	   Governance	   Program,	   as	   it	   was	   named,	   served	   to	   train	  
municipal	   councils,	   develop	   democratic	   councils	   and	   capacity-­‐building	   for	  
civil-­‐society	   organisations.	   A	   similar	   case	   scenario	   played	   out	   in	   Afghanistan	  
following	   foreign	   intervention	   when	   diasporic	   actors	   were	   used	   to	   fill	  
government	  and	  development	  positions	  (Brinkerhoff,	  2006;	  Shultz	  and	  Merril,	  
2006).	  What	   these	   two	   case	   studies	   indicate	   is	   that	  military	   involvement	   and	  
subsequent	   occupation	   increased	   opportunities	   for	   diaspora	   in	   the	   US	   to	  
contribute	   to	   their	   homelands	   directly	   due	   to	   the	   foreign	   policy	   position	   of	  
their	  hostland	  government.	  	  	  
	  
Yet,	  how	  did	  the	  war	   impact	   the	  Iraqi	  diaspora	   in	  Sweden	  whose	  government	  
opposed	  the	  war?	  In	  what	  ways	  did	  their	  anti-­‐intervention	  foreign	  policy	  stance	  
towards	   Iraq	   shape	   the	   state-­‐building	   endeavours	   that	  diaspora	   could	   involve	  
themselves	  in	  the	  aftermath?	  	  
	  
Diasporic	   interventions	  to	  support	  homeland	  states	   through	  civil	   society	  have	  
also	   materialized	   as	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   foreign	   policies	   of	   Western	  
governments,	   often	   working	   through	   United	   Nations	   frameworks	   of	   ‘good	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governance’	   or	   the	  Migration-­‐Development	  nexus6.	  Development	   cooperation	  
or	  what	  are	  termed,	  co-­‐development	  diaspora	  partnerships	  have	  thus	  received	  
funding	   from	   Foreign	   Ministries,	   Inter-­‐governmental	   Organisations	   (IGO),	  
development	   organisations	   as	   well	   as	   other	   civil	   society	   platforms	   with	   the	  
explicit	   aim	   of	   working	   with	   diaspora	   organisations	   and	   individuals	   to	  
strengthen	  weak	  states.	  	  
	  
Indeed	  diaspora	  are	   increasingly	   seen	  as	  bridges	  between	   their	  hostlands	  and	  
homelands	  due	  to	  their	  linguistic,	  cultural,	  social	  and	  political	  understanding	  of	  
their	   homelands	   and	   hostlands.	   	   As	   such	   there	   is	   growing	   awareness	   amidst	  
policy,	  IGO,	  and	  NGO	  circles	  of	  the	  link	  between	  migration	  and	  development	  
(Faist,	   2008b).	   As	   migrants	   leave	   their	   homelands,	   many	   maintain	   various	  
social	   and	   political	   links,	   which	   can	   serve	   as	   a	   platform	   for	   development	  
cooperation.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   host	   states	   are	   now	   more	   aware	   of	   their	   diverse	  
populations	   and	   are	   taking	   full	   advantage	   of	   their	   continued	   ties	   to	   their	  
country	  of	  origins	  (Laakso	  and	  Hautaniemi,	  2014).	  
	  
A	  good	  example	   is	   the	  collaboration	  between	   the	  Finnish	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  
Affairs,	   the	   International	   Organisation	   for	   Migration	   (IOM)	   and	   the	   Somali	  
diaspora	   in	   Finland.	   A	   pilot	   project	   was	   launched	   called	   the	   ‘MIDA	  Health	   -­‐	  
Strengthening	   the	   Health	   Sector	   in	   Somaliland	   and	   Puntland	   through	   the	  
Engagement	  of	  Somali	  Diaspora	  Health	  Professionals	   from	  Finland’	  under	   the	  
framework	   of	   the	   IOM’s	   Migration	   and	   Development	   for	   Africa	   (MIDA)	  
programme7.	   The	   aim	   of	   the	   project	   was	   to	   connect	   professional	   and	   skilled	  
diaspora	   from	  Finland	   to	  assist	   in	  contributing	   to	   the	  country’s	  health	  sector.	  
The	  project	  lasted	  18	  months	  from	  2008	  to	  2009	  and	  was	  considered	  a	  success	  
in	   delivering	   22	   female	   and	   male	   doctors	   and	   nurses	   to	   help	   with	   capacity	  
building	   in	   Somaliland	   and	   Puntland	   (Weiss,	   2009).	   Other	   hostland	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  See	  for	  instance	  the	  Migration	  and	  Development	  Programme	  of	  the	  International	  
Organisation	  for	  Migration	  (IOM)	  
7	  "Migration	  for	  Development	  in	  Africa"	  (MIDA)	  is	  a	  capacity-­‐building	  programme,	  which	  helps	  
to	  mobilize	  competencies	  acquired	  by	  African	  nationals	  abroad	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  Africa's	  
development.	  (‘Migration	  for	  Development	  in	  Africa	  (MIDA)’,	  2015)	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governments	   including	   the	   Dutch	   Foreign	   Ministry,	   the	   UK	   government,	   as	  
well	   as	   the	   Norwegian	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   have	   all	   engaged	   with	  
diasporas	   with	   varying	   degrees	   of	   interaction	   and	   success	   for	   supporting	  
homeland	   states	   through	   policy	   advice,	   capacity-­‐building	   and	   long	   term	  
partnerships	   (Ezzati	   and	   Horst,	   2014;	   Sinatti,	   2014;	   Moore,	   2013).	   Meanwhile	  
other	   countries	   which	   do	   not	   have	   the	   institutional	   capacity	   for	   diaspora	  
collaborations	   have	   designated	   responsibility	   to	   development	   NGOs	   as	   in	  
Spain,	  Italy	  or	  France	  (Mezzetti	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Nijenhuis	  and	  Broekhuis,	  2010).	  
	  
Clearly	   the	  empirical	  case	  studies	   reveal	   that	   foreign	  ministries	  are	   increasing	  
their	  development	   toolkit	  by	   including	  diaspora	   in	   their	   repertoire,	  providing	  
an	   opportunity	   for	   diaspora	   individuals	   and	   groups	   to	   become	   involved	   in	  
supporting	  their	  countries	  of	  origin.	  However	  the	  opportunity	  is	  dependent	  on	  
a	   number	   of	   factors	   related	   to	   the	   foreign	   policy	   position	   of	   hostland	  
governments	   vis	   à	   vis	   the	   diaspora’s	   country	   of	   origin	   and	   whether	  
development	   forms	   part	   of	   their	   remit.	   If	   for	   instance	   relations	   between	   the	  
country	   of	   origin	   and	   settlement	   are	   fraught	   with	   problems	   then	   co-­‐
development	   projects	   will	   simply	   not	   be	   possible	   leading	   to	   diaspora	  
independent	  initiatives,	  or	  no	  initiatives	  at	  all	   if	  the	  diaspora	  is	  not	  welcomed	  
by	  the	  homeland	  government.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  if	  relations	  exist,	  and	  foreign	  
policy	   stances	   also	   include	   developmental	  work	   then	   opportunities	  may	   exist	  
for	  some	  diaspora	  individuals	  or	  groups	  with	  the	  requisite	  skills	  to	  contribute	  in	  
various	  ways.	  	  
	  
Co-­‐development	   diaspora	   partnerships	   by	   foreign	   ministries	   are	   particularly	  
relevant	  for	  my	  case	  study	  in	  Sweden	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  literature	  on	  hostland	  
state	   and	   diaspora	   engagement	   initiatives	   in	   the	   literature	   reference	   case	  
studies	   from	   Scandinavian	   countries	   and	   the	   Netherlands	   where	   civil	   society	  
and	  social	  capital	  often	  rank	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  global	  charts	  (Sivesind	  and	  Selle,	  
2010).	   In	   countries	   such	   as	   these	   the	   gap	   between	   society	   and	   the	   state	   is	  
smaller,	   and	   civic	   associations	   tend	   to	   have	   far	  more	   influence	   on	   the	   state’s	  
decision	  making	  processes	  (Ibid.,	  2010).	  As	  such	  foreign	  policy	  stances	  and	  their	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implementation	  will	  likely	  include	  far	  more	  stakeholders	  than	  countries	  whose	  
politics	  is	  not	  defined	  by	  its	  associational	  life.	  	  
	  
Since	  Sweden	  did	  not	   involve	   itself	   in	  military	   intervention	   in	   Iraq,	   it	   is	  most	  
likely	   that	   it	   contributed	   to	   its	  development	   through	   the	  United	  Nations.	  Yet	  
considering	   Sweden’s	   large	   Iraqi	   population8,	   the	   diaspora	   may	   have	   been	  
incorporated	   into	   their	   development	   strategy	   directing	   their	   engagement	   to	  
supporting	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society.	  	  
	  
Clearly	  the	  type	  of	  state-­‐building	  that	  diaspora	  engage	  in	  is	  strongly	  affected	  by	  
the	  hostlands’	  foreign	  policy	  position	  towards	  the	  homeland.	  This	  leads	  to	  my	  
second	   hypothesis:	   H2:	   If	   a	   diaspora	   hostland’s	   foreign	   policy	   supported	  
militarily	   intervention	   and	   occupation	   then	   there	   will	   be	  more	   opportunities	  
for	   diaspora	   to	   contribute	   to	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance	  where	   as	   if	  
the	   hostland’s	   foreign	   policy	   is	   limited	   to	   development	   interventions	   than	   it	  
will	   create	   more	   opportunities	   for	   diaspora	   to	   contribute	   to	   state-­‐building	  
through	  civil	  society.	  	  
	  
Links	  to	  Ethno-­‐Sectarian	  political	  parties	  
Much	  of	  the	  literature	  related	  to	  political	  transnationalism	  focuses	  on	  countries	  
of	   settlement	   (McGregor	   and	   Pasura,	   2014)	   with	   far	   less	   work	   addressing	  
diaspora’s	   relationship	   to	   homeland	   states	   and	   how	   this	   can	   impact	   who	  
contributes	   and	   the	   type	   of	   contributions	   made.	   	   The	   final	   hypothesis	   is	  
therefore	   deduced	   from	   the	   case	   of	   Iraq	   and	   addresses	   this	   matter	   by	  
investigating	   the	   impact	   of	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   politics	   in	   Iraq	   and	   its	   affect	   on	  
types	  of	  diaspora	  mobilisation.	  	  
	  
Since	  the	  diaspora	  literature	  does	  not	  address	  this	  variable	  of	  links	  to	  homeland	  
ethnic	  parties	  I	  draw	  on	  the	  limited	  diaspora	  case	  studies	  and	  borrow	  from	  the	  
ethnic	  party	  system’s	  literature	  to	  make	  the	  argument	  that	  ethnic	  cleavages	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  According	  to	  Statistics	  Sweden,	  as	  of	  2015	  there	  are	  131,	  388	  Iraqis	  officially	  registered	  in	  
Sweden.	  http://www.scb.se/en_/	  	  
69	  	   	  
lead	   to	   a	   divisive	   politics,	   that	   privileges	   diaspora	   dominant	   groups	   at	   the	  
expense	  of	  diasporic	  minorities.	  	  
	  
The	   ethnic	   party	   systems	   literature	   has	   highlighted	   the	   dynamics	   of	   ethnic	  
diversity	   and	   the	   maintenance	   of	   democracy.	   Many	   studies,	   for	   example,	  
underline	  that	  democracy	  is	  difficult	  to	  maintain	  in	  ethnically	  diverse	  societies	  
(Rabushka	   and	   Shepsle,	   1972;	   Lijphart,	   1977;	   Reilly,	   2001;	   Horowitz,	   2001;	  
Guelke,	   2004;	   Elischer,	   2013).	   They	   argue	   that	   the	   dependency	   on	   communal	  
support	   entrenches	   division	   and	   conflict,	   as	   communal	   boundaries	   are	  
dominated	  by	  ethnic	  or	  religious	  cleavages	  rather	  than	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  political	  
or	   ideological	  cleavages	  (Elischer,	  2013).	   In	  their	  bid	  to	  maintain	  their	  grip	  on	  
power,	  ethnic	  groups	  thus	  adopt	  more	  radical	  stances	  to	  allay	  any	  competition	  
from	   inside	   groups	   (Horowitz,	   2001),	   eventually	   leading	   to	   more	   autocratic	  
forms	  of	   governance	   (Elischer,	   2013).	   Even	  politics	   theorists	   such	   as	  Lijpharat	  
and	  Horowitz,	  who	  propose	  institutional	  engineering	  in	  pluralist	  societies,	  are	  
circumspect	   about	   the	   success	   of	   sustaining	   democracy	   in	   multi-­‐ethnic	  
societies	  (Lijphart,	  1977;	  Horowitz,	  2001).	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  cited	  studies	  relating	  to	  ethnic	  dynamics	  is	  David	  Horowitz’s	  
Ethnic	   Groups	   in	   Conflict	   (Horowitz,	   2001),	   which	   demonstrates	   how	   ethnic	  
parties	   can	   exacerbate	   and	   entrench	   ethnic	   divisions	   as	   they	   appeal	   to	   their	  
ethnically	   divided	   electorate.	   Case	   studies	   from	   the	   African	   continent	   have	  
showcased	  these	  political	  dynamics	  at	  play,	  where	  elites	  have	  taken	  advantage	  
of	  ethnic,	   religious	  or	   linguistic	  cleavages	   for	  political	  gain	  (Doorenspleet	  and	  
Nijzink,	   2014).	   An	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   of	   party	   politics	   in	   Kenya	   by	   Sebastian	  
Elischer	  for	  instance,	  reveals	  that	  ethnicity	  has	  dominated	  politics	  where	  ethnic	  
alliances	   have	   led	   to	   relationships	   of	   patronage	   and	   marginalisation	   and	  
underrepresentation	  for	  ethnic	  minorities	  (Elischer,	  2013).	  Similarly,	  in	  Zambia,	  
ethno-­‐regional	   factors	   are	   still	   significant	   and	  where	   the	   politics	   of	   inclusion	  
and	  exclusion	  determine	  votes	  (Paget,	  2014).	  	  
	  
There	   are,	   however,	   several	   cases	   in	   Africa	   that	   demonstrate	   that	   ethnic	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cleavages	  do	  not	  always	  lead	  to	  undermining	  the	  democratic	  system	  or	  lead	  to	  
ethnic	   conflict,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Ghana	   or	   Benin	   (Doorenspleet	   and	  Nijzink,	  
2014;	   Gisselquist,	   2008),	   in	   others	   cases	   they	   have	   led	   to	   polarizing	   effects.	  
Meanwhile,	   Chandra	   argues	   that	   democracy	   can	   be	   sustained	   in	   ethnically	  
divided	   societies	   and	   that	   what	   matters	   more	   is	   the	   institutional	   context	  
(Chandra,	  2005).	  Using	  the	  case	  study	  of	  India,	  and	  the	  state	  of	  Uttar	  Pradesh,	  
Chandra	   demonstrates	   how	   state-­‐recognised	   institutional	   social	   categories	   of	  
caste	   and	   language	   helped	   overcome	   divisive	   ethnic	   divisions	   by	  moderating	  
cleavages	   and	  moving	  party	  politics	   towards	   a	   centrist	   ground,	   in	   contrast	   to	  
the	  more	  opposing	  affect	  of	  religious	  cleavages.	  	  
	  
Indeed,	  in	  divided	  societies	  where	  religious	  cleavages	  exist,	  minorities	  or	  those	  
excluded	  from	  political	  representation	  in	  the	  homeland	  will	  not	  have	  the	  same	  
opportunities	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   political	   process.	   For	   example	   Ethiopian	  
Muslims	  have	  struggled	  to	  contribute	  to	  state-­‐building	  inside	  the	  country	  due	  
to	   their	   exclusion	   from	   the	  Ethiopian	  political	   system	  which	   is	  dominated	  by	  
Christians	  elites.	  Consequently	  the	  Ethiopian	  Muslim	  diaspora’s	  state-­‐building	  
efforts	  have	  focused	  on	  lobbying	  for	  inclusion	  and	  political	  rights	  for	  Ethiopian	  
Muslims	   through	   diasporic	   civil	   society	   organizations,	   which	   have	   been	  
effective	   at	   reaching	   Ethiopian	   government	   officials	   and	   even	   the	   Prime	  
Minister	   (Feyissa,	   2014).	   Meanwhile	   in	   Nigeria,	   ethnic	   cleavages	   have	   been	  
reflected	   in	   the	   diaspora	   as	   transnational	   practices	   have	   reinforced	   ethnic	  
competition	  for	  power	  and	  resources	  in	  Nigeria	  (Lampert,	  2009).	  In	  what	  way	  
has	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   politics	   in	   Iraq	   shaped	   or	   informed	   the	   type	   of	   state-­‐
building	  processes	  that	  diaspora	  have	  been	  able	  to	  engage	  in?	  
	  
These	   insights	   are	  pertinent	   for	   the	   case	   study	  of	   Iraq	   and	   for	  understanding	  
state-­‐building	   in	   Iraqi	   politics	   today.	  When	   sovereignty	  was	   formally	   handed	  
over	  to	  Iraqis	  in	  2004	  and	  democratic	  elections	  later	  took	  place	  in	  2005,	  Iraq’s	  
political	   system	   was	   consolidated	   on	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   grounds	   (Dodge,	   2005,	  
2012;	  Herring	  and	  Rangwala,	  2006).	  The	  politics	  of	  ethno-­‐sectarianism	  has	  been	  
advantageous	  for	  those	  in	  the	  majority	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  minority	  who	  have	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been	  excluded	  due	  to	  their	  social,	  political,	  ethnic	  or	  religious	  minority	  status.	  	  
	  
Since	  2005,	   this	  has	  meant	  power	   for	   the	  dominant	  Shi’a	   and	  Kurdish	  parties	  
and	   their	  members	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   Iraq’s	   other	   national	  minorities.	   As	   the	  
literature	   above	   rightly	   asserts	   the	   reinforcement	   of	   ethnic	   and	   sectarian	  
cleavages	   in	   Iraq	   has	   led	   to	   authoritarian	   rule	   resembling	   the	   politics	   of	  
Saddam’s	   dictatorship	   defined	   by	   violence	   and	   relationships	   of	   patronage	  
(Dodge,	  2012;	  Tripp,	  2007).	  As	  the	  ethnic	  party	  system	  literature	  has	  shown	  this	  
has	   led	   to	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   conflict	   as	   the	   exclusionary	   political	   environment	  
has	  fuelled	  electoral	  violence,	  autocratic	  rule,	  which	  further	  drives	  polarization	  
and	  conflict	  (Horowitz,	  2001;	  Basedau	  and	  Stroh,	  2012;	  Elischer,	  2013).	  	  
	  
Using	  Chandra’s	   focus	  on	   the	   institutional	   context,	   it	   is	   also	   clear	   to	   see	   that	  
the	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  system	  discourages	  cross-­‐cutting	  cleavages	  that	  undermine	  
majoritarian	   groups	   since	   each	  Ministry	   in	   Iraq	   is	   essentially	   run	   by	   specific	  
sectarian	   parties,	   who	   control	   various	   sectors	   of	   the	   state	   (Tripp,	   2007).	   As	  
such,	   despite	   having	   the	   formal	   constitutional	   and	   democratic	   governance	  
apparatus	  of	  the	  state,	  the	  reality	  on	  the	  ground	  has	  thus	  far	  been	  more	  akin	  to	  
what	  Tripp	  refers	  to	  as	  absolute	  control	  by	  ‘fiefdoms’.	  
	  	  
Drawing	  on	  this	  literature,	  I	  therefore	  posit	  that	  following	  the	  period	  of	  formal	  
occupation	  when	   Shi’a	   Islamists	   and	   the	  Kurds	   took	  hold	   of	   power	   following	  
Iraq’s	   first	   democratic	   elections,	   this	   impacted	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   and	  
diasporic	  contributions	  to	  state-­‐building	  as	  power	  positions	  were	  echoed	  in	  the	  
diaspora.	  Thus	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  those	  in	  the	  diaspora	  who	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  
ethno-­‐sectarian	  ruling	  parties	  in	  Iraq	  will	  most	  likely	  have	  opportunities	  in	  the	  
diaspora	   to	  engage	   in	   institution-­‐building	  and	  governance	  processes	  where	  as	  
those	  unconnected	  will	  be	  directed	  to	  supporting/challenging	  the	  state	  through	  
civil	  society.	  The	  type	  of	  state-­‐building	  that	  diaspora	  can	  engage	  in	  is	  therefore	  
heavily	   influenced	  by	   the	  governing	  political	  parties	   at	  home	  and	   the	  politics	  
they	   practice,	   which	   has	   repercussions	   for	   diaspora.	   My	   last	   hypothesis	  
therefore	  is:	  H3:	  Diaspora	  connected	  to	  ruling	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  political	  parties	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will	  have	  more	  opportunities	  to	  support	  the	  state	  through	  institution-­‐building	  
and	   governance	   where	   as	   those	   unconnected	   to	   the	   ruling	   ethno-­‐sectarian	  
parties	   will	   more	   likely	   have	   opportunities	   to	   support/challenge	   the	   state	  
through	  civil	  society.	  	  	  
	  
Before	   proceeding	   to	   the	   empirical	   chapters,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   now	   address	  
competing	   explanations	   for	   why	   the	   UK	   and	   Swedish	   diaspora	   had	   different	  
opportunities	  for	  engagement.	  To	  this	  I	  now	  turn.	  	  
	  
Alternative	  explanations	  
In	  this	  section	  I	   look	  at	  competing	  explanations	  for	  why	  there	  may	  have	  been	  
differences	  in	  the	  state-­‐building	  contributions	  of	  the	  two	  diaspora	  case	  studies.	  	  
In	   the	   first	   instance,	   hostland	   factors	   such	   as	   citizenship	   and	   integration	  
regimes	  can	  encourage	  diaspora	  mobilisation	  for	  different	  reasons.	  While	  some	  
have	   argued	   that	   exclusive,	   assimilationist	   citizenship	   regimes	   encourage	  
transnational	   mobilisation	   because	   they	   can	   exclude	   ethnic	   minorities	   from	  
integrating	   into	   hostlands	   due	   to	   discriminatory	   practices	   (Koopmans,	   2004;	  
Koopmans	  and	  Statham,	  2001;	  Koopmans	  et	  al.,	   2005;	  Odmalm,	  2009),	  others	  
have	   made	   opposite	   claims	   that	   more	   open	   and	   multicultural	   citizenship	  
regimes	  encourage	  transnational	  activities	  because	  they	  allow	  ethnic	  minorities	  
to	  participate	  politically	   in	  public	   life	  (Wayland,	  2004;	  Baser,	  2012;	  Van	  Houte	  
et	   al.,	   2013).	   Those	  who	   side	   on	   the	   exclusive	   political	   systems	   argue	   that	   an	  
inability	   to	   access	   the	   political	   system	   orients	   claims-­‐making	   towards	   the	  
homeland	  due	   to	   high	   barriers	   to	   naturalisation	   and	   accessing	   the	   hostland’s	  
political	  institutions	  (Koopmans	  and	  Statham,	  2001).	  Furthermore,	  as	  Odmalm	  
rights	   states,	   citizenship	   also	   confers	   the	   type	   of	   relationship	   it	   has	   with	  
newcomers	   through	   their	   labelling.	   In	   Germany,	   immigrants	   are	   called	  
foreigners,	   an	   inherently	   exclusive	   label	   that	   restricts	   their	   entry	   into	   the	  
hostlands	   political	   community	   and	   directs	   their	   mobilisation	   towards	   the	  
country	   of	   origin	   (Østergaard-­‐Nielsen,	   2000).	   In	   other	   words,	   exclusive	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citizenship	  models	   prohibit	   political	   integration	   through	   discriminatory	   laws	  
and	  denial	  of	  rights.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  integration	  and	  diaspora	  mobilisation,	  it	  is	  
argued	   that	  more	   inclusive	  political	   systems	  encourage	  diaspora	  mobilisation.	  
Therefore	  by	  providing	  the	  political	  space	  for	  minority	  representation,	  they	  give	  
diaspora	   communities	   the	   opportunity	   and	   access	   to	   formal	   political	  
institutions	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  mobilise	  towards	  homeland	  issues	  (Van	  Houte	  et	  
al.,	   2013).	   Inclusive	   citizenship	  models	   in	   the	   words	   of	   Shain	   are	   “weak”	   and	  
“permeable	   to	   societal	   influences	   on	   its	   decision-­‐making	   process”	   (Shain,	  
2007:143).	   This	   allows	   diasporas	   to	   act	   as	   ethnic	   interest	   groups	   in	   their	   host	  
societies	   (Shain,	   1999).	   Furthermore,	   open	   access	   to	   citizenship	   allows	   a	   two	  
pronged	   approach	   whereby	   diasporas	   can	   travel	   to	   their	   homelands	   and	  
mobilise	   whilst	   simultaneously	   lobbying	   their	   host	   state	   governments	  
(Wayland,	  2004).	  Additionally	  more	   inclusive	  political	   systems	  can	  encourage	  
developmental	   projects	   between	   diasporas	   and	   host	   state	   governments	   (De	  
Haas,	   2006).	   Inclusive	   citizenship	   regimes	   therefore	   facilitate	   diaspora	  
mobilisation	   through	   an	   open	   access	   political	   system,	   thereby	   encouraging	  
transnationalism	  through	  a	  mechanism	  of	  accessibility.	  	  
Citizenship	   regimes	   are	   clearly	   important	   for	   understanding	   the	   structural	  
constraints	  that	  can	  limit	  political	  behaviour	  both	  in	  their	  policy	  and	  discursive	  
manifestations.	  Yet	  this	  variable	  is	  unhelpful	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  as	  
both	  the	  UK	  and	  Sweden	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  multicultural	  regimes	  (Howard,	  
2009;	   Koopmans	   et	   al.,	   2005).	   There	   are	   of	   course	   differences	   in	   their	  
multicultural	  approaches,	  with	  the	  UK’s	  best	  described	  as	  laissez-­‐faire	  (Joppke,	  
1999),	  where	  the	  onus	  of	  integration	  is	  on	  ethnic	  minorities	  via	  the	  Big	  Society	  
and	   local	   authorities.	   Meanwhile	   in	   Sweden	   there	   is	   a	   more	   structured	  
incorporation	   regime	   that	   funds	   Swedish	   language	   classes,	   native–tongue	  
language	  schools,	  and	  more	  funding	  opportunities	  for	  ethnic	  social	  and	  cultural	  
events	   (Khayati,	   2008;	   Khayati	   and	   Dahlstedt,	   2014).	   However	   these	   minor	  
differences	   may	   account	   for	   why	   there	   may	   be	   more	   social	   and	   cultural	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diaspora	   events	   in	   Sweden	   owing	   to	   more	   opportunities	   for	   funding,	   but	   it	  
cannot	   explain	   differences	   in	   the	   way	   the	   two	   diaspora	   communities	  
contributed	  to	  mobilising	  towards	  state-­‐building	  in	  Iraq.	  
Another	  factor	  could	  be	  related	  to	  the	  openness	  and	  accessibility	  of	  the	  political	  
systems	   in	  each	  hostland,	  where	  more	  permeable	  political	   systems	   such	  as	   in	  
the	  United	  States	  are	  said	  to	  facilitate	  accessibility	  to	  policy	  makers	  (Shain	  and	  
Barth,	   2003).	   For	   example,	   in	   a	   comparative	   study	   between	   Albanians	   in	  
America	   and	   the	   UK,	   Maria	   Koinova	   looked	   at	   the	   ways	   hostland	   political	  
systems	  can	  affect	  the	  political	  strategies	  of	  homeland	  elites,	  who	  may	  choose	  
the	  diaspora	  hostlands	  that	  can	  further	  their	  causes	  the	  most	  (Koinova,	  2013).	  
Her	  research	  showed	  that	  Albanians	  in	  the	  US	  had	  far	  more	  success	  in	  lobbying	  
for	  Kosovo	  independence	  due	  to	  the	  openness	  and	  accessibility	  of	  congress	   in	  
comparison	  to	   the	  UK’s	  parliamentary	  system,	  which	  proved	  more	  difficult	   to	  
influence.	  Though	   there	  will	   inevitably	  be	  variation	   in	   levels	  between	   the	  UK	  
and	  Swedish	  political	  systems,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  the	  openness	  of	  
both	   the	  UK	   and	   Sweden	   becomes	   a	   controlled	   variable	   as	   both	   systems	   are	  
considered	   open	   and	   accessible	   (Howard,	   2009;	   Koopmans	   et	   al.,	   2005).	  
Furthermore,	  while	  openness	  may	  encourage	  activity,	  it	  tells	  us	  nothing	  about	  
why	   activity	   is	   directed	   towards	   one	   type	   of	   state-­‐building	   or	   another.	  
Therefore	   this	  variable	   is	   inadequate	   for	  explaining	  why	   there	  was	  divergence	  
between	  the	  two	  diaspora	  hostlands.	  	  
Defining	  the	  Independent	  Variables	  	  
To	  reiterate,	  the	  hypotheses	  to	  be	  explored	  in	  this	  study	  are:	  	  
	  
H1:	  Diaspora	  who	  were	  connected	  to	  elite	  socio-­‐political	  networks	  in	  2003	  and	  
had	   monetary	   resources	   had	   more	   opportunities	   to	   engage	   in	   state-­‐building	  
through	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance,	   while	   those	   who	   were	   not	  
connected	   to	   elite	   political	   networks	   and	   had	   insufficient	   resources	   were	  
directed	  to	  supporting	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society.	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H2:	  If	  a	  diaspora	  hostland’s	  foreign	  policy	  supported	  militarily	  intervention	  and	  
occupation	  then	  there	  will	  be	  more	  opportunities	  for	  diaspora	  to	  contribute	  to	  
institution-­‐building	   and	   governance	   where	   as	   if	   the	   hostland’s	   foreign	   policy	  
was	  limited	  to	  development	  than	  it	  will	  create	  more	  opportunities	  for	  diaspora	  
to	  contribute	  to	  state-­‐building	  through	  civil	  society.	  	  
	  
H3:	   Diaspora	   connected	   to	   ruling	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   political	   parties	   will	   have	  
more	   opportunities	   to	   support	   the	   state	   through	   institution-­‐building	   and	  
governance	  where	   as	   those	  unconnected	   to	   the	   ruling	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  parties	  
will	   have	   more	   opportunities	   to	   support/challenge	   the	   state	   through	   civil	  
society.	  	  	  
	  
Below	   is	   a	   table	   summarising	   the	  hypotheses	  under	   review	  with	   the	  concepts	  
that	  they	  relate	  to	  and	  their	  operationalization.	  
The	  Independent	  Variables:	  
	  
	   Concept	   Value	   Operationalization	  
H1	   Elite	   Socio-­‐
political	  
networks	   and	  
monetary	  
resources	  	  
Having	   resources	  
and	   links	   to	   elite	  
socio-­‐political	  
networks	  or	  not	  
Having	   monetary	   resources	  
to	   mobilise	   and	   linked	   to	  
socio-­‐political	   networks	   in	  
Iraq	  and	  in	  the	  hostland.	  	  
H2	   Foreign	  Policy	  	   Military	  
involvement	  or	  not	  
Military	   employment	   and	  




Connection	  or	  lack	  
of	  connection	  
Membership	  or	  link	  to	  ethno-­‐
sectarian	  party	  or	  not.	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Before	   this	   study’s	   investigation	   can	   proceed	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   define	   and	  
operationalize	  the	  independent	  variables.	  	  	  
	  
1.	  Having	  monetary	  resources	  and	  links	  to	  elite	  socio-­‐political	  networks	  
Though	  the	  word	  elite	  has	  in	  history	  been	  used	  to	  depict	  a	  minority	  ruling	  class	  
which	   governed	   and	  was	   distinct	   from	   the	  masses,	   in	   today’s	  modern	   usage,	  
elites	   can	   be	   a	   number	   of	   social	   groups	   within	   society	   who	   have	   a	   powerful	  
influence	   on	   the	   political	   process.	   In	   Europe	   this	   can	   include	   a	   plethora	   of	  
actors	  who	  are	  a	   reflection	  of	   the	  capitalist	  and	   industrial	  political	   systems	   in	  
which	   they	   operate,	   including	   businessmen,	   bureaucrats	   and	   managers,	  
political	   leaders	   and	   intellectuals.	   Yet	   in	   developing	   countries,	   such	   as	   Iraq,	  
elites	  are	  the	  creation	  of	  not	  only	  industrialisation	  but	  also	  of	  colonial	  rule,	  as	  
such	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  factors	  have	  shaped	  their	  creation	  (Bottomore,	  
2006).	  	  
	  
Elite	   groups	   in	   the	   Middle	   East	   have	   thus	   been	   the	   product	   of	   dynasties,	  
nationalist	  movements,	  wealthy	  individuals	  and	  the	  intelligentsia	  (Ibid.,	  2006).	  
Indeed	   in	   the	   case	  of	   Iraq,	   there	  have	  been	   the	  British	   installed	  monarchists,	  
nationalist	   movements	   such	   as	   pan-­‐Arabism,	   Communism	   and	   Islamist	  
movements,	   as	  well	   as	   intellectuals	   and	  prominent	   and	  wealthy	   elite	   families	  
who	  have	  shaped	  and	  influenced	  politics	  in	  Iraq	  (Batatu,	  2004;	  Farouk-­‐Sluglett	  
and	  Sluglett,	  2001;	  Marr,	  2012;	  Tripp,	  2007).	   In	   Iraq,	   there	   is	  also	   the	  religious	  
authority	   of	   the	   Marja’,	   the	   highest	   clerical	   authority	   in	   the	   country.	   Even	  
though	   the	  Marja’iya	   does	   not	   engage	   directly	   in	   politics	   it	   has	   the	   power	   to	  
influence	  political	  decisions	  as	  witnessed	   in	   Iraq	   in	  2004,	  when	  Ali	  Al	  Sistani,	  
the	   Iraqi	   Marja’	   demanded	   that	   the	   constitutional	   convention	   be	   elected	  
(Bremer	  and	  McConnell,	  2006).	   In	  any	  case	   it	   is	   this	  mix	  of	   Iraq’s	  elite	   socio-­‐
political	   network	   that	   I	   refer	   to	   in	   my	   study.	   Those	   who	   are	   connected	   to	  
political,	  religious	  and	  powerful	  leaders	  in	  the	  hostland	  and	  homeland.	  	  
	  
In	  order	   to	  observe	   their	  presence	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	   trace	  back	   the	  migration	  
waves	   of	   the	   diaspora	   to	   understand	   who	   left	   and	   when,	   what	   their	   socio-­‐
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economic	   position	   was	   in	   the	   country	   of	   origin	   upon	   exiting,	   their	   political	  
pasts	  and	  their	  reasons	  for	  migrating	  to	  the	  UK.	   	  In	  doing	  so	  we	  can	  compare	  
the	  profile	  of	  the	  two	  diaspora	  in	  Sweden	  and	  the	  UK	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  
their	   links	   to	   Iraq	   and	   their	   capabilities.	   For	   example,	   were	   they	   from	  
prominent	   political,	   wealthy	   or	   religious	   families?	  What	   is	   their	   educational	  
level	  or	  professional	  status?	  Were	  they	  linked	  to	  opposition	  politics	  and	  how?	  
All	  these	  questions	  will	  be	  determined	  from	  interview	  questions	  shedding	  light	  
into	   the	  profile	  of	   interviewees.	  This	   information	  will	   also	  be	   triangulated	  via	  
other	   diaspora	   individuals	   and	   groups	   and	   where	   possible	   via	   Arabic	   and	  
English	  media	  outlets.	  	  
	  
Similarly,	   their	   access	   to	   monetary	   resources	   will	   also	   be	   determined	   from	  
interviews	  where	  respondents	  are	  questioned	  about	  their	  professions	  as	  well	  as	  
how	  they	  financed	  their	  political	  activities.	  	  
	  
2.	  Foreign	  policy	  	  
The	  concept	  of	  foreign	  policy	  loosely	  relates	  to	  a	  country’s	  diplomatic	  relations	  
with	  other	  states.	  The	  type	  of	  relations	  that	  states	  have	  is	  determined	  by	  its	  set	  
of	  shared	  interests	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  states	  in	  the	  world	  (Nye,	  1999),	  which	  is	  
often	  referred	  to	  as	  its	  national	  interest.	  	  Foreign	  policy	  thus	  is	  often	  debated	  in	  
the	  literature	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  national	  interest.	  Foreign	  policies	  are	  
said	  to	  be	  decided	  by	  what	  a	  state	  considers	  to	  be	  its	  national	  interest.	  Yet	  the	  
concept	  of	  national	  interest	  is	  elusive,	  and	  has	  been	  defined	  in	  both	  narrow	  and	  
broad	   terms	   by	   scholars	   who	   view	   it	   as	   relating	   to	   state	   survival,	   material	  
economic	  or	  political	   interests,	  moral	  values	  or	  anything	  that	  the	  government	  
deems	   the	   ‘interest’	   to	   be	   (Krasner	   and	   Affairs,	   1978;	   Nye,	   1999;	   Rice,	   2000;	  
Waltz,	  1979;	  Burchill,	  2014).	  	  	  
	  
In	   this	   study	   foreign	   policy	   is	   defined	   practically	   as	   the	   policy	   adopted	   and	  
behaviour	   towards	   Iraq	   in	   2003.	   	   It	   therefore	   eschews	   rationales	   and	  
assumptions	   about	   the	   foreign	   policies	   adopted	   by	   the	   UK	   and	   Sweden,	   but	  
78	  	   	  
rather	   focuses	   on	   the	   strategy	   and	   implementation	   of	   policy	   and	   how	   this	  
created	  or	  limited	  opportunities	  for	  the	  diaspora	  under	  study.	  	  	  
	  
The	   UK’s	   foreign	   policy	   towards	   Iraq	   in	   2003	   was	   involvement	   in	   military	  
intervention	  to	  change	  the	  regime	  of	  Saddam	  Hussein.	  This	  required	  working	  
collaboratively	   with	   the	   US	   and	   deploying	  military	   and	   civilian	   personnel	   to	  
Iraq	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Multi-­‐National	  Force,	  code-­‐named	  Operation	  Iraqi	  Freedom	  
in	  2003.	  Meanwhile	  Sweden	  was	  opposed	  to	  the	  Iraq	  War	  and	  did	  not	  involve	  
itself	   in	   military	   intervention	   or	   occupation	   of	   the	   country	   in	   2003	   but	  
supported	   the	   work	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   in	   Iraq.	   The	   divergent	   foreign	  
policies	  may	  account	  for	  the	  different	  diasporic	  state-­‐building	  contributions	  of	  
the	  UK	  and	  Swedish	  diaspora.	  
	  
Operationally,	   this	   variable	   will	   be	   determined	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   practical	  
involvement	   of	   each	   host	   state	   in	   the	   Iraq	  War	   and	   how	   these	   positions	   of	  
involvement	  or	   lack	  of	   affected	  diasporic	   state-­‐building.	  This	  will	   be	   assessed	  
with	  data	  from	  interviews	  with	  diaspora,	  diplomatic	  and	  government	  officials,	  
policy	   papers	   and	   media	   reports	   where	   UK	   and	   Swedish	   foreign	   policy	   and	  
actions	  are	  stated.	  	  
	  
	  
3.	  Links	  to	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  political	  parties	  
A	   political	   party	   is	   identified	   by	   its	   organisation	   and	   separation	   from	   other	  
organisations,	  it	  is	  also	  defined	  by	  its	  participation	  or	  attempts	  at	  participation	  
in	   the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  of	   a	   state	   (Neumann,	   1969).	   	  A	  political	  party	  
thus	   is	   a	   group,	   “however	   loosely	   organised	   seeking	   to	   elect	   governmental	  
office-­‐holders	   under	   a	   given	   label”	   (Epstein,	   1980,	   p.9).	   The	   label	   is	   the	  
distinguishing	  factor	  that	  differentiates	  one	  party	  from	  another	  in	  a	  competitive	  
and	   participatory	   political	   system,	   distinguishing	   between	   participatory	  
political	  systems	  and	  authoritarian	  ones.	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The	   type	  of	  parties	   in	   the	  political	   system	  will	   thus	  dictate	   the	   foundation	  of	  
politics	   since	   it	   is	   their	   political	   programmes	   and	   candidates	   who	   will	   be	  
structuring	   this	   process	   (Manning,	   2005)	   .	   In	  Western	   democracies	   labels	   or	  
party	   identities	   are	   predominantly	   based	   on	   cross-­‐cutting	   social	   cleavages	  
(Lipset	   and	   Rokkan,	   1967)	   such	   as	   class	   and	   political	   ideology.	   Yet	   in	   non-­‐
Western	  countries,	  cleavages	  are	  less	  diverse	  and	  ethnic,	  religious	  or	  linguistic	  
cleavages,	  are	  often	  more	  dominant	  than	   ideology	  (Doorenspleet	  and	  Nijzink,	  
2014).	   Often	   these	   are	   centred	   around	   political	   elites	   or	   clientelist	   networks	  
that	   take	   advantage	   of	   ethnic	   or	   religious	   cleavages,	   to	   build	   constituencies	  
(Manning,	  2005).	  Eligibility	  for	  membership	  to	  these	  groups	  is	  thus	  determined	  
by	   descent-­‐based	   attributes	   or	   at	   least	   those	   believed	   to	   be	   associated	   with	  
descent	   (Chandra,	   2006).	   These	   include	   and	   are	   not	   restricted	   to	   language,	  
religion,	  tribe,	  or	  physical	  traits.	  Thus	  ethnic	  labels	  for	  political	  parties	  are	  often	  
politically	  rewarding	  for	  dominant	  ethnicities	  (Kaufmann,	  2004).	  	  
	  
A	  defining	  feature	  of	  ethnic	  parties	  is	  therefore	  their	  narrow	  interests,	  which	  is	  
to	  advance	  their	  particular	  ethnic	  group	  or	  coalition	  of	  groups	  by	  using	  existing	  
state	   structures	   to	   channel	   benefits	   towards	   their	   particular	   group	   (Gunther	  
and	  Diamond,	  2003,	  p.183;	  Chandra,	  2005).	  According	  to	  Herbert	  Kitschelt	  their	  
defining	  feature	  is	  their	  appeal	  to	  a	  particular	  constituency	  where	  inclusive	  and	  
exclusive	   boundaries	   are	   drawn	   between	   co-­‐ethnics	   and	   others	   (quoted	   from	  
(Diamond	  and	  Gunther,	  2001,	  p.184).	  
	  
Understanding	  links	  to	  ruling	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  parties	  is	  pertinent	  to	  the	  case	  of	  
Iraq	   where	   in	   the	   post-­‐2003	   period	   an	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   party	   system	   was	  
consolidated	   under	   the	   Coalition	   Provisional	   Authority,	   which	   gave	   way	   to	  
ethno-­‐sectarian	  politics	  and	  thus	  the	  rise	  of	  dominant	  ethno-­‐religious	  groups	  in	  
the	   country	   (Herring	   and	   Rangwala,	   2006;	   Allawi,	   2007;	   Barakat,	   2005;	  
Dawisha,	  2005).	  The	  dominant	  ethno-­‐religious	  groups	  in	  Iraq	  are	  the	  long	  time	  
repressed	  Shi’a	  and	  the	  Kurds	  who	  have	  capitalised	  on	  their	  majoritarian	  status	  
in	  their	   respective	  regions.	  Consequently	  both	  have	  dominated	  Iraqi	  elections	  
in	  2005,	  2010	  and	  2014	  where	  politicians	  have	   relied	  on	   their	   co-­‐ethnic	  or	   co-­‐
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sectarian	   constituencies	   to	   keep	   them	   in	   power.	   Iraq’s	   Shi’a	   and	   Kurds	   have	  
thus	  largely	  controlled	  building	  the	  state	  of	  Iraq	  in	  the	  post-­‐intervention	  phase	  
at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  ethnic	  and	  sectarian	  minorities.	  	  
	  
Links	  to	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  parties	  in	  the	  diaspora	  will	  therefore	  likely	  create	  more	  
opportunities	   to	   contribute	   to	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance	   than	   for	  
those	  disconnected	  from	  this	  new	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  political	  class.	  These	  include	  
but	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  Shi’a	  Islamic	  parties,	  Da’wa	  and	  the	  Islamic	  Supreme	  
Council	  of	   Iraq,	  and	   the	  Kurdish	  parties,	  Kurdistan	  Democratic	  Party	  and	   the	  
Patriotic	   Union	   of	   Kurdistan.	   Meanwhile	   Iraq’s	   others	   minorities,	   whether	  
ethnic,	   sectarian,	   or	   political	   will	  most	   likely	  mobilise	   towards	   supporting	   or	  
challenging	   the	   state	   through	   civil	   society	   by	   holding	   the	   government	  
accountable	  and	  fighting	  for	  democratic	  and	  political	  representation	  and	  rights.	  	  
	  
Operationally	   this	   variable	   will	   be	   evidenced	   through	   interviews	   where	  
diaspora	   are	   questioned	   about	   their	   political	   work	   and	   memberships	   and	  
historical	   links	   to	   political	   parties	   and	   activism.	   This	   information	   is	   also	  
determined	   through	   triangulation	   with	   other	   diaspora	   individuals	   and	   also	  
media	  reports	  where	  necessary.	  	  
	  
To	  summarise,	  this	  chapter	  has	  narrowed	  in	  on	  diaposra	  mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐
building	   by	   showing	   the	   ways	   diaspora	   have	   contributed	   to	   this	   political	  
process	   but	   also	   by	   highlighting	   the	   gaps	   in	   the	   literature	   related	   to	   our	  
understanding	   of	   diaspora	  mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐building	   in	   cases	   of	  military	  
intervention	   and	   regime	   change.	   Furthermore,	   understanding	   how	   and	   why	  
diaspora	  approach	  the	  task	  of	  state-­‐building	  in	  different	  ways	  remains	  a	  puzzle	  
that	  the	  state-­‐building	  and	  diaspora	  literature	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  adequately	  
answer.	   I	   have	   thus	   presented	   explanatory	   factors	   that	  may	   account	   for	   why	  
there	  were	  divergences	  in	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  two	  diaspora	  case	  studies	  and	  
presented	  three	  hypotheses	  relating	  to	  the	  profile	  of	  diaspora	  in	  each	  host	  state,	  
the	  hostland	  foreign	  policy	  of	  each	  host	  state	  towards	  the	  homeland	  and	  links	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to	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   parties	   in	   the	   homeland.	   I	   have	   similarly	   presented	  
alternative	   explanations,	  which	   can	   only	   partially	   account	   for	   differences	   and	  
defined	  the	  independent	  variables	  to	  be	  investigated	  in	  chapters	  5	  and	  6.	  In	  the	  
next	  chapter,	   I	  explain	  how	  I	  carry	  out	  my	  investigation	  and	  analyse	  my	  data.	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CHAPTER	  4	  –	  METHODOLOGY	  
The	  previous	  two	  chapters	  addressed	  the	  concept	  of	  diaspora,	  transnationalism	  
and	  defined	  the	  dependent	  variable	  of	  diaspora	  mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐building	  
and	  its	  two	  categories	  to	  be	  analysed	  in	  this	  study	  and	  compared	  in	  each	  host	  
state	   context.	   Secondly,	   three	   hypotheses	   were	   proposed	   relating	   to	   the	  
diaspora’s	  profile,	  hostland	   foreign	  policy	   stance,	  and	   links	   to	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  
parties	  in	  the	  homeland.	  In	  this	  chapter	  the	  research	  design	  is	  outlined	  that	  will	  
be	  used	  to	  help	  address	  the	  two	  research	  questions	  of	  this	  study:	  
1.	  How	  have	   Iraqis	   in	   Sweden	  and	   the	  UK	  contributed	   to	   state-­‐building	  
following	  the	  2003	  intervention?	  
2.	   Why	   was	   the	   UK	   diaspora	   able	   to	   contribute	   more	   to	   institution-­‐
building	   and	   governance	  while	   the	   Swedish	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   contributed	  
more	  to	  supporting	  Iraq’s	  new	  state	  through	  civil	  society?	  
	  
Since	  this	  is	  a	  comparative	  study	  that	  is	  interested	  in	  understanding	  why	  state-­‐
building	  contributions	  differed	  across	  cases	  an	  imperfect	  Most	  Similar	  Systems	  
Design	   (MSSD)	   is	   most	   fitting	   for	   this	   comparative	   study.	   Following	   a	  
discussion	   on	   the	   small	   N	   comparative	   method	   and	   the	   MSSD	   design,	   the	  
methods	   used	   for	   data	   gathering,	   coding	   and	   process	   tracing	  will	   follow.	  My	  
position	  as	  a	  researcher	  is	  also	  addressed	  in	  the	  final	  section	  where	  I	  reflect	  on	  
my	  presumed	  	  ‘insider’	  position	  and	  how	  it	  influenced	  the	  research	  process.	  	  
	  
Small-­‐	  N	  Comparative	  method	  
Since	  this	  study	  is	   interested	  in	  understanding	  why	  diasporic	  contributions	  to	  
state-­‐building	  vary,	   individual	  accounts	  are	  needed	   to	  determine	  how	  choices	  
were	  made.	  Therefore	   the	  unit	   of	   analysis	   in	   this	   study	   is	   the	   individual	   so	   a	  
case-­‐oriented	   approach	   (Ragin,	   1989)	   as	   opposed	   to	   a	   statistical–oriented	  
approach	  is	  fitting	  for	  my	  research	  design.	  As	  George	  and	  Bennett	  rightly	  assert	  
“case	   studies	   remain	  much	   stronger	   at	   assessing	  whether	   and	   how	   a	   variable	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mattered	  to	  the	  outcome	  than	  at	  assessing	  how	  much	  it	  mattered	  (George	  and	  
Bennett,	   2005:25).	  This	   is	   precisely	  what	  my	   research	   attempts	   to	  uncover	  by	  
assessing	   how	   the	   variables	   under	   study	   affected	   the	   type	   of	   state-­‐building	  
efforts	  that	  individual	  actors	  engaged	  in.	  	  
Secondly,	   a	   small	   number	   of	   case-­‐studies	   will	   allow	   for	   the	   “rich	   details	   of	  
diverse	   societies	   and	   cultures	   and	   to	   show	  how	   the	   different	   spheres	   of	   each	  
society	   and	   culture	   interrelate”	   to	   produce	   a	   given	   outcome	   (Skocpol	   and	  
Somers,	  1980:	  192).	  Indeed,	  one	  of	  the	  strengths	  of	  comparing	  a	  small	  number	  
of	  cases	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  investigate	  specific	  contexts	  in	  more	  depth,	  due	  to	  the	  
lower	   level	   of	   abstraction	   that	  makes	   them	   less	   extensive	   in	   scope	   yet	  more	  
intensive	   in	   detail	   (Lijphart,	   1971,	   1975;	   Landman,	   2008).	   This	   is	   particularly	  
relevant	   for	  my	  research	  as	  detailed	   information	  on	  the	   Iraqi	  diaspora	  and	   its	  
political	  transnationalism	  from	  a	  European	  context	  is	  severely	  lacking.	  	  
	  
Every	  research	  design	  has	  its	  weaknesses	  and	  the	  small-­‐N	  comparative	  method	  
is	   no	   exception.	  While	   focusing	   on	   a	   small	   number	   of	   cases	   provides	   “detail,	  
richness,	  completeness,	  wholeness,	  or	  degree	  of	  variance”	  (Gerring,	  2004:	  348),	  
which	  may	   contribute	   to	  meso-­‐level	   theory	   development,	   it	   will	   not	   uncover	  
trends	   related	   to	   diaspora	   contributions	   to	   state-­‐building	   more	   generally.	  
Therefore	   in	   comparing	   diaspora	   state-­‐building	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   Sweden,	   this	  
research	   design	   will	   provide	   description,	   and	   test	   hypotheses,	   which	   may	  
contribute	   to	  middle	   range	   theory	   (Meckstroth,	   1975),	   but	  will	   not	   serve	   as	   a	  
predictor	  of	  outcomes	  due	  to	  the	  small	  number	  of	  cases	  under	  study.	  The	  study	  
will	  therefore	  hold	  internal	  validity	  and	  strong	  inferences	  within	  selected	  cases	  
but	   weak	   externally	   since	   representativeness	   can	   only	   be	   achieved	   once	  
empirical	   testing	   is	   carried	   out	   in	   other	   host	   lands	   (Slater	   and	   Ziblatt,	   2013)	  
where	   Iraqi	   diasporic	   state-­‐building	   is	   occurring	   or	   with	   other	   diaspora	   in	  
different	  hostlands.	  	  
	  
However	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  whose	  main	  concern	  is	  to	  understand	  
variances	  in	  mobilisation	  types,	  case	  studies	  will	  provide	  original	  empirical	  data	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on	   Iraqi	   diasporic	   state-­‐building	   in	   Europe.	   The	   comparative	  method	   of	   two	  
cases	   therefore	  makes	   a	   valuable	   starting	   point	   for	   our	   understanding	   of	   this	  
political	   phenomenon	   among	   the	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   2003	  
Iraq	  war.	  	  
	  
The	  Comparative	  Method	  
While	  all	  political	  inquiry	  may	  be	  classified	  as	  comparative	  in	  nature	  owing	  to	  
the	   fact	   that	   we	   define	   who	   we	   are	   by	   comparing	   ourselves	   to	   others,	   the	  
comparative	   method	   is	   not	   a	   technique	   of	   analysis	   but	   a	   strategic	   scientific	  
method	   comparable	   to	   the	   experimental,	   statistical	   and	   case	   study	   method	  
(Lijphart,	  1971).	  It	  therefore	  follows	  a	  positivist	  approach	  whose	  epistemological	  
assumptions	  suggest	  that	  political	  behaviour	  is	  observable	  and	  explanations	  of	  
that	   behaviour	   can	   be	   empirically	   tested	   for	   its	   verification	   or	   falsification	  
(Ritchie	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  The	  science	  of	  politics	  thus	  draws	  on	  the	  rigour	  of	  natural	  
science	   in	   its	   methodological	   assumptions	   so	   that	   a	   scientific	   ordering	   is	  
obtained	  via	  a	  cyclical	  relationship	  between	  discovery	  and	  justification	  (Faure,	  
1994).	  This	  approach	  to	  political	  science	  acknowledges	  that	  empirical	  evidence	  
may	  be	  less	  than	  perfect	  (Lijphart,	  1971;	  Landman,	  2008),	  yet	  it	  attempts	  to	  gain	  
the	   best	   empirical	   data	   available	   in	   an	   ordered	   and	   systematic	   way,	   so	   that	  
inference	  is	  made	  possible	  (King	  et	  al.,	  1994:119).	  	  
The	   comparative	   method	   will	   thus	   be	   helpful	   for	   this	   study	   as	   it	   generates	  
“logically	   rigorous	   causal	   explanations	   of	   regularities	   and	   variations	   in	  
empirical	   phenomena”	   (Smelser,	   1976:	   174).	   It	   does	   this	   by	   providing	   much	  
needed	   description	   and	   classification	   of	   phenomenon,	   as	   well	   as	   hypothesis–
testing	   and	   prediction.	   In	   this	   study	   it	   will	   be	   used	   to	   eliminate	   rival	  
explanations,	   test	   theory	   derived	   hypotheses	   for	   similarities	   and	   differences	  
cross-­‐nationally,	   uncover	   important	   variables,	   explicate	   causal	   relationships	  
(Landman,	  2008:	  6-­‐9)	  and	  help	  contribute	  to	  middle	  range	  theory.	  	  
Consequently	   the	   comparative	  method	   is	   apt	   for	   this	   study	   as	   it	   is	   not	   only	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useful	  for	  comparing	  political	  phenomena	  and	  “testing	  hypothesised	  empirical	  
relationships	  among	  variables”	  (Lijphart,	  1971,	  1975),	  which	  will	  address	  the	  why	  
question	  of	   this	   thesis,	  but	   following	  Rose	   (1991),	   also	  one	   that	  will	  provide	  a	  
substantive	  focus	  with-­‐in	  cases	  addressing	  the	  how	  question	  of	  this	  study.	  
Traditionally	   there	   have	   been	   two	   classical	   comparison	   models	   whose	  
methodological	  roots	  stem	  from	  John	  Stuart	  Mills’	  “method	  of	  difference”	  and	  
method	   of	   concomitant	   variations”	   (Lijphart,	   1971:	   687-­‐688).	   The	   first	  model,	  
developed	  by	  Lijphart	  (1971)	  is	  the	  Most	  Similar	  Systems	  Design	  (MSSD),	  which	  
compares	   different	   outcomes	   across	   similar	   countries.	   Similarities	   across	  
systems	  act	  as	  the	  control	  variables,	  allowing	  the	  researcher	  to	  uncover	  the	  key	  
dependent	   variable	   that	   is	   common	   among	   cases.	  Meanwhile,	   another	  model	  
offered	   by	   Przeworksi	   and	   Teune	   is	   the	   Most	   Different	   Systems	   Design	  
(MDSD),	   which	   works	   by	   uncovering	   the	   common	   key	   independent	   variable	  
that	  accounts	  for	  similar	  outcomes	  in	  different	  countries	  (1970).	  	  
	  
The	  MSSD	  model	  is	  the	  most	  commonly	  used	  comparative	  research	  design	  and	  
is	   considered	   by	   various	   scholars	   (Lijphart	   1971,	   Faure	   1994)	   as	   the	   optimal	  
design	   owing	   to	   the	   similarities	   between	   countries	   that	   make	   them	   apt	   for	  
comparative	   inquiry	   (Przeworski	   and	   Teune,	   1970:32).	   With	   regards	   to	   this	  
study’s	   interests	   regional	   clustering	   also	   helps	   with	   controlling	   and	   reducing	  
extraneous	  variation.	  This	  is	  valid	  for	  my	  research	  project	  whose	  cases	  are	  both	  
European	   and	   share	  many	   political	   features	   (this	  will	   be	   further	   expanded	   in	  
the	  case	  selection	  segment	  of	  this	  chapter).	  This	  is	  helpful	  as	  one	  can	  be	  more	  
confident	   that	   the	   phenomena	   investigated	   will	   be	   more	   closely	   comparable	  
because	  of	  the	  similarity	  in	  social	  and	  political	  context	  (Smelser,	  1976:169).	  	  
	  
Under	  this	  framework,	  common	  systemic	  factors	  provide	  the	  “control”,	  whereas	  
inter-­‐systemic	   differences	   are	   considered	   explanatory	   variables.	   The	   more	  
similarities	   exist	   between	   cases,	   and	   the	   less	   differences	   that	   exist	   between	  
them	  the	  better.	  This	  will	  make	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  an	  explanatory	  variable	  can	  
be	  determined	  for	  explaining	  differences	  in	  the	  dependent	  variable.	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For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   study	   an	  MSSD	  model	   is	   the	  most	   fitting	   design	   for	  
addressing	   the	   research	   question	   since	   explaining	   variations	   in	   the	   type	   of	  
state-­‐building	  engaged	  in	  across	  country	  contexts	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  research	  
problem.	  The	  MSSD	  model	  will	  allow	  a	  comparative	  and	  detailed	  investigation	  
of	  contributions	  to	  state-­‐building	  within	  the	  two	  country	  cases	  addressing	  the	  
first	  research	  question	  related	  to	  how	  the	  diaspora	  in	  each	  context	  contributed	  
to	   state-­‐building	   while	   an	   explanation	   for	   understanding	   differences	   and	  
patterns	  across	  cases	  will	  address	  the	  second	  research	  question	  related	  to	  why	  
this	  was	  the	  case.	  	  
	  
Case	  Selection	  
As	  many	  comparative	   scholars	  have	   rightfully	  warned,	   in	  order	   to	  carry	  out	  a	  
systematic	   scientific	   comparative	   inquiry,	   appropriate	   case	   selection	   is	   vital	  
(Lieberson,	  1991;	  Slater	  and	  Ziblatt,	  2013).	  Case	  selection	  is	  critical	  for	  avoiding	  
selection	   bias	  where	   the	   choice	   of	   countries	   has	   been	   deliberately	   chosen	   on	  
the	   outcome	   of	   the	   dependent	   variable	   (Geddes,	   1990;	   Landman,	   2008)	   or	  
particular	  sources	  used	  that	  support	  a	  particular	   theoretical	  position	  (Lustick,	  
1996).	  	  
The	   country	   cases	   were	   chosen	   for	   this	   study	   by	   the	   ERC	   funded	   research	  
project	   ‘Diasporas	   and	   Contested	   Sovereignty’	   based	   on	   differences	   in	  
integration	   regimes.	   The	   UK	   and	   Sweden,	   however,	   share	   similar	   citizenship	  
regimes	   as	   indicated	  using	   the	   citizenship	  models	   of	  Howard	   (2009)	  but	   also	  
Koopmans,	   Statham,	   Giugni	   and	   Passy	   (2005).	   Howard	   and	   Koopmans	   have	  
documented	   the	   divergences	   in	   citizenship	   policies	   and	   classified	   them	   as	  
either	   	   ‘restrictive’,	   ‘medium’	   and	   ‘liberal’	   in	   the	   former	   and	   ‘exclusive’	   or	  
‘ethnic’,	  ‘assimilationist’	  or	  ‘republican’	  and	  ‘multicultural’	  or	  ‘plural’	  regimes	  in	  
the	  latter.	  Howards	  model	  is	  formulated	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  policies	  surrounding	  
whether	   jus	   soli	   is	   granted,	   naturalisation	   rates	   and	   ability	   to	   gain	   dual-­‐
citizenship,	  whereas	  Koopmans	  and	  colleagues	   focuses	  on	   the	   levels	  of	  access	  
87	  	   	  
to	   the	   political	   community	   and	   naturalisation.	   Both	   the	   cases	   of	   the	  UK	   and	  
Sweden	  are	  considered	  liberal	  and	  multicultural	  under	  these	  two	  models.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  the	  two	  cases	  differ	  in	  their	  modes	  of	  incorporation	  with	  the	  UK	  
having	   a	   much	   more	   laissez-­‐faire	   approach	   to	   its	   multiculturalism(Joppke,	  
1999),	  where	  as	  Sweden	  has	  a	  more	  interventionist	  approach	  that	  provides	  for	  
language	   classes,	   funding	   for	   native	   language	   classes	   for	   children	   and	   ethnic	  
cultural	   and	   social	   events	   (Borevi,	   2013).	   However,	   what	   is	   more	   important	  
about	   this	   controlled	   variable	   is	   that	   it	   gives	   the	   same	   opportunities	   for	  
diaspora	   to	   mobilise	   politically	   as	   it	   encourages	   political	   participation	   and	  
allows	  diaspora	   to	   freely	  engage	  with	   regards	   to	  homeland	  affairs	   in	  both	   the	  
UK	  and	  Sweden.	  	  
Secondly,	   both	   cases	   bypass	   selection	   bias	   problems	   because	   the	   cases	   have	  
been	  selected	  on	  the	  certainty	  of	  finding	  diaspora	  political	  transnationalism	  in	  
each	  host	  state	  prior	  and	  following	  the	  2003	  intervention	  without	  selecting	  on	  a	  
particular	  outcome.	  	  	  
Thirdly,	   the	  cases	  of	  UK	  and	  Sweden	  are	  suitable	   for	  a	  controlled	  comparison	  
since	  they	  both	  share	  political	  and	  social	  similarities.	  Both	  are	  liberal,	  western	  
democracies,	  with	  a	  cultural	  heritage	  that	  pertains	  to	  a	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  lineage.	  
All	  have	  a	  ranking	  of	   10	  signifying	  full	  democracy	  status	  on	  the	  Polity	  VI	  data	  
set	   (Polity	   VI	   Project,	   2013)	   and	   all	   are	   considered	   Free	   by	   Freedom	  House’s	  
democracy	  indicators	  (Freedom	  House,	  2013).	  Furthermore,	  both	  are	  members	  
of	   the	   European	   Union,	   the	   United	   Nations	   and	   are	   considered	   advanced	  
economies	  by	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)9,	  as	  well	  as	  having	  a	  very	  
high	   human	   development	   index	   score.	   The	   cases	   are	   thus	   fitting	   for	   holding	  
constant	   certain	   variables	   to	   reduce	   explanatory	   variables	   within	   cases	  
(Lijphart,	  1971).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  The	  Human	  Development	  Index	  focuses	  on	  “a	  long	  and	  healthy	  life,	  being	  knowledgeable	  and	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Fourthly,	  the	  host	  countries	  also	  have	  the	  largest	  Iraqi	  communities	  in	  Europe	  
according	   to	   various	   governmental	   and	   non-­‐governmental	   organisations	  
(Sassoon,	   2009).	   Although	   there	   are	   no	   accurate	   official	   figures	   for	   Iraqi	  
populations	  in	  Europe	  due	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  newly	  arrived	  refugees	  and	  European	  
born	  Iraqis,	  according	  to	  Sweden’s	  National	  Statistic	  Office	  there	  were	   131,888	  
Iraqis	   in	   2015 10 .	   Estimates	   for	   the	   UK	   range	   between	   350,000	   to	   450,000	  
according	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  Embassy	  in	  London,	  where	  as	  a	  mapping	  exercise	  by	  the	  
International	   Organisation	   for	   Migration	   estimated	   that	   the	   figure	   could	   be	  
around	  200,000	  (IOM,	  2007).	  Size	  matters	  for	  this	  project	  since	  it	  is	  important	  
that	   the	   Iraqi	   communities	   studied	   reflect	   the	   diversity	   of	   Iraq’s	   ethnic	   and	  
religious	  make-­‐up,	   though	   this	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   there	  may	   not	   be	  majority	  
groups	  or	  differences	  in	  configuration.	  
	  
Data	  Gathering	  	  
Semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   with	   politically	   engaged	   diaspora	   individuals	   who	  
worked	   independently,	  or	  were	  members	  of	   civil	   society	  groups,	  political	   and	  
religious	   parties	   was	   the	   main	   method	   used	   for	   gathering	   data.	   One	   to	   one	  
interviews	  were	  needed	   to	  understand	   the	   intentions	  and	  motivations	  of	  why	  
and	   how	   people	   mobilised	   and	   the	   meanings	   they	   gave	   to	   their	   actions.	  
Interviews	   are	   therefore	   necessary	   for	   entering	   into	   the	   person’s	   perspective	  
and	  gathering	  their	  stories	  (Patton,	  2002:	  341).	  
	  
Semi-­‐structured	   interview	   provided	   a	   middle	   ground	   for	   capturing	   “detail,	  
depth	  and	  an	  insider’s	  perspective,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  allowing	  hypothesis	  
testing	  and	  the	  quantitative	  analysis	  of	  interview	  responses”	  (Leech,	  2002:	  665).	  
They	  also	  allowed	  for	  more	  focused	  exploration	  and	  advancement	  of	  knowledge	  
concerning	  Iraqi	  political	  diasporic	  engagement,	  while	  the	  open-­‐ended	  element	  
ensured	   that	   time	  could	  be	  given	   to	  probing	   for	  additional	  details	   that	  might	  
otherwise	   be	   lost	   in	   a	   structured	   questionnaire	   (Louise	   Barriball	   and	  While,	  
1994).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Statistics	  Sweden	  database	  found	  at	  http://www.scb.se/en_/	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The	  questions	  formulated	  drew	  out	  information	  regarding	  social	  backgrounds,	  
migration	   motivations,	   political	   activities	   prior	   to	   and	   after	   the	   2003	  
intervention,	   political	   motivations,	   organisation,	   experiences	   in	   the	   hostland	  
and	  attitudes	  to	  the	  2003	  intervention.	  The	  questions	  were	  designed	  to	  aid	  the	  
process-­‐tracing	   method	   (George	   and	   Bennett,	   2005),	   and	   contribute	   to	   the	  
analysis	   and	   understanding	   of	   why	   and	   how	   diaspora	  mobilise	   differently	   in	  
different	  contexts	  and	  over	  time.	  	  For	  the	  questions	  see	  Appendix	  1.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   last	   three	   years	   I	   have	   also	   conducted	   a	   large	   number	   of	   informal	  
interviews	  with	   a	   plethora	   of	   Iraqis	   including	   Iraqi	   writers,	   poets,	  musicians,	  
academics	   that	   provided	   invaluable	   background	   information	   about	   the	  
diasporic	   experience	   and	   the	   political	   situation	   in	   Iraq.	   I	   also	   attended	  
academic,	   cultural	   and	   social	   events	   in	   London	   and	   Stockholm	   pertaining	   to	  
Iraq,	  which	  provided	  more	  opportunities	  to	  meet	  with	  individuals	  and	  discuss	  
my	   work.	   I	   also	   carried	   out	   open-­‐ended	   interviews	   with	   government,	  
diplomatic	   and	  public	  officials	  who	  worked	  or	   collaborated	  with	   the	  diaspora	  
both	  prior	  to	  and	  after	  intervention	  in	  both	  the	  UK	  and	  Sweden.	  
	  
Participant	  Selection	  and	  Ethics	  
Selection	   of	   participants	   for	   this	   study	   commenced	   in	   2013	   in	   London,	   UK.	  
Participants	   were	   selected	   based	   on	   their	   political	   activities	   towards	   the	  
homeland	   whether	   through	   political	   party	   branches	   or	   civil	   society	  
organisations	   or	   individual	  work.	   As	   best	   I	   could	   I	   tried	   to	   capture	   voices	   of	  
individuals	   from	   various	   ethnic,	   social	   backgrounds	   and	   gender	   who	   were	  
willing	  to	  be	  interviewed.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  claim	  to	  represent	  the	  views	  of	  
the	  entire	  Iraqi	  diaspora	   in	  each	  host	  state,	  nor	  could	   it	  ever.	  The	  diaspora	   in	  
each	   host	   state	   is	   not	   a	   monolithic	   community.	   Not	   only	   are	   there	   diverse	  
ethnic,	   social,	   political	   and	   religious	   groups,	   but	   there	   are	   also	   divisions	   and	  
differences	   within	   them.	   For	   example,	   some	   Iraqi	   Christians	   identify	   as	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Assyrians,	  others	  Syriac	  or	  Chaldean	  depending	  on	  how	  they	  view	  their	  history.	  
Neither	  does	  this	  thesis	  claim	  to	  depict	  the	  entire	  spectrum	  of	  activities,	  actors	  
and	  organisations	   that	   represent	   the	   Iraqi	  diaspora	   in	   each	  host	   state.	  Rather	  
this	   thesis	   aims	   to	   gain	   an	   indicative	   overview	   of	   the	   variety	   of	   political	  
activities	   since	   2003	   to	   2013	   in	   each	   host	   state	   for	   an	   understanding	   of	   how	  
actors	  contributed	  to	  state-­‐building	  and	  the	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  these	  choices.	  	  
	  
London	  
Being	  a	  Londoner	  with	  an	  Iraqi	  background	  I	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  various	  diaspora	  
communities	  based	   in	  London	  and	  was	  able	   to	   locate	  participants	  easily.	   	  My	  
search	   commenced	   with	   informal	   gatekeepers	   associated	   with	   the	   Iraqi	  
Association	  in	  London,	  who	  provided	  a	  good	  background	  to	  the	  active	  political	  
groups	   and	   organisations	   operating,	   as	   well	   as	   identifying	   key	   individuals	  
associated	   with	   the	   organization	   both	   past	   and	   present	   who	   remained	  
politically	  active.	  	  
	  
In	  seeking	   to	  meet	  with	  members	   from	  different	  backgrounds	   I	  also	  attended	  
diasporic	  events,	  and	  conducted	  Internet	  and	  social	  media	  searches	  to	  identify	  
participants.	  A	  very	  useful	  diaspora	  event	  was	  the	  Iraqi	  government’s	  Migrants	  
and	  Displaced	  Persons	  Conference,	  which	  convened	  in	  London	  in	  October	  2013.	  
The	  conference	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  rich	  source	  for	  identifying	  key	  gatekeepers	  from	  
Iraq’s	   multiple	   ethnic	   and	   religious	   communities,	   civil	   society	   organisations,	  
businessmen,	   as	   well	   as	   political	   parties	   who	   were	   invited.	   This	   led	   to	   a	  
snowball	   effect	   as	   once	   participants	   understood	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   study	   they	  
were	   able	   to	   identify	   other	   individuals	   within	   their	   network	   that	   were	  
politically	  active	  towards	  Iraq.	  	  
	  
In	   London	   I	   conducted	   37	   semi-­‐structured	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   interviews	   with	   Iraqi	  
diaspora	   participants	   that	   lasted	   from	   1-­‐2	   hours.	   I	   met	   with	   individuals	   at	   a	  
place	  of	   their	   choosing	  and	  explained	   to	  participants	  how	   the	  data	  was	   to	  be	  
used	  in	  my	  study	  and	  reassured	  them	  of	  their	  anonymity.	  Once	  I’d	  gained	  their	  
permission	   to	  use	   the	  data	   for	   this	   research	   I	  presented	   them	  with	  a	   letter	  of	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consent	   from	   Warwick	   University	   to	   sign,	   which	   some	   chose	   to	   sign	   while	  
others	   refused.	   	   I	   always	   sought	  permission	   to	   record	   interviews,	  which	   some	  
were	  happy	  for	  me	  to	  do.	  	  
	  
I	   also	   conducted	   6	   open-­‐ended	   interviews	   with	   senior	   diplomatic	   figures,	  
Foreign	   and	   Common	   Wealth	   officials	   and	   NGO	   organisations	   that	   either	  
worked	   on	   Iraq	   prior	   to	   intervention,	   served	   in	   Iraq	   during	   the	   occupation	  
years,	  or	  beyond.	  The	  open-­‐ended	  method	  used	  for	  these	  interviews	  helped	  to	  
elaborate	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  collaborations	  with	  diaspora	  individuals	  and	  groups	  
in	   the	   UK	   prior	   and	   after	   intervention	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   UK	  
government	   and	   its	   foreign	   policy	   at	   the	   time.	   It	   also	   helped	   to	   triangulate	  
information	  received	  from	  diaspora	  individuals.	  	  
	  
Sweden	  
Identifying	  participants	  in	  Sweden	  commenced	  through	  friendship	  networks	  in	  
Stockholm	   that	   were	   able	   to	   provide	   the	   names	   and	   contact	   details	   of	   key	  
gatekeepers	   who	   were	   politically	   active	   and	   who	   had	   contacts	   with	   political	  
representatives	  from	  various	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  backgrounds.	  Upon	  arrival	  in	  
Sweden	   I	   discovered	   that	   there	   was	   also	   a	   coordinating	   committee	   between	  
Iraq’s	   political	   party	   branches	   in	   the	   diaspora	   representing	   the	   Iraqi	  
Communist	   Party,	   the	   Kurdish	   Democratic	   Party,	   the	   Patriotic	   Union	   of	  
Kurdistan,	   Da’wa,	   Islamic	   Supreme	   Council	   of	   Iraq,	   Turkmen	   Front,	   various	  
Iraqi	   Christian	   parties,	   Yezidi	   organisations,	   and	   the	   Iraqi	   Democratic	  
Movement	  amongst	  others.	  This	  was	  a	  great	   source	   from	  which	   I	  was	  able	   to	  
meet	   political	   Iraqis	   from	   all	   ethnic	   backgrounds	   but	   also	   gain	   information	  
about	  other	  Iraqi	  organisations	  and	  associations	  and	  also	   individuals	  active	   in	  
this	   area.	   This	   was	   important	   for	   capturing	   as	   wide	   a	   range	   of	   activities	   and	  
actors	  from	  all	  backgrounds	  within	  each	  diasporic	  community.	  	  
	  
I	   conducted	   27	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   with	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   in	   Stockholm	  
that	   lasted	   from	  1-­‐2	  hours.	  As	  with	  London	  I	   reassured	  participants	  about	   the	  
nature	   of	   the	   study	   and	   how	   the	   data	   was	   to	   be	   used	   before	   asking	   their	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permission	  to	  use	  it.	  Unlike	  London	  many	  participants	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  sign	  the	  
consent	   forms	  and	   some	   refused	   to	  have	   the	   interview	   recorded.	  However	   all	  
gave	   their	   consent	   orally	   and	   were	   happy	   for	   me	   to	   use	   their	   interviews	  
anonymously	  for	  the	  PhD.	  	  
	  
	  I	  also	  carried	  out	   10	  open-­‐ended	  interviews	  with	  government,	  diplomatic	  and	  
public	  officials	  who	  worked	  or	  collaborated	  with	  the	  diaspora	  both	  prior	  to	  and	  
after	   intervention.	   The	   interviews	   helped	   to	   triangulate	   information	   received	  
from	   the	   diaspora	   but	   also	   served	   to	   give	   an	   accurate	   understanding	   of	   the	  
Swedish	   government’s	   foreign	   policy	   position	   towards	   Iraq	   during	   different	  
phases,	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   collaborations	   with	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   individuals	   and	  
groups.	  	  
	  
Secondary	  sources	  from	  academic	  texts,	  NGOs,	  government	  policy	  papers	  and	  
international	   organisations	   were	   are	   also	   used	   both	   for	   the	   UK	   and	   Swedish	  
case	   studies	   for	   supporting	   evidence	   and	   further	   triangulation	   (Elliott	   and	  
Timulak,	  2005).	  	  	  
	  
Data	  Analysis	  
Data	   analysis	   for	   this	   study	   adopts	   wisdoms	   and	   practices	   of	   both	   grounded	  
theory	   and	   positivism,	   two	   approaches	   that	   are	   considered	   theoretically	  
paradoxical.	   Grounded	   theory	   starts	   with	   the	   data	   and	   uses	   a	   bottom–up	  
approach	  inductively	  to	  draw	  out	  theory	  (Strauss	  and	  Corbin,	  1994;	  Glaser	  and	  
Strauss,	   2009),	  where	   as	  positivism	  works	   in	   the	  opposite	  way	  by	  deductively	  
identifying	  hypotheses	  from	  theory	  to	  be	  tested	  on	  the	  data	  gathered	  (Ritchie	  et	  
al.,	  2013).	  However,	  owing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  research	  puzzle	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  an	  
area	   under	   studied	   in	   the	   diaspora	   literature,	   it	   is	   an	   area	   that	   requires	  
exploration,	  as	  well	  as	  investigation	  calling	  on	  the	  use	  of	  what	  Johnny	  Saldaña	  
refers	  to	  as	  ‘eclectic	  pragmatism’	  in	  the	  approach	  of	  how	  data	  should	  be	  coded	  
(Saldaña,	  2009).	  While	  hypotheses	  have	  been	  drawn	  out	  from	  the	  literature,	  a	  
more	   open	   approach	   is	   also	   required	   for	   other	   interesting	   factors	   to	   emerge	  
(Seidman,	  2006).	  	  As	  such	  it	  is	  argued	  here	  that	  the	  two	  approaches	  need	  not	  be	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contradictory,	  but	  can	  actually	  be	  complimentary	  if	  undertaken	  in	  stages,	  that	  
allow	  for	  the	  data	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  theory,	  while	  also	  allowing	  the	  theory	  then	  to	  
speak	  to	  the	  data.	  	  	  
	  
Before	  uncovering	  this	  research	  puzzle	  and	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  study,	  a	  preliminary	  
research	  trip	  to	  Sweden	  was	  taken	  to	  meet	  with	  few	  diasporic	  actors	  to	  gain	  a	  
sense	   of	   Iraqi	   political	   transnationalism.	   Once	   a	   number	   of	   interviews	   were	  
conducted	  I	  was	  able	  to	  listen	  to	  the	  interviews	  without	  having	  any	  theoretical	  
guidance,	  which	   helped	   identify	   an	   emerging	   pattern	   regarding	   the	   diasporic	  
contributions	  of	  participants,	  which	  differed	  to	  those	  witnessed	  in	  London.	  As	  
such	   interviews	   were	   firstly	   heard	   without	   assumptions	   borrowing	   from	   the	  
wisdom	  of	  a	  grounded	  theory	  approach	  (Glaser	  and	  Strauss,	  2009).	  I	  wanted,	  in	  
effect,	   to	   observe	   the	   data	   in	   the	   first	   place	   from	   a	   more	   neutral	   position,	  
without	  any	  theory	  framing	  my	  analysis.	  This	  helped	  direct	  my	  study	  to	  a	  focus	  
on	   state-­‐building,	   and	   to	   explore	   theoretically	   how	   and	   why	   diasporas	   built	  
their	  countries	  of	  origin	  in	  different	  ways.	  	  
	  
Coding	  	  
Once	   all	   interviews	   were	   complete,	   extensive	   notes	   and	   part	   transcriptions	  
were	  made	  of	  each	  interview.	  After	  reading	  and	  rereading	  the	  interviews	  I	  gave	  
myself	   time	   to	   process	   the	   information	   before	   I	   began	   to	   code	   (DeWalt	   and	  
DeWalt,	   2002).	  This	  was	  effective	   in	  helping	  me	   see	   the	  broader	   causal	   links,	  
and	   to	   differentiate	   between	   intervening	   and	   independent	   variables	   when	   I	  
finally	  came	  to	  coding	  the	  data	  using	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  adopted.	  	  
	  
I	   then	   commenced	   initial	   coding	   of	   the	   interviews	   using	   the	   theoretical	  
framework	  outlined	  in	  the	  study	  as	  well	  as	  allowing	  for	  other	  noteworthy	  topics	  
to	   emerge	   (Seidman,	   2006).	   Initial	   coding	   included	   past	   political	   activities,	  
persecution	   in	   the	   homeland,	   belonging,	   elite	   networks,	   grass-­‐roots	   activism,	  
political	   parties,	   democracy	   building,	   human	   rights,	   minority	   rights,	  
collaboration	  with	  hostland	  state,	  work	  with	  Iraqi	  government	  amongst	  others.	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After	   gaining	   a	   comprehensive	   understanding	   of	   the	   range	   of	   diasporic	  
integration	   experiences,	   motivations,	   range	   of	   political	   activities,	   and	   actors,	  
codes	  were	  recoded	  under	  the	  categories	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  in	  order	  to	  
distinguish	   between	   the	   causal	   paths	   that	   lead	   to	   each	   type.	   This	   followed	   a	  
second	  cycle	  of	  process	  coding	  for	  understanding	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  that	  
lead	   to	   each	   type	   (Saldaña,	   2009)	   .	   Eventually	   thematic	   categories	   emerged	  
from	   the	   data	   relating	   to	   the	   hypotheses	   put	   forward.	   Gradually	   connective	  
threads	  were	  made	   between	   the	   type	   of	   activities	   engaged	   in	   and	   the	   factors	  
that	  lead	  to	  specific	  types.	  	  
	  
Analysing	  the	  data	  with	  Process	  Tracing	  
Controlled	  comparisons	  in	  qualitative	  research	  methods	  are	  difficult	  to	  achieve	  
under	  the	  strict	  criteria	  outlined	  by	  Mill’s	  method	  of	  agreement	  and	  difference	  
(cf.	  George	  and	  Bennett	  2005	  Ch.	  10).	  Indeed,	  Mill	  himself	  was	  sceptical	  about	  
their	  use	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  (Lijphart,	  1971).	  As	  George	  and	  Bennett	  explain,	  
both	  methods	  may	   lead	   to	   ‘false	   positives’	   and	   ‘false	   negatives’,	   where	   causal	  
inferences	  made	  by	  comparing	  two	  cases	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  spurious	  or	  invalid	  
when	  tested	  against	  another	  case	  (2005:	  153-­‐160).	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  address	  the	  
shortfalls	  within	  the	  controlled	  comparison,	  the	  1990s	  saw	  a	  wave	  of	  literature	  
sparked	   by	   King,	   Keohane	   and	   Verba’s	   influential	   Designing	   Social	   Inquiry	  
(1994)	  who	  sought	  to	  make	  qualitative	  comparative	  methods	  more	  robust.	  The	  
dawn	  of	   this	  new	  era	  of	  methodology	   focused	  on	  new	  tools	  and	  strategies	   for	  
improving	  causal	   inference	  (Mahoney,	  2010:	   123),	  and	  one	  of	   the	  key	  methods	  
outlined	  was	  the	  use	  of	  “process	  tracing”	  for	  refining	  causal	  inference.	  So	  what	  
is	  process	  tracing?	  
George	   and	   Bennett	   define	   process	   tracing	   as	   a	  method,	   which	   “attempts	   to	  
identify	  the	  intervening	  causal	  process-­‐the	  causal	  chain	  and	  causal	  mechanism-­‐
between	   an	   independent	   variable	   (or	   variables)	   and	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	  
dependent	  variable.”	  (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:206).	  It	  is	  therefore	  a	  research	  
method	   for	   analysing	   evidence	   in	   light	   of	   research	   questions	   and	   hypotheses	  
put	   forward	   by	   the	   researcher	   (Collier,	   2011:	   823).	   ‘By	   tracing	   the	   process	   of	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events,	   causal	   variables	   may	   or	   may	   not	   be	   ruled	   out	   as	   having	   causal	  
significance’	   (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:214-­‐215).	   In	  this	  way	  causal	  paths	  that	  
lead	   to	   a	   specific	   outcome	   are	   uncovered	   or	   differences	   in	   causal	   paths	   in	  
different	  cases	  identified.	  	  
	  
Due	   to	   its	   close	   inspection	   of	   individual	   cases,	   process	   tracing	   is	   therefore	  
useful	   for	  a	  variety	  of	   research	   tasks	   including,	   “(a)	   identifying	  novel	  political	  
and	  social	  phenomena	  and	  systematically	  describing	  them;	  (b)	  evaluating	  prior	  
explanatory	  hypotheses,	  discovering	  new	  hypotheses,	  and	  assessing	  these	  new	  
causal	  claims;	  (c)	  gaining	  insight	  into	  causal	  mechanisms;	  and	  (d)	  providing	  an	  
alternative	   means—compared	   with	   conventional	   regression	   analysis	   and	  
inference	  based	  on	  statistical	  models—of	  addressing	  challenging	  problems	  such	  
as	   reciprocal	   causation,	   spuriousness,	   and	   selection	   bias.”	   (Collier,	   2011:	   824).	  	  
Furthermore	   as	   George	   and	   Bennett	   have	   pointed	   out	   process	   tracing	   can	  
contribute	   to	   testing	   theory	   and	   theory	  development	   as	   it	   not	  only	   generates	  
many	  observations	  within	  a	  case	  but	  that	  these	  observations	  must	  be	  linked	  in	  
meaningful	  ways	  to	  form	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  case	  (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005:	  
207).	   It	   is	   therefore	   a	   method	   that	   can	   develop	   middle-­‐range	   theories	   and	  
typological	  theories	  (2005:	  225).	  	  
	  
One	   of	   the	   crucial	   differences	   between	   process	   tracing	   and	   historical	  
explanation	  is	  that	  the	  process	  tracing	  method	  is	  couched	  by	  theory	  identified	  
by	   the	   researcher	   which	   will	   serve	   to	   offer	   an	   analytical	   explanation	   of	   the	  
outcome	  under	  study.	  It	  is	  not	  solely	  historical	  account	  that	  offers	  a	  chronology	  
of	  events,	  but	  rather	  one	  that	  offers	  a	  causal	  sequence,	  analysis	  and	  explanation	  
(Collier,	   2011:	   823).	   The	   two	   crucial	   elements	   of	   process	   tracing	   are	   thus	  
description	  and	   sequencing.	   In	  describing	  events	   carefully	  and	  knowing	  cases	  
well	   we	   can	   start	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   how	   they	   link	   together	   and	   analyse	   the	  
causal	  change	  from	  one	  event	  to	  another	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time.	  	  
	  
Since	  this	  thesis	  is	  concerned	  with	  explaining	  contextual	  and	  causal	  factors	  that	  
lead	  to	  variances	   in	  state-­‐building	  during	  a	   time	  period	  spanning	  the	  pre	  and	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post	   intervention,	   process	   tracing	   within	   cases	   provides	   the	   best	   means	   of	  
uncovering	   the	   linking	  minutiae	  of	   these	   temporal	  processes.	   It	   is	   therefore	  a	  
complimentary	  method	  to	  the	  small-­‐n	  comparative	  method	  that	  will	  chart	  the	  
intervening	  causal	  process	  and	  explanation	   for	   state-­‐building	   in	  each	  context.	  
In	   doing	   so	   differences	   in	   state-­‐building	   paths	  will	   be	   discovered,	   allowing	   a	  
comparative	  composition	  across	  cases	  (Mahoney	  2010;	  Slater	  and	  Ziblatt,	  2013).	  	  
	  
Process-­‐	  tracing	  will	  be	  used	  throughout	  my	  empirical	  chapters	  to	  analyse	  the	  
migrations	  and	  creations	  of	  each	  diaspora	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Sweden.	  Tracing	  the	  
diaspora	  back	  in	  time	  to	  its	  creation	  and	  migration	  waves	  allows	  us	  to	  inspect	  
the	   profiles	   of	   diaspora	   in	   each	   hostland,	   while	   allowing	   us	   to	   see	   how	   the	  
profiles	   within	   each	   context	   created	   a	   very	   different	   social	   and	   political	  
diasporic	   scene.	   This	   is	   important	   for	   recounting	   how	   oppositional	   activity	  
grew	   in	   each	   hostland	   in	   the	   lead	   up	   to	   intervention	   in	   2003	   and	  why	   there	  
were	  differences	  in	  the	  capabilities	  of	  each	  diaspora.	  	  
	  
As	   the	   2003	   intervention	   and	   occupation	   took	   place,	   the	   empirical	   chapters	  
piece	   together	   how	   the	   foreign	   policy	   stances	   of	   each	   hostland	   impacted	   or	  
shaped	  the	  type	  of	  state-­‐building	  that	  each	  diaspora	  was	  able	  to	  engage	  in.	  The	  
UK’s	  foreign	  policy	  stance	  of	  military	  intervention	  and	  later	  occupation	  created	  
openings	   for	   the	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   as	   political	   leaders,	   governors	   and	   advisors.	  
Meanwhile	   Sweden’s	   foreign	   policy	   stance	   of	   non-­‐intervention	   and	   working	  
through	   the	  UN	   framework	  during	   the	   occupation	   years	  meant	   that	   Iraqis	   in	  
Sweden	   had	   no	   access	   into	   Iraq	   until	   Iraqis	   gained	   their	   sovereignty	   and	  
Sweden	  created	  its	  own	  relationship	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  government.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   post-­‐2005	   period	   and	   after	   Iraq’s	   first	   democratic	   elections	   a	   different	  
story	   begins	   to	   unfold	   as	   repercussions	   of	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   dynamics	   in	   Iraq	  
have	  a	  bearing	  on	  the	  capabilities	  of	  those	  in	  the	  diaspora	  to	  mobilise	  towards	  
state-­‐building	   processes.	   The	   empirical	   chapters	   trace	   the	   effects	   of	   ethno-­‐
sectarianism	   to	   reveal	   that	   those	   linked	   to	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   parties	   have	   far	  
more	   opportunities	   to	   mobilise	   towards	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance	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while	   those	   not	   linked	   to	   these	   ruling	   parties	   are	   steered	   towards	  
supporting/challenging	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society.	  	  
	  
The	   empirical	   chapters	   thus	   will	   proceed	   by	   recounting	   the	   story	   of	   each	  
diaspora	   over	   time	   revealing	   how	   diasporic	   profiles,	   hostland	   foreign	   policy	  
stances	  and	   later	   links	   to	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  political	  parties	  affected	   the	   type	  of	  
state-­‐building	  that	  diaspora	  were	  able	  to	  engage	  in	  2003	  and	  beyond.	  	  
	  
Positionality	  and	  Reflexivity	  
The	  production	  of	  knowledge	  is	  a	  two	  way	  relationship	  between	  researcher	  and	  
participant	  (Geertz,	  1993).	  A	  multitude	  of	  categories	  including	  the	  researcher’s	  
class,	   religion,	  gender,	   sexual	  orientation,	  as	  well	   as	   the	   subject	  matter	  of	   the	  
research	  and	  the	  locations	  in	  which	  the	  research	  is	  conducted	  (Al-­‐Ali	  and	  Pratt,	  
2006)	   can	   all	   influence	   the	   production	   of	   knowledge	   in	   subtle	   and	   unsubtle	  
ways.	  Having	  a	   reflexive	  approach,	   i.e.	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  one’s	   subject	  
position	  can	  alter	  the	  research	  process	  is	  therefore	  important	  for	  understanding	  
how	  knowledge	  is	  produced.	  Crucially	  however	  it	  can	  also	  crucially	  enhance	  the	  
research	  by	  lending	  greater	  understanding	  to	  the	  nuances	  of	  the	  research	  topic	  
(Finlay	  and	  Gough,	  2003).	  	  	  
	  
Indeed,	  as	  a	  British	  citizen	  with	  an	  Iraqi-­‐Arab	  background	  I	  was	  aware	  from	  the	  
few	   readings	   on	   reflexivity	   how	   my	   positionality	   carried	   with	   it	   obvious	  
privileges	   owing	   to	   my	   cultural,	   social	   and	   political	   understanding	   of	   Iraqi	  
issues,	   speaking	   Iraqi	   Arabic,	   and	   crucially,	   access	   and	   legitimacy	   within	   the	  
community	  (Chavez,	  2007).	  Born	  to	  Arab	  Iraqi	  parents	  associated	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  
Communist	  Party,	  I	  knew	  first	  hand	  the	  political	  persecution	  my	  parents	  faced	  
in	  Iraq,	  the	  personal	  sacrifices	  made	  for	  me	  and	  my	  brothers	  and	  sister,	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  loneliness,	  missed	  opportunities,	  and	  the	  yearning	  for	  home	  that	  life	  in	  
the	   diaspora	   often	   evoked.	   My	   parents’	   left-­‐wing	   associations	   affected	   the	  
diasporic	   life	  they	   led	  and	  consequently	  my	  diasporic	  milieu.	  Growing	  up	  this	  
largely	  incorporated	  Iraqi	  poets,	  musicians,	  artists	  and	  political	  stalwarts	  of	  the	  
Iraqi	  Communist	  Party.	  Growing	  up	  in	  the	  diaspora,	  I	  was	  oblivious	  to	  ethnic,	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religious	  or	  sectarian	  tensions	  because	  I	  led	  a	  secular	  familial	  life.	  	  
	  
In	  my	   younger	   years	   I	   attended	   cultural	   events	   with	  my	   parents	   at	   the	   now	  
defunct	   and	   sorely	  missed	  Kufa	   gallery	   in	  Bayswater,	   as	  well	   as	   social	   parties	  
organised	  by	  the	  Iraqi	  Association	  or	  the	  Iraqi	  Communist	  Party	  in	  Acton	  Town	  
Hall	   or	  Holborn’s	  Conway	  Hall.	  Up	  until	   this	   point	   in	  my	   late	   teens,	   I	   had	   a	  
diasporic	   life,	   which	   was	   also	   shaped	   by	   an	   increasingly	   distant	   hope	   and	  
waiting	   game	   of	   returning	   when	   Saddam	   Hussein’s	   reign	   would	   come	   to	   an	  
end.	  With	  each	  year	  both	  the	  hopelessness	  and	  the	  distance	  from	  the	  diaspora	  
increased	   until	   I	   stopped	   going	   to	   diasporic	   Iraqi	   events	   and	   parties.	   My	  
relationship	   to	   Iraq	   was	   only	   revived	   in	   my	   late	   twenties	   through	   my	  
identification	   with	   feminism	   as	   I	   decided	   to	   explore	   the	   position	   of	   Iraqi	  
women	  following	  the	  2003	  Iraqi	  occupation	  for	  my	  MA	  dissertation.	  This	  study	  
subsequently	  re-­‐connected	  me	  to	  Iraq,	  to	  activism	  and	  thus	  to	  the	  diaspora.	  
	  
On	  entering	  this	  research	  project	  I	  did	  not	  consider	  myself	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  
Iraqi	  diaspora	  but	  I	  understood	  it	  from	  my	  own	  diasporic	  references.	  My	  links	  
to	  Iraq	  were	  largely	  familial,	  understood	  through	  the	  food,	  the	  stories	  of	  family	  
back	   in	   Iraq,	   the	   music,	   the	   news,	   talking	   the	   language,	   but	   also	   through	  
sporadic	  activism.	  As	  such	  I	  am	  considered	  by	  the	  literature	  as	  a	  classic	  ‘insider’	  
whether	  understood	  as	  belonging	  to	  a	  group	  in	  terms	  of	  culture	  or	  biology	  or	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  community	  under	  study	  (Merton,	  1972).	  In	  reality	  I	  felt	  more	  
of	  a	  cultural	   ‘insider’	  because	   it	   is	   the	  culture	   I	   am	   intimate	  with	   (Ganga	  and	  
Scott,	  2006).	  In	  any	  case	  I	  could	  never	  have	  anticipated	  or	  appreciated	  how	  my	  
own	  experiences	  of	  diasporic	  life	  differed	  and	  how	  much	  of	  an	  outsider	  I	  could	  
be	  until	  I	  was	  faced	  with	  other	  ethnic	  or	  sectarian	  Iraqi	  individuals	  and	  groups.	  	  
	  
Markers	   of	   ‘insider’	   and	   ‘outsider’	   affected	   the	   research	   process	   in	   different	  
ways.	   These	   included	   generation,	   different	  migration	  waves,	   language/accent,	  
religion,	   ethnicity,	   gender	   and	   family	   political	   background.	  By	   the	   end	  of	  my	  
fieldwork	  I	  had	  a	  greater	  appreciation	  for	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	   ‘insider’	  and	  
‘outsider’	   dynamic	   and	   how	   ethno-­‐national	   boundaries	   do	   not	   automatically	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inspire	   ‘insider’	  status	  (Carling	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  Rather	  there	  are	  multiple	  layers	  of	  
intersectional	   categories	   (Crenshaw,	   1991)	   creating	   shifting	   ‘insider’	   and	   ‘	  
outsider’	  positionalities	  that	  can	  be	  both	  felt	  from	  the	  researcher’s	  own	  position	  
or	  attributed	  by	  respondents.	  	  
	  
Contrary	  to	  the	  dominant	  literature	  on	  migration	  research	  that	  perceives	  those	  
who	  are	  ethnically	  from	  the	  migrant	  community	  as	  ‘insiders’	  and	  those	  who	  are	  
not	  part	   of	   it	   as	   ‘outsiders’	   (Ganga	   and	  Scott,	   2006)	   in	  most	   cases	  during	  my	  
fieldwork	   I	   felt	   both	   an	   insider	   and	   outsider.	  During	   the	   same	   interview,	  my	  
feelings	   changed	   sometimes	   within	   minutes	   due	   to	   my	   or	   my	   respondent’s	  
behaviour.	   Thus	   my	   positioning	   shifted	   and	   altered,	   underlining	   the	   false	  
dichotomy	   of	   the	   insider/outsider	   taxonomy	   (Breen,	   2007;	   Chavez,	   2007;	  
Greene,	   2014).	   Instead	   my	   position	   changed	   when	   categories	   of	  
difference/similarity	  between	  myself	  and	  the	  respondent	  were	  highlighted.	  For	  
example,	   religion	   proved	   to	   be	   a	   category	   of	   difference,	   which	   affected	   my	  
interactions	  and	  relationships	  with	  participants.	  A	  good	  example	  was	  the	   first	  
interview	   I	  had	  with	  a	   religious	   Iraqi	  man.	  Not	  being	   religious	  or	  growing	  up	  
around	  religiosity	  in	  my	  Iraqi	  family	  life,	  I	  was	  unaware	  of	  the	  religious	  customs	  
associated	   with	   a	   woman	   greeting	   a	   religious	   man.	   Upon	   meeting	   the	  
respondent	   I	   went	   to	   shake	   his	   hand,	   to	   which	   he	   politely	   declined.	   In	   that	  
instant	  I	  was	  acutely	  reminded	  of	  my	  secular	  position	  and	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  of	  
religious	   custom,	   which	   made	   me	   feel	   like	   an	   outsider.	   It	   also	   served	   to	  
underline	   the	   distance	   between	  my	   diasporic	   life	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   that	   of	   the	  
participant.	  In	  that	  gesture	  I	  had	  effectively	  communicated	  my	  lack	  of	  religious	  
knowledge,	  which	   immediately	   set	   us	   apart,	  making	   both	   of	   us	   aware	   of	   our	  
different	  social	  and	  religious	  positions	  (Ganga	  and	  Scott,	  2006).	  	  
	  
Another	  example	  related	  to	  my	  visit	  to	  a	  religious	  mufti	  in	  London.	  Thinking	  I	  
understood	   the	   social	   norms	   I	   dressed	   professionally	   and	   conservatively	   and	  
tied	  my	  hair	  back.	  When	  I	  greeted	  him,	  the	  first	  question	  he	  asked	  me	  was	  why	  
I	  was	   not	  wearing	   a	   hijab.	  My	   internal	   reaction	   to	   his	   question,	   a	  mixture	   of	  
indignation	   and	   irritation,	   also	   made	   me	   realise	   how	   removed	   I	   was	   from	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certain	  segments	  of	  Iraqi	  diasporic	  society	  due	  to	  my	  secular	  beliefs.	  I	  also	  felt	  
naïve	  in	  thinking	  that	  I	  could	  visit	  a	  senior	  religious	  cleric	  as	  a	  woman	  without	  
expecting	   and	  being	   prepared	   for	   such	   a	   question.	   I	   felt	   like	   an	   outsider	   and	  
was	   seen	   as	   one,	   and	   the	   conversation	   between	   us	   hence	  was	   shaped	   by	  my	  
response	  to	  his	  question	  and	  his	  need	  to	  educate	  me	  on	  religious	  practice.	  	  
	  
In	   those	   instances	   I	   could	   understand	   why	   a	   positivist	   position	   of	   using	  
‘outsiders’	   to	   conduct	   social	   inquiry	   (Chavez,	   2007)	   might	   be	   deemed	   more	  
appropriate.	  I	  wondered	  whether	  an	  ‘outsider’	  might	  have	  been	  better	  suited	  to	  
meeting	  with	   religious	   clerics	   or	   religious	   figures	   as	   the	   relationship	  between	  
them	  would	  have	  been	  more	  neutral	  and	  less	  affected.	  However,	  knowledge	  is	  
always	  inter-­‐subjective,	  irrespective	  of	  outsider	  or	  insider	  categories.	  Both	  carry	  
ideas,	  values	  and	  presumptions	  that	  shift	  and	  can	  affect	  the	  research	  process	  in	  
individual	  ways	  (Naples,	  1996).	  A	  stark	  reminder	  that	  during	  migration	  research	  
ethno-­‐national	  categories	  do	  not	  always	  an	  ‘insider’	  make	  (Carling	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  	  
	  
There	  were	  also	  generational	  issues	  that	  came	  to	  the	  fore	  during	  my	  research.	  
Being	   the	   same	  age	  as	  many	   respondents’	   sons	  or	  daughters,	   I	  was	   treated	  as	  
such	  by	  first	  generation	  Iraqis.	  I	  was	  welcomed	  into	  people’s	  homes	  where	  they	  
insisted	  I	  eat	  and	  drink	  and	  many	  expressed	  a	  pride	  that	  I	  was	  doing	  a	  PhD	  on	  
Iraq,	  which	  facilitated	  my	  access	  to	  knowledge	  and	  placed	  me	  as	  an	  insider.	  	  
	  
Often	   however,	   with	   respect	   to	   conservative	   first	   generation	   individuals,	   this	  
positioning	   of	   older/younger	   meant	   that	   I	   had	   to	   be	   especially	   respectful	   of	  
elders	  so	  that	  challenging	  them	  on	  specific	  political	  issues	  had	  to	  be	  done	  with	  
much	   diplomacy	   and	   caution,	   especially	   as	   sensitive	   political	   issues	   were	  
discussed.	  Several	  respondents	  for	  example	  had	  lost	  family	  members	  or	  friends	  
to	   the	   Baath	   regime,	   which	  made	   talking	   to	   them	   about	   their	   prior	   political	  
activities	  difficult	  at	  times.	  Self-­‐reflection	  and	  awareness	  of	  my	  own	  position	  of	  
researcher	  helped	  me	  overcome	  these	  difficult	  instances	  and	  proceed	  in	  a	  more	  
professional	  manner.	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At	   other	   times	   first	   generation	   respondents	   assumed	   I	   knew	   about	   political	  
legacies,	  religious	  customs	  or	  historical	  events,	  which	  I	  had	  to	  admit	  I	  did	  not,	  
again	  positioning	  me	  as	  an	  outsider.	  	  These	  episodes	  impacted	  the	  research	  in	  
that	   I	   learnt	   a	   great	   deal	   during	   interviews	   but	   it	   also	   meant	   that	   lack	   of	  
knowledge	   about	   certain	   historical	   events	   affected	   the	   questions	   I	   raised	   or	  
didn’t	  raise	  during	  the	  research	  process.	  	  
	  
While	   my	   Iraqi	   Arabic	   allowed	   me	   to	   conduct	   research	   in	   the	   respondents	  
native	   language	   making	   me	   feel	   like	   one	   of	   ‘them’,	   I	   was	   surprised	   when	  
particularly	  in	  Sweden,	  my	  Iraqi	  accent	  was	  teased	  for	  being	  southern	  and	  also	  
more	  interestingly,	  for	  using	  archaic	  words	  that	  respondents	  hadn’t	  heard	  in	  a	  
long	   time.	   This	  was	   a	   revelation	   to	  me,	   as	   I	   had	   never	   reflected	   on	  my	   Iraqi	  
language	  in	  this	  way.	  It	  suddenly	  occurred	  to	  me	  how	  my	  Iraqi	  language	  hadn’t	  
evolved	  and	  was	   in	  effect	   stuck	   in	   time.	  Since	  my	   family’s	   exile	   in	   the	  UK,	   in	  
1990,	  my	  Iraqi	  language	  learning	  occurred	  in	  the	  diaspora	  and	  mainly	  through	  
my	  parents’	  and	  their	  generation’s	  vocabulary	  and	  expressions.	  	  
	  
This	   realisation	   made	   me	   once	   again	   feel	   like	   an	   outsider	   and	   at	   times	   self	  
conscious	  as	  I	  could	  not	  know	  whether	  my	  expressions	  were	  archaic	  or	  not.	  It	  
brought	   into	   sharp	   relief	   the	  distance	  between	   the	   older	   ‘diaspora’	   and	   those	  
who	  had	  fled	  Iraq	  more	  recently.	  I	  felt	  closer	  to	  those	  who	  left	  Iraq	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  as	  my	  family,	  mostly	  those	  in	  the	  UK,	  than	  the	  Iraqis	  in	  Sweden	  who	  had	  
arrived	  more	  recently.	   	  On	  the	  meta-­‐level	  were	  any	  of	  us	  really	   insiders?	  This	  
relationship	  thus	  proved	  to	  be	  far	  more	  complex	  due	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  diaspora	  
being	  the	  subject	  under	  study	  as	  well	  as	  the	  self-­‐ascribed	  or	  attributed	  identity	  
of	   the	  researcher	  and	  the	  researched.	  Reflexivity	  when	  studying	  diaspora	  thus	  
brought	  its	  own	  particularities	  and	  challenges	  (Collet,	  2008;	  Baser,	  2012)	  
	  
My	   southern	   Iraqi	   accent	   and	   vocabulary	   also	   proved	   to	   be	   a	   source	   of	  
suspicion,	  which	  at	   times	  meant	   I	  had	   to	  work	  hard	   to	  prove	   that	   I	  was	   Iraqi	  
and	   not	   from	   the	   Gulf	   as	   some	   respondents	   accused	   me	   of	   being.	   A	   rather	  
tragic	   incident	   occurred	   when	   I	   called	   one	   gentleman	   on	   the	   telephone	   to	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arrange	   an	   interview	   who	   then	   proceeded	   to	   shout	   at	   me	   and	   accuse	  me	   of	  
being	  an	   Islamist	   spy.	  This	  was	   in	  spite	  of	   the	   fact	   that	   I	  had	  approached	   the	  
man	  through	  a	  trusted	  gatekeeper,	  to	  reassure	  him	  of	  my	  authenticity	  as	  a	  PhD	  
student	  conducting	  doctoral	  research.	  	  
	  
Though	   this	  was	  an	  extreme	  case,	  and	  most	  participants	  were	   reassured	  once	  
they’d	   met	   me,	   these	   experiences,	   though	   ten	   years	   after	   intervention,	  
expressed	  the	  continued	  fear/distrust	  of	  Iraqi	  governments	  and	  spies.	  Unknown	  
individuals	  were	  still	  treated	  with	  suspicion.	  	  During	  these	  times	  I	  had	  to	  give	  
more	  of	  my	  self	  by	  presenting	  a	  personal	  curriculum	  vitae,	  usually	  in	  relation	  to	  
three	  specific	  areas,	  my	  family	  name,	  where	  in	  Iraq	  my	  parents	  were	  from	  and	  
when	  we	  migrated	   to	   the	  UK.	  Often	   I	  was	   asked	   about	  my	   father,	   his	   name,	  
occupation	  and	  politics.	  In	  many	  respects	  participants	  interviewed	  me	  before	  I	  
could	  start	  interviewing	  them.	  	  
	  
What	   is	   apparent	   as	   I	   look	   back	   to	   my	   experience	   in	   the	   field	   is	   that	  
insider/outsider	   positionalities	   are	   in	   many	   respects	   irrelevant	   as	   each	  
individual	  and	   their	  meeting	  with	  an	   (other)	  create	  both	   insider	  and	  outsider	  
dynamics	  irrespective	  of	  traditional	  understandings	  of	  this	  phenomenon.	  What	  
is	   perhaps	  more	   important	   is	   the	   self-­‐reflection	  needed	  prior	   to	   commencing	  
research	  about	  how	  interactions	  with	  the	  groups/individuals	  under	  study	  may	  
affect	  us	  or	  be	  affected	  by	  us,	  which	  then	  calls	  for	  methodological	  solutions	  for	  
countering	  these	  in	  specific	  situations.	  	  
	  
One	  caveat	  to	  this	  remains	  the	  privilege	  of	  accessibility	  that	  those	  connected	  to	  
the	  migrant	  community	  they	  research	  have	  at	  their	  disposal.	  Being	  seen	  as	  an	  
insider	   and	   speaking	   the	   language	   allowed	  me	   to	   penetrate	   various	   elite	   and	  
non-­‐elite	   circles,	   build	   trust,	   gain	   access	   to	   events	   and	   information	   relatively	  
easily	  because	  I	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  legitimate	  member	  of	  the	  ‘community’,	  a	  feat	  that	  
might	  otherwise	  be	  difficult	  for	  those	  perceived	  as	  outsiders	  (Agar,	  1980).	  	  
	  
To	  summarise,	  this	  chapter	  established	  the	  research	  design	  and	  methodological	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tools	  used	  for	  carrying	  out	  my	  investigation	  and	  the	  data.	  It	  drew	  attention	  to	  
the	   small	   n	   comparative	   method,	   which	   frames	   my	   research,	   and	   the	   case	  
studies	   that	   are	   under	   investigation.	   Due	   to	   the	   need	   to	   uncover	   new	  
information,	   as	   well	   as	   understand	   causal	   mechanisms,	   I	   explained	   why	   the	  
semi-­‐structured	   interview	   proved	   the	   best	   method	   for	   gathering	   the	   data.	  
Furthermore,	  I	  emphasised	  that	  analysing	  the	  data	  with	  process	  tracing	  allows	  
for	  contextual	  and	  temporal	  variations	  to	  be	  exposed,	  so	  that	  causal	  pathways	  
can	   be	   explained.	   Finally,	   I	   reflected	   on	   my	   own	   positionality	   as	   an	   Iraqi	  
researcher,	   and	   how	   my	   own	   ethnic,	   cultural	   and	   political	   background	  
informed	  the	  research	  process.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  explore	  the	  case	  study	  of	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As	  outlined	  in	  the	  theory	  section	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  three	  hypotheses	  presented	  
for	   investigating	   throughout	   this	   chapter	   are	   related	   to	   the	   profile	   of	   the	  
diaspora,	  the	  hostland’s	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  Iraq	  in	  2003,	  and	  lastly	  links	  to	  
homeland	  political	  parties.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  make	  the	  argument	  that	  all	  three	  
variables	   affected	   the	   type	   of	   diaspora	  mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐building	   during	  
different	   time	   periods	   .	   The	   first	   relates	   to	   the	   period	   leading	   up	   to	  military	  
intervention,	   followed	  by	   the	   period	   of	   occupation	   and	   lastly	   following	   Iraq’s	  
first	  democratic	  elections.	  	  
	  
This	  chapter	  thus	  traces	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  and	  their	  mobilisation	  
for	   state-­‐building	   over	   time.	   The	   chapter	   commences	   by	   tracing	   how	   the	  
profiles	  of	  those	  who	  came	  to	  the	  UK	  and	  their	  social	  formations	  in	  London	  had	  
a	  bearing	  on	  what	  they	  were	  able	  to	  do	  in	  opposition	  and	  who	  they	  were	  able	  to	  
reach.	   As	   shall	   be	   explained	   in	   this	   chapter,	   that	   strategy	   created	   an	  
opportunity	  for	  the	  Iraqi	  opposition	  figures	  in	  the	  diaspora	  to	  be	  involved	  both	  
in	   the	   pre	   and	   post	   intervention	   years	   for	   several	   reasons.	   In	   the	   pre-­‐
intervention	  phase	  the	  coalition	  sorely	  needed	  intelligence	  on	  Iraq	  as	  very	  little	  
was	   known	   about	   the	   inner	   workings	   of	   state	   and	   society.	   Secondly,	   the	  
coalition	   needed	   Iraqi	   opposition	   figures	   it	   could	   work	   with	   to	   carry	   out	  
propaganda	  projects	  and	  preparations	  for	  the	  post-­‐intervention	  phase.	  Thirdly	  
the	  coalition	  needed	  to	  collaborate	  with	  Iraqi	  political	   figures	  to	  gain,	  at	   least	  
publicly,	   legitimation	  for	  the	  military	  campaign	  taking	  shape.	   	  This	  ultimately	  
affected	   their	   ability	   to	   influence	   UK	   and	   US	   policy	   makers	   and	   position	  
themselves	  as	  future	  leaders	  of	  the	  new	  Iraq	  once	  the	  war	  became	  imminent.	  
	  
In	   the	  post-­‐intervention	   and	  occupation	  period	   the	   coalition	  needed	  political	  
figures	   to	  govern	   the	  country	  as	   there	  was	  a	  dearth	  of	  political	   leaders	   in	   the	  
country	  under	  Saddam’s	  oppressive	  dictatorship.	  The	  diaspora	  thus	  assumed	  a	  
privileged	  position	  because	  they	  were	  political	  leaders	  the	  coalition	  could	  work	  
with	  to	  govern	  Iraq	  and	  who	  in	  their	  minds	  were	  representative	  and	  legitimate	  
political	  leaders.	  This	  opened	  a	  transnational	  channel	  whereby	  further	  diaspora	  
figures	  were	  recruited	  from	  abroad	  with	  each	  political	  development,	  creating	  a	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chain	   of	   diaspora	   returnees.	   Secondly,	   following	   the	   controversial	   policies	   of	  
de-­‐baathification	  and	  disbanding	  of	   the	  army,	   the	  coalition	  was	  desperate	   for	  
skilled	   Iraqis	   to	   fill	   the	   thousands	   of	   government	   and	  ministry	   positions	   that	  
were	   now	   left	   empty.	   This	   further	   created	   opportunities	   for	   educated	   and	  
skilled	   UK	   diaspora	   to	   become	   involved	   and	   gain	   positions	   during	   the	  
occupation	  years.	  	  
	  
The	   first	   two	  hypotheses	   account	   for	  how	  and	  why	   certain	  UK	   Iraqi	  diaspora	  
were	   able	   to	   contribute	   to	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance	   due	   to	   the	  
profile	   of	   diaspora	   and	   hostland	   military	   intervention	   up	   until	   Iraqi’s	   first	  
elections.	  However,	  following	  the	  2005	  national	  elections	  the	  playing	  field	  was	  
altered.	  After	  Iraq’s	  first	  elections	  the	  third	  hypothesis	  holds	  explanatory	  power	  
for	   this	   phase	   in	   Iraq’s	   state-­‐building	   when	   ethno-­‐sectarianism	   became	  
institutionalised	  in	  Iraqi	  politics.	  This	  transformed	  the	  politics	  of	  belonging	  so	  
that	   those	   connected	   to	   the	   ruling	   ethno-­‐sectarian	  political	   parties	   and	   elites	  
were	  more	  able	  to	  contribute	  to	  institution-­‐building	  and	  governance	  and	  those	  
excluded	   from	   power	   were	   driven	   towards	   supporting/challenging	   the	   state	  
through	  civil	  society,	  outside	  the	  structures	  of	  power.	  	  
	  
The	  UK	  Iraqi	  Diaspora	  
Before	  understanding	  the	  ways	  that	  military	  intervention	  created	  opportunities	  
for	   the	   diaspora	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance,	   it	   is	  
important	  to	  understand	  how	  London	  come	  to	  be	  an	  opposition	  centre	  for	  the	  
Iraqi	  diaspora	  and	  how	  those	  involved	  were	  able	  to	  access	  and	  influence	  US	  and	  
UK	  policy	  makers.	  Understanding	  this	  relationship	  requires	  taking	  a	  look	  at	  the	  
historical	   context	   from	   which	   the	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   in	   the	   UK	   emerged,	   the	  
migration	   waves	   that	   took	   them	   to	   British	   shores	   and	   their	   socio-­‐economic	  
profiles	   upon	   exiting	   the	   country	   of	   origin.	   It	   is	   precisely	   these	   factors	   that	  
provided	  the	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  in	  London	  the	  symbolic,	  educational,	  cultural	  and	  
financial	   resources	   to	   create	   a	   vibrant	   Iraqi	   cultural	   and	  political	  milieu.	  This	  
link	   between	   the	   profile	   of	   diaspora	   and	   the	   connection	   to	   the	   kind	   of	  
transnational	   political	   work	   they	   engaged	   in	   therefore	   needs	   to	   be	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contextualised	  within	  the	  relationship	  that	  these	  migrants	  had	  with	  Iraq	  when	  
they	  left,	  and	  their	  networks	  and	  resources,	  which	  I	  argue	  affected	  their	  ability	  
and	  proclivity	  towards	  political	  work.	  To	  this	  I	  now	  turn.	  	  
	  
As	   a	   former	  British	  mandate,	   Iraq	   and	   Iraqis’	   links	  with	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  
have	  a	  long	  and	  historic	  precedent.	  The	  first	  waves	  of	  Iraqi	  migrants	  to	  the	  UK	  
were	   the	   Iraqi	   Jews,	   Assyrians	   and	  Monarchists	   who	   came	   to	   the	   UK	   in	   the	  
1940s	  and	  50s	   largely	  because	  they	  no	   longer	   felt	  welcome	  or	  safe	   in	   Iraq	  and	  
were	  opposed	  by	  the	  incoming	  regime.	  Iraqi	  Jews	  up	  until	  1939	  formed	  part	  of	  
the	   fabric	  of	   Iraqi	   society	  as	  politicians,	  educators,	  merchants,	   journalists	  and	  
government	   officials	   (Morad	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   Yet	   turbulent	   times	   loomed	   ahead	  
when	  anti-­‐Zionist	  sentiment	  and	  Arab	  nationalism	  combined	  and	  unleashed	  a	  
pogrom	  against	   them	  named	   the	   ‘Farhoud’	   in	  Baghdad	   in	   1941.	  One	  hundred	  
and	   thirty	   Jews	  were	  killed	   and	  2,500	   injured	   (Ibid.,	   2008).	  The	   situation	  was	  
further	   exacerbated	   following	   the	   creation	  of	   Israel	   in	   1948.	   Iraqi	   Jewish	   lives	  
were	  threatened	  and	  despite	  the	  patriotism	  that	  many	  felt	  as	  Iraqis,	  conditions	  
progressively	  worsened	  and	  many	  felt	  compelled	  to	  leave	  to	  Israel,	  Europe	  and	  
beyond.	  	  
	  
The	  Assyrians	  were	  considered	  allies	  of	  the	  British	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War	  
and	  later	  formed	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  levies.	  The	  Iraqi	  levies	  were	  a	  military	  
force	   that	   became	   dominated	   by	   Assyrian	   Iraqis,	   recruited	   by	   the	   British	   to	  
protect	  Assyrian	  refugees,	  who	  were	  displaced	  from	  their	  homes	  during	  the	  fall	  
of	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire,	   and	   the	   defence	   of	   Mosul’s	   northern	   borders	   (Al-­‐
Rasheed,	   1998:48).	   Their	   close	   association	   to	   the	   British	   and	   the	   role	   they	  
played	   in	   crushing	   a	   revolt	   against	   the	   British	   by	   Iraqi	   forces	   in	   1941	   created	  
further	  hostility	  towards	  them	  from	  the	  Iraqi	  government.	  While	  employment	  
in	   the	   levies	   helped	   formulate	   nationalism	   amongst	   Iraqi	   Assyrians,	   it	  
simultaneously	   helped	   cement	   their	   association	   with	   the	   British	   from	   whom	  
Iraqis	  had	  been	  so	  strenuously	  trying	  to	  eject	  from	  their	  territory	  (Al-­‐Rasheed,	  
1998,	  p.50).	  Thus	  by	  the	  time	  the	  British	  mandate	  was	  coming	  to	  an	  end,	  many	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Assyrians	   no	   longer	   felt	   safe	   in	   a	   country	   that	   increasingly	   saw	   them	   as	   an	  
obstacle	  to	  independence	  and	  many	  sought	  settlement	  elsewhere.	  	  
	  
Iraqi	  monarchists,	  those	  closely	  allied	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  royal	  family	  created	  another	  
flow	   of	   political,	   diplomatic	   and	   administrative	   elites	   leaving	   the	   country	  
following	  the	  1958	  Revolution	  (Batatu,	  2004;	  Al-­‐Rasheed,	  1992;	  Farouk-­‐Sluglett	  
and	  Sluglett,	  2001).	  Many	  had	  maintained	  links	  with	  Britain	  since	  the	  creation	  
of	   the	   monarchy,	   and	   were	   familiar	   with	   the	   country	   and	   its	   peoples	   (Al-­‐
Rasheed,	   1992,	   p.539).	   Several	   diaspora	   elites	   interviewed	   for	   this	   thesis	  
belonged	  to	  this	  wave	  of	  Iraqi	  migrants	  to	  the	  UK.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  migration	  wave	  to	  the	  UK	  was	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  1963	  Baathist	  coup,	  
which	   overthrew	   the	   government	   of	   Abd	   al-­‐Kareem	   Qasim.	   The	   Baathists,	  
determined	  to	  quash	  the	  Communist	  threat	  and	  expel	  politicians	  from	  the	  Iraqi	  
Communist	  party,	   instigated	  a	  Communist	  witch	  hunt,	  which	  killed	  hundreds	  
of	  Iraqis	  and	  exiled	  many	  more	  (Batatu,	  2004).	  This	  time	  the	  profile	  of	  migrants	  
was	  somewhat	  different	  with	  mostly	  middle	  class	  professional	  doctors,	  lawyers,	  
artists	   and	   intellectuals	   (Al-­‐Rasheed,	   1992).	   Many	   came	   under	   the	   guise	   of	  
continuing	  their	  education,	  while	  those	  who	  had	  a	  profession	  continued	  their	  
practice	   in	  the	  diaspora.	  This	  profile	  of	  migrants	  continued	  to	  arrive	  after	   the	  
Baathist	  leadership	  coup	  in	  1968,	  wherein	  a	  young	  Saddam	  Hussein	  emerged	  as	  
the	  new	  Baathist	   leader.	  Amongst	  this	  wave	  were	  also	  middle	  class	  Kurds	  and	  
Christian	   Assyrians,	   who	   felt	   increasingly	   pushed	   out	   by	   the	   regime’s	  
intolerance	   of	   Iraq’s	   other	   ethnic	   identities,	   political	   opposition	   movements	  
and	  general	  climate	  of	  repression	  (Al-­‐Rasheed,	  1992).	  	  
	  
As	  can	  be	  seen,	  the	  profile	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  in	  London,	  from	  the	  1950s	  and	  
all	  the	  way	  through	  the	  1970s,	  consisted	  of	  largely	  wealthy	  landed	  gentry	  closely	  
associated	   to	   the	   British	   monarchy	   or	   middle	   class	   professionals,	   artists,	  
intellectuals	  and	  political	  leading	  figures	  from	  the	  Communist	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  
parties.	   Iraqis	  who	  arrived	  during	  this	  period	  were	  thus	   largely	  affluent	  upper	  
and	   middle	   class	   Iraqis	   who	   were	   able	   to	   establish	   investments	   and	   live	   a	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comfortable	   existence	   in	   the	  UK	   (Al-­‐Rasheed,	   1992).	   They	  were	   able	   to	   leave	  
voluntarily	  due	  to	  their	  material	  capabilities,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  colonial	  social	  or	  
political	  links.	  Consequently,	  their	  migration	  and	  integration	  was	  facilitated	  by	  
their	   financial	   resources,	  but	  also	  their	  social	   ties	  with	  the	  British	  system	  (Al-­‐
Rasheed,	   1992).	   	   Many,	   for	   instance,	   came	   to	   pursue	   their	   undergraduate	  
degrees	  in	  the	  UK.	  As	  one	  interviewee	  recounted,	  	  
	  
	   “We	  knew	  the	  system,	  we	  knew	  the	  language,	  we	  have	  friends	  here.	  Yes.	  
We	  have	  connections	  in	  this	  country	  and	  especially	  people	  in	  the	  Gulf	  and	  Iraq,	  
they	   used	   to	   look	   up	   to	   the	   English	   as	   great	  men	   and	   very	   respectable	  men,	  
altogether	  admirable,	  they	  used	  to	  look	  up	  to	  them.”11	  
	  
All	  were	  conflict-­‐generated	  migrants	  because	  conflict	  in	  the	  homeland	  was	  the	  
reason	  they	  migrated.	  However,	  though	  the	  literature	  has	  emphasised	  conflict	  
as	  the	  reason	  for	  diasporas	  emotive	  responses,	  I	  argue	  that	  what	  matters	  more	  
is	   the	   relationship	   that	   conflict-­‐generated	   migrants	   had	   to	   their	   country	   of	  
origin	  prior	  to	  exiting.	  	  
	  
UK	  Iraqis	  who	  left	  during	  the	  50s	  to	  70s	  had	  a	  very	  different	  relationship	  with	  
their	   country	   of	   origin	   than	   those	   who	   came	   later.	   They	   were	   wealthy	   and	  
professional	  individuals	  who	  were	  forced	  out	  either	  because	  of	  an	  unwelcoming	  
and	   unsafe	   political	   climate,	   or	   those	   who	   feared	   for	   their	   lives	   or	   were	  
persecuted	   due	   to	   their	   political	   opposition	   and	   political	   activities.	   Many	  
families	   within	   this	   group	   had	   prospered	   before	   the	   1958	   revolution	   due	   to	  
British	   inspired	   land	   reforms	   and	   oil	   booms	   (Farouk-­‐Sluglett	   and	   Sluglett,	  
2001).	   For	   others,	   the	   social	   and	   political	   changes	   that	   took	   place	   after	   the	  
revolution	  offered	  fresh	  promise.	  For	  example,	  women	  were	  encouraged	  to	  play	  
their	  parts	   in	   the	  workforce	  and	   in	  public	   life	   (N.	  S.	  Al-­‐Ali,	  2007;	  Efrati,	  2012)	  
and	   the	   oil	   boom	   in	   the	   early	   seventies	   led	   to	   more	   prosperity	   and	   better	  
economic	   and	   social	   policies	   (Tripp,	   2007;	   Farouk-­‐Sluglett	   and	   Sluglett,	   2001;	  
Marr,	   2012),	   which	   meant	   better	   education,	   health	   and	   hope.	   Thus	   for	   the	  
diaspora	  who	   fled	  during	   this	  period,	   their	  associations	  and	  memories	  of	   Iraq	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  29,	  22	  April	  2015,	  London	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were	   tainted	   by	   nostalgia	   for	   an	   Iraq	   they	   loved	   and	   that	   was	   prospering	  
socially	  and	  economically.	  This	  acted	  as	  a	  spur	  for	  their	  political	  involvement	  in	  
the	  diaspora,	  as	  many	  hoped	  to	  return	  to	  what	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  the	  Iraq	  of	  
the	  Golden	  Age.	  	  
Following	   the	   flow	   of	   political	   Leftist	   and	   Kurdish	   leaders	   as	   well	   as	   more	  
affluent	   Iraqis	   into	  London,	   the	  eighties	   saw	  a	  new	  wave	  of	   Iraqis	  make	   their	  
way	   to	   the	   UK.	   The	   Iraq-­‐Iran	   war,	   which	   commenced	   in	   1979	   and	   ended	   in	  
1988,	   brought	   in	   largely	   Shi’a	   families	   who	   were	   Da’wa	   party	   activists,	  
sympathisers,	   or	   those	   accused	   of	   taba’iya	   Irania	   (Iranian	   ancestry)	   and	  
deported	  by	  the	  regime	  in	  droves	  (Tripp,	  2007).	  This	  wave	  of	  Iraqis	  was	  mixed,	  
from	   merchants	   who	   had	   lost	   their	   wealth,	   to	   professionals	   left	   without	   an	  
occupation,	   to	   semi-­‐skilled	   and	   unskilled	   workers	   with	   poor	   education	   and	  
qualifications	  (Al-­‐Rasheed,	  1992,	  p.539).	  	  
This	  wave	  effectively	  continued	  throughout	  the	  eighties	  until	  the	  next	  big	  wave	  
hit	   in	   1990	   and	   1991	   during	   the	   First	   Gulf	   War	   and	   the	   Shi’a	   and	   Kurdish	  
uprisings	   (Tripp,	   2007).	   This	   surge	   of	  migrants	   and	   refugees	  was	   also	  mixed.	  
Those	  who	  had	  the	  material	  wealth	  to	  escape	  and	  claim	  asylum	  in	  the	  UK	  did	  
so.	  One	   interviewee	   from	   a	  wealthy	  Kurdish	   family	   recounted	   arriving	   in	   the	  
UK	  with	  USD	  52,000	  in	  his	  hand	  luggage.	  Others	  meanwhile	  recount	  arriving	  in	  
1990	  illegally	  with	  few	  resources	  and	  were	  dependent	  on	  the	  UK’s	  social	  welfare	  
system	  to	  support	  their	  families.	  Either	  way,	  those	  who	  arrived	  during	  this	  time	  
were	   either	   persecuted	   by	   the	   regime	   following	   the	   failed	   uprisings	   or	   those	  
who	   had	   left	   Iraq	   previously	   due	   to	   political	   persecution	   but	   had	   firstly	  
migrated	   either	   to	   neighbouring	   Middle	   Eastern	   countries	   or	   to	   one	   of	   the	  
Soviet	  Union’s	  satellite	  states.	  	  Many	  were	  former	  Communists	  party	  members	  
or	  Shi’a	  families.	  	  
As	  such	  the	  Iraqi	  community	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  comprised	  of	  Iraqis	  who	  came	  from	  
the	  1950s	  all	  the	  way	  to	  the	  present.	  The	  socio-­‐economic	  backgrounds	  of	  those	  
who	  came	  earlier	  differed	  to	  those	  who	  left	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  beyond.	  The	  earlier	  
migration	   waves	   bought	   with	   them	   Iraqi	   elites,	   businessmen,	   intellectuals,	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teachers,	  doctors,	  writers	  and	  artists,	  but	  also	  prominent	  political	  and	  religious	  
families.	  These	  elite	  families	  continued	  to	  be	  linked	  to	  Iraq	  in	  a	  nostalgic	  way	  as	  
their	  positions	  and	  experiences	  of	  privilege	  throughout	  the	  monarchy	  or	  during	  
Iraqi’s	   golden	   years	   (up	   to	   the	  mid	   70s)	   coloured	   their	  memories	   so	   that	   the	  
majority	   faced	   the	   myth	   of	   return	   dilemma.	   Though	   many	   were	   able	   to	  
integrate	   economically	   due	   to	   their	   business	   or	   professional	   skills,	   many	  
remained	   strongly	   attached	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   returning	   to	   Iraq.	  Those	  who	  were	  
politically	   active	   or	   linked	   to	   opposition	   politics	   continued	   their	  work	   in	   the	  
diaspora	  and	  were	  able	  to	  do	  so	  because	  of	  their	  particular	  social	  and	  political	  
networks	   inside	   and	   outside	   Iraq	   and	   also	   the	   resources	   they	   had	   at	   their	  
disposal.	  	  
Iraqi	  diaspora	  political	  activity	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  
Consequently	   with	   prominent	   political,	   business	   and	   educated	   Iraqi	   elites	  
settling	  in	  London	  since	  the	  1950s	  it	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  London	  came	  to	  be	  the	  
Arab	   capital	   in	   Europe.	   Wealthy,	   intellectual	   and	   educated	   Arabs	   helped	  
establish	  London	  as	  a	  hive	  of	   social	  and	  cultural	  activity.	  Cultural	  venues	   like	  
the	   Kufa	   Gallery,	   established	   by	   the	   Iraqi	   Architect,	  Mohamed	  Makiya,	   were	  
regularly	  frequented	  by	  Iraqi	  poets,	  artists,	  writers	  and	  intellectuals,	  as	  was	  the	  
Baathist	   financed	   Iraqi	   Culture	   Centre,	   based	   in	   Holborn12.	   Similarly	   for	   the	  
Kurds	   and	   the	   Assyrians,	   cultural	   centres	   and	   clubs,	   churches	   and	   religious	  
events	  were	  active	  in	  their	  respective	  communities,	   in	  Croydon	  for	  the	  former	  
and	  Ealing	  for	  the	  latter.	  Shi’a	  religious	  Iraqis	  have	  also	  founded	  a	  multitude	  of	  
religious	  and	  faith	  based	  centres	  along	  the	  Shi’a	  triangle	  between	  the	  boroughs	  
of	  Westminster,	  Brent	  and	  Harrow	  (Bowen,	  2014)	   including	   the	  prominent	  Al	  
Khoei	  Foundation	  and	  the	  Ahlul	  Bayt	  Islamic	  Centre	  amongst	  many	  others.	  	  
Political	   activity	   soon	   followed.	   London	   quickly	   became	   alongside	   Syria	   and	  
Iran	   another	   Iraqi	   opposition	   centre	   with	   emerging	   opposition	   leaders	   and	  
groups	  actively	  working	  to	  oppose	  and	  raise	  awareness	  of	  Saddam’s	  dictatorial	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  29	  ,	  22	  April	  2015,	  London	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regime.	   Reflecting	   this,	   Arab	   publishing	   houses	   and	   newspapers	   were	  
established	   in	   London	   catering	   for	   the	   now	   large	   Arab	   diaspora.	   Iraqi	  
intellectuals	  in	  exile	  wrote	  for	  popular	  Arabic	  newspapers	  published	  in	  London	  
such	   as	  Al	  Hayat,	   Al	   Sharq	   Al	   Awsat,	   Azzamman	   and	  Al	   Arab13.	   Furthermore	  
politically	  mobilised	  groups	  within	   this	   social	   class	  had	   the	  means	   to	  publish	  
their	  own	  opposition	  newspapers,	  most	  famously	  Al	  Tayyar	  Al	   Jadid	  (The	  New	  
Current)	   (N.	   S.	   Al-­‐Ali,	   2007;	   Allawi,	   2007)	   and	   created	   other	   opposition	  
newspapers	   and	   magazines	   including	   the	   National	   Democratic	   Alliance’s	  
Democrat	   Magazine,	   all	   of	   which	   helped	   denounce	   Saddam’s	   regime 14 .	  
Meanwhile	   other	   opposition	   papers	  were	   published	   abroad	   in	   either	   Syria	   or	  
Iran	  but	  distributed	   in	  London.	  This	   included	   the	  Da’wa	  party’s,	  Lua’	   Al	   Sadr	  
and	   Sawt	   Al	   Iraq,	   and	   the	   Iraqi	   Communist	   party’s	   Tareeq	   Al	   Shaab15.	   One	  
respondent	  recalled	  distributing	  an	  opposition	  paper	  published	  in	  Syria	  called	  
Al	   Badeel	   from	   his	   house	   in	   London16.	   Having	   material	   resources	   therefore	  
helped	   organise	   activities	   and	   raise	   awareness	   about	   the	   regime	   through	  
magazines,	  newspapers	  and	  meetings.	  	  
Newspapers	  and	  opposition	  papers	  also	  provided	  a	  political	  platform	  whereby	  
the	  diaspora	  was	  able	  to	  assert	  opposition	  to	  Saddam’s	  Baath	  regime,	  and	  start	  
sowing	   the	   seeds	  of	   resistance.	  Arabic	  media	   in	  London	  created	  a	   connecting	  
transnational	   space	   for	   Arab	   diaspora	   and	   their	   former	   homelands	   and	   vice	  
versa.	   The	   global	   city	   of	   London	   thus	   provided	   a	   multitude	   of	   outlets	   for	  
disseminating	  information	  transnationally	  (Adamson	  and	  Koinova,	  2013).	  Iraqis	  
in	   London	   could	   now	   not	   only	   receive	   information	   about	   the	   homeland	   but	  
writers	   and	   journalists	   could	   also	  denounce	  homeland	  governments	   and	   thus	  
target	   both	   hostland	   and	   homeland	   Iraqi	   audiences.	   In	   an	   age	   before	   the	  
Internet	   this	  mode	  of	   communication	  was	   the	  only	  means	  of	   spreading	   ideas	  
and	  showing	  solidarity	  with	  Iraqis	  inside	  the	  country.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  29	  ,	  22	  April	  2015,	  London	  
14	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondents	  16,	  22	  and	  29,	  12	  November	  2013,	  21	  November	  2013	  and	  22	  
April	  2015,	  London	  
15	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  31,	  1	  May	  2015,	  London	  
16	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  25,	  6	  January	  2014,	  London	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Iraqi	  opposition	  in	  London	  –	  pushing	  for	  regime	  change	  in	  the	  1990s	  
In	   time	   a	  more	   organised	   political	   opposition	  was	   formed.	   Loosely	   speaking,	  
the	   groups	   that	  made	   up	   the	   formal	   opposition	  were	   the	   Kurds,	   the	   Islamist	  
groups,	   anti-­‐Saddam	   Arab	   nationalists,	   Baathists	   allied	   to	   Syria,	   liberals,	  
communists	  and	  socialists	  (Allawi,	  2007:	  35).	  	  Iraq’s	  main	  political	  parties	  were	  
represented	   in	   the	   diaspora	   to	   include	   the	   Iraqi	   Communist	   Party	   (ICP),	   the	  
Patriotic	   Union	   of	   Kurdistan	   (PUK),	   the	   Kurdistan	   Democratic	   Party	   (KDP),	  
and	   later	   in	   the	   1980’s	   Shi’a	   Islamist	   parties	   including	   the	   Da’wa	   and	   the	  
Supreme	  Council	   for	   the	   Islamic	   Revolution	   in	   Iraq	   (SCIRI).	   There	  were	   also	  
other	   notable	   religious	   figures	   from	   respected	   Islamic	   centres	   such	   as	   Ahlul	  
Beyt	  and	  the	  Al	  Khoei	  Foundation	  and	  democratic	  individuals	  and	  groups.	  	  
As	   repressive	   stories	   from	   within	   Iraq	   started	   spreading	   in	   the	   diaspora	  
following	  the	  flow	  of	  political	  refugees	  arriving	  in	  London	  due	  to	  the	  1980	  Iran-­‐
Iraq	  war,	  (Allawi,	  2007)	  a	  campaign	  was	  launched	  by	  key	  political	  and	  academic	  
Iraqis	   to	   raise	   awareness	   about	   the	   brutality	   of	   the	   regime.	   CARDRI	  
(Committee	   Against	   repression	   and	   for	   Democratic	   rights	   in	   Iraq)	   was	  
established.	   The	   organisation	   reported	   “the	   crimes	   of	   the	   regime	   of	   Saddam	  
Hussein	   and	   protested	   against	   the	   tacit	   support	   he	   received	   throughout	   the	  
eighties	   from	  western	   governments”	   (Rt	  Hon	  Ann	  Clwyd	  MP,	   2010).	   CARDRI	  
was	   eventually	   sponsored	   by	   a	   group	   of	   British	   parliamentarians	   from	   all	  
political	   persuasions.	   In	   1984	   Rt,	   Hon	   Ann	   Clywd,	   who	   would	   later	   become	  
Tony	  Blair’s	  Special	  Envoy	  to	  Iraq	  in	  2003,	  became	  the	  organisation’s	  chair	  and	  
helped	  publish	  several	  books	  on	  Iraq	  written	  by	  British	  and	  Iraqi	  academics	  and	  
political	   figures	   (Committee	  Against	  Repression	  and	   for	  Democratic	  Rights	   in	  
Iraq,	   1986;	   Hazelton	   and	   Committee	   Against	   Repression	   and	   for	   Democratic	  
Rights	   in	   Iraq,	   1994).	  Meanwhile	   the	   Iraqi	  Association17	  and	   the	   Iraqi	  Welfare	  
Association18	  were	   established	   to	   help	   integrate	   Iraqi	   political	   refugees	   now	  
flowing	  through	  the	  UK’s	  asylum	  system.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  The	  Iraqi	  Association,	  www.iraqiassociation.org	  [Last	  accessed	  30	  September	  2015]	  
18	  The	  Iraqi	  Welfare	  Association,	  www.iraqiwelfare.com	  [Last	  accessed	  30	  September	  2015]	  
113	  	   	  
As	  political	  momentum	  was	  increasing	  amongst	  the	  political	  network	  of	  Iraqis	  
in	  the	  UK,	  their	  organisational	  capabilities	  increased	  further	  once	  the	  UK’s,	  and	  
to	   a	   large	   extent,	   the	   international	   community’s	   stance	   towards	   Iraq	   shifted.	  
The	  first	  perceptible	  shift	  was	  following	  the	  Bazoft	  Affair,	  which	  led	  The	  UK’s	  
prime	   minister,	   Margaret	   Thatcher,	   to	   recall	   the	   UK’s	   ambassador	   to	   Iraq	  
(‘Butchery	  in	  Baghdad’,	  1990).	  In	  1989	  Farzad	  Bazoft,	  a	  young	  journalist	  for	  the	  
Observer	  newspaper	  in	  the	  UK,	  was	  accused	  of	  espionage	  by	  the	  Baath	  regime	  
and	  executed	  in	  Iraq	  in	  1990	  (Harding,	  2011).	  This	  event	  would	  act	  as	  a	  catalyst	  
for	  the	  growing	  isolation	  of	  the	  regime,	  which	  would	  reach	  its	  apex	  only	  a	  few	  
months	  later	  when	  Iraq	  invaded	  Kuwait.	  The	  United	  Nations	  punished	  the	  Iraqi	  
regime	   for	   its	   transgression	   against	   Kuwait	   and	   retributive	   sanctions	   were	  
placed	  on	  the	  country	  for	  thirteen	  years.	  	  
	  
Iraqi	   opposition	   figures	   that	   were	   desperate	   to	   rid	   the	   country	   of	   Saddam	  
Hussein	   and	   insert	   themselves	   in	   power	   saw	   a	   golden	   opportunity	   to	   take	  
advantage	  of	  this	  shift	  in	  policy	  and	  political	  climate.	   	  A	  respondent,	  who	  was	  
part	  of	  the	  opposition	  during	  this	  time	  and	  would	  later	  serve	  in	  the	  new	  Iraqi	  
government	  for	  8	  years,	  explained	  how	  a	  distinguishable	  change	  in	  UK	  foreign	  
policy	   in	   1989	  opened	  up	  the	  political	  space	   in	  which	  the	  diaspora	  opposition	  
were	  able	  to	  act;	  “After	  1989,	  things	  changed.	  The	  government	  here	  was	  closer	  
to	   the	   opposition	   and	   after	   the	   invasion	   of	   Kuwait	   things	   changed	  
completely.”19	  Another	  diaspora	  opposition	  figure	  that	  is	  now	  a	  Minister	  in	  Iraqi	  
Kurdistan	  explained	   that	   the	  UK	  context	  was	  optimal	   for	  working	  against	   the	  
Baathist	  regime	  due	  to	  the	  support	  received	  from	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  (FCO):	  	  
	   “When	   I	   arrived	   to	   the	   UK	   [1990]	   I	   found	   the	   environment	   a	   great	  
environment	   to	   work	   politically	   against	   Saddam	   Hussein	   from	   there.	   I	   was	  
among	  the	  people	  and	  the	  INC,	  we	  established	  INA	  in	  London	  then	  we	  had	  the	  
first	   conference	   in	   London	   then	   Vienna	   and	   Kurdistan.	   I	   started	   to	   be	  more	  
politically	  active	  on	  Iraqi	  level	  than	  Kurdish	  level.”	  	  
	  
Author:	   So	  when	   you	   say	   the	   environment	   in	   the	  UK	  was	   great	   for	  working	  
against	  Saddam,	  what	  aspect	  made	  it	  great?”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  27	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Respondent	  1:“I	  think	  the	  Foreign	  Office	  was	  great	  they	  were	  helping	  us	  to	  form	  
ourselves,	  to	  organise	  ourselves	  as	  opposition	  groups,	  to	  come	  out	  with	  a	  plan	  
or	   at	   least	   to	   educate	   the	   international	   community	  about	  what	  we	  have	  been	  
through,	  what	  was	  happening	   in	   Iraq	  at	   that	   time	  by	  the	  regime	  against	   Iraqi	  
people	  and	  how	  it’s	  a	  threat	  to	  regional	  and	  international	  stability	  as	  well.”	  	  
	  
A	  variety	  of	  opposition	  groups	  emerged	  in	  London	  privately	  financed	  who	  were	  
able	  to	  target	  UK/US	  and	  international	  government	  officials,	  ambassadors	  and	  
the	   general	   public.	   Prominent	   amongst	   them	  was	  Ahmed	  Chalabi,	   a	  wealthy,	  
intelligent	   and	   secular	   Shi’a	   Iraqi.	   Chalabi,	   an	   Iraqi	   from	   a	   historical	   and	  
eminent	   family	   in	   Iraq	   had	   powerful	   political	   and	   business	   networks	   both	   in	  
the	   Middle	   East	   and	   across	   the	   Atlantic.	   His	   determination	   and	   tireless	  
lobbying	   in	  Washington	   since	   the	   early	   1990s	  would	   eventually	   see	  his	  newly	  
created	   Iraqi	   National	   Congress	   (INC)	   funded	   by	   the	   CIA	   for	   several	   years	  
(Bonin,	   2011).	   The	   covert	   operation	   allowed	   the	   INC	   to	   have	   an	   office	   in	  
northern	  Kurdistan	  (Ibid.,	  2011).	  	  
	  
It	  was	  under	  the	  INC	  now	  acting	  as	  an	  umbrella	  organisation	  for	  the	  fractious	  
opposition	  groups,	  namely	  Patriotic	  Union	  of	  Kurdistan	  (PUK),	  The	  Kurdistan	  
Democratic	  Party	  (KDP),	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Council	   for	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution	  
in	   Iraq	   (SCIRI),	   that	   two	   conferences	   were	   held	   as	   a	   means	   of	   fomenting	  
cooperation	  between	  the	  various	  opposition	  factions	  (Tripp,	  2007).	  The	  first	  in	  
Vienna	   in	   1992,	   and	   later	   that	   year,	   another	   conference	   in	   Salahuddin,	   in	   the	  
Kurdish	   region,	   where	   Ahmed	   Chalabi	   was	   confirmed	   as	   leader.	   Both	   were	  
funded	  by	  the	  CIA	  (Bonin,	  2011)	  
	  
Another	  group,	  the	  Iraqi	  National	  Accord	  (INA),	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Ayad	  
Allawi,	  was	  also	  formed	  in	  early	   1990	  to	   include	  Baathist	  defectors,	  and	  Sunni	  
Arabs.	   Allawi	   was	   from	   a	   prominent	   Shi’a	   family	   from	   Baghdad,	   a	   former	  
Baathist	   with	   close	   connections	   to	   Arab	   and	   Western	   governments	   (Allawi,	  
2007)	   and	   for	   many	   years	   also	   on	   the	   CIA	   pay	   roll	   (Chandrasekaran,	   2006).	  
There	   were	   also	   other	   groups	   including	   Saad	   Salih	   Jabr’s	   Free	   Iraq	   Council	  
(Allawi,	  2007;	  Suri,	  2004).	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The	   1990s	   saw	   a	   new	   dawn	   of	   organisation	   largely	   due	   to	   the	   tangible	   new	  
political	   climate	   and	   the	   confluence	   of	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   opposition	   figures	  with	  
the	   material	   wealth	   and	   networks	   to	   access	   the	   corridors	   of	   power.	   Ahmed	  
Chalabi	   was	   by	   now	   well	   connected	   in	   Washington	   amongst	   the	   neo-­‐
conservatives	   in	   the	   Pentagon	   (Chandrasekaran,	   2006),	   and	   had	   been	  
advocating	  for	  regime	  change	  for	  some	  time.	  Meanwhile	  Ayad	  Allawi,	  who	  was	  
a	  Baathist	  defector	  had	  strong	  links	  to	  the	  State	  Department,	  and	  the	  CIA	  for	  
many	   years	   (Barakat,	   2008).	   Both	   also	   had	   contacts	   with	   the	   FCO	   and	   the	  
British	   intelligence	   services.	   Though	   the	   two	   diaspora	   leaders	   had	   different	  
approaches20	  they	  both	  organised	  around	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  regime	  change	  by	  
attempting	   to	   influence	   and	   convince	   American	   and	   British	   governments	   to	  
help	  depose	   the	   regime.	  One	  diaspora	  member,	  who	   reflected	  on	   this	  period,	  
emphasised	   the	   social	   and	  political	  networks	  of	   those	   involved	   as	  well	   as	   the	  
material	  capabilities	  of	  the	  diaspora	  that	  helped	  mount	  a	  strategic	  offensive:	  
	  	   	  
	   “We	   began	   to	   identify	   the	   global	   centres	   of	   power	   and	  make	   contacts	  
with	   them,	   strengthening	   the	   internal	   opposition	   with	   the	   Salehuddin	  
conference.	  The	  first	  thing	  is	  to	  strengthen	  the	  internal	  opposition	  and	  to	  have	  
a	  formal	  leadership.	  We	  voted	  for	  three	  leaders,	  Massoud	  Barzani	  representing	  
the	   Kurds,	   Hassan	   Al	   Niqab	   representing	   the	   Sunnis	   and	   Bahr	   Al	   Uloum	  
representing	  the	  Shi’a.	  It	  was	  important	  to	  have	  one	  unified	  leadership	  so	  this	  
gives	  support	  and	  this	  gives	  a	  united	  front	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  Americans.	  And	  of	  
course	   the	  patrons,	  Ahmed	  Chalabi	   and	  Ayad	  Allawi	  were	  on	   the	  ground	   the	  
relationships	  with	  the	  Americans	  and	  the	  British	  and	  all	  the	  western	  countries.	  
There	  was	  a	  structure.	  On	  the	  head	  was	  the	  leadership	  and	  individuals	  working	  
on	   the	   ground	   and	   this	   was	   what	   was	   needed	   and	   this	   was	   invested	   in	   an	  
effective	  way	  before	  regime	  fall.21	  
	  
By	  framing	  Saddam	  Hussein	  as	  a	  war	  criminal	  the	  groups	  lay	  the	  grounds	  for	  a	  
foreign	  policy	  shift	  towards	  regime	  change.	  These	  activities	  required	  time	  and	  
money,	  which	   only	   certain	   diaspora	   individuals	  with	   the	  material	   power	   and	  
networks	  could	  achieve:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  The	   INC	   approach	  was	   to	   gain	   support	   from	   Iraq’s	   disenfranchised	  minorities,	   namely	   the	  
Shi’a	  and	  Kurds	  to	  mount	  a	  rebellion,	  while	  the	  INA	  preferred	  a	  tactic	  of	  infiltrating	  Saddam’s	  
military	  and	  state	  structure.	  
21	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  25,	  6	  January	  2014,	  London	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   “I	   got	   involved.	   I	   went	   to	   the	   Vienna	   conference,	   the	   first	   conference	  
with	  Tamara	  Daghestani,	  Ahmed	  Chalabi	  and	  others.	  I	  did	  a	  lobbying	  campaign	  
for	   the	  UN	  human	   rights	   conference	   in	  Switzerland,	  we	  used	   to	  go	  because	   I	  
was	  a	  member	  of	   the	  Coalition	   for	   Justice	   in	   Iraq,	   […].	  So	   the	  purpose	  of	   that	  
group	  was	   to	  get	  political	   support	   in	   the	  west	   to	   try	  Saddam	  Hussein	   for	  war	  
crimes,	  crimes	  against	  humanity.	  ….[…]	  This	  was	  in	  the	  90s.22	  
	  
Several	  groups	  financed	  international	  conferences	  and	  conducted	  international	  
lobbying	   trips	   to	   influence	   policies	   on	   Iraq	   23 .	   One	   diaspora	   individual	  
recounted	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  new	  liberal	  political	  opposition	  group	  called	  the	  
Democratic	  Alliance.	  Members	  were	  largely	  wealthy,	  professional	  and	  political	  
figures	   able	   to	   personally	   finance	   trips	   to	   lobby	   Arab	   and	   Western	  
Governments	  and	  organise	  conferences24.	  	  
	  
Chalabi	  reached	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  Capitol	  Hill	  where	  he	  impressed	  the	  new	  
class	  of	  neoconservatives,	  including	  Richard	  Perle,	  Paul	  Wolfowitz	  and	  Douglas	  
Feith	   (Bonin,	   2011).	   He	   published	   several	   pieces	   in	   leading	   papers	   including	  
Foreign	   Policy	   (Chalabi,	   1991),	   and	   provided	   the	   neo	   cons	   in	   Washington	  
intelligence	   about	   Iraqi’s	  Weapons	   of	  Mass	   Destruction	   (WMDs)	   capabilities	  
(Dodge,	  2005).	  Finally,	  Chalabi’s	   intellect	  and	   impressive	  resolve	  would	   in	  the	  
mid	  to	  late	  1990s	  finally	  pay	  off.	  	  The	  Iraq	  Liberation	  Act	  (ILA)	  was	  passed	  in	  US	  
Congress	   in	   1998	   marking	   an	   historic	   and	   important	   milestone	   in	   the	  
organisation	  and	  collaboration	  between	  the	  US	  and	  later	  UK	  governments	  with	  
the	   Iraqi	   opposition.	   Without	   Ahmed	   Chalabi’s	   personal	   wealth,	   time	   and	  
connections	   dedicated	   to	   Iraqi	   politics	   from	   afar	   (Packer,	   2003),	   the	  
opposition’s	   collaboration	   with	   US	   and	   later	   UK	   governments	   for	   regime	  
change	  would	  not	  have	  occurred.	  	  
	  
The	  ILA	  effectively	  sanctioned	  the	  provisions	  of	  weapons,	  military	  training	  and	  
other	   forms	   of	   support	   to	   designated	   opposition	   groups	   (Herring	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  23,	  21	  November	  2013,	  London	  
23	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondents	  16,	  23	  and	  15,	  12	  November	  2013,	  21	  November	  2013	  and	  6	  
November	  2013,	  London	  
24	  One	  party	  had	  agreed	  to	  a	  personally	  financed	  budget	  of	  USD	  5	  million	  dollars	  to	  establish	  a	  
political	  party	  in	  Iraq	  for	  the	  post	  intervention	  period,	  Author	  interview	  with	  respondent	  16,	  12	  
November	  2013,	  London.	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Rangwala,	  2006).	  The	  ILA	  stated	  “it	  should	  be	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  US	  to	  support	  
efforts	   to	   remove	   the	   regime	  headed	  by	   Saddam	  Hussein	   from	  power	   in	   Iraq	  
and	   to	   promote	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   democratic	   government	   to	   replace	   the	  
regime.”	   (Cited	   in	   Herring	   and	   Rangwala,	   2006:	   10).	   Later	   however	   they	  
focussed	   more	   on	   building	   their	   organisational	   capacity	   and	   supporting	  
democracy	  building	  with	  a	  USD	  97	  million	  pay	  cheque	  (Allawi,	  2007).	  	  
	  
Funding	  for	  the	  opposition	  from	  the	  ILA	  was	  also	  being	  channelled	  in	  the	  UK	  
through	   INDICT,	   the	   international	   campaign	   to	   indict	   Iraqi	   war	   criminals	  
(Allawi,	  2007).	  INDICT	  was	  launched	  by	  Ann	  Clwyd,	  the	  President	  of	  CARDRI	  
in	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  in	  1997	  and	  the	  campaign	  was	  supported	  in	  the	  UK	  
parliament	   in	   1997	   by	   several	   leading	   political	   figures	   including	   the	   Prime	  
Minister	   Tony	   Blair,	   and	   the	   previous	   Prime	  Minister	   John	  Major,	   as	   well	   as	  
other	   international	  organizations,	  governments	  and	  groups	   including	   the	   INC	  
(Kani,	   1997).	   At	   the	   launch	   Ahmed	   Chalabi	   stated,	   “We	   are	   using	   the	   sixth	  
Anniversary	  of	   the	   start	  of	   the	  Gulf	  War	   to	  draw	   the	  world’s	   attention	   to	   the	  
fact	  that	  Saddam	  and	  his	  criminal	  regime	  are	  still	  there.	  They	  must	  be	  brought	  
to	  justice”	  (Kani,1997).	  Indeed	  the	  INDICT	  campaign	  was	  a	  collaborative	  effort	  
that	  would	  seal	  the	  fate	  of	  Saddam	  as	  a	  war	  criminal,	  snow	  balling	  the	  need	  to	  
indict	  him	  and	  preparing	  the	  grounds	  for	  regime	  change.	  	  
	  
The	  lead	  up	  to	  Military	  Intervention	  
Suffice	  it	  to	  say	  that	  that	  the	  diaspora	  opposition	  groups	  and	  leaders	  had	  made	  
their	   influence	   in	   US	   and	   UK	   foreign	   policy	   circles	   through	   their	   privately	  
financed	  lobbying	  trips	  in	  the	  UK,	  US	  and	  the	  Middle	  East.	  The	  ILA	  effectively	  
institutionalised	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  diaspora	  opposition	  groups	  and	  
the	   Anglo-­‐American	   coalition.	   This	   relationship	   meant	   that	   the	   diaspora	  
opposition	   parties,	   who	   were	   happy	   to	   collaborate	   with	   US/UK	   plans,	   were	  
involved	   in	   pre-­‐war	   state-­‐building.	   Those	   whose	   vision	   diverged	   from	   the	  
coalition	  did	  not	  attend	  the	  opposition	  conferences.	  This	   included	  the	  Da’wa,	  
the	  Communists	  and	  the	  Democratic	  Alliance.	  These	  parties	  insisted	  on	  Iraqis	  
liberating	   themselves	   and	  wanted	   the	   coalition	   to	   play	   a	   supporting	   role.	   As	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such	   these	   groups	   were	   not	   included	   in	   the	   formal	   opposition	   and	   did	   not	  
receive	   funding	   through	   the	   ILA	   or	   join	   in	   state-­‐building	   plans.	   At	   the	   same	  
time,	  it	  meant	  that	  the	  UK	  and	  US	  were	  setting	  the	  agenda	  now.	  As	  such	  those	  
who	   sought	   a	   position	   in	   any	   future	   Iraqi	   government	   needed	   to	   gain	   favour	  
and	  collaborate	  with	  the	  coalition.	  	  
	  
	  In	  the	  US,	  the	  parties	  were	  designated	  Zalmay	  Khalilzad	  as	  ‘Ambassador	  to	  the	  
opposition’	   (Allawi,	   2007)	   and	   in	   the	  UK	   it	   led	   to	   increased	   contact	  with	   the	  
FCO.	  Yet	  why	  was	  this	  the	  case?	  	  Why	  did	  military	  intervention	  create	  a	  need	  
for	  collaboration	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  opposition?	  	  
	  
While	   the	   coalition	  were	   capable	   of	   executing	   a	  military	   strategy	   for	   ousting	  
Saddam	  Hussein	  out	  of	  Iraq,	  the	  problem	  the	  coalition	  faced	  was	  a	  serious	  lack	  
of	   intelligence	   about	   the	   political,	   social,	   economic	   infrastructure	   of	   the	  
country.	   Intervention	   would	   require	   planning	   and	   strategizing	   for	   a	   new	  
democratic	  political	  and	  economic	  order,	  as	  we	  have	  witnessed	  in	  the	  previous	  
chapters,	   yet	   very	   little	   was	   known	   about	   the	   inner	   workings	   of	   state	   and	  
society	   in	   Iraq	   at	   this	   point.	   Since	   the	   1990	   Gulf	   War,	   most	   Western	  
governments	   had	   withdrawn	   their	   embassies	   from	   Baghdad	   as	   a	   punitive	  
measure	  against	  Iraq’s	  invasion	  of	  Kuwait.	  The	  severing	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  
between	  the	  US	  and	  UK	  governments	  with	  Iraq	  meant	  that	  for	  the	  last	  13	  years	  
very	   little	  was	   known	  about	  what	  was	  happening	   inside	   the	   country.	  When	   I	  
asked	  UK	  diplomat	   1	  where	  their	  sources	  came	  from	  at	  the	  time,	  he	  stated	   	   it	  
was	  largely	  from	  intelligence	  sources	  at	  the	  Jordanian	  embassy,	  which	  had	  close	  
links	  with	  Iraq,	  and	  French	  and	  Italian	  governments	  who	  were	  one	  of	  the	  few	  
who	  still	  maintained	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  the	  old	  regime25.	  	  	  
	  
Faced	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  up	  to	  date	  sources,	  on	  the	  ground	  knowledge	  and	  contacts,	  
the	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   assumed	   a	   privileged	   position	   as	   brokers	   between	   Iraqi	  
society	  and	  the	  coalition.	  As	  FCO	  official	  1	  remarked	  uncomfortably,	  “	  If	  the	  UK	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Author	  interview	  with	  former	  UK	  diplomat,	  Cambridge,	  9	  April	  2015	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government	  has	  no	  one	  else	  to	  talk	  to	  then…”26.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  under	  this	  climate	  
that	  the	  Iraqi	  opposition	  came	  into	  prominence.	  The	  UK	  and	  US	  now	  needed	  
partners	   they	   could	   work	   with,	   partners	   who	   could	   provide	   sorely	   needed	  
intelligence	  so	  that	  planning	  could	  take	  shape.	  A	  Senior	  FCO	  official	  confirmed	  
that	  in	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  Iraq	  war,	  orders	  from	  above	  had	  encouraged	  reaching	  
out	   to	   the	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   where	   informal	   and	   regular	   meetings	   were	   held27.	  	  
When	  the	  author	  asked	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  meetings	  between	  the	  Iraqi	  
opposition	   and	   the	   UK	   government,	   it	   appears	   that	   the	   Iraqi	   opposition	  
diaspora	  provided	  much	  needed	  information	  on	  Iraq	  and	  supported	  the	  UK	  and	  
US	  in	  whatever	  form	  to	  oust	  Saddam	  Hussein	  out	  of	  Iraq.	  	  
	  
With	  intervention	  now	  firmly	  on	  the	  horizon,	  the	  US	  and	  UK	  coalition	  would	  
need	   further	   help	   from	   the	   diaspora	   in	   two	   strategic	   areas,	   which	   would	  
necessitate	   collaboration.	   Firstly,	   if	   the	  UK	   and	  US	  were	   preparing	   to	   govern	  
the	  country,	  they	  needed	  propaganda	  tools	  to	  prepare	  Iraqi	  society	  of	  what	  was	  
about	  to	  occur	  but	  also	  to	  win	  over	  the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  Iraqis	  and	  public	  
opinion	  in	  the	  Arab	  world.	  One	  diaspora	  interviewed	  who	  was	  tasked	  with	  this	  
job	  described	  what	  he	  was	  hired	  to	  do:	  	  
	  
	   “Yes	  to	  do	  a	  basically	  TV	  channel	  aimed	  at	  the	  Iraqis,	  but	  predominantly	  
as	   they	   always	   do	  when	   they	   go	   to	  war	   they	  want	   to	   psychologically	  win	   the	  
war.	  So	  what	   they	  do	   is	   they	  have	  a	  broadcast.	  They	  know	  for	  example,	  all	  of	  
Saddam’s	  generals.	  They	  say	  we	  are	  going	  to	  attack,	  defect	  be	  careful	  you	  don’t	  
want	  to	  be	  killed,	  your	  kids	  etc.	  But	  they	  have	  this	  Hercules,	  which	  has	  all	  this	  
radio	  signals	  in	  it.	  So	  what	  they	  do	  is	  that	  whatever	  bulletin	  they	  do	  they	  go	  and	  
jam	  Saddam’s	  antennae	  and	  go	  and	  broadcast	  the	  bulletin.	  So	  they	  said	  can	  you	  
lead	  this”28	  
	  
He	   also	   recalled	   an	   incident,	   confirmed	   by	   Richard	   Bonin	   in	   his	   book	   on	  
Ahmed	  Chalabi,	  Arrows	  of	  the	  Night,	  (Bonin,	  2011,	  p.109)	  whereby	  the	  CIA	  froze	  
their	   assets	   in	   order	   to	   verify	   whether	   any	   broadcasts	   had	   been	   aired	   and	  
decided	  they	  would	  pay	  the	  INC	  head	  office	  in	  Knightsbridge	  a	  surprise	  visit.	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Author	  interview	  with	  former	  FCO	  official	  1,	  8	  April	  2015,	  London.	  
27	  Author	  interview	  with	  FCO	  UK	  official	  2,	  April	  2015,	  London	  	  
28	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  23,	  21	  November	  2015,	  London,	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a	  last-­‐minute	  effort	  the	  respondent	  claimed	  he	  was	  called	  by	  Ahmed	  Chalabi	  to	  
set	  up	  an	  INC	  TV	  and	  radio	  station	  called	  Al	  Hurriya,	  which	  was	  broadcast	  out	  
of	   Camden	   in	   London	   so	   that	   they	   could	   convince	   the	   CIA	   they	   were	   using	  
their	  money	  effectively.	  Respondent	  23	  described	  how	  the	  INC	  often	  sent	  him	  
communiqués	   to	   publish	   in	   the	   Times	   Newspaper	   or	   the	   Guardian29.	   Indeed	  
this	  strategy	  was	  adopted	  during	  the	  INC’s	  first	  operation	  phase	  with	  the	  CIA,	  
when	   the	  majority	  of	   its	  USD	  4	  million	  budget	  was	  being	   spent	  on	   television	  
and	   radio	   stations	   as	   well	   as	   the	   INC’s	   newspaper	   (Bonin,	   2011).	   	   This	   time	  
round	   it	  was	  more	  of	   the	   same.	   Indeed	  both	   the	   INA	  and	   the	   INC	  were	  now	  
publishing	  their	  own	  papers,	  Al	  Wifaq	  and	  Al	  Mu’tamar	  respectively.	  	  	  
	  
The	  second	  strategy	  lay	  in	  preparing	  and	  planning	  for	  a	  post-­‐Saddam	  Iraq.	  US	  
and	   UK	   policy	   makers	   needed	   the	   opposition’s	   help	   with	   planning	   for	   the	  
effective	   running	   of	   the	   state	   for	   the	   post-­‐intervention	   period.	   Frank	  
Riccardione,	   the	   senior	   State	   Department	   official	   designated	   by	   the	   Clinton	  
administration	   as	   its	  man	   responsible	   for	   the	   Iraqi	   Liberation	  Act,	   reportedly	  
stated	  that	  the	  other	  role	  of	  the	  diaspora	  was	  to	  “perhaps	  draft	  a	  blueprint	  for	  
maintaining	   government	   services	   for	   the	  morning	   after	   Saddam	   fell-­‐	   how	   to	  
keep	   the	   hospitals	   and	   schools	   running,	   the	   courts	   functioning,	   and	   the	  
electricity	  flowing”	  (Bonin,	  2011,	  p.164).	  	  	  
	  
The	  new	   Iraq	  would	   require	   technocrats,	  professionals	   and	  various	  experts	   to	  
purge	  Iraq	  of	  its	  old	  socialist	  and	  centralised	  state	  system.	  Therefore	  those	  with	  
expertise	  and	  skills	  and	  who	  were	  of	  course	  willing	  to	  go	  along	  with	  neo-­‐liberal	  
state	   building	   plans	   had	   opportunities	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   pre-­‐intervention	  
institution-­‐building	  and	  governance.	  In	  fact,	  just	  before	  the	  war	  in	  2003	  Ahmed	  
Chalabi	   reportedly	   reached	   out	   to	   Iraqi	   academics	   and	   technocrats	   and	  
informed	  them	  of	  the	  impending	  war	  in	  Iraq.	  He	  reportedly	  urged	  them	  to	  get	  
involved	  in	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  country	  as	  the	  Americans	  were	  looking	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  23,	  23	  November	  2013,	  London	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Iraqi	  experts	  to	  administer	  the	  Iraqi	  governorates30.	  Indeed	  as	  shall	  be	  detailed	  
later,	  Emad	  Dhia,	  an	  American	  Iraqi,	  was	  recruited	  by	  the	  Pentagon	  Office	   to	  
recruit	  Iraqis	  from	  abroad	  who	  were	  willing	  and	  who	  had	  the	  relevant	  expertise	  
to	  help	  the	  coalition	  with	  the	  administration	  of	  Iraq’s	  ministries	  (Allawi,	  2007).	  
An	  interview	  with	  one	  of	  the	  principal	  recruiters	  revealed	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  
experts	   taken	   on	   were	   from	   the	   coalition	   countries	   of	   the	   US	   and	   the	   UK	  
through	   networks	   of	   highly	   educated	   and	   professional	   individuals31.	   Two	   UK	  
respondents	  stated	  they	  were	  personally	  recruited	  through	  their	  contacts	  at	  the	  
IRDC	  and	  due	  to	  their	  expertise32.	  Eventually	  150	  people	  were	  recruited	  to	  help	  
with	   governance	   and	   helping	   re-­‐build	   political	   institutions	   and	   ministries	  
related	  to	  electricity,	  trade,	  health,	  education	  and	  much	  more33.	  	  
	  
Others	  meanwhile	  worked	  through	  the	  FCO,	  who	  were	  also	  busy	  preparing	  for	  
state-­‐building	  for	  the	  post-­‐intervention	  period.	  A	  good	  example	  was	  the	  media	  
expertise	  of	  Respondent	  23	  who	  was	  linked	  to	  the	  opposition	  and	  later	  helped	  
the	   INC	   with	   their	   political	   work	   through	   the	   FCO	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   Iraq.	  
Respondent	   23	   was	   commissioned	   to	   help	   write	   the	   constitution	   for	   the	  
establishment	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   Communications	   and	   Media	   Commission	   (CMC),	  
essentially	  the	  media	  infrastructure	  for	  the	  country	  that	  was	  to	  be	  modelled	  on	  
the	  UK’s	  communications	  regulator,	  Ofcom.	  In	  preparation	  for	  this,	  Inter	  News	  
Network,	   a	   not	   for	   profit	   media	   reform	   institution	   in	   the	   US	   who	  
predominantly	  worked	   for	  USAID,	  was	   to	   create	   a	   think	   tank	   consultancy	   in	  
order	   to	   strategize	   the	   media	   development	   plan	   in	   Iraq	   for	   the	   post-­‐
intervention	  period34.	  As	  a	  result	  two	  conferences	  funded	  by	  the	  United	  States	  
Agency	  for	  International	  Development	  (USAID)	  were	  held	  in	  early	  2003	  before	  
the	  war.	  The	   first	  was	   in	  Cairo,	  Egypt,	  with	   Iraqi,	  Arab,	  British	  and	  American	  
media	  experts,	  lawyers	  and	  journalists.	  	  Following	  this	  conference	  a	  document	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  Author	   interview	  with	  R30,	   Skype	   phone	   call	   1	  May	   2015,	   London.	   This	   group	  was	   to	   form	  
what	  was	  to	  be	  the	  American	  Iraqi	  Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  Council	  (IRDC)	  
31	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  35,	  25	  August	  2015,	  Skype	  telephone	  call	  with	  Montreal	  
32	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondents	  34	  and	  36,	  13	  August	  2015,	  London	  and	  28	  August	  2015,	  
Birmingham	  
33	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  35	  
34	  Author	  interview	  with	  Director	  of	  media	  strategy	  in	  Iraq,	  7	  April	  2015,	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was	   prepared	   for	   the	   proposed	   strategy	   for	   media	   reform	   in	   Iraq.	   This	  
document	   was	   to	   be	   interrogated	   at	   another,	   much	   bigger	   conference	   in	  
Athens,	  funded	  by	  USAID	  and	  the	  European	  Union,	  which	  was	  also	  organised	  
by	   Inter	   News	   and	   attended	   by	   various	   Iraqi	   and	   Arab	   journalists	   and	   other	  
media	  and	  journalism	  experts.	  The	  Athens	  conference,	  as	  it	  was	  referred	  to,	  was	  
where	   a	   suggested	   draft	   of	   the	   media	   strategy	   was	   presented	   and	   cross-­‐
examined	   at	   various	   workshops.	   The	   revised	   document	   from	   this	   conference	  
was	  later	  accepted	  and	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Athens	  Framework,	  which	  was	  to	  be	  
the	   founding	   document	   for	   Iraqi’s	   media	   strategy35.	   Respondent	   23	   helped	  
prepare	  the	  draft	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  CMC	  so	  that	  it	  could	  be	  presented	  
in	   time	   for	   the	   USAID	   funded	   conference	   in	   Athens	   in	   2002.	   According	   to	  
Respondent	  23	  he	  helped	  tweak	  and	  edit	  the	  draft	  to	  make	  it	  more	  localised	  for	  
Iraq,	  but	  that	  it	  was	  essentially	  based	  on	  the	  Ofcom	  constitution.	  
	  
Legitimation	   for	   the	  war	  effort	  was	  also	  necessary	   for	  winning	   the	  hearts	  and	  
minds	   of	   the	   British	   and	   US	   public.	   Especially	   as	   senior	   politicians	   in	   the	  
Labour	  government,	   including	  Robin	  Cook	  and	  Claire	  Short,	  were	  vehemently	  
against	   the	  war	  and	   the	  general	  public	  had	  expressed	   their	  opposition	  during	  
the	  global	  15	  February	  2003	  demonstration,	  where	  a	  reported	  1-­‐2	  million	  people	  
expressed	  their	  anti-­‐war	  stance	  (Moreton,	  2015).	  The	  coalition	  was	  therefore	  in	  
need	  of	  Iraqis,	  or	  what	  Dabashi	  might	  term	  ‘native	  informers’	  to	  legitimate	  the	  
west’s	   neo-­‐liberal	   plans	   (Dabashi,	   2011).	   The	   UK	   government	   was	   therefore	  
working	  to	  support	  the	  fractious	  Iraqi	  opposition	  groups	  to	  be	  united,	  	  
	  
	   “With	   the	   INC	   we	   had	   periodic	   roundtables	   to	   exchange	   briefings	   to	  
emphasise	   the	  need	   for	   the	   Iraqi	  opposition	   to	  act	   cohesively.	  One	  of	   the	  big	  
problems	  that	  a	  foreign	  government	  faces	  when	  it	  is	  dealing	  with	  a	  diaspora,	  is	  
if	   you’re	   dealing	   with,	   well	   you	   simply	   can’t	   deal	   with	   large	   numbers	   of	  
disparate	   organisations	   with	   different	   lobbying	   lines	   because	   in	   the	   end	   you	  
don’t	   know	  who’s	   right	   and	  who’s	   got	   support	   inside	   the	   country	   and	  who’s	  
actually	   offering	   any	   form	   of	   credible	   leadership	   or	   an	   ability	   to	   deliver,	   or	  
whether	  it’s	  a	  social	  programme	  or	  a	  political	  programme.	  Umm	  it’s	  actually	  a	  
point	  that	  the	  (mentions	  another	  UK	  diaspora	  group)	  have	  not	  got	  to	  grips	  with	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yet,	   that	  even	   if	   they	  have	  differences	  amongst	   themselves	   if	   they’re	  engaging	  
with	   the	   international	   community,	   even	   if	   they	   have	   differences	   amongst	  
themselves	   and	   differing	   objectives	   that	   if	   they’re	   actually	   going	   to	   carry	   any	  
weight	  at	   all	   they	   really	  have	   to	  agree	  on	   some	  basics	   if	   they’re	  going	   to	  deal	  
with	  the	  international	  community.”36	  
	  
The	  UK’s	   collaboration	  with	   the	   diaspora	   in	   the	   lead	   up	   to	   intervention	  was	  
strategic	  and	  necessary	  both	  for	  legitimation,	  intelligence	  and	  planning	  for	  the	  
post-­‐intervention	  period.	  Consequently,	  this	  need	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  British	  and	  
US	  coalition	  created	  opportunities	   for	   the	  diaspora	   to	  be	   involved	   in	   the	   lead	  
up	  to	  the	  war	  and	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  post-­‐intervention	  period.	  FCO	  official	  2	  
states,	   “Basically	   our	   job	  was	   to	   have	   as	   good	   an	   understanding	   of	  what	  was	  
going	  on	  inside	  Iraq	  and	  what	  the	  opposition’s	  lines	  of	  communications	  and	  in	  
the	  future	  what	  their	  ability	  to	  deliver	  would	  be”.	  
	  
The	   UK’s	   involvement	   in	   military	   intervention	   thus	   opened	   the	   door	   of	  
collaboration	  with	  certain	  groups	  and	   figures	   from	  the	   Iraqi	  diaspora	  because	  
they	  needed	  a)	  intelligence,	  b)	  propaganda	  tools,	  c)	  help	  with	  post-­‐intervention	  
state-­‐building	  plans	  and	  d)	  legitimation.	  Yet	  collaboration	  was	  facilitated	  for	  a	  
certain	   type	  of	  diaspora,	   those	  who	  supported	   the	  coalitions	  neo-­‐liberal	  plans	  
and	  were	  willing	  participants.	  One	   top	  British	   official,	  who	  worked	   alongside	  
Bremer	  during	  the	  occupation	  years	  stated,	  	  
	  
	   “You	   had	   people	   like	   Allawi	   who	   had	   their	   own	   political	   parties	   and	  
certainly	  I	  know	  that	  the	  FCO	  was	  talking	  to	  him	  and	  others,	  there	  were	  others	  
you	   know	  people	   like	  Ayad	  Allawi	   and	  Chalabi,	   although	  he	  was	   far	  more	   in	  
Washington	  than	  he	  was	  in	  London,	  who	  were	  fluent	  English	  speakers,	  highly	  
educated	   who	   had	   strong	   political	   organisation	   behind	   them,	   and	   therefore,	  
were	  natural	   interlocutors	  for	  either	  the	  British	  or	  the	  American	  governments	  
in	   the	   run	  up	   to	   the	   invasion	   and	   in	   the	   case	   of	  Allawi	   and	  Chalabi	   post	   the	  
invasion.	  And	   then	   there	  were	  other	  people	  whom	   I	   got	   to	  know	   in	  Baghdad	  
like	   Ibrahim	   Jaafari,	   the	   first	   Prime	  Minister,	   who’d	   lived	   in	   London.	   I	   don’t	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know	  how	  many	  years	  in	  exile,	  20	  years	  before	  the	  invasion	  as	  far	  as	  I’m	  aware..	  
barely	  spoke	  English.	  I	  can’t	  believe	  he	  was	  much	  of	  a	  viable	  interlocutor	  for	  the	  
British	   government	   in	   the	   run	  up	   to	   the	   invasion	   even	   though	  he	  was	   a	   very	  
senior	  person	  in	  the	  Da’wa	  and	  became	  a	  member	  of	  the	  governing	  council	  and	  
was	   Iraq’s,	   and	  ended	  up	  as	   Iraq’s	   first	  Prime	  Minister.	  So	   I	   suspect	   that	  who	  
the	   British	   government	   talked	   to	   depended	   certainly	   partly	   on	   whether	   they	  
represented	  political	  organisations	  which	  gave	  them	  a	  degree	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  
a	   good	   reason	   therefore	   for	   the	   British	   government	   to	   talk	   to	   them,	   but	   also	  
whether	   they	   were,	   to	   use	   a	   crude	   term,	   user-­‐friendly	   and	   for	   the	   British	  
government	   people	   who	   spoke	   English	   were	   always	   going	   to	   be	   more	   user	  
friendly	  than	  those	  like	  Jaafari	  who	  didn’t”.	  	  
	  
Despite	   Da’wa’s	   strong	   political	   following	   as	   represented	   by	   their	   results	   in	  
Iraq’s	  first	  democratic	  elections,	  their	  political	  leaders’	  anti-­‐intervention	  stance	  
meant	  that	  collaboration	  with	  the	  FCO	  was	  minimal.	  The	  main	  political	  parties	  
and	  groups	  who	  would	  later	  become	  official	  partners	  with	  the	  US	  and	  UK	  were	  
thus	   those	   who	   were	   capable	   of	   organising	   through	   their	   financial,	   social,	  
religious	   or	   political	   networks,	   such	   as	   ISCI,	   the	   INC	   and	   INA,	   but	   also	  
importantly	   those	  who	  had	  bargaining	  chips	   to	  offer	   the	  US	   for	  when	   regime	  
change	  would	  occur.	  This	  was	  either	  in	  the	  form	  of	  powerful	  political	  allies	  as	  in	  
the	   case	   of	   ISCI	   and	   its	   connection	   to	   Iran,	   or	   those	   who	   shared	   in	   their	  
ideology,	  or	   in	   the	  very	   least	   those	   they	  could	  work	  with	  once	  regime	  change	  
took	  place	  (Al-­‐Ali,	  2014).	  	  
	  
It	   is	   important,	   however,	   to	   recognise	   that	   the	   formal	   Iraqi	   opposition	   in	  
London	  was	  by	  no	  means	  representative	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  community	  in	  London,	  the	  
UK	   or	   for	   that	   matter	   any	   diaspora	   located	   outside	   of	   Iraq.	   Most	   were	  
disconnected	   from	   the	   opposition	   since	   it	  was	   by	   no	  means	   a	   democratically	  
elected	  unit,	  but	  rather	  an	  amalgam	  of	  opposition	  groups	  who	  had	  established	  
historical	  following	  through	  political	  or	  religious	  family	  ties,	  or	  those	  who	  had	  
the	  resources	  to	  create	  new	  groups	  in	  the	  diaspora.	  A	  vast	  majority	  were	  against	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the	  war	  and	  even	  those	  who	  were	   for	   regime	  change	  were	  against	   the	  US/UK	  
occupation	  that	  was	  to	  follow.	  
	  
The	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  and	  state-­‐building	  following	  military	  intervention	  
The	  UK’s	  military	   involvement	   in	   Iraq	  meant	   that	   various	  British	   civilian	  and	  
military	   officers	   would	   be	   based	   on	   the	   ground	   in	   Iraq.	   This	   created	  
opportunities	   for	   the	  UK	   Iraqi	  diaspora	   to	  be	   involved	   in	   institution-­‐building	  
and	  governance	  because	   the	  diaspora	   leaders	  had	  made	   themselves	  known	  to	  
the	  FCO	  and	  the	  Pentagon	  during	  the	  opposition	  years,	  which	  facilitated	  their	  
transition	   to	   positions	   in	   government	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   intervention.	  	  
Secondly	   anyone	  who	  was	   interested	   in	  helping	  out	   and	  offering	   expertise	   or	  
skills	  would	  have	  been	  encouraged	  and	  supported	  by	  the	  FCO.	  As	  one	  diplomat	  
interviewed	  stated	  “Any	  Iraqi	  who	  said	  look	  I’d	  like	  to	  come	  out	  and	  help	  would	  
have	   been	   encouraged	   and	   helped	   to	   do	   that…	   they	   would	   have	   approached	  
London	  not	  Iraq”37.	  	  Thirdly,	  the	  coalition,	  who	  was	  eager	  to	  leave	  Iraq	  as	  soon	  
as	   possible,	   could	   not	   find	   alternatives	   to	   govern	   the	   country	   at	   the	   time	   of	  
occupation.	   In	   an	   increasingly	   hostile	   environment	   towards	   the	   CPA	   and	   its	  
occupation	   of	   Iraq,	   the	   diaspora	   leaders	   thus	   became	   natural	   interlocutors	  
between	  the	  CPA	  and	  the	  groups	  they	  allegedly	  represented	  in	  Iraq.	  They	  spoke	  
English,	  which	  facilitated	  communication,	  and	  they	  were	  known	  by	  US	  and	  UK	  
officials.	   It	   is	   under	   this	   climate	   of	   occupation	   and	   a	   shortage	   of	   political	  
leaders	   and	   skilled	   technocrats	   that	   certain	   diaspora	   groups	   and	   individuals	  
were	  able	  to	  intervene	  to	  claim	  a	  stake	  in	  Iraq’s	  new	  political	  system.	  	  
	  
When	  intervention	  took	  place	  on	  the	  19	  March	  2003,	  the	  diaspora	  leaders	  had	  
by	  now	  cemented	  their	  relationships	  with	  the	  coalition,	  placing	  them	  firmly	  in	  
a	  position	  to	  govern	  Iraq	  and	  be	  a	  part	  of	  Iraq’s	  state-­‐building	  enterprise.	  The	  
Pentagon,	   and	   more	   specifically	   the	   Office	   of	   Special	   Plans,	   who	   had	   been	  
placed	  to	  handle	  the	  post-­‐intervention	  period	  had	  by	  now	  earmarked	  the	  Iraqi	  
leaders,	   notably	   Ahmed	   Chalabi,	   to	   take	   over	   as	   a	   Provisional	   Government	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(Herring	  and	  Rangwala,	  2006).	  Their	   influence	   in	  Washington	  had	  become	  so	  
great	   in	   fact	   that	   tragically	   one	   coalition	   civilian	   officer	   remarked	   that	   the	  
political	  strategy	  in	  2003	  “relied	  upon	  two	  things:	  exiles	  and	  optimism”	  (quoted	  
in	  Herring	  and	  Rangwala,	  2006:	  12).	  	  
	  
As	   the	   US	   and	   UK	   coalition	   forces	   toppled	   the	   old	   regime	   and	   successfully	  
battled	  the	  Iraqi	  army	  they	  were	  now	  faced	  with	  trying	  to	  govern	  a	  country	  that	  
had	   not	   welcomed	   them	   with	   “sweets	   and	   flowers”	   (Packer,	   2003)	   or	   as	  
“liberators”	   (Herring	  and	  Rangwala,	  2006)	  as	   some	  of	   the	  diaspora	  opposition	  
had	  convincingly	  argued	  at	  the	  time.	  	  Upon	  finding	  a	  devastated	  infrastructure,	  
decrepit	   industries	   and	   a	   broken	   society,	   the	   US	   military	   realised	   that	   their	  
presence	   in	   the	   country	  would	   last	   longer	   than	   previously	   expected	   and	   that	  
the	  original	  plan	  of	  handing	  over	  to	  an	  interim	  Iraqi	  government	  by	  May	  2003	  
was	  not	  feasible	  (Bremer	  and	  McConnell,	  2006).	  	  
	  
The	  Office	  of	  Reconstruction	  and	  Humanitarian	  Assistance	  (ORHA)	  leading	  the	  
military	  strategy	  in	  Iraq	  at	  the	  time	  and	  headed	  by	  Lieutenant	  Jay	  Garner,	  was	  
keen	  to	  get	  Iraqis	  to	  govern	  themselves	  and	  wanted	  elections	  held	  as	  quickly	  as	  
possible.	   The	   diaspora	   Iraqi	   political	   leaders	   wanted	   to	   form	   a	   transitional	  
government	  that	  would	  take	  control	  of	  the	  country	  headed	  by	  a	  small	  council	  
to	  include	  the	  most	  prominent	  diaspora	  politicians	  that	  were	  already	  known	  to	  
the	   US	   and	   the	   UK	   governments.	   This	   included,	   Ahmed	   Chalabi	   and	   Ayad	  
Allawi,	   Shiite	   leaders	   Ibrahim	   Al-­‐Jafari	   (Da’wa)	   and	   Abdul	   Aziz	   al-­‐Hakim	  
(ISCI),	  and	  Kurdish	  chieftains	  Jalal	  Talabani	  (PUK)	  and	  Massoud	  Barzani	  (KDP)	  
(Chandrasekaran,	  2006).	  This	  plan	  was	  endorsed	  by	  the	  Pentagon	  who	  wanted	  
a	  quick	  handover	   to	  Ahmed	  Chalabi	  and	  the	  other	  exiles	  but	  was	  opposed	  by	  
the	   State	   Department,	   which	   wanted	   an	   occupation	   with	   the	   US	   in	   charge	  
before	  identifying	  representative	  internal	  Iraqi	  leaders	  (Chandrasekaran,	  2006).	  
It	   is	   under	   this	   context	   that	   the	   ORHA	   was	   replaced	   by	   the	   Coalition	  
Provisional	  Authority	  under	  the	  management	  of	  Paul	  Bremer	  who	  became	  the	  
Viceroy	  of	  occupied	  Iraq	  with	  his	  junior	  UK	  partner,	  Sir	  John	  Sawers,	  the	  UK’s	  
Special	  Representative.	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Under	  the	  CPA	  the	  diaspora	  leaders	  felt	  short	  changed	  as	  effectively	  the	  US	  and	  
UK	  governments	  had	  turned	  from	  liberators	  to	  occupiers	  and	  were	  the	  rulers	  of	  
Iraq.	  This	  meant	   that	   they	  had	   to	  adhere	   to	   the	  coalition’s	  policies	  and	  state-­‐
building	   plans	   for	   the	   country	   if	   they	   wanted	   to	   maintain	   their	   positions	   of	  
power.	   Yet	   the	   CPA	   who	   was	   determined	   to	   start	   the	   reconstruction	   of	   the	  
country	  needed	   Iraqi	   involvement	  both	   for	   legitimacy	   in	   the	   eyes	  of	   ordinary	  
Iraqis	   and	   the	  wider	   international	   community	   (Herring	   and	  Rangwala,	   2006).	  
Finding	   native	   Iraqi	   leaders	   representative	   of	   all	   of	   Iraq’s	   diverse	   ethnic	   and	  
sectarian	  mix	   to	   take	   over	   government	  ministries	   however	  was	   proving	  more	  
difficult	  than	  previously	  envisaged.	  Firstly,	  the	  majority	  of	  Iraqis	  who	  were	  not	  
Baathists	   had	   been	   forbidden	   from	   forming	   political	   groups	   and	   mobilising,	  
thus	  many	   inside	  the	  country	  did	  not	  have	  experience	  of	  open	  politics	  due	  to	  
the	  stringent	  conditions	  they	  experienced	  in	  Saddam	  Hussein’s	  Iraq.	  	  
	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  many	  native	  Iraqis	  were	  distrustful	  of	  the	  coalition	  and	  did	  
not	   want	   to	   be	   seen	   to	   collaborate	   with	   it.	   The	   need	   for	   local	   ownership	   to	  
legitimate	   state-­‐building	   in	   Iraq,	   as	  much	   of	   the	   state-­‐building	   literature	   has	  
emphasised,	   drove	   the	   Anglo–American	   coalition	   to	   the	   Iraqi	   diaspora	  
opposition	  leaders	  who	  were	  more	  than	  willing	  to	  collaborate	  under	  occupation	  
to	  maintain	  their	  grip	  on	  power	  (Dodge,	  2003;	  Herring	  and	  Rangwala,	  2006).	  A	  
symbiotic	   relationship	   was	   therefore	   fostered	   between	   the	   coalition	   who	  
needed	   Iraqi	   leaders	   to	   support	   their	   ideological	   plans	   for	   Iraq	   and	   diaspora	  
leaders	  who	  were	  willing	   to	  acquiesce	   to	  coalition	  plans	   to	  gain	  access	   to	   the	  
corridors	  of	  power.	  	  
	  
Military	   intervention	   and	   the	   commitment	   to	   reform	   Iraq’s	   political	   system	  
therefore	   opened	   opportunities	   for	   the	   diaspora	   elite	   leaders	   to	   become	  
involved	   in	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance.	   The	   CPA	   knew	   the	   Iraqi	  
opposition	   leaders;	   especially	   those	   they’d	   groomed	   and	   who	   spoke	   their	  
language	   and	   in	   the	  words	   of	   one	  British	   official	  who	  worked	   alongside	   Paul	  
Bremer,	   “people	   who	   had	   good	   English	   and	   understood	   the	   way	   the	   west	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worked,	   therefore	  were	   able	   to	  make	   themselves	   useful	   and	   approachable	   by	  
western	  politicians	  and	  diplomats	  and	  so	  on”38.	  This	  gave	  the	  opposition	  groups	  
and	  leading	  figures	  a	  head	  start	  in	  subsequently	  governing	  the	  country	  (Allawi,	  
2007;	   Al-­‐Ali,	   2014).	   A	   Leadership	   Council	   (LC)	   informally	   called	   the	   G-­‐7	   was	  
thus	   set	  up,	   comprising	   six	   leaders	   including,	   Jalal	  Talabani,	  Masoud	  Barzani,	  
Ahmed	   Chalabi,	   Ayad	   Allawi.	   Naseer	   al-­‐Chadirchi	   and	   the	   Da’wa	   Party,	  
spokesman,	   Ibrahim	   al-­‐Jaafari	  39(Allawi,	   2007:108-­‐109)	   many	   of	   whom	   were	  
from	  the	  UK	  diaspora.	   	  As	  one	  Senior	  FCO	  official	  who	  served	   in	   Iraq	   stated,	  
“Most	   of	   the	  people	   I	  worked	  with	   in	  London	   ended	  up	   in	  Baghdad	  or	   other	  
governorates”40.	  The	  LC	  was	   to	  work	  alongside	   the	  CPA	  and	  effectively	  act	  as	  
the	  political	  bridge	  between	   the	  CPA	  and	   Iraq’s	  political	   elites	  as	  a	  makeshift	  
provisional	   government.	   Indeed,	   in	   July	   2003,	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   Iraqi	  
Governing	  Council	  (IGC)	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  steps	  taken	  by	  the	  CPA	  and	  the	  LC	  
towards	  Iraq	  gaining	  sovereignty	  and	  running	  its	  own	  affairs.	  	  
	  
The	  chosen	  25	  ministers,	  most	  of	  whom	  were	  from	  the	  diaspora,	  were	  carefully	  
sifted	  by	  Paul	  Bremer	  on	  ethnic	  quotas,	  without	  anti-­‐US	  Shi’a	  leaders	  (such	  as	  
Moqtada	  Al	  Sadr)	  or	  former	  Baath	  members	  (except	  some	  former	  exiles	  such	  as	  
Ayad	  Allawi)	  (Barakat,	  2008),	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  were	  only	  three	  
women	   none	   of	   whom	   were	   on	   the	   rotating	   presidency	   of	   the	   Governing	  
Council.	   This	   political	   exclusion	   of	   Baathist	   officials	   or	   anyone	   with	   an	  
alternative	  view	  to	  state-­‐building	   in	   Iraq	  did	  not	   lead	  to	  a	  collaborative	  state-­‐
building	  exercise,	  but	  rather	  an	  exclusive	  one,	  where	  only	  those	  aligned	  to	  the	  
coalition	  and	  their	  particular	  neo-­‐liberal	  state-­‐building	  agendas	  were	  consulted	  
at	  the	  expense	  of	  ordinary	  Iraqis.	  The	  chosen	  diaspora	  leaders	  had	  thus	  helped	  
institute	  a	  divisive	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  political	  system,	  which	  did	  not	  adhere	  to	  an	  
Iraq	   of	   2003-­‐2004	   (Dodge,	   2005).	   Furthermore	   they	   endorsed	   the	   harsh	   neo-­‐
liberal	   policies	   forcefully	   pushed	   through	   by	   Bremer	   and	   his	   colleagues	   (For	  
more	  on	  this	  see	  Medani,	  2004;	  Barakat,	  2008,	  2005;	  Ismael	  and	  Ismael,	  2008,	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The	  significance	  of	  the	  chosen	  diaspora	  leaders	  is	  hard	  to	  underestimate	  since	  
it	   laid	   the	   foundations	   for	   the	   fabric	   of	   the	   political	   system	   in	   Iraq.	   As	   each	  
member	  was	  tasked	  to	  choose	  a	  cabinet	  minister,	   the	  now	  firmly	  rooted	  Iraqi	  
diaspora	   leaders	   reached	   out	   to	   their	  members	   in	   the	   diaspora	   and	   recruited	  
from	   their	   previous	   social	   and	   political	   networks	   abroad.	   Several	   Iraqi	  
politicians	  interviewed	  for	  this	  thesis	  confirmed	  this	  finding.	  When	  asked	  how	  
they	   became	   involved	   in	   the	   domestic	   politics	   of	   their	   homeland	   two	  
contributing	  factors	  were	  mentioned:	  firstly	  that	  they	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  the	  
opposition	  elite	  network	   in	  London	  prior	   to	  regime	  change	  and	  secondly	  that	  
they	  were	  approached	  by	  opposition	  leading	  figures	  who	  were	  now	  established	  
in	   Iraq.	   Ali	   Allawi,	   for	   instance,	   states	   that	   he	   was	   called	   by	   Mowaffak	   Al	  
Rubaie,	   who	   offered	   him	   a	   position	   in	   the	   cabinet	   as	   a	   Trade	   Minister	   in	  
September	  2003	  (Allawi,	  2007).	  Meanwhile	  Respondent	  22	  was	  invited	  by	  one	  of	  
the	   IGC	   leaders	   to	   Iraq	   where	   she	   campaigned	   for	   women’s	   rights,41	  and	   has	  
served	   in	   Iraq	   since	   2004	   in	   several	   positions	   including	   Deputy	   Minister	   of	  
Culture	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  Representatives42	  
	  
One	  minister	  interviewed	  by	  the	  author	  was	  called	  to	  help	  rebuild	  relationships	  
between	   the	   Islamists	   and	   the	   now	   appointed	   Interim	   Prime	  Minister,	   Ayad	  
Allawi.	  He	  states:	  
	  
	   “When	  the	  regime	  fell,	  our	  goal	  was	  achieved.	  At	  that	  time,	  my	  work	  was	  
going	  well,	  I	  had	  work.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  it’s	  not	  in	  my	  nature	  to	  take	  a	  position	  
after	  regime	  change.	  Ayad	  Allawi	  became	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  he	  insisted	  that	  I	  
come	  to	  Iraq	  to	  take	  up	  a	  position	  in	  a	  ministry.	  I	  did	  not	  accept.	  I	  didn’t	  want	  
to.	  What	  we	   had	  wanted	  we	   achieved.	   This	  was	   in	   2004.	   In	   2004	   he	   left	   the	  
ministry,	  after	  I	  saw	  that	  things	  were	  going	  backwards.	  At	  that	  time	  Ayad	  called	  
me	  up	  again	  in	  2005	  and	  wanted	  me	  to	  come.	  I	  had	  prior	  connections	  with	  the	  
Islamic	  opposition	  movement	  so	  I	  could	  play	  a	  role.	  Though	  I	  wanted	  to	  play	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  The	  Iraqi	  Independent	  Women’s	  Group	  is	  an	  organization	  dedicated	  to	  giving	  women	  in	  Iraq	  
a	  voice	  to	  address	  women’s	  issues.	  It	  was	  established	  in	  May	  2003,	  www.iiwg.org/index.html	  
[Last	  accessed	  20	  September	  2015]	  
42	  Author	  interview	  with	  respondent	  23,	  21	  November	  2013,	  London	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national	  role	  not	  a	  Shi’a	  or	  Sunni,	  this	  was	  why	  I	  stood	  by	  Ayad	  Allawi	  and	  so	  I	  
played	   a	   role	   in	   bringing	   Ayad	   Allawi	   and	   the	   Islamic	   parties	   to	   work	  
together.”43	  	  
	  
The	  ease	  in	  which	  figures	  such	  as	  Ayad	  Allawi	  and	  other	  UK	  diaspora	  were	  able	  
to	   recruit	   from	  abroad	   friends	   and	  associates	  depicts	  not	  only	   the	  ubiquitous	  
cronyism	   but	   the	   importance	   of	   specific	   transnational	   political	   and	   social	  
networks	   stemming	   from	   the	  UK	   diaspora	  where	  many	   elite	   and	   	   prominent	  
Iraqi	   families	   had	   chosen	   to	   reside	   in	   exile.	  While	   the	  CPA	  had	   the	   final	   say	  
over	  matters,	   the	   diaspora	   leaders	   were	   responsible	   for	   how	   they	   distributed	  
roles	  and	  the	  institutions	  they	  led.	  	  
	  
Further	   opportunities	   for	   involvement	   in	   state-­‐building	   emerged	   through	   the	  
CPA	   when	   it	   became	   evident	   that	   the	   country	   was	   missing	   leaders	   to	  
administer	  governorates	  and	  ministries	  in	  Iraq.	  This	  was	  felt	  more	  acutely	  and	  
took	  on	  more	  urgency	  after	  de-­‐baathification,	  which	  saw	  the	   four	   top	   tiers	  of	  
Baath	   government	   removed 44 	  and	   after	   disbanding	   the	   Iraqi	   army.	   The	  
controversial	  policies	  were	  meant	   to	  act	  as	  a	   reassurance	   to	  native	   Iraqis	   that	  
the	   era	   of	   Saddam	   had	   ended,	   similar	   to	   de-­‐nazification	   (Sky,	   2015).	   De-­‐
baathification,	   however,	   left	   the	   country	   with	   effectively	   no	   senior	  
administrative	   staff	   to	   run	   Iraqi	   ministries,	   senior	   management	   positions	   in	  
hospitals,	   universities	   and	  other	  public	   institutions.	  Meanwhile	  disbanding	  of	  
the	   army	   left	   the	   vulnerable	   Iraqi	   state	   with	   no	   security	   apparatus	   and	   a	  
widening	  security	  vacuum	  with	   roughly	  400,000	  armed	  and	  now	  unemployed	  
army	  personnel	  (Herring	  and	  Rangwala,	  2006).	  The	  decision	  was	  taken	  by	  Paul	  
Bremer	  and	  was	  backed	  by	  the	  IGC,	  especially	  Ahmed	  Chalabi	  who	  was	  keen	  to	  
dismiss	  and	  isolate	  any	  ties	  to	  the	  former	  regime	  (Markaz	  al-­‐Imārāt	  lil-­‐Dirāsāt	  
wa-­‐al-­‐Buḥūth	   al-­‐Istirātījīyah,	   2004;	   Chandrasekaran,	   2006;	   Sky,	   2015).	   Chalabi	  
would	   later	   become	   the	   head	   of	   the	   de-­‐baathification	   commission,	   which	  
removed	   the	   four	   top	   tiers	   of	   Baath	   personnel,	   leaving	   millions	   of	   Iraqis	  
disenfranchised	  and	  unemployed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  25,	  2014,	  London	  
44	  This	  was	  roughly	  40,000	  Baath	  employees	  (Stewart,	  2006:	  7)	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Consequently,	   this	  move	   encouraged	   by	   Ahmed	  Chalabi,	   and	   enacted	   by	   the	  
CPA,	  created	  more	  spaces	  for	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  individuals	  to	  involve	  themselves,	  
as	   the	  coalition	  now	  sorely	  needed	  people	   to	   fill	   those	  positions.	   	  As	  a	   senior	  
diplomat	   working	   alongside	   Paul	   Bremer	   confirmed,	   de-­‐baathification	   had	  
created	  more	  opportunities	  for	  the	  diaspora	  to	  become	  involved;	  “It	  created	  an	  
enormous	  need	  for	  Iraqi	  expatriates	  to	  get	  involved	  and	  the	  Americans	  did	  try,	  
no	  doubt	  about	  this,	  they	  did	  try	  quite	  hard	  to	  get	  expatriate	  Iraqis	  to	  come	  out	  
and	  fill	  some	  of	  these	  positions.”45	  	  
	  
Indeed,	  the	  CPA’s	  response	  was	  to	  encourage	  Iraqi	  expertise	  and	  skill	  through	  
the	   Iraqi	  Reconstruction	   and	  Development	  Council	   (IRDC),	   set	  up	  by	   the	  US	  
Department	   of	  Defence	   (DOD)	   to	  manage	   the	   structures	   of	   civil	   government	  
after	  Saddam	  was	  deposed	  from	  power	  (Herring	  and	  Rangwala,	  2006).	  Though	  
the	  IRDC’s	  role	  was	  eventually	  reduced	  to	  supporting	  CPA	  administration,	  the	  
creation	  of	  such	  councils	  gave	  British	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  an	  opportunity	  to	  engage	  
in	  institution-­‐building	  and	  governance	  albeit	  in	  more	  inferior	  and	  subordinate	  
roles	  than	  had	  been	  promised	  or	  envisaged	  (Herring	  and	  Rangwala,	  2006).	  	  
	  
As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  IRDC	  was	  made	  up	  of	  predominantly	  US	  and	  UK	  
diaspora	   experts,	   exemplifying	   how	   military	   intervention	   created	   more	  
opportunities	  for	  the	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  in	  these	  two	  hostlands	  to	  become	  involved	  
in	  state-­‐building.	  However,	  on	  paper	  at	  least,	  these	  individuals	  had	  to	  have	  the	  
appropriate	  educational	  or	  professional	  credentials	  to	  be	  considered.	  Speaking	  
to	   one	   British	   Iraqi	   woman	   who	   was	   recruited	   by	   the	   IRDC	   to	   work	   for	   the	  
Ministry	  of	  Culture,	  the	  opportunity	  came	  as	  a	  result	  of	  her	  expertise.	  Recalling	  
the	   first	   IRDC	  meeting	   in	  Washington	   in	  preparation	   for	   their	  deployment	   in	  
Baghdad	   in	   2003,	   Respondent	   34	   stated	   that	   IRDC	   recruits	   were	   all	   PhDs	   or	  
Doctors.46	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Author	  interview	  with	  Diplomat	  official	  2	  
46	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  34,	  13	  August	  2015,	  London	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Respondent	   23	   also	   offers	   a	   good	   example	   of	   a	   skilled	   Iraqi	  who	  was	   able	   to	  
contribute	   to	   institution-­‐building	   due	   to	   his	   expertise	   and	   skills	   by	   working	  
through	   the	   FCO	   in	   Iraq.	   R23	   was	   contracted	   to	   work	   on	   Iraq’s	   media	  
infrastructure,	  i.e	  a	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  framework	  for	  telecommunications	  and	  
broadcasting.	  According	   to	   the	  man	   responsible	   for	  media	   reform	   strategy	   in	  
Iraq,	  the	  project	  was	  funded	  through	  the	  CPA	  and	  later	  the	  British	  Embassy	  to	  
establish	   a	   free,	   independent	   and	   professional	   media	   in	   Iraq47 .	   This	   also	  
involved	   formulating	   and	   drafting	   Iraqi	   media	   and	   telecommunications	  
legislation	   and	   regulations,	   developing	   the	   Iraqi	   Communications	   and	  Media	  
Commission	  (CMC)	  and	  its	  subsequent	  broadcasting	  regulation,	  licensing,	  law	  
and	  policy,	   as	  well	   as	  many	  other	  media	   related	   tasks	   such	  as	   election	  media	  
monitoring	  48.	  	  
	  
Once	  intervention	  had	  taken	  place	  R23,	  who	  was	  part	  of	  the	  opposition	  and	  a	  
skilled	   Iraqi,	   contacted	   the	  FCO	  and	   flew	   into	  Baghdad	   in	  2003.	  He	  met	  with	  
the	   FCO,	   who	   were	   stationed	   in	   the	   Green	   Zone,	   to	   offer	   help	   as	   he	   had	  
previously	  worked	  with	   the	   opposition	   and	   the	   FCO	   prior	   to	   regime	   change.	  
From	   2003	   to	   2010	   he	   worked	   alongside	   the	   coalition	   governments	   and	  
developed	  a	   string	  of	   initiatives	   including	   the	  CMC,	  election	  campaigns,	  anti-­‐
terrorism,	   human	   rights	   and	   Basra	   trash	   campaigns,	   police	   recruitment	  
campaigns,	   big	  media	   campaigns	   on	   television,	   and	   radio	   broadcasts,	   posters	  
and	   helping	   to	   reform	   the	   country’s	   media	   legislation	   and	  media	   law	   in	   the	  
Iraqi	  constitution.	  Once	  the	  British	  forces	  officially	  left	  in	  2009,	  R23	  continued	  
to	   work	   with	   the	   Iraqi	   government	   helping	   to	   implement	   their	   state	   media	  
strategy.	  Media	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  vital	  component	  of	  state-­‐building	  as	  explained	  by	  
the	  man	  leading	  the	  strategy	  as	  it	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  a	  marker	  of	  a	  true	  democracy	  
for	   states	   emerging	   from	   dictatorship,	   but	   also	   necessary	   for	   state-­‐building	  
purposes	  as	  the	  population	  needed	  to	  be	  informed	  of	  what	  was	  happening	  49.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Author	  interview	  with	  Director	  of	  media	  strategy	  in	  Iraq,	  7	  April	  2015,	  London	  
48	  Author	  interview	  with	  Director	  of	  media	  strategy	  in	  Iraq,	  7	  April	  2015,	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  See	  also	  
http://www.albanyassociates.com/about-­‐us/projects/iraq	  	  
49	  Author	  interview	  with	  FCO	  contracted	  senior	  official	  1	  who	  worked	  in	  Iraq	  from	  2003	  to	  2006,	  
8	  April	  2015,	  London	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Similarly	   those	   working	   from	   the	   diaspora	   could	   also	   contribute	   to	   state-­‐
building	  from	  afar	  through	  their	  associations	  with	  diaspora	  opposition	  leaders	  
from	   their	   social	   circles	   back	   in	   London.	   Two	   of	   the	   diaspora	   members	  
interviewed	  who	  had	  been	  active	   in	   the	  opposition	  years	  and	  knew	   leaders	   in	  
the	   transitional	   government	   set	   up	   a	   new	   democratic	   group	   in	   the	   UK	   to	  
support	   Iraq’s	   transition	   to	  democracy.	   Since	   2004,	   they	  organised	   a	   series	  of	  
conferences	   bringing	   together	   the	   most	   prominent	   Iraqi	   intellectuals,	  
scientists,	   lawyers	   and	   academics	   from	   the	   diaspora	   to	   address	   the	   pressing	  
issues	   that	   Iraq	  was	   facing	   including	   the	  contents	  of	   the	  constitution,	  human	  
rights,	   democratic	   rule,	   and	   the	   controversial	   Kirkuk	   issue	   50 .	   The	   Iraqi	  
President,	   Jalal	   Talabani,	   funded	   the	   conference	   at	   the	   time,	   giving	   USD	  
100,000	  for	  its	  organisation.	  The	  conferences	  were	  held	  in	  London	  and	  brought	  
together	  diaspora	  experts	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  law,	  justice,	  science,	  engineering	  and	  
various	   others	   to	   discuss	   and	   write	   policy	   reports,	   which	   were	   consequently	  
written	   up	   and	   sent	   to	   the	   Iraqi	   government51.	   The	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   in	   London	  
were	   thus	   able	   to	   inform	   state	   policy	   and	   governance	   of	   Iraq	   via	   these	   state	  
funded	  conferences	  from	  afar.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   ensuing	   chaos	   during	   this	   period	   the	   British	  
government,	  which	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  southern	  region	  of	  Iraq,	  reached	  out	  
to	  certain	  well	  respected	  members	  of	  the	  diaspora	  in	  the	  UK	  for	  help	  with	  how	  
to	  deal	  with	  religious	  and	  governance	  issues.	  This	  gave	  diaspora	  political	  elites	  
the	  opportunity	  to	  act	  as	  advisors	  to	  the	  British,	  but	  also	  work	  alongside	  them	  
in	   some	  cases	   as	   consultants52.	  According	   to	  one	  diaspora	   interviewed	  British	  
officials	   from	   the	  Defence	  Ministry	   and	   the	   FCO	  would	   regularly	   call	   in	   to	   a	  
prominent	   religious	   Iraqi	   organisation	   to	   ask	   for	   advice	   on	   certain	   issues	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  Author	  interview	  with	  R11,	  6	  November	  2013,	  London	  and	  R16,	  12	  November	  2013,	  London	  
51	  Author	  interview	  with	  R11,	  6	  November	  2013,	  London	  and	  R16,	  12	  November	  2013,	  London	  
52	  Author	  interview	  with	  R11,	  6	  November	  2013,	  London	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including	  cultural	  and	  religious	  rituals	  and	  suggestions	  for	  who	  should	  lead	  the	  
country53.	  	  	  
	  
Supporting	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society	  	  
The	  coalition’s	  commitment	  towards	  building	  a	  free	  Iraq	  also	  meant	  that	  they	  
had	   a	   responsibility	   towards	  democracy	   building,	  women’s	   rights	   and	  human	  
rights.	  Military	   intervention	  and	  occupation	  brought	  with	   them	  a	  bandwagon	  
of	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  (NGOs)	  to	  help	  towards	  creating	  Iraqi	  civil	  
society.	   A	   ‘packaged’	   civil	   society	   that	   would	   be	   transported	   by	   funding	  
democracy	  building,	  human	  rights	  and	  women’s	  rights	   initiatives.	   	  The	  senior	  
British	   diplomat	   working	   alongside	   Paul	   Bremer	   in	   2003	   stated	   that	   several	  
foundations	  were	  brought	   in	  to	  advise	  on	  how	  to	  create	  civil	  society	   in	  Iraq54.	  	  
Indeed,	  this	  was	  corroborated	  by	  an	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  from	  the	  UK	  who	  was	  part	  of	  
a	  UK	  based	  organisation	  called	  the	  Iraqi	  Prospect	  Organisation,	  which	  returned	  
to	   help	   with	   democracy	   building	   and	   was	   funded	   by	   the	   coalition	   and	   their	  
chosen	  partners	  including,	  The	  United	  States	  Institute	  for	  Peace	  (USIP)	  and	  the	  
National	   Endowment	   for	   Democracy	   (NED).	   He	   described	   how	   this	  
opportunity	  came	  about,	  	  
	   “It	   became	   very	   obvious	   that	   some	   Iraqis	   didn't	   understand	   or	   have	   a	  
real	  experience	  of	  democracy,	  and	  so	  the	  organization	  moved	  from	  focusing	  on	  
the	   political	   elite	   to	   democracy	   promotion	   in	   the	   grass	   roots.	   They	   picked	  
universities	   and	   started	   university	   societies	   aimed	   at	   promoting	   democracy	  
through	  debates	  and	  newsletters,	  all	  of	  which	  were	  run	  by	  an	  elected	  student	  
body.	  The	  project	  was	  a	  huge	  success	  in	  Baghdad	  University,	  and	  funding	  came	  
in	   from	   a	   number	   of	   groups	   like	   the	   USIP55	  and	   National	   Endowment	   for	  
Democracy	   and	   the	   like.	   The	   experience	   was	   moved	   to	   a	   couple	   of	   other	  
universities	  were	  it	  was	  also	  relatively	  successful.”56	  
	  
Organisations	  such	  as	  the	  USIP	  and	  NED	  were	  brought	  in	  by	  the	  United	  States	  
government	   to	   help	   the	   growth	   of	   civil	   society,	   to	   encourage	   democracy	   and	  
political	   participation	   in	   Iraq.	   These	   organisations	   were	   funded	   by	   the	   US	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Author	  interview	  with	  R11,	  6	  November	  2013,	  London.	  The	  author	  was	  also	  provided	  with	  
photographic	  evidence	  of	  top	  Iraqi	  and	  British	  elites	  at	  the	  aforementioned	  organization.	  
54	  Author	  interview	  with	  Diplomat	  2	  
55	  United	  States	  Institute	  of	  Peace	  is	  a	  federally	  funded	  organization	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
www.usip.org	  
56	  Author	  interview	  with	  R31	  via	  email	  exchange,	  3	  May	  2015	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government,	  which	  had	  earmarked	  USD	  750	  million	  dollars	  from	  the	  American	  
and	   Iraqi	   budget	   for	   funding	   civil	   society	   institutions,	   which	   Paul	   Bremer	  
referred	   to	   as	   Iraq’s	   “social	   shock	   absorbers”	   (Bremer	   and	   McConnell,	   2006,	  
p.385).	  Opportunities	   for	   funding	   revolved	  mainly	  around	  areas	  of	  democracy	  
building,	   education	   and	   importantly	   the	   inclusion	   of	   women	   in	   the	   state-­‐
building	  process.	  As	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  Prospect	  Organisation	  shows,	  UK	  or	  
US	  diaspora	  organisations	  present	  in	  Iraq	  had	  access	  to	  these	  colossal	  funds.	  	  
	  
The	   issue	  of	  women’s	   rights	  was	  particularly	  poignant	  considering	   that	   it	  was	  
rhetoric	   that	   was	   repeatedly	   stressed	   by	   the	   coalition	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   war	  
(Allawi,	  2007).	  Therefore	  the	  objective	  of	  empowering	  women	  was	  part	  of	   the	  
neo-­‐liberal	  political	  agenda	  and	  this	  meant	  ensuring	  their	  participation	  in	  the	  
newly	   forming	   Iraqi	   state.	   Indeed	   the	   UK	   had	   a	   Civil	   Society	   Fund	   and	   a	  
Political	  Participation	  Fund	  whose	  aim	  was	  also	  to	  back	  gender	  equality	  and	  the	  
inclusion	  of	  women	   in	   the	  political	   process	   (Development	  Assistance	   in	   Iraq,	  
2005).	  Thus	  in	  2003,	  Tony	  Blair	  appointed	  Ann	  Clwyd,	  Special	  Envoy	  to	  Iraq	  on	  
Human	  Rights,	   to	  “embed	  human	  rights	  best	  practices	  as	  the	   institutions	  of	  a	  
new	   Iraqi	   government	   and	   society	   were	   being	   formed”	   (Clwyd,	   2010).	   Ann	  
Clwyd	  held	  a	  meeting	  with	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  women	  and	  women’s	  organisations	  in	  
the	  UK	  to	  ask	  how	  the	  UK	  can	  support	  women’s	  rights	  in	  Iraq.	  This	  gave	  Iraqi	  
diaspora	   women	   the	   opportunity	   to	   voice	   their	   opinions	   and	   concerns	   and	  
inform	  the	  MPs	  present	  about	  issues	  affecting	  women’s	  rights	  at	  the	  time.	  	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  major	  issues	  facing	  Iraqi	  women’s	  rights	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  meeting	  
by	   Iraqi	   women	   in	   the	   diaspora	   was	   Resolution	   137,	   introduced	   by	   the	   Iraqi	  
Governing	   Council	   in	   2003	   as	   a	   means	   to	   overrule	   Iraq’s	   progressive	   1959	  
personal	   status	   law.	   The	   1959	   personal	   status	   law	   provided	   security	   and	  
protection	   for	   women	   and	   girls	   in	   the	   areas	   of	   family	   and	   personal	   matters	  
(Efrati,	  2012).	  	  The	  acceptance	  of	  Resolution	  137	  would	  allow	  Muslim	  courts	  to	  
rule	  disputes	   relating	   to	  marriage	  divorce	  and	   family	  matters.	  This	   resolution	  
provoked	  a	  huge	  outcry	  from	  Iraqi	  women	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  country.	  
In	  the	  UK,	  Iraqi	  women	  activists	  lobbied	  MPs,	  gave	  public	  talks	  at	  the	  European	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parliament,	  wrote	   against	   the	   resolution	   in	   London	  based	  Arabic	   newspapers	  
and	  worked	  to	  raise	  awareness.	  
	   “Here	   Ann	   Clwyd,	   was	   in	   charge	   of	   human	   rights	   under	   Blair’s	  
government.	   They	   had	   a	  meeting	  with	   Iraqi	  women	   at	   the	   end	   of	   2003.	   Ann	  
Clwyd	  was	   the	   chair	   in	  parliament.	  Ann	   spoke	   and	   then	   I	  put	  my	  hand	  up.	   I	  
said	  to	  Ann,	  Ann	  we	  really	  respect	  you,	  you	  have	  campaigned	  with	  us	  against	  
Saddam	  Hussein,	   but	   seeing	   that	   you’re	   responsible	   for	   human	   rights	   under	  
Blair’s	   government	  what	  have	  you	  done	  about	   rule	   137	   for	  human	   rights?	  She	  
said	  this	  meeting	  is	  not	  about	  this,	  and	  I	  said,	  No!	  This	  is	  the	  pressing	  issue	  of	  
the	  day	  […]	  Two	  of	  the	  women	  sat	  at	  the	  front,	  two	  MPs	  one	  was	  conservative	  
and	  the	  other	  labour,	  were	  listening,	  Ann	  said	  we	  don’t	  have	  time	  for	  this	  and	  
they	   said,	  what	  do	  you	  mean	  we	  don’t	  have	   the	   time,	  we’ll	  write	   this	  up	  now	  
against	  law	  137.”57	  	  
Iraqi	  women	  in	  the	  diaspora	  have	  had	  opportunities	  to	  influence	  state-­‐building	  
measures	  inside	  Iraq	  through	  the	  UK’s	  Special	  Envoy	  to	  Iraq	  on	  Human	  Rights	  
who	  was	  acting	  as	  a	  liaison	  between	  the	  coalition	  government	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Tony	  
Blair,	   the	   UK	   Prime	   Minister	   at	   the	   time.	   In	   this	   respect	   the	   transnational	  
linkage	   between	   the	  homeland,	   diaspora	   and	  hostland	  has	   been	   subverted	   in	  
the	  Iraqi	  case	  so	  that	  the	  hostland	  government	  has	  appealed	  to	  Iraqi	  women	  in	  
the	  diaspora	  for	  help	  with	  implementing	  women’s	  rights	  in	  the	  homeland	  due	  
to	  their	  occupation	  in	  Iraq.	  	  
Interestingly,	   interviews	  with	   diaspora	   and	   government,	   FCO	   and	   diplomatic	  
UK	  officials	   serving	   in	   Iraq	  did	  not	   reveal	   any	  development	   projects	   between	  
the	   diaspora	   and	   the	   Department	   for	   International	   Development	   (DFID).	   In	  
fact,	   according	   to	   Hilary	   Synnott,	   the	   coalition’s	   senior	   civilian	   officer	   in	  
Southern	  Iraq,	  “DFID	  undertook	  little	  or	  no	  planning	  for	  possible	  post-­‐conflict”	  
(Synnott,	   2008).	  This	  was	  partly	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  Clare	  Short,	  who	  was	   in	  
charge	  of	  DFID	  at	   the	  time,	  was	  opposed	  to	  the	  occupation	  and	  thus	  was	  not	  
enthusiastic	   about	   working	   alongside	   the	   FCO	   during	   this	   time58(Synnott,	  
2008)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  6,	  1	  November	  2013,	  London	  
58	  Author	  interview	  with	  Diplomat	  2	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Assessing	  Diasporic	  Interventions	  in	  Iraq	  2003-­‐2005	  
Though	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  diaspora	  leaders	  influenced	  and	  contributed	  to	  
state-­‐building	   in	   Iraq	  during	   this	   period,	   one	   can	   critically	   question	   the	   kind	  
and	  quality	  of	  state-­‐building	  diaspora	  leaders	  conceded	  to	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  state	  
they	  were	  helping	  to	  build.	  The	  IGC	  leaders	  were	  after	  all	  cherry-­‐picked	  by	  Paul	  
Bremer	  on	  ethnic	  quotas	  and	  were	  allegedly	   representative	  of	   Iraqis	   (Barakat,	  
2008).	   Political	   appointments	   by	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   coalition	   and	   the	  
acquiescence	  of	  IGC	  members	  to	  go	  along	  with	  coalition	  plans	  did	  nothing	  for	  
gaining	  the	  nation’s	  support	   in	  re-­‐building	  the	  country.	   Indeed,	  as	  mentioned	  
previously,	  from	  an	  Iraqi	  perspective	  they	  promised	  liberation	  yet	  collaborated	  
in	  occupation,	  with	  the	  full	  might	  of	  US	  and	  UK	  military	  power.	  In	  agreeing	  to	  
an	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   political	   system	   they	   undermined	   state-­‐building	   efforts	  
institutionalising	   a	   politics	   of	   sectarianism	   rather	   than	   creating	   a	   national	  
vision	   for	   re-­‐building	  the	  country.	  Consequently,	   the	  diaspora	   leaders	  did	  not	  
endear	   themselves	   to	   the	   native	   population.	   Several	   polls	   and	   anecdotal	  
evidence	   indicated	   their	   lack	   of	   popularity	   (Dodge,	   2005;	   Ismael	   and	   Ismael,	  
2008;	   Al-­‐Ali,	   2014)	   revealing	   their	   inability	   to	   gain	   legitimacy	   as	   Iraq’s	   new	  
leaders	  and	  impeding	  any	  sound	  state-­‐building	  plans.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  the	  naiveté	  of	  diaspora	  leaders	  who	  had	  been	  out	  of	  the	  country	  
for	  decades	  meant	  that	  often	  the	   intelligence	  they	  provided	  was	  out	  dated,	  or	  
tainted	   by	   nostalgia	   for	   an	   Iraq	   they	   left.	   Put	   simply,	   they	  were	  misinformed	  
about	   current	   conditions	   in	   Iraq.	  One	   former	   Iraqi	  minister	   interviewed	  who	  
returned	   spoke	   honestly	   about	   his	   culture	   shock	   at	   finding	   a	   corrupt	   society	  
whose	  moral	   values	   had	   degenerated,	   “I	   thought	   that	   the	   shock	   of	   wars	   and	  
dispossession,	  sanction,	  and	  invasion	  which	  must	  be	  the	  most	  degrading	  thing	  
that	  people	  can	  go	  through	  would	  make	  people	  question	  the	  kind	  of	  societies	  
they	  have	  created.”59	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This	  lack	  of	  awareness	  was	  reflected	  in	  the	  monumental	  errors	  the	  IGC	  leaders	  
endorsed,	   including	   de-­‐baathification	   and	   the	   disbanding	   of	   the	   army,	  which	  
effectively	  dismantled	  existing	  state	   institutions	  and	  human	  resources	   instead	  
of	  strengthening	  or	  building	  on	  the	  legitimate	  institutions	  it	  had.	  Not	  only	  did	  
these	   two	   policies	   remove	   any	   law	   and	   order	   that	   could	   have	   prevented	   the	  
wide	  scale	  looting	  and	  violence,	  but	  they	  unleashed	  public	  resentment	  and	  the	  
exclusion	   of	   thousands	   from	   state	   and	   society	   who	   would	   later	   enact	   their	  
vengeance.	   It	   also	   contributed	   to	   a	   complete	   loss	   of	   legitimacy	   in	   terms	   of	  
containing	   the	   worsening	   security	   situation.	   Instead	   of	   promoting	   peace	   and	  
reconciliation	  by	  co-­‐opting	  the	  old	  functionaries	  of	  the	  old	  regime,	  the	  diaspora	  
leaders,	   along	   with	   the	   coalition	   who	   were	   ruling	   Iraq,	   endorsed	   political	  
exclusion,	  which	  has	  plagued	  the	  country’s	  state-­‐building	  efforts	  ever	  since.	  	  
	  
As	   a	   result	   the	   new	   political	   system	   authorised	   and	   consolidated	   by	   the	  
majority	  of	  diaspora	  ministers	  would	  have	  serious	  repercussions	  on	  Iraq’s	  state-­‐
building	   future.	   In	   the	   first	   place,	   the	   governing	   structure	   of	   the	   IGC	   was	  
consequently	   not	   decided	   on	   technocratic	   abilities	   needed	   for	   state-­‐building	  
but	   rather	   through	   cronyism	   and	   submission	   to	   CPA	   state-­‐building	   plans.	  	  
Instead	  of	  moving	  away	  from	  a	  corrupt	  and	  centralised	  system,	  as	  in	  the	  former	  
Baath	   regime,	   the	   diaspora	   ministers	   actually	   reverted	   back	   to	   the	   same	  
methods	   that	   they	   had	   fought	   to	   overturn	   in	   opposition.	  UK	   diplomatic	   and	  
coalition	   officials	   interviewed	   also	   underlined	   that	   the	   diaspora	   leaders	   they	  
worked	  with	  lacked	  any	  understanding	  of	  politics,	  with	  the	  noted	  exception	  of	  
Ahmed	  Chalabi,	  who	  was	  described	  as	  “a	  politician	  to	  his	  finger	  tips”	  although	  
he	  was	  “	  only	  interested	  in	  advancing	  his	  own	  career	  ultimately”60.	  Even	  though	  
one	  can	  be	  critical	  of	  FCO	  officials,	  who	  may	  be	  wanting	  to	  divert	  blame	  on	  the	  
diaspora	   for	   failures	   in	   Iraq,	   there	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   cronyism	   was	  
institutionalised	  during	  Iraq’s	  first	  phase	  of	  state-­‐building	  laying	  the	  grounds	  of	  
division	  and	  authoritarianism	  that	  would	  later	  blight	  the	  country	  indefinitely.	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One	   can	   therefore	   question	   the	   opportunities	   for	   diaspora	   individuals	   whose	  
vision	  of	   state-­‐building	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  or	  conform	  to	   the	  CPA’s	  vision	   for	  
Iraq.	  As	   the	   case	   of	  Ahmed	  Chalabi	   shows,	   once	  his	   views	  diverged	   from	   the	  
CPA,	   he	   was	   no	   longer	   the	   neo-­‐conservative	   favourite	   he	   had	   been	   prior	   to	  
intervention.	  It	  also	  leads	  us	  to	  question	  how	  much	  the	  coalition	  was	  interested	  
in	  real	  qualifications	  since	  they	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  more	  interested	  in	  figures	  
they	  could	  co-­‐opt	  and	  work	  with.	  	  
	  
From	  this	  perspective	  there	  has	  been	  a	  great	  irony	  to	  state-­‐building	  in	  Iraq.	  The	  
project	   of	   state-­‐building	   a	   democratic	   and	   free	   Iraq	   commenced	  
undemocratically	  through	  cronyism	  rather	  than	  a	  meritocratic	  political	  process.	  
By	   the	   time	   Iraq’s	   first	   democratic	   elections	   took	   place	   in	   December	   2005,	  
political	   leaders	  put	  in	  place	  through	  the	  IGC	  had	  already	  gained	  a	  significant	  
advantage,	  so	  it	  was	  unsurprising	  that	  one	  of	  the	  top	  political	  positions	  in	  the	  
country	   went	   to	   a	   British	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   exile,	   Ibrahim	   Jaafari	   who	   took	   the	  
position	  of	  Iraqi’s	  first	  democratically	  elected	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Jalal	  Talabani	  
who	  was	   elected	   the	   President	   of	   Iraq.	  Many	  more	   from	   the	   diaspora	   would	  
later	  assume	  ministerial	  and	  parliamentary	  positions.	  	  
	  
Similarly,	   the	   coalition’s	   insistence	   on	   having	   Iraqi	   leaders	   to	   legitimate	   the	  
occupation	  backfired	  because,	  in	  having	  left	  Iraq	  decades	  ago,	  they	  carried	  little	  
credibility	  with	  the	  native	  population	  who	  more	  often	  than	  not	  resented	  them	  
returning	   to	   occupy	   top	   positions.	   This	   was	   especially	   the	   case	   as	   from	   the	  
population’s	  perspective	  they	  had	  not	  lived	  under	  Saddam’s	  rule.	  Furthermore,	  
the	   fact	   that	   there	   were	   no	   Sunnis	   amongst	   the	   opposition	   diaspora	   leaders	  
undermined	   state-­‐building	   efforts	   from	   the	   start,	   as	   the	   original	  G7	  were	  not	  
representative	   of	   all	   Iraq’s	   ethnicities.	   Consequently	   despite	   well	   intentioned	  
efforts	  by	  some	  at	  state-­‐building,	  Iraqis	  did	  not	  see	  the	  leaders	  of	  this	  period	  as	  
credible	  governors	  of	  the	  country	  leading	  to	  a	  fragmented	  and	  incoherent	  state	  
with	  no	  legitimate	  central	  authority	  (Herring	  and	  Rangwala,	  2006).	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Likewise,	  as	  shown	  above,	  experts	  and	  skilled	  diaspora	  also	  had	  opportunities	  
to	   contribute	   because	   they	   provided	  much	   needed	   professionalism	   and	   skills	  
that	  have	  been	  previously	  missing	  in	  Iraq’s	  formerly	  defunct	  state.	  This	  was	  felt	  
more	   acutely	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   de-­‐baathification	  where	   administrative	   staff	  
from	   the	   Baath	   regime	  were	   removed	   leaving	   an	   administrative	   vacuum	   that	  
many	  skilled	  and	  highly	  educated	  diaspora	  were	  able	  to	  fill	  through	  the	  IRDC	  
or	   through	   their	   own	   initiatives.	   In	  many	   respects	   the	   IRDC	  opportunity	   and	  
working	  through	  other	  CPA	  or	  FCO	  platforms,	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  more	  productive	  
use	  of	  diaspora	  talent	  and	  skills	  for	  rebuilding	  the	  country.	  Especially	  as	  the	  UK	  
diaspora	   has	   many	   skilled	   and	   professional	   lawyers,	   doctors,	   engineers,	  
architects	   to	   offer	   as	   shown	   above.	   However	   it	   appears	   that	   the	   majority	   of	  
those	  who	  had	  successful	  careers	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  beyond	  did	  not	  return	  in	  2003	  
(Al-­‐Ali,	   2014)	   due	   to	   their	   opposition	   to	   the	   occupation	   or	   security	   concerns,	  
while	   the	   large	   part	   of	   those	   who	   did	   were	   more	   concerned	   about	   gaining	  
political	  positions	  than	  rebuilding	  the	  country.	  
	  
Military	  intervention	  and	  occupation	  also	  created	  opportunities	  for	  supporting	  
the	   state	   through	   civil	   society	   through	   funding	   initiatives	   for	   democracy	  
building,	  human	  rights	  and	  women’s	  rights.	  The	  neo-­‐liberal	  agenda	  in	  Iraq	  thus	  
created	   further	   spaces	   to	  be	   involved	   through	   funding	  bottom-­‐up	  approaches	  
as	  we	  have	  seen.	  It	  is	  questionable,	  however,	  how	  much	  these	  initiatives	  by	  the	  
coalition	  were	  genuine	  in	  trying	  to	  help	  Iraqis	  considering	  how	  little	  time	  was	  
dedicated	  to	  this	   task	  before	  occupation	  officially	  ended	   in	   June	  2004.	  As	  one	  
UK	   diplomat	   confirmed,	   the	   handicap	   was	   the	   lack	   of	   time	   and	   the	   lack	   of	  
indigenous	   support	   to	   take	   initiatives	   forward	  but	   also	   a	   lack	   of	  military	   and	  
civilian	  resources,	  which	  ultimately	  led	  to	  the	  British	  failing	  in	  Iraq61.	  
	  
Summary	  
The	  first	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  profile	  of	  the	  UK	  diaspora,	  
namely	   the	   links	   that	   diaspora	   have	   with	   their	   country	   of	   origin,	   and	   their	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socio-­‐economic	  resources	  and	  their	  networks	  are	  important	  for	  understanding	  
the	   type	   of	   political	   activity	   in	   which	   they	   can	   engage.	   Their	   resources	   and	  
networks	   created	   the	   means	   by	   which	   they	   could	   influence	   policy	   makers,	  
organise	  an	  opposition	  and	  eventually	  have	  a	  say	  in	  Iraq’s	  state-­‐building	  future.	  
When	   the	   UK’s	   foreign	   policy	   towards	   Iraq	   shifted	   in	   the	   early	   1990s,	   their	  
resources	   and	   networks	   helped	   them	   to	   become	   organised	   and	   eventually	  
influence	  US	  and	  UK	  policy	  makers	  so	   that	  once	   their	   foreign	  policies	  shifted	  
the	   diaspora	  were	   able	   to	   take	   advantage	   and	   insert	   themselves	   in	   the	   state-­‐
building	   process,	   presenting	   themselves	   as	   a	   government	   in	  waiting	   ready	   to	  
govern	  the	  country.	  
	  
During	   the	   2003	   to	   2005	   period	   and	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   writing	   of	   the	  
constitution	   and	   Iraq’s	   first	   democratic	   elections	   the	   coalition	   and	   the	   Iraqi	  
diaspora	   leaders	   faced	   turbulent	   times.	   They	   grappled	   with	   a	   society	   whose	  
social	   fabric	   had	   been	   vastly	   destroyed	   and	   whose	   attitude	   towards	   the	  
occupying	  powers	  and	  the	  diaspora	  leaders	  was	  suspicious	  at	  best	  and	  seen	  as	  
an	  American	  construct	  at	  worst	  (Synnott,	  2008).	  Nonetheless	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  
military	   intervention	   and	   the	   subsequent	   occupation	   of	   Iraq	   heralded	   a	   new	  
political	  system	  and	  the	  need	  for	  new	  leaders	  to	  administer	  the	  running	  of	  the	  
country	   created	   opportunities	   to	   contribute	   to	   institution-­‐building	   and	  
governance.	   The	   UK’s	   involvement	   in	   military	   intervention	   thus	   created	   the	  
political	   space	   for	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   leaders	   to	   become	   involved.	   While	   the	  
coalition	   were	   the	   true	   governors	   of	   Iraq	   they	   needed	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   leaders	  
who	   could	   lead	   ministries,	   and	   with	   whom	   they	   could	   collaborate	   with,	   to	  
inform	  Iraq’s	  political	  process	  and	  enact	  their	  state-­‐building	  plans.	  	  
	  
As	  shown,	  opposition	   leaders	  had	  cultivated	  an	   institutional	  relationship	  with	  
the	   coalition	   government	   so	   that	   once	   intervention	   took	   place	   opposition	  
leaders	  positioned	   themselves	   alongside	  British	  and	  American	  officials	  on	   the	  
ground	   and	   became	   part	   of	   the	   first	   cohort	   of	   politicians	   to	   govern	   the	   new	  
Iraqi	   state	   along	  with	   the	   CPA.	   The	   coalition’s	   need	   for	   political	   leaders	   and	  
skilled	   Iraqis,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   filling	   important	   political	   positions	   and	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legitimacy	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  Iraqis	  and	  the	  wider	  international	  community,	  created	  
the	  opportunity	   for	   the	  opposition	   to	   take	   leading	   roles	   in	   the	  governance	  of	  
the	   new	   Iraqi	   state.	   The	   roots	   they	   planted	   during	   the	   opposition	   years	   also	  
meant	  that	  an	  institutionally	  backed	  channel	  was	  created	  whereby	  other	  figures	  
from	  the	  former	  UK	  opposition	  network	  could	  be	  recruited	  from	  the	  diaspora.	  
They	   joined	   in	   the	  governance	  of	   the	  new	  Iraq	   through	  direct	   involvement	   in	  
the	   IGC,	   and	   subsequent	  political	  developments	   including	   the	  drafting	  of	   the	  
constitution	  and	  in	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  handing	  over	  of	  sovereignty	  with	  a	  new	  
Interim	  government.	  	  
	  
We	   have	   also	   seen,	   however,	   that	   those	   who	   were	   involved	   were	  more	   than	  
often	   those	   who	   were	   selected	   by	   the	   coalition.	   These	   were	   political	   leaders	  
who	  were	  seen	  to	  have	  political	  organisations	  and	  legitimacy	  behind	  them,	  or	  
to	  use	  one	  diplomat’s	  term	  ‘user-­‐friendly’	  diaspora	  individuals	  whose	  objectives	  
did	   not	   appear	   to	   diverge	   from	   that	   of	   the	   coalition.	   Others	   who	   had	  
opportunities	   to	  be	   involved	  had	  the	  expertise,	   skills,	  or	  political	  backing	  and	  
influence	  to	  be	  of	  use.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  British	   involvement	   in	   Iraq	  also	  meant	   that	   they	  were	  stationed	  
on	   the	  ground	  and	   this	  opened	  up	   further	  opportunities	   to	  work	  with	  British	  
officials	  as	  shown	  above.	  Those	  who	  were	  willing	  and	  able	  and	  who	  turned	  up	  
at	  the	  gates	  of	  the	  occupation	  compounds	  or	  those	  who	  contacted	  the	  FCO	  in	  
London	  were	  welcomed62	  especially	  Arabic	  speakers	  and	  skilled	  personnel	  who	  
could	   provide	   expertise	   and	   so-­‐called	   local	   knowledge	   and	   act	   as	   brokers	  
between	  the	  coalition	  and	  Iraqi	  society.	  	  
	  
Military	   intervention	   and	   the	   subsequent	   occupation	  of	   Iraq	   as	  we	  have	   seen	  
also	   created	   opportunities	   for	   the	   diaspora	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   supporting	   the	  
state	   through	   civil	   society,	   through	   coalition	   funding	   of	   democracy	   building,	  
human	  rights	  and	  women’s	  rights	  initiatives.	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Iraq’s	  2005	  elections	  and	  beyond	  
On	   the	   8	   June	   2004,	   the	   Coalition	   Provisional	   Authority	   was	   effectively	  
dismantled	   and	   sovereign	   powers	   were	   handed	   over	   to	   the	   Interim	   Iraqi	  
government	  who	  had	   succeeded	   in	  writing	   an	   interim	  constitution	  under	   the	  
Transitional	  Administrative	  Law.	  During	  this	  period,	  most	  of	  the	  IGC	  diaspora	  
leaders	  retained	  their	  positions	  of	  power	  and	  continued	  their	  governance	  of	  the	  
new	   Iraqi	   state.	  The	  next	   stop	  on	   the	  CPA	  political	   roadmap	  were	   Iraq’s	   first	  
democratic	  elections	  scheduled	  for	  the	  end	  of	  2005.	  	  
	  
Iraqi	   diaspora	   leaders	   were	   now	   competing	   with	   political	   figures	   and	   parties	  
that	   had	   previously	   been	   denied	   under	   the	   Baath	   regime	   that	   had	   by	   2004	  
mushroomed	   into	   7,785	   political	   candidates	   and	   111	   political	   parties	   (Dodge,	  
2005).	   Yet	   despite	   the	   surge	   in	   political	   participation,	   diaspora	   leaders	   had	  
consolidated	   their	  political	  positions	  within	   their	   respective	  parties,	   and	   their	  
relationships	  with	   the	   coalition	   governments,	   as	  well	   as	  Ali	  Al	   Sistanti,	   Iraq’s	  
most	  senior	   religious	  authority,	  which	  put	   them	  at	  a	  political	  advantage.	  One	  
senior	  FCO	  official	  stated	  that	  Ayad	  Allawi	  was	  backed	  by	  the	  coalition	  albeit	  
not	   publicly63,	   meanwhile	   the	   Shi’a	   parties,	   ISCI	   and	   Da’wa	   were	   the	   front	  
runners	   receiving	   support	   from	   Al	   Sistani,	   and	   the	   two	   Kurdish	   parties,	   the	  
KDP	  and	  the	  PUK	  had	  their	  strong	  regional	  support–base.	  This	  reality	  put	  the	  
diaspora	   leaders	   at	   a	   huge	   advantage	   that	   did	   not	   promote	   the	   growth	   of	  
indigenous	  political	  parties	  (Dodge,	  2005).	  Furthermore	  with	  their	  wealth	  and	  
vast	  political	  networks	  diaspora	  leaders	  were	  able	  to	  make	  the	  biggest	  impact	  in	  
the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  country’s	  first	  elections	  in	  200564.	  It	  was	  no	  surprise	  then	  that	  
the	   election	   results	   reflected	   those	   who	   were	   previously	   in	   power.	   The	   Shi’a	  
topped	   the	   results	   with	   their	   United	   Iraqi	   Alliance,	   followed	   by	   the	   Kurdish	  
Alliance	  and	  Allawi’s	  Iraqi	  List,	  with	  Ibrahim	  Jaafari	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Jalal	  
Talabani	   as	   president.	   The	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   political	   structure	   put	   in	   place	   by	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the	  coalition	  and	  supported	  by	  the	  diaspora	   leaders	  was	  now	  institutionalised	  
as	  Iraq’s	  new	  political	  system.	  	  
	  
As	   a	   consequence,	   opportunities	   for	   diaspora	   to	   involve	   themselves	   in	   state-­‐
building	  in	  Iraq	  also	  reflected	  this	  ethnic	  division.	  Those	  in	  power	  continued	  to	  
involve	   their	   relatives	   and	   associates	   abroad	   in	   the	  political	   process,	   or	   those	  
with	  connections	  to	  Iraq’s	  new	  political	  leaders	  were	  equally	  able	  to	  reach	  out	  
and	   gain	   access	   to	   political	   positions	   through	   these	   social	   and	   political	  
networks.	   Yet	   this	   time	   round	  with	   government	   positions	   and	   administrative	  
staff	   to	   fill,	   Iraq’s	   state-­‐building	   plans	   were	   dashed	   when	   ethno-­‐sectarianism	  
became	   the	   rule	   of	   the	   day.	   Instead	   of	   hiring	   technocrats	   to	   rebuild	   state	  
institutions,	  ruling	  elites	  were	  recruiting	  from	  the	  diaspora	  ethnic	  or	  sectarian	  
kin	  irrespective	  of	  qualifications.	  As	  one	  professional	  diaspora	  interviewed,	  who	  
regularly	  returns	  to	  Iraq	  to	  help	  the	  government	  with	  various	  communications	  
work	  stated,	  
	   “I	  saw	  the	  symptoms	  before	  they	  went	  to	  Iraq.	  So	  when	  they	  went	  to	  Iraq	  
I	   wasn’t	   surprised	   at	   what	   was	   happening	   because	   when	   they	   went	   to	   Iraq	  
everyone	  was	  bringing	  their	  family	  and	  friends	  and	  cousins	  and	  brother	  in	  law	  
around	  him	  even	  if	  he	  is	  an	  idiot	  or	  a	  primary	  school	  graduate…”	  65	  
	  
The	  majority	  of	  diaspora	   leaders	   in	   Iraq	  clearly	  had	  no	  political	  qualifications	  
that	   would	   allow	   them	   to	   administer	   a	   country	   (Al-­‐Ali,	   2014).	   A	   former	   IGC	  
member	   interviewed	   described	   the	  majority	   of	   UK	   diaspora	  who	   returned	   to	  
take	   up	   political	   positions	   as	   “second	   stringers	   at	   best	   or	   losers	   and	   dead	  
enders”66.	  When	   I	   questioned	  what	   happened	   to	   those	  who	  were	   part	   of	   the	  
opposition	   movement	   in	   London,	   the	   former	   minister	   stated	   that	   they	  
succumbed	  to	   “animal	   farm”67.	  This	   scathing	  review	  of	  UK	  diaspora	   returnees	  
was	   also	   echoed	   by	   another	   former	   minister,	   who	   stated	   that	   many	   saw	   an	  
opportunity	   for	   corruption	   and	   took	   it,	   perverting	  both	   the	   Iraqi	   and	   the	  UK	  
system68.	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   new	   political	   classes	   were	   not	   those	   who	   had	   the	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country’s	   best	   interest	   at	   heart	   but	   rather	   those	  who	   fitted	   a	   certain	   criteria,	  
namely	  a	  particular	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  identity	  and	  connections	  to	  a	  ruling	  party	  
or	   what	   in	   Iraq	   is	   referred	   to	   as	  muhasasa	   “the	   distribution	   of	   the	   spoils	   of	  
power	  along	  communal,	  ethnic	  and	  tribal	  lines”	  (Gerges,	  2014).	  As	  such	  it	  is	  no	  
wonder	  that	  Iraq’s	  first	  state-­‐building	  venture	  outside	  of	  occupation	  led	  to	  ruin	  
as	  those	  running	  the	  state	  were	  more	  interested	  in	  recruiting	  people	  who	  would	  
offer	  them	  their	  allegiance,	  than	  their	  skills.	  The	  legacy	  of	  occupation	  and	  the	  
fragmentation	  of	  political	  authority	  were	  now	  beginning	  to	  reverberate.	  
	  
Power	  dynamics	  inside	  the	  country	  were	  thus	  reflected	  in	  the	  diaspora	  as	  long-­‐
time	   opposition	   parties	   and	   those	   connected	   to	   them	   were	   now	   firmly	   in	  
power,	   elevating	   their	   status	   in	   the	   diaspora	   but	   also	   vis	   à	   vis	   the	   hostland	  
government.	   Access	   to	   hostland	   governments	   has	   been	   facilitated	   for	   those	  
linked	  to	  ruling	  parties	  in	  Iraq.	  When	  I	  asked	  one	  representative	  from	  a	  ruling	  
party	   how	   this	   development	   had	   impacted	   his	   political	   work	   in	   the	   diaspora	  
since	  2003,	  he	  responded:	  	  
	   “Yes,	   now	  we	   feel	   free	   in	   our	  work.	  We	  have	  people	   in	   government	   in	  
Iraq,	   they	  have	  connection	  with	  British	   so	  now	   it’s	   easy	   for	  us	   to	  be	   in	   touch	  
with	  Foreign	  ministers	  and	  MPs,	  politicians,	  with	  the	  community.	  They	  look	  at	  
us	  as	  government	  people	  not	  just	  as	  refugees.	  This	  is	  a	  good	  impression”.69	  	  	  
	  
The	  consolidation	  of	  power	  that	  stemmed	  from	  the	  diaspora	  into	  Iraq	  has	  now	  
boomeranged	   back	   into	   the	   diaspora.	   From	   the	   humble	   origins	   of	   the	  
opposition	  movement	   in	   London,	   diaspora	   leaders	  were	   able	   to	   impose	   their	  
authority	   in	   Iraq,	   consolidate	   their	   power	   and	   re-­‐use	   it	   to	   their	   advantage	  
amongst	   the	   diaspora	   networks	   they	   were	   a	   part	   of	   prior.	   As	   a	   result,	   a	  
transnational	  political	  bubble	  exists	  between	  the	  social	  and	  political	  networks	  
of	   religious,	   social	   and	   political	   elites	   in	   Iraq	   and	   their	   respective	   kin	   in	   the	  
diaspora.	   As	   one	   former	   Minister	   interviewed	   reflected,	   “politics	   has	   been	  
seized	  by	  a	  coterie,	  by	  a	  group	  of	  people	  so	  the	  diaspora	  people	  in	  Iraq	  have	  to	  
be	  connected	  to	  this	  coterie,	  and	  if	  you’re	  not	  connected	  to	  it	  there’s	  very	  little	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you	   can	   do	   except	   on	   an	   individual	   basis.”70.	   It	   is	   this	   coterie	   of	   individuals,	  
which	   created	   in	   Iraq	   in	   the	   early	   years	   of	   occupation	   a	   dual	   society	   that	  
stemmed	  from	  two	  distinct	  sets	  of	  political	  elites;	  diaspora	  political	  figures	  and	  
local	   political	   figures71.	   Yet	   in	   the	   later	   years	   this	   dichotomy	   has	   increasingly	  
morphed	   into	   those	  who	   are	   connected	   to	   powerful	   ruling	   parties	   and	   those	  
who	  are	  not.	  	  
	  
Thus,	   opportunities	   for	   diaspora	   individuals	   to	   contribute	   to	   institution-­‐
building	  and	  governance	   in	   Iraq	  has	   thus	  been	   limited	   to	   those	   associated	   to	  
specific	  ethnic	  or	  sectarian	  political	  circles	   in	  Iraq.	  This	  has	   largely	  meant	  the	  
Shi’a	  and	  the	  Kurds	  in	  Iraq	  whose	  diaspora	  communities	  in	  the	  UK	  have	  been	  
able	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   their	   connections	   to	   leading	   parties,	   which	   have	  
opened	   up	   for	   them	   opportunities	   in	   the	   hostland.	   Respondents	   described	  
relations	  with	  members	  of	  parliament,	   the	  House	  of	  Lords	  and	   the	  FCO	  with	  
whom	   they	   clarified	   political	   party	   positions	   on	   various	   issues,	   corrected	  
‘misinformation’	   about	   events	   inside	   the	   country	   or	   lobbied	   about	   critical	  
homeland	  events72.	  In	  this	  regard	  political	  party	  branches	  in	  the	  diaspora	  have	  
acted	   as	   lobbyists	   for	   political	   parties	   in	   the	   Iraqi	   government,	   pushing	   for	  
international	   support,	   foreign	   investment	   or	   recognition	   for	   various	  domestic	  
issues.	  	  
	  
At	   other	   times	   they	   have	   tried	   to	   support	   their	   political	   parties	   through	  
governance	   initiatives	   more	   generally	   by	   bringing	   their	   cadres	   to	   meet	   with	  
Labour	   or	   Conservative	   politicians	   in	   the	   UK 73 .	   The	   Kurdish	   Special	  
Representative	  to	  the	  UK,	  a	  diaspora	  Kurd	  appointed	  by	  the	  Kurdish	  Regional	  
Government	  (KRG)	  described	  the	  ways	  she	  has	  been	  able	  to	   influence	  the	  UK	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and	  Kurdish	  government	   in	  her	  ambassadorial	   role	  between	  the	  diaspora,	   the	  
hostland	  and	  the	  homeland74:	  	  
	  
	   “In	  my	  role	   I	  can	   influence	   things	  by	  helping	  to	   take	  back	  some	  of	   the	  
expertise	   that	   there	   is.	   For	   example	   we	   have	   a	   good	   relationship	   with	  
parliamentarians	   here;	   we	   arrange	   visits	   for	   them	   to	   go	   back	   and	  meet	   with	  
people	  and	  keep	  them	  up	  to	  date.	  One	  of	  them	  happens	  to	  be	  chair	  woman	  of	  
the	  Westminster	   Foundation	   for	  Democracy	   (WFD)	   and	   it	   trains	  parliaments	  
abroad	  in	  democracy	  and	  through	  her	  we	  got	  them	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  Kurdish	  
parliament,	  so	  now	  both	  parliaments	  are	  going	  through	  workshops	  with	  WFD.	  I	  
was	  there	  for	  introducing	  the	  idea	  and	  nurturing	  it.”75	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  recognise	  that	  due	  to	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  UN	  agreement	  in	  1991,	  
Iraqi	  Kurds	  had	  a	  safe	  haven	  from	  Iraqi	  security	  forces	  (Tripp,	  2007),	  the	  Kurds	  
enjoyed	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  autonomy	  and	  protection	  from	  Baghdad,	  but	  also	  the	  
chance	  for	  stability,	  reconstruction	  and	  the	  maturation	  of	  their	  regional	  politics	  
and	   governance.	   Where	   politics	   in	   Baghdad	   was	   still	   in	   the	   process	   of	  
consolidating	   new	  parties	   and	   leaders	   that	   could	   unite	   the	   country,	  Kurds	   in	  
the	   diaspora	  were	   answering	   to	   two	  well-­‐established	  parties	   and	   elite	   leaders	  
with	  a	  vision	  for	  the	  region.	  This	  put	  the	  diaspora	  Kurds	  at	  a	  relative	  advantage	  
both	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   political	   organisation	   and	   engagement	   during	   the	  
opposition	  years	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  links	  with	  the	  British	  government	  in	  
the	  aftermath	  of	  regime	  change.	  Several	  diplomats	  interviewed	  who	  worked	  in	  
Iraq	   during	   the	   occupation	   years	   and	   beyond	   confirmed	   that	   the	   Kurdish	  
leaders	  were	  far	  more	  skilled	  than	  their	  Arab	  counterparts76.	  
	  
The	  Kurdish	  diaspora	  has	  greatly	  benefitted	  from	  a	  close	  and	  active	  relationship	  
with	   the	   British	   government,	   a	   partnership	   that	   has	   been	   supported	   and	  
facilitated	  by	   the	  Kurdish	  All	  Parliamentary	  Group,	  which	  was	   set	  up	   in	  2007	  
“to	   encourage	   the	   development	   of	   democratic	   institutions	   in	   the	   Kurdistan	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Region	  as	  part	  of	  the	  democratic	  and	  federal	  process	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  Iraq”77.	  One	  
Kurdish	  Minister	  I	  interviewed	  related	  how	  the	  diaspora	  has	  been	  fundamental	  
to	  Kurdish	  state-­‐building,	  	  
	  
	   “They	  did	  a	  great	   job	  seriously.	   I	   think	  Kurdistan	  is	  going	  to	  be	  a	  good	  
example	  of	  a	  successful	  diasporic	  community.	  When	  they	  come	  back	  how	  they	  
affected	   the	   society.	   Before	   these	   people	   came	   back	   we	   were	   a	   conservative	  
society.	   We	   had	   big	   villages	   instead	   of	   cities.	   I	   think	   one	   of	   the	   main	  
achievements	  the	  diaspora	  managed	  to	  divert	  the	  culture	  from	  a	  village	  culture	  
to	  a	  city	  culture.	  In	  the	  methods	  of	  government,	  planning,	  and	  the	  vision	  of	  the	  
government.	  Look	  at	  Erbil,	  most	  of	  the	  investors	  most	  of	  the	  Kurds	  were	  either	  
in	   Europe	   or	   the	   States.	   They	   got	   education,	   they	   made	   money	   and	   they	  
returned	   their	  money	  back	  and	   investing	   in	  Kurdistan	  now.	  That’s	   the	  key	  of	  
our	  success.	  In	  the	  KRG	  government	  from	  20	  ministers,	  more	  than	  half	  of	  them	  
were	  a	  diaspora	  at	  some	  stage.”78	  	  
	  
On	   the	   Shi’a	   side,	   several	   ministers	   formerly	   part	   of	   the	   UK	   Iraqi	   diaspora	  
served	  in	  Baghdad	  and	  formed	  part	  of	  the	  UK	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  under	  the	  United	  
Iraqi	  Alliance,	  made	  up	  of	  predominantly	  Shi’a	  Islamic	  Parties.	  These	  ministers	  
were	  able	   to	  use	   their	   expertise	   and	   skills	   learned	   in	   the	  UK	   to	  affect	   change	  
from	  within	  the	  government.	  One	  minister	  interviewed	  who	  served	  in	  Iraq	  from	  
2005	   to	   2013	   used	   his	   experiences	   of	   the	   British	   system	   to	   develop	   similar	  
institutions	   in	   Iraq.	   Respondent	   25	   reportedly	   helped	   develop	   Iraq’s	   security	  
infrastructure	   by	   establishing	   CCTV	   for	   Baghdad	   and	   the	   Iraq-­‐Syria	   border.	  
With	  the	  help	  of	  the	  UK	  government	  a	  High	  Tech	  Project	  was	  developed	  so	  that	  
Baghdad	  now	  enjoys	  the	  same	  security	  system	  as	  the	  UK.	  	  While	  these	  attempts	  
to	  help	  rebuild	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  are	  laudable	  from	  an	  individual	  perspective,	  they	  
nonetheless	  need	   to	  be	  contextualised	  within	   the	  neo-­‐liberal	   framework	   from	  
which	   the	  occupiers	  would	  gain	   the	  most	   lucrative	  business	   contracts	   in	   Iraq	  
(see	   for	   instance	   (Billon,	   2005;	   Barakat,	   2008;	   Herring	   and	   Rangwala,	   2006;	  
Medani,	  2004).	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Another	  system	  put	  in	  place	  by	  R25	  was	  a	  method	  to	  tackle	  the	  widespread	  and	  
insidious	  corruption,	  which	  had	  fomented	  during	  the	  years	  of	  sanctions	  under	  
Saddam’s	  regime:	  	  
	  
	   “So	  I	  created	  a	  system,	  whereby	  any	  company	  dealing	  with	  the	  Ministry	  
had	  to	  sign	  a	  contract,	  so	  that	  if	  they	  were	  found	  to	  pay	  a	  bribe	  to	  any	  official	  
the	   contract	   would	   be	   cancelled	   and	   that	   they	   would	   face	   a	   penalty	   of	   30	  
percent	  of	  the	  overall	  contract	  and	  placed	  on	  a	  black	  list	  for	  three	  years.	  Those	  
who	   didn’t	   sign	   we	   wouldn’t	   work	   with.	   Western	   companies	   were	   satisfied	  
because	   they	   didn’t	   want	   to	   pay	   bribes	   and	   contracts	   were	   going	   to	   Chinese	  
companies.	  These	  were	  one	  of	  the	  problems	  I	  faced	  in	  Iraq.”79	  	  
	  
The	   majority	   of	   respondents	   I	   interviewed	   repeatedly	   cited	   corruption	   as	   a	  
serious	   problem	   confirming	   reports	   from	   Transparency	   International,	   where	  
Iraq	   has	   consistently	   ranked	   low	   on	   its	   Corruption	   Perception	   Index 80 .	  
According	   to	   one	   diaspora	   it	   even	   penetrated	   the	   top	   echelons	   of	   power,	  
“Maliki	  deals	  with	  people	  if	  they	  are	  loyal	  to	  him	  regardless	  of	  how	  corrupt	  or	  
how	   much	   they	   steal” 81 .	   A	   feature	   of	   Maliki’s	   premiership,	   which	   has	  
exacerbated	  sectarian	  tensions	  and	  corruption	  in	  the	  country	  (Dodge,	  2012)	  
	  
Another	  minister	  interviewed	  who	  served	  as	  Iraq’s	  Trade	  and	  Defence	  Minister	  
in	   2003	   to	   2005	   and	   later	   Finance	   Minister	   in	   2006,	   developed	   Iraq’s	   first	  
economic	   development	   plan	   for	   the	   country,	   introduced	   a	   social	   security	  
system	  and	  helped	  restructure	  Iraq’s	  USD	  20	  billion	  debt82.	   	  There	  were	  other	  
attempts	  to	  curb	  corruption	  by	  introducing	  a	  vetting	  system	  on	  contracts	  and	  
limiting	   the	  power	  of	  Ministers	   to	   sign	  off	  on	  USD	   100	  million	  contracts	   that	  
failed,	  as	  did	  attempts	  to	  computerise	  Iraq’s	  government	  budget	  with	  the	  help	  
of	  Transparency	  International.	  	  
	  
Meanwhile,	   other	   UK	   diaspora	   who	   had	   contacts	   in	   Baghdad	   with	   the	   Shi’a	  
government	   of	   Prime	   Minister	   Nouri	   Al	   Maliki	   were	   able	   to	   organise,	   in	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collaboration	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  government,	  an	  Iraqi	  expatriates	  conference	  in	  an	  
attempt	   to	  bring	   Iraqi	   experts	   from	  around	   the	  world	   to	  Baghdad	   to	  help	   re-­‐
build	   the	   country.	   Thus	   in	   2008	   the	   first	   international	   conference	   for	   Iraqi	  
Expatriates	   and	   Experts	   was	   launched	   bringing	   together	   hundreds	   of	  
professional	   and	   skilled	   Iraqis	   from	   different	   fields	   to	   meet	   with	   the	  
government	  and	  help	   in	   the	   reconstruction	  of	   Iraq	  83.	   	  The	  conference,	  which	  
took	  place	   in	  Baghdad	  and	  was	  reportedly	  televised	   in	  Iraq,	   failed	  to	  make	  an	  
impact.	  Maliki	  reportedly	  approached	  the	  diaspora	  at	  the	  conference	  as	  though	  
they	  had	  a	  duty	  to	  serve	  Iraq	  rather	  than	  call	  on	  their	  expertise	  to	  help	  rebuild	  
the	  country,	  “They	  said	  you	  know	  you	  are	  our	  sons	  and	  you	  have	  a	  debt	  to	  Iraq	  
and	   I	   said	   no	  we	   don’t.	   In	   fact	  we	   could	   claim	   a	   debt	   to	   Iraq	   because	   it	   has	  
made	   us	   feel	   like	   expatriates,	   “hejejtoone84”.	   Furthermore	   individuals	   who	  
returned	   to	   Iraq	   and	   attempted	   to	   help	   rebuild	   the	   country	   repeatedly	  
mentioned	   clashes	   between	   local	   Iraqis	   and	   diaspora	   returnees.	   Respondents	  
described	   the	   challenges	   they	   faced	   from	  native	   Iraqis	  who	  were	   resentful	   of	  
being	   governed	   by	   external	   Iraqis	   who’d	   not	   lived	   through	   the	   ravages	   of	  
Saddam’s	  dictatorship.	  	  
	  
Subsequently	  those	  disconnected	  from	  ethnic	  or	  sectarian	  powers	  are	  inhibited	  
in	  their	  access	  to	  institution-­‐building	  and	  governance,	  diverting	  their	  diaspora	  
mobilisation	  towards	  supporting/challenging	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society.	  As	  
an	  example,	  supporters	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  Communist	  Party	  who	  did	  not	  win	  any	  seats	  
in	   the	  2005	  election	  and	  Iraqis	  opposed	  to	   the	  US	  occupation	  were	   limited	   in	  
their	  ability	  to	  influence	  or	  shape	  institution-­‐building	  and	  governance	  in	  Iraq.	  
This	  has	  not	  meant	  however	  that	  state-­‐building	  has	  altogether	  been	  hindered,	  
rather	   the	   lack	   of	   opportunity	   in	   the	   homeland	   has	   directed	   energies	   to	  
political	   activism	   in	   the	   hostland	   by	   challenging	   domestic	   policies	   and	  
undemocratic	   practices	   through	   protests,	   press	   releases	   and	   writing	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  23,	  21	  November	  2013,	  London	  and	  Respondent	  27,	  13	  
January	  2014	  –	  exact	  figures	  vary	  
84	  The	  word	  hejejtoone	  in	  Iraqi	  Arabic	  means	  you	  made	  us	  flee.	  Author	  interview	  Respondent	  
21,	  20	  November	  2013,	  London.	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hostland85.	  In	  other	  words	  their	  mobilisation	  has	  been	  directed	  to	  challenging	  
domestic	  policies	  or	  upholding	  democratic	  values	  through	  grass	  roots	  activism.	  
In	  many	  ways	  their	  opposition	  years	  have	  continued,	  yet	  this	  time	  they	  face	  not	  
a	  violent	  tyrant	  but	  a	  tyrannical	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  system.	  	  
	  
Similarly	  minority	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Turkmen	  or	  the	  Assyrians	  have	  also	  been	  
limited	   in	   their	   ability	   to	   contribute	   to	   institution-­‐building	   or	   governance	   in	  
the	  country	  following	  the	  2005	  elections.	  Their	  marginalisation	  in	  Iraq	  has	  lead	  
to	  an	  active	  lobbying	  in	  the	  UK	  against	  land	  grabs	  in	  Kirkuk	  and	  the	  Ninevah	  
plains	   where	   disputes	   with	   the	   Iraqi	   government	   and	   Kurds	   are	   on-­‐going	  
problems.	  The	  difference	  between	  these	   lobbying	  efforts	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  and	  
Shi’a	  lobbying	  parties	  is	  that	  their	  power	  and	  material	  resources	  are	  limited	  and	  
therefore	  less	  influential	  with	  hostland	  governments,	  especially	  since	  they	  have	  
no	  sway	  inside	  Iraq.	  This	  limitation	  has	  directed	  their	  political	  activism	  towards	  
challenging	   the	   state	   through	   civil	   society,	   in	   effect	   acting	   like	   an	   Iraqi	  
transnational	   civil	   society	   holding	   the	   Iraqi	   government	   to	   account	   through	  
their	  hostland	  government.	  Respondent	  18,	  a	  Turkmen	  party	  representative	  in	  
London	  stated,	  	  
	  
	   “We	  can’t	  get	  our	  land	  back	  from	  the	  government.	  Even	  if	  a	  Turkmen	  is	  
more	  skilled	  than	  anyone	  else,	  they	  don’t	  have	  the	  right	  to	  be	  in	  a	  ministerial	  
position.	  This	  made	  us	  in	  a	  democratic	  country	  like	  the	  UK	  and	  especially	  one	  
that	  took	  part	  in	  regime	  change	  to	  demand	  our	  rights.	  The	  British	  promised	  us	  
that	  after	  2003	  the	  democratic	  regime	  that	  was	  to	  take	  place	  in	  Iraq	  was	  to	  be	  
inclusive	  of	  all	  and	  no	  one	  would	  feel	  their	  rights	  denied.	  But	  we	  still	   feel	  our	  
rights	  are	  denied	  day	  after	  day,	  so	  we	  have	  to	  promote	  our	  case	  here.”86	  	  
	  
Meanwhile	  others	  excluded	  from	  the	  political	  system	  or	  have	  taken	  a	  moral	  and	  
activist	  stand	  to	  avoid	  working	  with	  a	  corrupt	  government,	  have	  contributed	  to	  
civil	  society	  building	  through	  personal	  initiatives	  and	  private	  resources	  in	  a	  bid	  
to	  circumvent	  the	  domestic	  structures	  of	  power	  while	  simultaneously	  providing	  
services	   otherwise	   the	   domain	   of	   the	   state.	   These	   invisible	   and	   ad	   hoc	   state-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  10,	  6	  November	  2013,	  London	  86	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  18,	  14	  November	  2013,	  London.	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building	   initiatives	  have	   supported	  diaspora’s	   local	   towns	  and	  cities	  and	   their	  
needs	   in	   various	   ways.	   Interviews	   with	   UK	   diaspora	   revealed	   funding	   a	  
travelling	  medical	  caravan	  in	  remote	  areas	  in	  Iraq	  where	  locals	  were	  unable	  to	  
access	   medical	   assistance	   and	   immunisation.	   Other	   attempts	   have	   included	  
setting	   up	   a	   torture	   centre	   to	   offer	   psychological	   support	   for	   Iraqis	   tortured	  
during	  Saddam’s	   reign,	   funding	   for	   Iraqis	  orphaned	  by	   the	  2003	  war,	   training	  
for	   local	   NGOs	   about	   their	   rights	   and	   human	   rights	   work,	   and	   support	   for	  
women’s	  rights	  and	  gender	  based	  violence,	  amongst	  others.	  	  
	  
Indeed,	   in	  a	  bid	  to	  provide	  local	  services	  to	  Iraqis	   in	  Baghdad,	  Respondent	  26	  
(R26)	   who	   left	   Baghdad	   in	   the	   late	   1950s	   returned	   to	   support	   the	   state	   by	  
working	  with	  international	  civil	  society	  organisations	  to	  address	  social	  housing	  
and	   public	   sanitation	   needs,	   and	   also	   provide	  medical	   and	   other	   educational	  
textbooks	   equipment	   to	   Iraqi’s	   National	   Library87.	   Amidst	   sectarian	   violence	  
and	  corruption,	  the	  initiatives	  carried	  out	  by	  R26	  were	  destroyed	  or	  opposed	  by	  
government	   officials	   who	   more	   often	   than	   not	   refuse	   any	   applications	   or	  
initiatives	  that	  they	  do	  not	  benefit	  or	  profit	  from.	  
	  
In	   response	   to	   the	   security	   situation	   and	   the	   corruption	   some	   diaspora	  
individuals	  attempted	  to	  support	  Iraq	  from	  the	  hostland	  by	  spreading	  the	  ideals	  
of	  tolerance,	  human	  rights	  and	  democracy.	  	  A	  very	  active	  diaspora	  member	  who	  
had	  worked	   extensively	   in	   the	   field	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   through	   an	   Islamic	  
organisation	  had	  been	  an	  advisor	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  and	  UK	  governments	  since	  2003	  
on	  various	  issues	  related	  to	  governance,	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights.	  He	  had	  
also	   attempted	   to	   work	   directly	   with	   the	   Iraqi	   government	   to	   set	   up	  
conferences	   to	   tackle	   the	   issues	   of	   democracy	   building,	   writing	   of	   the	   Iraqi	  
constitution,	   human	   rights,	   fighting	   terrorism	   and	   the	   Kurdish	   question.	  
Disillusioned	   with	   the	   ineffectiveness	   of	   the	   political	   class	   and	   culture,	   he	  
decided	   that	  grass-­‐roots	  activism	  to	   influence	   the	  minds	  of	   Iraq’s	  civil	   society	  
would	  be	  more	  effective	  in	  changing	  the	  country	  and	  proceeded	  to	  establish	  the	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  Author	  interview	  with	  R26,	  13	  January	  2014,	  London	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Humanitarian	  Dialogue	  Foundation	  in	  London	  (HDF).	  The	  HDF	  was	  set	  up	  to	  
build	   a	   “peaceful	   Iraqi	   society,	   human	   rights	   and	   civil	   society”88	  from	   the	  
outside	  to	  inside	  Iraq	  through	  live	  public	  lectures	  transmitted	  from	  London	  to	  
Baghdad.	  Lectures	  are	  transmitted	  through	  the	  Al	  Selam	  satellite	  channel	  of	  its	  
founder	  Hussein	  Al	  Sadr	  straight	  to	  an	  Iraqi	  audience.	  Lectures	  involving	  expert	  
speakers	  have	  been	  organised	   to	  address	   issues	   in	   the	   fields	  of	  human	   rights,	  
women’s	   rights,	   children’s	   rights,	   as	   well	   as	   economic,	   cultural,	   social	   and	  
health	   education.	   Furthermore,	   videos	   of	   the	   lectures	   are	   uploaded	   on	  
YouTube,	  the	  foundation	  website	  and	  emails	  of	  the	  links	  are	  sent	  to	  members	  
in	   Iraq.	   Though	   the	   channel	   is	   funded	   by	   a	   Shi’a	   cleric,	   its	   mission	   is	   non-­‐	  
sectarian	   and	   aims	   to	   build	   tolerance	   and	   reconciliation	   amidst	   Iraqi	   society.	  
Attending	   an	  HDF	  event	   in	  London,	   the	   author	   saw	  a	  mix	  of	   Jewish,	   secular,	  
Shi’a	  and	  various	  Iraqis	  from	  different	  backgrounds.	  
	  
While	  others	  have	  directed	   their	  politics	  outside	   the	   structures	  of	  power,	   the	  
new	   and	   emerging	   Sunni	   diaspora	   largely	   made	   up	   of	   those	   who	   were	  
historically	  associated	  or	  linked	  to	  the	  old	  Baathist	  regime,	  whether	  true	  party	  
supporters	  or	  otherwise,	  have	  been	  particularly	  excluded	  from	  participating	  in	  
Iraqi	   politics.	   For	   many	   mainly	   Sunni	   diaspora	   individuals	   in	   this	   position	  
opportunities	  to	  contribute	  to	  state-­‐building	  have	  been	  thwarted	  by	  previously	  
cited	   de-­‐baathification	   policies	   and	   sectarian	   politics	   that	   has	   until	   more	  
recently	  denied	  true	  representation	  for	  the	  Sunni	  community.	  A	  Sunni	  diaspora	  
individual	  interviewed	  stated	  that	  he	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  go	  back	  to	  Iraq	  and	  
contribute	  to	  rebuilding	  the	  country	  because	  he	  is	  accused	  of	  being	  a	  Baathist	  
and	  he	  can	  no	  longer	  return	  to	  the	  country89.	  Denied	  a	  place	  in	  the	  new	  Iraq,	  
former	   Baathists	   have	   been	   exiled	   into	   diaspora,	   their	   political	   rights	   and	  
attachments	  severed	  by	  the	  new	  political	  classes.	  	  
	  
The	  examples	  above	  demonstrate	  the	  limitations	  placed	  on	  diaspora	  individuals	  
from	   hostlands	   with	   corrupt,	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   governments	   that	   practice	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  Human	  Dialogue	  Foundation	  website	  http://www.hdf-­‐iq.org	  [Last	  accessed	  1	  August	  2014]	  
89	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  29,	  6	  May	  2015,	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exclusionary	   politics.	   Nonetheless	   they	   show	   that	   in	   such	   circumstances	  
mobilisation	  may	  be	  directed	  to	  supporting/challenging	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  
society	  by	  privately	  funded	  individuals	  or	  civil	  society	  organisations	  that	  work	  
outside	   the	   structures	   of	   power	   to	   provide	   for	   state	   and	   society.	   Significantly	  
these	   transnational	   links	   also	   show	   that	   they	   are	  more	  often	   than	  not	   rooted	  
through	   a	   translocalism	   rather	   than	   transnationalism,	   i.e,	   local	   links	  between	  
diaspora	  and	  the	  towns	  their	  families	  live	  or	  once	  lived,	  or	  their	  former	  political	  
party	   branches	   or	   organisations	   they	   were	   formerly	   connected	   to	   prior	   to	  
exiting	  the	  country	  of	  origin.	  	  
	  
Assessing	  diasporic	  interventions	  following	  the	  2005	  elections	  
What	   becomes	   evident	   from	   research	   for	   this	   study	   is	   that	   diaspora	  
mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐building	   since	   2005	   has	   been	   shaped	   around	   ethno-­‐
sectarian	   lines	  that	  clearly	  demarcate	  who	   in	  the	  diaspora	   is	  able	  to	   influence	  
institution-­‐building	  and	  governance	  and	  who	  is	  denied.	  Confirming	  hypothesis	  
3,	   groups	   that	   are	   connected	   to	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   ruling	  political	   parties	   in	   the	  
homeland	   will	   have	   more	   opportunities	   to	   contribute	   to	   institution-­‐building	  
and	  governance	  while	  those	  outside	  the	  structures	  of	  power	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  
be	   involved	  by	  supporting	  or	  challenging	  the	  state	   through	  civil	   society,	  or	   in	  
some	  cases	  prevented	  completely.	  	  
	  
The	  Shi’a	  and	  Kurds,	  the	  powerful	  governing	  groups	  in	  Iraq	  have	  been	  able	  to	  
maximise	  diaspora	  opportunities	  and	  gain	  from	  the	  UK	  relationship	  cementing	  
their	  hold	  on	  power	  and	  the	  very	  structures	  that	  keep	  them	  there.	  Meanwhile	  
other	   individuals	   in	  the	  diaspora	  who	  do	  not	   identify	  with	  an	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  
identity	   or	   are	   outside	   these	   structures	   of	   power	   have	   been	   limited	   by	   this	  
exclusionary	   politics.	   Their	  mobilisation	   has	   not	   necessarily	   been	   denied	   but	  
rather	   been	   channelled	   towards	   civil	   society	   focussed	   around	   holding	   the	  
government	  to	  account,	  lobbying	  for	  minority	  rights,	  and	  providing	  services	  to	  
towns,	   villages,	  political	  organisations	  and	  opposition	  groups	  where	   the	  weak	  
Iraqi	  state	  has	  failed	  to	  deliver.	  The	  meeting	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  and	  its	  multiple	  
constituent	  parts,	   to	  refer	  back	  to	  Migdal’s	  definition	  of	   the	  state,	  means	  that	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Iraqis	  on	  the	  outside	  have	  also	  been	  shaping	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  state,	  by	  
continuing	  to	  support	  it,	  challenge	  it	  and	  shape	  its	  future	  outcomes.	  	  
	  
A	  by-­‐product	  of	  this	  exclusionary	  politics	  in	  Iraq	  has	  been	  the	  entrenchment	  of	  
ethno-­‐sectarian	   identities	   in	   the	   diaspora	   so	   that	   Assyrian	   Iraqis	   are	   now	  
Christian	   Iraqis,	   and	   Iraqi	   Kurds	   are	   simply	   Kurds.	   Ethno-­‐sectarian	   power	  
dynamics	  have	  encouraged	  sectarian	  identifications	  if	  only	  to	  gain	  government	  
or	   political	   positions.	   One	   diaspora	   member	   identified	   with	   the	   Iraqi	  
Communist	   party	   stated	   that	   he	  had	  been	   approached	  by	   Islamists	   parties	   in	  
Iraq	  who	  wanted	  him	  to	  join	  if	  only	  he	  would	  confess	  his	  Shi’a	  allegiance	  and	  
identity 90 .	   Examples	   of	   previously	   non-­‐religious	   individuals	   who	   upon	  
returning	  adopted	  a	  sectarian	   identity	  to	  engage	   in	  homeland	  politics	  abound	  
in	  the	  diaspora.	  	  
	  
Furthermore	  political	   activism	   in	   the	  diaspora	  on	   issues	  of	  human	   rights	   and	  
democracy	  have	  gradually	  decreased	   since	   intervention.	  This	  has	  been	   largely	  
due	   to	   the	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   divides	   that	   have	   plagued	   the	   country	   as	   argued	  
above	   but	   also	   because	   the	   majority	   of	   diaspora	   who	   were	   politically	   active	  
prior	  to	  regime	  change	  have	  subsequently	  returned	  to	  take	  up	  government	  or	  
political	  positions.	  This	  has	  left	  only	  those	  who	  have	  no	  place	  in	  the	  new	  Iraqi	  
state	   to	   lobby,	   hold	   the	   Iraqi	   government	   accountable	   and	   fight	   for	   human	  
rights.	   Yet	   even	   this	   diaspora	   network	   is	   shrinking	   due	   to	   an	   aging	   political	  
class	  and	  hopelessness	  within	  the	  diaspora	  about	  Iraq’s	  political	  future.	  	  As	  an	  
example,	   the	   UK’s	   National	   Health	   Service	   employs	   over	   5,000	   Iraqi	   doctors	  
(‘Iraqi	  Doctors	  in	  Britain	  and	  the	  War	  on	  Terror’,	  n.d.),	  in	  2003	  there	  was	  a	  fear	  
that	  these	  doctors	  would	  return	  to	  Iraq	  and	  leave	  the	  NHS	  in	  peril.	  Yet	  the	  vast	  
majority	  have	  remained	  in	  the	  UK	  disillusioned	  with	  the	  corrupt	  nature	  of	  the	  
political	   system	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   incentive	   for	   professionals.	   For	  many	   in	   the	  
diaspora	  who	  wanted	   to	   contribute	   and	   help	   in	   rebuilding	   Iraq,	   the	  myth	   of	  
return	   became	   a	   reality	   but	   quickly	   dissipated	   to	   be	   replaced	   by	   a	   beautiful	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  30,	  1	  May	  2015,	  London	  Skype	  call.	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memory	  that	  cannot	  be	  altered	  or	  taken	  away.	  It	  is	  an	  Iraq	  they	  can	  conjure	  up	  
through	  memories,	  food,	  social	  and	  cultural	  rituals,	  but	  no	  longer	  the	  land	  they	  
want	  to	  return	  to.	  	  
	  
Similarly,	   for	   the	   diaspora’s	   second	   generation,	   there	   is	   a	   high	   level	   of	  
engagement	  on	  social	  media	  platforms	  such	  as	  Twitter	  and	  Facebook	  towards	  
Iraqi	   issues.	   Increasingly	   both	   through	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   stances,	   as	   well	   as	  
recently	   counter	   reactions	   through	   Iraqi	   national,	   non-­‐sectarian	   positions.	   It	  
remains	   to	  be	   seen	  whether	   the	  second	  and	   third	  generations	  of	   Iraqis	   in	   the	  
diaspora	  will	  continue	  their	  links	  with	  Iraq	  and	  how.	  More	  recently,	  a	  new	  Iraqi	  
Transnational	  Collective	  has	  been	  instigated	  between	  second	  generation	  Iraqis	  
in	  New	  York,	  London	  and	   the	  wider	  Middle	  East91	  suggesting	   that	   the	   1.5	  and	  
second	   generation	   Iraqis	   are	   finding	   new	  ways	   of	   engaging	   in	   the	   politics	   of	  
their	  homeland.	  Yet	  other	   than	  a	   couple	  of	  Youth	  Groups	   including	   the	   Iraqi	  
Youth	  Foundation	  and	  university	  student	  Iraqi	  societies,	  who	  organise	  various	  
social	   and	   cultural	   activities,	   there	   is	   very	   little	   in	   the	   way	   of	   political	  
engagement	  and	  activism	  among	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  youth	  currently	  in	  London.	  	  
	  
Another	   further	   reason	   why	   political	   activism	   has	   decreased	   in	   the	   diaspora	  
may	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  now	  exists	  an	  accessible	  Iraqi	  embassy	  
in	  London	  that	  at	  least	  nominally	  represents	  all	  Iraqis	  and	  their	  concerns.	  Thus	  
often	  protests,	  campaigns	  and	  letters	  of	  complaint	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  are	  
addressed	  to	  the	  embassy	  and	  less	  elsewhere.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
Since	  2005	  when	  the	  new	  Iraqi	  political	  system	  was	  consolidated	  along	  ethno-­‐
sectarian	   lines,	   opportunities	   for	   diaspora	   to	  mobilise	   towards	   state-­‐building	  
have	  been	  divided	  between	   those	   linked	   to	   ethno-­‐sectarian	  parties	   and	   those	  
who	   are	   not.	   	   Thus	   opportunities	   to	   contribute	   to	   institution-­‐building	   and	  
governance	  and	  Iraq’s	  on-­‐going	  political	  process	  has	  been	  dominated	  by	  those	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Iraq	  Transnational	  Collective	  http://iraqitransnationalcollective.org/en/mission/	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in	   power.	   This	   has	   meant	   the	   Kurds	   and	   Shi’a	   parties,	   which	   have	   further	  
consolidated	   their	   political	   positions	   in	   the	   country	   and	   their	   grip	   on	   power.	  
Meanwhile,	   groups	   excluded	   and	  marginalized	   in	   Iraqi	   society	   directed	   their	  
efforts	  by	  acting	  as	  a	  diasporic	  civil	  society,	  providing	  support	  for	  the	  needy	  or	  
repressed	  in	  Iraqi	  society,	  challenging	  and	  holding	  the	  government	  accountable	  
for	   its	   corruption,	   lack	   of	   human	   security	   and	   the	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   political	  
system,	  which	  has	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  democratic	  Iraq.	  What	  have	  emerged	  thus	  are	  
two	  tiers	  in	  Iraq,	  those	  who	  are	  linked	  to	  the	  ruling	  class	  and	  those	  who	  are	  not.	  
The	   reality	   of	   this	   exclusionary	   politics	   has	   been	   reflected	   in	   the	   diaspora,	  
which	  has	   shaped	  and	  directed	   the	   state-­‐building	  efforts	  of	   those	   involved.	   If	  
included	  and	  connected	  they	  continue	  to	  be	  involved	  through	  the	  apparatus	  of	  


















CHAPTER	  6	  -­‐	  THE	  IRAQI	  DIASPORA	  IN	  SWEDEN	  
Following	   on	   from	   the	   UK	   chapter,	   let	   us	   turn	   our	   attention	   to	   the	   data	  
gathered	   in	   Sweden.	   In	   this	   chapter	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   all	   three	   hypotheses	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investigated	   in	   this	   study	  have	   impacted	   the	   capabilities	   of	   the	   Swedish	   Iraqi	  
diaspora	   to	   mobilise	   for	   state-­‐building.	   A	   lack	   of	   Iraqi	   elites	   in	   Sweden	   and	  
non-­‐involvement	   in	   military	   intervention	   and	   occupation	   directed	   the	  
diaspora’s	   political	   engagement	   towards	   supporting	   the	   state	   through	   civil	  
society	   in	   the	   period	   up	   to	   Iraqi’s	   first	   elections.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   Iraqi	  
diaspora	   in	  Sweden	   is	   relatively	  new	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   a	  big	  wave	  of	   Iraqis	  
only	   arrived	   into	   Sweden	   in	   the	   1990s.	   The	   majority	   of	   Iraqis	   were	   conflict-­‐
generated	   refugees	  who	   had	   suffered	   significantly	   from	  wars	   and	   destitution.	  
They	  were	  not	  wealthy	   individuals	  or	  prominent	  political	  or	   religious	   families	  
that	  maintained	  political	  links	  with	  Iraq.	  Political	  activists	  were	  few	  in	  number	  
and	  without	  the	  resources	  or	  networks	  to	  organise	  seriously	  and	  lobby	  powerful	  
actors.	   Nor	   was	   there	   enough	   time	   for	   new	   elites	   to	   surface	   that	   could	   have	  
formed	  a	  strong	  Iraqi	  opposition	  to	  influence	  Swedish	  policy	  makers,	  or	  engage	  
with	  UK	  or	  US	  state-­‐building	  plans.	  As	  a	  result	  their	  energies	  were	  directed	  to	  
supporting	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society	  and	  grass-­‐roots	  activity.	  
	  
Similarly,	   Sweden’s	   non-­‐involvement	   in	   military	   intervention	   diverted	   their	  
policy	   in	   Iraq	   towards	   development,	   which	   created	   opportunities	   for	   the	  
diaspora	   through	   diaspora/development	   initiatives,	   such	   as	   supporting	  
democratisation	   in	   Iraq.	   Other	   hostland	   organisations	   also	   funded	   the	  
development	   of	   democracy,	   education	   and	  human	   rights	   diaspora	   projects	   in	  
Iraq.	  	  
	  
Following	   Iraq’s	   first	   elections	   when	   ethno-­‐sectarianism	   was	   consolidated	   in	  
Iraqi	   politics,	   the	   situation	   changed	   for	   those	   connected	   to	   ruling	   ethno-­‐
sectarian	   parties	   as	   ethnic	   and	   sectarian	   kin	   recruited	   from	   the	   diaspora.	  
Though	   not	   as	   widespread	   as	   in	   the	   UK,	   the	   Swedish	   case	   also	   confirms	  
hypothesis	   3	   and	   shows	   that	   once	   Iraqis	   took	   over	   following	   Iraq’s	   first	  
elections,	  only	  those	  who	  were	  connected	  to	  ruling	  parties	  had	  opportunities	  to	  
contribute	   to	   institution-­‐building,	   whereas	   those	   still	   mobilised	   but	   were	  
excluded	  from	  this	  were	  directed	  to	  challenging	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society.	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The	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  in	  Sweden	  
The	   first	   part	   to	   understanding	   the	   puzzle	   of	   why	   the	   Swedish	   diaspora	  
contributed	  more	  to	  supporting	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society	  than	  institution-­‐
building	  and	  governance	  is	  related	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  Iraqi	  elites	  in	  Sweden	  and	  the	  
generally	   lower	   socio-­‐economic	   positions	   of	   those	   who	   migrated	   to	   Sweden.	  
Unlike	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   UK	   diaspora,	   Iraqi	   migration	   to	   Sweden	   had	   a	  
much	  later	  genesis	  and	  was	  discernible	  for	  having	  an	  entirely	  different	  profile.	  	  
	  
During	  the	  1970s	  Iraqi	  migration	  to	  Sweden	  was	  minimal	  and	  consisted	  largely	  
of	  Kurds	  and	  Iraqi	  Christians92.	  Kurdish	  migration	  to	  Western	  Europe	  was	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  European	  demands	  for	  guest	  workers	  in	  the	  1960s.	  Most	  of	  these	  were	  
Turkish	   Kurds	   who	   went	   to	   Germany	   but	   later	   migrated	   to	   other	   countries	  
including	   Sweden	   (Hassanpour	   and	   Mojab,	   2005).	   Iraqi	   Kurds	   migrated	   to	  
Europe	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   defeat	   of	   the	   autonomous	  Kurdish	  movement	   from	  
1961-­‐1975	  (Hassanpour	  and	  Mojab,	  2005).	  The	  autonomous	  Kurdish	  movement	  
reached	  its	  crescendo	  in	  1974	  when	  successive	  conflicts	  between	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  
and	  the	  KDP	  ended	  in	  a	  civil	  war.	  The	  war	  was	  provoked	  by	  the	  proposal	  put	  
forward	  by	  the	  Iraqi	  governments	  terms	  of	  an	  autonomy	  agreement,	  which	  the	  
Kurds	   rejected	  (Tripp,	  2007;	  Khayati,	  2008).	  The	  conflict	   took	   its	   toll	  on	  both	  
sides	  and	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  exile	  of	  the	  KDP	  and	  the	  flight	  of	  over	  100,000	  
civilian	   refugees	   to	   Iran.	   This	   along	   with	   the	   expulsion	   of	   40,000	   Shi’a	   Faili	  
Kurds,	   due	   to	   their	   supposed	   Iranian	   descent	   (taba’iya)	   in	   the	   1970s	   (Tripp,	  
2007),	  led	  to	  a	  wave	  of	  Kurds	  to	  flee	  Iraq,	  some	  of	  whom	  would	  eventually	  make	  
their	  way	   to	  Europe.	  By	   the	   1970s	   there	  was	  a	  mixture	  of	  Kurds	   from	  Turkey,	  
Iraq	  and	  Iran	  in	  Sweden	  (Khayati,	  2008;	  Khayati	  and	  Dahlstedt,	  2014).	  	  
	  
For	  Iraqi	  Christians,	  some	  of	  whom	  were	  also	  living	  in	  the	  Kurdish	  region	  and	  
often	   caught	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   states’	   war	   with	   the	   Kurds,	   the	   1970s	  
proved	   to	   be	   a	   perilous	   time	   (Rassam,	   2005).	   Not	   only	   did	   the	   war	   in	   Iraqi	  
Kurdistan	  create	  refugees	  but	  also	  the	  Iraqi	  government’s	  stringent	  laws	  denied	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  21,	  23	  June	  2015,	  Stockholm 
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the	   right	   to	   the	   use	   of	   the	   Syriac	   language	   and	   identity.	   This	   led	   to	   many	  
persecutions	   and	   a	   feeling	   of	   insecurity	   that	   drove	   many	   to	   find	   settlement	  
elsewhere.	  Respondent	  6	  captures	  this	  trend	  with	  his	  own	  personal	  story,	  	  	  
	   “I	   left	   Iraq	   for	   political	   reasons	   but	   I	   wasn’t	   politically	   active.	   I	   was	  
working	  for	  the	  Syriac	  radio.	  The	  Syriac	  radio	  meant	  that	  I	  made	  programmes	  
in	  the	  Syriac	  language	  about	  our	  issues,	  but	  at	  the	  time	  this	  was	  not	  permitted	  
during	  Saddam’s	  time93.”	  
	  
Many	  Iraqi	  Christians	  who	  had	  fled	  Iraq	  previously	  migrated	  to	  Lebanon	  where	  
a	   Christian	   population	   also	   exists,	   which	   facilitated	   their	   settlement	   in	  
Lebanon.	  However,	   the	  onset	  of	   the	  1975	  Lebanese	  civil	  war	  meant	  that	  many	  
found	   their	   security	   compromised	   yet	   again	   and	   attempted	   to	   flee	   to	   other	  
parts	  of	  the	  world.	  It	  was	  during	  this	  time	  and	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  help	  the	  plight	  
of	  Iraqi	  Christians	  that	  the	  Assyrian	  Universal	  Alliance	  allegedly	  decided	  to	  host	  
their	   annual	   conference	   in	   Sweden94	  as	   a	  means	   of	   facilitating	  Assyrian	   entry	  
into	  Sweden	  where	  they	  could	  then	  seek	  asylum95.	  Many	  who	  attended	  did	  not	  
leave	  and	  instead	  started	  a	  new	  life.	  	  
	  	  
During	  this	  time,	  respondents	  recall	  that	  there	  were	  very	  few	  Iraqis	  in	  Sweden,	  
so	  much	  so	  in	  fact	  that	  as	  one	  diaspora	  respondent	  recalled	  when	  any	  Iraqi	  had	  
a	  wedding	  all	  of	   the	   Iraqis	   in	  Sweden	  would	  be	   invited96.	  Another	  meanwhile	  
recalled	  that	  his	  Iraqi	  accent	  was	  becoming	  more	  Lebanese	  due	  to	  mixing	  with	  
other	  exiled	  Arabs97	  as	  there	  were	  so	  few	  Iraqis98.	  	  
	  
This	   reality	   changed	   however	   in	   the	   1980s	   when	   Iraqi	   migration	   to	   Sweden	  
increased	  due	  to	  several	  events	  and	  persecutions	  leading	  to	  a	  diverse	  group	  of	  
Iraqi	  migrants.	   This	  migration	  wave	   saw	  middle	   class	   but	   impoverished	   Iraqi	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  6,	  9	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm	  
94	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  6,	  9	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm,	  See	  also	  Assyrian	  Universal	  
Alliance	  website	  www.aua.net	  where	  it	  states	  that	  the	  1976	  conference	  was	  held	  in	  Stockholm,	  
Sweden.	  In	  fact	  the	  conference	  helped	  bring	  discriminated	  Assyrians	  from	  Turkey	  as	  well	  as	  
those	  caught	  in	  conflict	  in	  Lebanon.	  	  
95	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  5,	  8	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm	  
96	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  6,	  9	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm	  
97	  There	  were	  also	  Lebanese	  migrants	  and	  refugees	  who	  had	  fled	  the	  Lebanese	  civil	  war,	  which	  
commenced	  in	  1975.	  
98	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  5,	  8	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm 
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families	  flee	  the	  Iraq-­‐Iran	  war	  and	  make	  their	  way	  to	  Sweden	  where	  Sweden’s	  
humanitarian	   reputation	   for	   taking	   refugees	   was	   now	   taking	   hold.	   Similarly	  
during	   this	   time	   persecuted	   Iraqi	   communists	   who	   were	   leaving	   the	   Soviet	  
Union	  or	   its	  satellite	  states	  were	  now	  also	  making	  their	  way	  to	  Sweden	  as	  the	  
Soviet	  Union’s	   future	  was	  becoming	  more	  and	  more	  questionable.	  Many	  Iraqi	  
Communists	  had	  previously	  migrated	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  either	  as	  students	  or	  
politically	  persecuted	  dissidents	  but	   felt	  unsafe	  and	  no	   longer	  welcome	  in	  the	  
crumbling	  and	  tense	  environment	  of	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Republic.	  	  
	  
Further	  migrations	  were	  caused	  by	  the	  former	  regime	  who	  persecuted	  against	  
Shi’a	   Iraqis,	   whether	   Arab	   or	   Faili	   Kurds,	   who	   were	   considered	   of	   Persian	  
descent	   and	  were	  no	   longer	  welcome	   in	   Iraq	   especially	   as	  hostilities	   between	  
Iraq	   and	   Iran	   took	  hold	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s	   (Farouk-­‐Sluglett	   and	  Sluglett,	  
2001;	   Fattah,	   2009).	   It	   is	   during	   this	   time	   that	   political	   party	   branches	  
representing	   the	   KDP,	   PUK,	   ICP	   and	   the	   Assyrian	   Democratic	   Movement	  
(ADM)	  were	  formed	  in	  the	  Swedish	  diaspora	  reflecting	  the	  political	  persuasions	  
of	  diaspora	  individuals	  who	  had	  fled	  the	  country.	  	  
	  
Later	   in	   1988	   the	   Kurds	   were	   targets	   of	   Saddam’s	   Anfal	   campaign	   where	  
thousands	  of	  Kurds	  were	  exterminated	  in	  chemical	  gas	  attacks,	  leading	  many	  to	  
leave	   and	   head	   for	   the	   Turkish	   border	   (Bruinessen,	   1998).	   Yet	   the	   first	   real	  
surge	   in	   Iraqi	  migration	   to	  Sweden	   took	  place	   in	   the	   1990s	   following	   the	   first	  
Gulf	  War.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  violence	  and	  destruction	  cause	  many	  to	  flee,	  but	  the	  
Shi’a	   uprising	   that	   was	   crushed	   by	   the	   regime	   in	   1991	   saw	   the	   first	   wave	   of	  
largely	   Shi’a	   families	   from	   the	   south	   arrive	   in	   Sweden.	  Many	  were	   escaping	   a	  
vengeful	  Baathist	   regime	  or	  made	   their	  way	   from	  the	   infamous	  Rafha	   refugee	  
camps	   in	   Saudi	   Arabia99.	   Similarly	   in	   1991,	   after	   the	   failed	   and	   crushed	   Shi’a	  
uprising,	   the	  Kurds	  also	   felt	   the	  wrath	  of	  Saddam’s	   security	   forces	  once	  again	  
and	  fled	  to	  Iran	  and	  Turkey	  (Bruinessen,	  1998;	  Tripp,	  2007)	  and	  from	  there	  to	  
Europe.	   Other	   families	   meanwhile	   escaped	   the	   harsh	   conditions	   of	   the	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  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  27,	  5	  November	  2015,	  Skype	  call	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economic	  sanctions	  by	  selling	  everything	  they	  owned	  and	  paying	  smugglers	  to	  
get	  them	  out	  of	  the	  country.	  From	  1990	  to	  1999	  a	  total	  26,156	  Iraqis	  had	  arrived	  
into	  Sweden100.	  	  
	  
The	  final	  migration	  wave,	  and	  the	  largest,	  which	  has	  not	  abated	  in	  Sweden	  has	  
been	  due	  to	  the	  2003	  Iraq	  war.	  With	  violence	  erupting	  as	  the	  coalition	  battled	  
Iraqi	   forces	  and	  subsequent	   sectarian	  violence,	  many	   Iraqi	   families	  have	  been	  
forced	  into	  refuge	  in	  neighbouring	  countries	  and	  beyond.	  Many	  made	  their	  way	  
to	  Sweden	  as	  by	  now	  Sweden’s	  open	  door	   immigration	  policy	   and	   reputation	  
for	   taking	   refugees	   on	   humanitarian	   grounds	   was	   well	   known	   amongst	   Iraqi	  
families.	  A	   series	  of	   chain	  migrations	   led	  many	   to	  make	   their	  way	   to	  Sweden	  
and	   join	   family	   and	   friends	   who	   had	   already	   settled	   in	   Sweden	   in	   previous	  
waves.	   Many	   were	   motivated	   by	   Sweden’s	   family	   reunification	   policy	   that	  
permits	   immediate	   family	   and	   or	   spouses	   to	   join	   once	   permit	   residence	   has	  
been	  granted101.	  Since	  the	  year	  2000	  and	  up	  till	  2014,	  61,442	  Iraqis	  have	  entered	  
Sweden102.	  As	  of	  2015,	  there	  are	  a	  reported	  131,888	  Iraqis	  in	  Sweden103.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  since	  2003,	  a	  new	  category	  of	  Iraqi	  migrants	  also	  formed	  part	  of	  
the	  2003	  wave.	  The	  ousting	  of	  Saddam	  Hussein	  and	  his	  Baathist	  regime	  by	  the	  
US	   led	   coalition	   meant	   that	   a	   class	   of	   top	   tier	   officials	   were	   now	   no	   longer	  
welcome	  in	  Iraqi	  society,	  especially	  after	  the	  infamous	  de-­‐baathification	  process	  
in	   2003.	   The	   changing	   power	   dynamics	   in	   Iraq	   brought	   a	   wave	   of	   former	  
Baathists	  to	  Sweden	  and	  those	  associated	  with	  the	  regime.	  Interviews	  with	  Iraq	  
embassy	  staff	  in	  Sweden	  and	  several	  diaspora	  reveal	  that	  many	  former	  Baathists	  
live	  in	  isolation	  in	  Sweden	  without	  interacting	  in	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  life	  of	  
the	  diverse	  Iraqi	  diaspora104.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  Statistical	  data	  provided	  from	  correspondence	  with	  Statistics	  Sweden	  www.scb.se  
101	  Author	  interview	  with	  Swedish	  Member	  of	  Parliament,	  11	  June	  2015,	  Stockholm	  
102	  Statistics	  Sweden	  www.scb.se	  
103	  Statistics	  Sweden	  www.scb.se	  
104	  Author	  interview	  with	  Iraqi	  ambassador	  to	  Sweden,	  17	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm 
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Iraqis	  in	  Sweden	  live	  all	  over	  the	  country	  but	  there	  are	  large	  concentrations	  in	  
Sweden’s	   capital	   city	   Stockholm,	   as	   well	   as	  Malmo	   and	   Gothenburg.	   A	   large	  
Iraqi	  Assyrian,	  and	  Mandean	  community	  also	  reside	  in	  Sodertalje,	  a	  town	  south	  
of	  Stockholm.	  There	  are	   reportedly	   10,000	   Iraqis	   living	   in	  Sodertalje	   since	   the	  
2003	  War	  (Anon,	  2009).	  
	  
The	   above	   summary	   of	   Iraqi	   migration	   into	   Sweden	   reveals	   that	   the	   Iraqi	  
diaspora	  in	  Sweden	  is	  still	  relatively	  new.	  Though	  many	  would	  have	  preferred	  
to	  go	  to	  the	  UK,	  due	  to	  having	  some	  knowledge	  of	  English	  and	  some	  familiarity	  
with	   an	   English	   education	   system,	   several	   interviewees	   stated	   that	   news	   had	  
spread	  about	  the	  difficulties	  of	  gaining	  entry	  into	  the	  UK	  and	  its	  asylum	  system,	  
while	  Sweden’s	  open-­‐door	  policy	  meant	  that	  illegal	  migration	  routes	  were	  thus	  
being	  diverted	  to	  Sweden.	  	  
	  
For	  those	  of	  middle	  class	  origins	  however,	  who	  arrived	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  of	  
middle	  class	  origins	   in	   the	  homeland	  have	   integrated	  well,	  especially	  as	   there	  
were	   so	   few	   Iraqis	   to	   mix	   with	   and	   so	   their	   language	   skills	   and	   subsequent	  
economic	  integration	  have	  developed	  more	  easily.	  Furthermore,	   for	  the	  Kurds	  
and	  Assyrians	  who	  came	  in	  the	  1980s,	  their	  integration	  was	  facilitated	  by	  their	  
ethnic	  compatriots	  from	  other	  countries	  such	  as	  the	  Turkish	  Kurds	  and	  Syriani	  
Christians	   who	   came	   in	   the	   1960s	   to	   Sweden	   (Westin,	   2003)	   and	   whose	  
economic	  and	  social	  networks	  provided	  a	  platform	  into	  Swedish	  society.	  In	  this	  
respect	  the	  Iraqi	  Kurdish	  diaspora	  in	  Sweden,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  the	  Syriani	  
Christians,	  are	  the	  exceptions	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  in	  Sweden.	  The	  
Kurds	   appear	   to	  have	   a	   large	  number	   of	   authors,	   novelists,	   poets,	   politicians,	  
political	   leaders,	   intellectuals,	   scholars,	   artists,	   musicians,	   singers	   and	  
journalists	   (Khayati,	   2008;	   Khayati	   and	   Dahlstedt,	   2014;	   Baser,	   2015).	   All	   of	  
whom	   have	   contributed	   greatly	   to	   the	   social,	   cultural	   and	   political	   life	   of	  
Kurdish	  diasporic	  life	  in	  Sweden.	  Sweden,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Khayati,	  has	  been	  a	  
“centre	   of	   gravity”	   for	   the	   Kurds	   (Khayati	   and	   Dahlstedt,	   2014:	   58),	   where	  
Kurdish	   identity	   has	   become	  more	   pronounced	   and	   flourished	   (Alinia	   et	   al.,	  
2014).	  The	  Kurds	  have	  thus	  been	  able	  to	  carve	  out	  a	  place	  for	  themselves	  in	  the	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diaspora,	  which	  has	   reinforced	   their	   integration	   in	   Sweden.	  According	   to	   the	  
KRG	   special	   representative	   to	   Sweden,	   there	   are	   6	   Kurdish	   MPs	   in	   Sweden,	  
Kurds	  working	  in	  every	  municipality	  and	  40-­‐50	  Kurds	  working	  for	  the	  Swedish	  
National	  Radio105.	  In	  this	  way	  opportunities	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  homeland	  have	  
been	  far	  greater	  for	  the	  Kurds	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  intervention.	  This	  is	   in	  part	  
due	  to	  their	  profile	  in	  the	  diaspora,	  but	  also	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  been	  able	  to	  
go	  back	  to	  Iraqi	  Kurdistan	  and	  maintain	  transnational	  links	  since	  the	  1990s	  due	  
to	   the	   ‘safe	   haven’	   zone	   created	   after	   the	   failed	   uprising	   of	   1991,	   where	   Iraqi	  
forces	  were	  forbidden	  from	  entering	  the	  Iraqi	  Kurdish	  region	  (Tripp,	  2007).	  	  
	  
Yet	   for	   the	   majority	   of	   Iraqis	   who	   came	   in	   the	   mid	   1990s	   and	   beyond	   as	  
refugees,	  it	  was	  Sweden’s	  open	  door	  policy,	  which	  offered	  a	  safe	  haven	  and	  an	  
opportunity	   for	  a	  new	   life.	  This	   largely	  Shi’a	  wave	   is	   important	   to	  consider	  as	  
the	   profile	   of	  migrants	   differed	   in	   two	   substantial	   ways.	   Firstly,	   the	  majority	  
were	  conflict-­‐generated	  and	  discriminated	  against	   in	   the	   land	   they	  previously	  
lived	   due	   to	   their	   sectarian	   background.	   As	   such,	  many	   were	   not	   able	   to	   be	  
political	  or	  participate	  in	  any	  political	  activity	  unless	  it	  was	  in	  an	  underground	  
fashion.	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  majority	  were	  not	  connected	  to	  political	  networks	  
in	   the	   homeland.	   Secondly,	   the	   majority	   were	   of	   a	   lower	   social	   status;	   they	  
lacked	   the	  material	   resources	   that	   might	   facilitate	   their	   integration	   as	   many	  
were/are	  dependent	  on	  social	  welfare.	  Consequently	  their	  transnationalism	  has	  
been	   largely	   defined	   by	   familial	   and	   religious	   links,	   which	   directed	   their	  
political	  transnationalism	  to	  grass-­‐roots	  activity.	  	  
	  
The	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  in	  Sweden	  and	  political	  activity	  before	  2003	  
Now	  that	  Iraqi	  migration	  into	  Sweden	  has	  been	  sketched	  out,	  we	  can	  turn	  our	  
attention	   to	   how	   the	   profile	   of	   Iraqi	   Swedes	   has	   shaped	   their	   political	  
transnationalism.	  As	  shown	  above,	  the	  majority	  of	  Iraqis	  who	  arrived	  in	  Sweden	  
were	  conflict-­‐generated	  refugees	  fleeing	  from	  the	  first	  Gulf	  war,	  repression	  due	  
to	   the	   Shi’a	   uprising	   and	   later	   the	   economic	   deprivation	   created	   by	   the	   UN	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  Author	  interview	  with	  respondent	  19,	  10	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm. 
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placed	   sanctions.	   These	   were	   not	   wealthy	   individuals	   who	   chose	   to	   leave	  
voluntarily	   but	   those	   forced	   to	   flee	   due	   to	   poverty,	   wars	   and	   personal	  
persecution.	   Those	   who	   arrived	   to	   Sweden	   were	   of	   a	   lower	   social	   class	   and	  
many	  had	  a	  low	  level	  education,	  especially	  those	  who	  arrived	  after	  2003.	  Simply	  
put	  the	  diaspora	  lacked	  the	  education,	  material	  resources,	  and	  the	  political	  and	  
social	   networks	   to	   contribute	   to	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance,	   which	  
directed	   those	   keen	   to	   mobilise	   towards	   supporting	   the	   state	   through	   civil	  
society.	  	  
	  
Migrants	   or	   refugees	   with	   less	   disposable	   income	   are	   restricted	   from	   certain	  
forms	  of	  mobilisation	  because	   these	   require	   financial	   resources	   to	   set	  up.	  For	  
example,	   creating	   political	   organisations,	   hiring	   event	   halls,	   and	   travelling	  
nationally	  or	   internationally	   to	   lobby,	   all	   require	   significant	   time	  and	  money.	  	  
And	  yet	  time	  and	  money	  are	   luxuries	   for	  refugees	  whose	  starting	  point	   in	  the	  
hostland	  is	  effectively	  a	  retrograde	  clean	  slate	  whereby	  lives	  are	  to	  be	  built	  from	  
scratch.	   They	   arrived	   with	   limited	   financial	   resources	   having	   sold	   what	   they	  
could	   to	   escape	   the	   country.	   It	   therefore	   took	   some	   time	   for	   the	   diaspora	   to	  
establish	  themselves	  in	  their	  new	  country	  of	  settlement.	  
	  
Often	   placed	   in	   refugee	   camps	   outside	   the	  main	   cities	   either	   in	   the	  north	   or	  
south	   of	   Sweden,	   newly	   arrived	   refugees	   awaiting	   their	   residence	   permit	   can	  
expect	  anything	  from	  3	  months	  to	  a	  year	  waiting	  period	  before	  authorities	  are	  
able	  to	  process	  applications.	  During	  this	  time	  the	  majority	  were	  dependent	  on	  
the	  Swedish	  welfare	  system	  for	  their	  integration,	  housing	  and	  income.	  	  	  
	  
Language	  barriers	  also	  hindered	  settlement.	  Interviewees	  with	  respondents	  and	  
immigration	   officials	   stated	   that	   immigrants	   are	   only	   permitted	   to	   take	   the	  
Swedish	   for	   Immigrants	   (SFI)	   language	   course	   once	   they	   have	   gained	   their	  
resident	  permit.	  Once	   they	  do	  however	   they	   are	   faced	  with	   the	  difficulties	  of	  
learning	   the	   Swedish	   language,	   which	   many	   still	   struggle	   with.	   Swedish	  
municipalities	  offer	  different	  SFI	  courses	  depending	  on	  levels	  of	  education	  and	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language	   proficiency	   but	   the	   state	   recommends	   840	   hours	   for	   beginners106.	  
Language	  barriers	  have	  made	   finding	  a	   job	  problematic	   and	   stalled	  economic	  
integration.	  One	  diaspora	  reflected	  on	  the	  consequences	  of	  this	  on	  the	  diaspora	  
at	   large	   and	   stated,	   “so	  we	   couldn’t	   go	   to	   school	   straight	   away	   and	   learn	   the	  
language	  and	  residency	  and	  citizenship	  took	  a	  while,	  we	  were	   living	  in	  camps	  
for	   a	   long	   time.	   This	   affected	   a	   lot	   of	   immigrants.	   They	   became	   passive	   not	  
active	  in	  life.”107	  
	  
Secondly	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  Iraqis	  in	  Sweden	  who	  left	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  beyond,	  
their	  education	   levels	  and	  skills	   took	  a	  downward	  spiral	  during	   the	   1980-­‐1989	  
Iraq-­‐Iran	  war,	  the	  1990	  Gulf	  war	  and	  throughout	  the	  economic	  sanctions	  period	  
(1991-­‐2003).	   The	   effect	   of	   economic	   sanctions	   on	   Iraqi	   society	   and	   education	  
levels	   is	  difficult	   to	  underestimate.	  According	   to	   the	  United	  Nations	  Office	  of	  
the	  Humanitarian	  Coordinator	  for	  Iraq,	  	  
	   [A}t	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   1980s	   Iraq	   had	   one	   of	   the	   best	   education	  
systems	   in	   the	   Arab	   world.	   The	   gross	   enrolment	   rate	   (GER)	   for	   primary	  
schooling	  was	  around	  100%’’,	  adding	  that	  ‘‘the	  Higher	  Education,	  especially	  the	  
scientific	  and	  technological	  institutions	  were	  of	  international	  standard,	  staffed	  
by	   high	   quality	   personnel’’	   (United	   Nations	   Office	   of	   the	   Humanitarian	  
Coordinator	  for	  Iraq,	  2003).	  
	  
Yet	   all	   education	   institutions	   in	   Iraq	  were	   affected	  by	   the	   economic	   embargo	  
(Santisteban,	   2005).	   According	   to	   UNICEF’s	   2002	   report,	   literacy	   rates	   for	  
females	   had	   fallen	   from	   87	   percent	   in	   the	   1980s	   to	   45	   percent	   in	   1995.	  
Meanwhile	  primary	  and	  secondary	  drop	  out	  rates	  had	  vastly	  increased,	  23.7	  per	  
cent	  of	  children	  of	  primary	  school	  age	  were	  not	  in	  primary	  school,	  with	  figures	  
higher	   for	   girls	   and	   those	   in	   rural	   areas	   (quoted	   in	  Santisteban,	   2005,	  pg	  63).	  
Families	  could	  no	  longer	  afford	  to	  send	  their	  children	  to	  school.	  Instead	  many	  
were	  forced	  into	  work	  at	  a	  young	  age	  in	  order	  to	  support	  their	  families	  and	  help	  
put	  food	  on	  the	  table.	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  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  3,	  8	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm	  
107	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  10,	  12	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  2014,	  Stockholm 
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The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  those	  arriving	  into	  Sweden	  had	  a	  low	  level	  of	  education.	  
Having	   lived	   through	   successive	   wars,	   economic	   sanctions	   and	   foreign	  
intervention,	  many	  of	  the	  refugees	  coming	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  and	  since	  2003	  were	  
the	  product	  of	  the	  gradual	  degradation	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  and	  society.	  Education	  
under	  duress	  became	  a	  luxury	  for	  many	  impoverished	  families	  trying	  to	  survive	  
and	  especially	  women’s	  education	  took	  a	  backseat	  (Jawaheri,	  2008).	  	  Thus	  those	  
who	  arrived	  in	  the	  1990s	  had	  a	  low	  level	  of	  education,	  a	  fact	  supported	  by	  the	  
average	   level	   of	   education	   of	   the	   majority	   of	   interviewed	   respondents	   who	  
arrived	  during	   this	   time	   (of	  which	  only	  3	  out	  of	  28	  had	  a	  masters	  degree	  and	  
several	   did	   not	   have	   a	   bachelors	   degree).	   Respondent	   three	   reflects,	   “In	   the	  
1980s	   the	   Iraqis	  who	  were	  here	  were	   few	  but	  what	   I	  would	  consider	   first	   rate	  
Iraqis,	  from	  the	  oppressed	  intellectuals,	  academics.	  It	  was	  from	  the	  middle	  and	  
above	   in	   terms	   of	   education	   and	   culture	   and	   politics.	   But	   after	   1991	   this	  
changed,	  it	  became	  refugees.”108	  	  
	  
Indeed	   for	  many	  who	  arrived	   in	   the	   1990s,	   Sweden	  was	  a	   first	  opportunity	   to	  
gain	   a	   full-­‐time	   education	   and	   relevant	   skills.	   Nearly	   a	   quarter	   of	   the	   27	  
Respondents	   had	   not	   continued	   their	   high	   school	   education	   on	   arrival	   to	  
Sweden.	  The	  rest	  who	  held	  a	  degree	  were	  not	  able	  to	  use	  them	  in	  Sweden	  due	  
to	  the	  fact	  that	  Iraqi	  or	  Soviet	  degrees	  are	  not	  recognised	  by	  the	  Swedish	  state,	  
which	  requires	  immigrants	  to	  re-­‐do	  degrees	  or	  re-­‐train	  outside	  of	  their	  chosen	  
field.	   This	   was	   not	   the	   case	   in	   the	   UK,	   where	   degrees	   are	   recognised,	   even	  
though	  some	  degrees,	   such	  as	  medical	  degrees,	  do	   require	   tests	   to	  prove	   that	  
skills	   are	   equivalent	   to	   those	   practiced	   in	   the	   UK109.	   In	   any	   case,	   this	   in	  
combination	  with	  language	  difficulties	  has	  demotivated	  many	  from	  trying	  and	  
yielding	  to	  accepting	  government	  funds	  instead.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  3,	  8	  October	  2015,	  Stockholm	  
109	  Author	  telephone	  and	  email	  communication	  with	  General	  Medical	  Council,	  10	  November	  
2016.	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Under	   these	   circumstances,	   it	   is	   not	   hard	   to	   appreciate	   that	   certain	   types	   of	  
political	   transnationalism	  may	  be	   inaccessible	   to	   those	  who	   lack	   the	  material	  
resources	   to	   organise,	   influence	   and	   lobby.	   Consequently	   in	   the	   early	   1990s	  
political	  activism	  was	  minimal	  in	  the	  Iraqi	  diaspora,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Iraqi	  
Kurds	  who	  in	  1991	  were	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  changing	  situation	  in	  Iraqi	  
Kurdistan.	   The	   no-­‐fly	   zone	   agreement,	   which	   created	   a	   safe	   haven	   for	   Iraqi	  
Kurds	  in	  the	  north	  of	  the	  country	  in	  1991	  (Tripp,	  2007),	  	  created	  an	  autonomous	  
region	  many	  could	  now	  return	  to	  and	  reconnect	  with	  their	  homeland	  socially,	  
commercially,	  culturally	  and	  politically110.	  Yet	   for	  the	  rest	  of	   the	  diaspora	  who	  
were	  still	  denied	  return	  or	  in	  many	  cases	  contact	  with	  their	  homeland	  the	  only	  
recourse	  were	  grass–roots	  political	  activities	  in	  the	  diaspora.	  	  
	  
Political	  activity	  following	  the	  first	  1990	  Gulf	  War	  
Things	  began	  to	  change	  after	  the	  first	  Gulf	  war	  and	  into	  the	  mid	  to	  late	  1990s	  
when	  grass-­‐roots	  activity	  increased.	  Diaspora	  groups	  had	  by	  now	  become	  more	  
economically	   integrated,	   language	   skills	   had	   improved	   and	   Swedish	   society	  
more	   understood.	   This	   was	   reflected	   in	   their	   ability	   to	   mobilise	   not	   only	  
amongst	   themselves	   but	   also	   in	   solidarity	   with	   other	   Swedish	   civil	   society	  
groups,	   politicians	   and	   the	  media111.	   One	   respondent	   had	   joined	   the	   Swedish	  
Left	  Party	  and	  had	  the	  support	  of	  other	   left	   leaning	  Latin	  American	  solidarity	  
groups	   and	   Swedish	   civil	   society	   organisations.112	  Others	   worked	   through	   the	  
Swedish	  Red	  Cross	   or	  Amnesty	   International	   to	   raise	   awareness	   about	   family	  
members	  imprisoned	  by	  the	  regime113.	  	  
	  
	  Whereas	  in	  the	  1990s	  there	  was	  only	  the	  14	  July	  club	  that	  united	  the	  small	  and	  
mixed	   Iraqi	   population	   in	   Sweden,	   in	   the	   1990s	   as	   more	   and	   more	   Iraqis	  
arrived,	   new	   Iraqi	   organisations	   were	   established	   to	   represent	   the	   diverse	  
ethnic,	  religious	  and	  political	  group	  interests.	  For	  example,	  a	  Mandean	  Society	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  Author	  interview	  with	  Iraqi	  Ambassador	  to	  Sweden.	  
111	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  20,	  16	  June	  2015,	  Malmo	  
112	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  3,	  08	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm 
113	  Author	  interviews	  with	  Respondent	  9	  and	  21,	  11	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm	  and	  26	  June	  2015	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was	  formed114,	  as	  was	  a	  Turkmen	  association115.	  Other	  organisations	  including	  a	  
literary	   society	   and	   more	   women’s	   organisation	   such	   as	   the	   Iraqi	   Women’s	  
League	   were	   also	   established 116 .	   Furthermore	   in	   the	   1990s	   the	   large	   Shi’a	  
migration	   wave	   saw	   the	   creation	   of	   Islamic	   parties	   including	   the	   Da’wa	   and	  
SCIRI	  who	  were	  now	  also	  involved	  in	  political	  activism	  against	  the	  regime.	  	  
	  
The	  increase	  in	  political	  and	  social	  organisations	  meant	  that	  political	  activism	  
towards	   the	   homeland	   also	   increased.	   By	   1995	   the	   Federation	   of	   Iraqi	  
Associations	  in	  Sweden	  was	  established	  as	  an	  umbrella	  organisation	  to	  cater	  for	  
and	   represent	   Iraqis	   in	   Sweden.	   It	   was	   actively	   working	   with	   Swedish	   civil	  
society	  organisations	  such	  as	   the	  Swedish	  Red	  Cross	   to	   raise	  awareness	  about	  
conditions	  in	  Iraq,	  economic	  sanctions	  and	  Iraqi	  refugees117.	  One	  of	  its	  founders	  
was	   referred	   to	   a	   European	   Union	  Migrants	   Forum	  where	   immigrants	   issues	  
where	   discussed	   and	  where	   he	   could	   raise	   awareness	   about	   Iraq	   in	   quarterly	  
meetings	  in	  Brussels	  and	  to	  a	  supranational	  body	  118.	  Meanwhile,	  political	  party	  
representations	  and	  other	  Iraqi	  organisations	  became	  more	  outspoken,	  meeting	  
with	  Swedish	  politicians,	  parliamentary	  committees	  and	  protests	  became	  more	  
frequent.	  
	  
The	   difference	   between	   the	   early	   1990s	   and	   the	   period	   before	   2003	   war	   was	  
stark.	  	  With	  increased	  integration	  into	  Swedish	  society	  the	  diaspora	  were	  now	  
connected	   to	   political	   networks	   with	   Swedish	   organisations,	   Swedish	  
politicians	   and	   the	   Swedish	  media.	  Respondent	   20	   emphasised	   the	  difference	  
between	  his	  political	  engagement	  during	   the	  early	   1990s	  and	   the	  years	  before	  
2003.	  	  
	   “R20:	  For	  example	   in	   1991	  we	  went	  out	  once	  to	  protest	  and	   it	   stopped,	  
where	   as	   this	   continued	   throughout	   the	   period	   [2003]	   and	   we	   tried	   and	  
influenced	   Swedish	   society	   and	   got	   them	   to	   stand	   in	   solidarity	   with	   us.	  We	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  8,	  10	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm	  
115	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  22,	  23	  June	  2015,	  Stockholm	  
116	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  21,	  23	  June	  2015,	  Stockholm	  
117	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  25,	  30	  June	  2015,	  Stockholm	  118	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  25 
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reached	  the	  big	  Swedish	  civil	  society	  organisations	  and	  got	  them	  to	  come	  out	  
with	  us.	  	  
Author:	  Who	  for	  example?	  
R20:	  Nearly	  all	   the	  Swedish	  political	  parties,	  mainly	   the	  social	  democrats	  and	  
the	  left	  parties,	  mainly	  the	  left	  as	  their	  line	  is	  always	  against	  America.	  Vänster	  
and	   Socialdemokraterna	   and	   communists	   too.	   The	   biggest	   Swedish	  
organisation	  was	  Attack,	  I	  think	  it	  also	  existed	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  
Author:	  Yes	  there	  was	  the	  Stop	  the	  War	  coalition.	  
R20:	  Yes.	  It	  was	  with	  liberal	  people	  but	  this	  was	  the	  biggest.	  Also	  through	  them	  
and	  the	  media	  we	  were	  able	  to	  reach	  ordinary	  people	  who	  came	  out	  too	  […]	  our	  
activities	   were	   better	   with	   the	   Swedes	   not	   just	   the	   Iraqis	   because	   of	   the	  
language.	  This	  was	  an	  important	  angle.”	  	  
	  
Improved	   language	  skills	  and	  understanding	  the	  political	   system	  opened	  up	  a	  
new	   audience	   and	   new	   political	   activities	   targeted	   at	   raising	   awareness	   and	  
calling	  for	  regime	  change.	  Language	  was	  repeatedly	  mentioned	  as	  a	  barrier	  and	  
facilitator	   for	   political	   activity.	   Several	   mentioned	   that	   their	   good	   language	  
skills	   helped	   them	   to	  mobilise	  with	   Swedish	  people	   and	   government119,	  while	  
those	  whose	  language	  skills	  were	  weak	  were	  limited	  to	  working	  with	  Arabs	  or	  
other	  ethnic	  groups.	  	  
	  
The	  change	  between	  the	  early	  1990’s	  and	  the	  2000’s	  can	  be	  demonstrated	  using	  
the	   following	   example.	   In	   2003,	   just	   before	   the	   war,	   when	   the	   Iraqi	   Cultural	  
Centre	  in	  Malmo	  heard	  that	  Anna	  Lindh,	  the	  Swedish	  Foreign	  Minister	  at	  the	  
time,	  was	  visiting	  Malmo,	  they	  used	  their	  contacts	  with	  politicians	  and	  invited	  
her	   to	  give	  a	   talk	   about	  Sweden’s	   foreign	  policy	  position	   towards	   Iraq.	   	  Anna	  
Lindh	  reportedly	  gave	  the	  first	  formal	  and	  public	  address	  of	  Sweden’s	  position	  
and	  stated	  that	  Sweden	  would	  be	  following	  UN	  agreements	  and	  laws120.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  10,	  11	  October	  2014,	  and	  Respondent	  11,	  12	  October	  2014,	  
Respondent	  3,	  8	  October	  2014,	  Respondent	  20,	  16	  June	  2015	  
120	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  20,	  16	  June	  2015,	  Malmö	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Yet	   despite	   the	   increased	   integration	   and	   rise	   in	   political	   activity,	   the	   fact	  
remains	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  diaspora	  had	  only	  been	  in	  Sweden	  for	  a	  decade	  
or	  so.	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  process	  of	  integration	  was	  still	  on	  going	  by	  the	  time	  
that	  the	  Iraq	  war	  became	  imminent.	  This	  did	  not	  leave	  enough	  time	  for	  Iraqis	  
to	   establish	   themselves,	   gain	   positions	   of	   power	   and	   influence	   in	   Swedish	  
society	   and	   therefore	   be	   able	   to	   lobby	   effectively	   the	   Swedish	   government	   to	  
intervene	   in	   Iraq,	   had	   there	   been	   such	   a	   desire.	   Nor	   did	   it	   necessarily	   leave	  
enough	  time	  to	  become	  financially	  successful	  so	  that	  resources	  could	  be	  spent	  
on	  opposition	  activities,	  and	  organisations.	  
	  
As	  discussed	   in	  the	  theory	  chapter,	   the	  diaspora	   literature	  has	  expounded	  the	  
important	  role	  of	  elites	  in	  diasporic	  life	  and	  political	  mobilisation	  due	  to	  their	  
resources	   (Tölölyan,	  2000;	  Koinova,	  2013;	  Baser,	  2012;	  Doraï,	  2002b;	  Adamson,	  
2002)	   and	   as	   I	   argue	   in	   this	   thesis	   their	   social	   and	   political	   networks.	   The	  
absence	   of	   elites	   affected	   the	   capability	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   Swedish	   diaspora	   to	  
organise	   effectively	   and	   influence	   policy	  makers	   and	   thus	   take	   part	   in	   Iraq’s	  
future	   state-­‐building	   plans.	   Though	   there	   were	   political	   party	   branches	  
representing	  the	  ICP,	  PUK,	  KDP,	  ADM	  and	  later	  Da’wa	  and	  SCIRI,	  their	  efforts	  
largely	   focussed	   on	   raising	   awareness	   through	   ad-­‐hoc	  meetings	   and	   protests	  
due	  to	  their	  inability	  to	  access	  material	  resources,	  both	  financially	  and	  in	  terms	  
of	   powerful	   social	   and	   political	   networks.	   When	   I	   asked	   political	   party	  
representatives	  what	  they	  did	  before	  the	  war,	  one	  of	  them	  stated,	  	  “We	  used	  to	  
go	  out	  to	  protest	  against	  the	  Iraqi	  embassy	  with	  other	  parties	  in	  a	  general	  sense	  
about	  what	  was	  happening	  inside”121.	  	  
	  
The	  lack	  of	  prominent	  Iraqi	  political	  leaders	  based	  in	  Sweden	  did	  not	  create	  the	  
means	   for	  a	  strong	  opposition	  centre	  to	   form	  in	  the	  country.	  As	  one	  diaspora	  
respondent	   remarked,	   those	   who	   had	   money	   went	   to	   London	   to	   reap	   the	  
benefits	  of	  a	  low	  tax	  system	  and	  where	  they	  already	  spoke	  English,	  meanwhile	  
those	   seeking	  humanitarian	  assistance	  went	   to	  Sweden122.	   Iraqi	  political	  party	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  9,	  11	  October	  2015,	  Stockholm	  
122	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  20,	  16	  June	  2015,	  Malmö	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representations	   in	  Sweden	  therefore	  acted	  as	  a	  support	  network	  but	  were	  not	  
the	  drivers	  of	  strategy	  or	  action.	  They	   informed	  Swedish	  politicians	  about	  the	  
situation	  in	  Iraq	  and	  their	  party’s	  positions	  vis	  à	  vis	  the	  war123.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  seeing	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  Iraqis	  arriving	  in	  Sweden	  in	  the	  1990s	  
were	  conflict-­‐generated	  Shi’a	   Iraqis,	   their	   transnational	  networks	  were	   largely	  
social	  not	  political,	  consisting	  of	  friends	  and	  family	  or	  religious	  kin	  inside	  and	  
outside	   the	   country	   because	   during	   Saddam’s	   reign	   the	   Shi’a	   were	  
discriminated	   against	   and	   there	   was	   no	   way	   for	   them	   to	   be	   openly	   political	  
during	   this	   time.	   It	   is	   these	   chain	   migrations	   that	   continued	   to	   flow	   into	  
Sweden	  as	  extended	  families	  joined	  their	  relatives	  in	  Sweden	  and	  spouses	  and	  
minors	  were	  re-­‐united	  under	  Sweden’s	  family	  reunification	  policy	  124.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  however	  that	  political	  engagement	  was	  impossible,	  but	  rather	  
under	  this	  context	  it	  was	  rather	  limited.	  Many	  respondents	  interviewed	  stated	  
that	   they	   were	   involved	   in	   political	   activity	   in	   the	   diaspora	   as	   soon	   as	   they	  
arrived	   through	   their	   friends	   or	   ethnic	   compatriots,	   primarily	   for	   social	  
reasons 125 ,	   even	   during	   their	   time	   in	   the	   Swedish	   camps.	   Yet,	   with	   their	  
restricted	  material	  capabilities,	  know-­‐how	  of	  the	  Swedish	  system	  and	  language,	  
gatherings,	   discussions,	   and	   meetings	   within	   the	   diaspora	   were	   the	   only	  
activities	  they	  had	  access	  to.	  
	  
Sweden’s	  foreign	  policy	  and	  diaspora	  political	  activity	  during	  occupation	  
While	   the	  profile	  of	   the	  Swedish	   Iraqi	  diaspora	  explains	  why	  political	   activity	  
was	   limited	   prior	   to	   intervention,	   Sweden’s	   lack	   of	   involvement	   in	   military	  
intervention	   explains	   why	   during	   occupation	   the	   diaspora	   were	   directed	  
towards	   supporting	   Iraq’s	   fledgling	   state	   through	   civil	   society.	   Confirming	  
Hypothesis	  2,	   it	   is	  argued	   that	   the	  Swedish	  government’s	  anti-­‐war	   stance	  and	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  Author	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  Respondent	  9,	  11	  October	  2015,	  Stockholm	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  Swedish	  Migration	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  1,	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  October	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non-­‐involvement	   in	   military	   intervention	   did	   not	   create	   the	   political	  
opportunities	   for	   the	   diaspora	   to	   contribute	   to	   institution-­‐building	   and	  
governance,	  which	  directed	  their	  political	  engagement	  towards	  supporting	  the	  
state	  through	  civil	  society	  and	  grass-­‐roots	  activity.	  By	  not	  engaging	  in	  military	  
intervention	  and	  occupation,	  the	  Swedish	  government	  did	  not	  have	  a	  say	  in	  the	  
building	  of	   the	   future	   Iraqi	   state.	  Consequently,	   the	   Iraqi	  diaspora	   in	  Sweden	  
had	  no	   entry	   into	   the	   country	  during	   the	   occupation	   years,	   and	   therefore	  no	  
stake	  in	  contributing	  to	  Iraq’s	  political	  institutions	  and	  future	  governance.	  	  
	  
Indeed,	  in	  the	  weeks	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  2003	  Iraq	  war,	  it	  was	  very	  clear	  that	  the	  
Swedish	  public	  held	  strong	  anti-­‐war	  views	  about	  the	  war	  in	  Iraq.	  Retrospective	  
reports	   estimate	   that	   the	   global	   anti-­‐war	  march	   on	   the	   15	   February	   attracted	  
between	   100,000	  and	  up	   to	   150,000	  people	   in	  Stockholm	   (Vries	   and	  Engelien,	  
2007).	  Swedish	  organisations	  and	  citizens	  from	  all	  hues	  and	  colours	  joined	  the	  
march,	  including	  politicians	  from	  all	  parties	  but	  mainly	  the	  Vänster	  (Left)	  and	  
Green	   Party.	   A	   Left	   party	   member	   of	   parliament	   on	   the	   Foreign	   Affairs	  
Committee	  who	  was	  an	  activist	  at	   the	   time	  recalled	   that	  on	  both	  sides	  of	   the	  
political	  spectrum	  there	  was	  a	  feeling	  that	  this	  war	  was	  simply	  “wrong”126.	  	  	  
	  
This	   sentiment	   had	   a	   lasting	   impression	   on	   the	   Swedish	   government	   at	   the	  
time.	   The	   government	   of	   Goran	   Persson,	   the	   Prime	  Minister,	   had	   taken	   the	  
decision	   to	   follow	   the	   United	   Nation’s	   lead,	   and	   who	   later	   declared	   the	  
occupation	  of	   Iraq	   illegal	   under	   the	  UN	  Charter	   (MacAskill	   and	  Washington,	  
2004).	   Interviews	   with	   parliamentarians	   and	   government	   officials	   state	   that	  
Goran	   Persson’s	   government	   was	   not	   necessarily	   against	   the	   war	   but	   that	  
Sweden	  was	  following	  a	  long	  tradition	  of	  following	  UN	  multilateral	  channels	  to	  
supporting	  peace:	  
	   “MP1:	   First	   of	   all	   to	   rely	   on	   the	   UN	  whether	   it	   is	   right	   or	   wrong	   as	   a	  
principal	   idea	   is	   a	   long	   tradition	   in	   Sweden	   and	   is	   very	   convenient	   for	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  Author	  interview	  with	  Member	  of	  Parliament	  2,	  30	  June	  2015,	  Telephone	  call	  to	  Gothenburg	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politicians	  here	  because	  you	  can	  use	   the	  UN	   to	   say	  well	   the	  UN	  says	  you	  are	  
good	  and	  you	  are	  bad	  etc.	  	  
Author:	  Where	  does	  this	  come	  from?	  
MP1:	  One	  of	  the	  first	  Secretary	  General’s	   in	  the	  UN	  is	  Dag	  Hjalmar	  Agne	  Carl	  
Hammarskjöld	  and	  Sweden	  is	  in	  all	  these	  years	  the	  most	  hardcore	  supporter	  of	  
the	   UN.	   The	   idea	   of	   a	   small	   country	   who	   wants	   to	   support	   peace	   through	  
multilateral	  relations	  and	  the	  super	  powers	  have	  to	  come	  down	  a	  little	  bit	  and	  
sit	  down	  and	  all	  the	  poor	  countries	  have	  to	  be	  there	  as	  well,	  this	  Swedish	  idea	  
of	  dialogue	  etc.	  But	   it	  has	  gone	  too	   far	  of	  course	  because	  what	  the	  UN	  did	   in	  
Srebrenica	   is	   a	   disaster,	   but	   still	   you	   cannot	   go	   anywhere	   else	   in	   the	   world	  
where	  the	  support	  for	  the	  UN,	  the	  	  moral	   support	   for	   the	   UN	   is	   bigger	   than	  
here.	  Maybe	  Norway.”	  
	  
Another	  government	  official	  meanwhile	  indicated	  that	  it	  was	  not	  a	  case	  of	  the	  
government	   being	   against	   intervention,	   that	   this	   was	   more	   the	   public	  
sentiment.	  Rather	  it	  simply	  chose	  not	  to	  send	  troops,	  though	  in	  an	  indirect	  way	  
it	  did	  aid	  intervention	  since	  Swedish	  weapons	  were	  used	  in	  Iraq127.	  
	  
The	  above	  extracts	  are	  revealing	  about	  Sweden’s	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  Iraq	  at	  
the	  time	  but	  also	  help	  elucidate	  the	  cautious	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  engaged	  with	  
the	   country	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   intervention.	   On	   the	   one	   hand	   Sweden	   was	  
interested	  in	  helping	  rebuild	  the	  country,	  yet	  on	  the	  other	  it	  steered	  away	  from	  
any	  direct	  political	  involvement	  with	  coalition	  forces	  during	  this	  period.	  Several	  
interviewees	  indicated	  that	  the	  Left	  party,	  which	  was	  in	  a	  coalition	  government	  
with	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  at	  the	  time	  and	  the	  Communist	  party	  saw	  the	  Iraqi	  
Governing	  Council	  as	  a	  Vichy	  government128	  or	  a	  Quisling	  government129.	  This	  
was	   in	   reference	   to	   Norway’s	   Vidkun	   Quisling’s	   collaboration	   with	   the	   Nazi	  
government	   during	   the	   Second	  World	  War,	   which	   was	   considered	   a	   puppet	  
government.	   I	   asked	   several	   Swedish	   officials	   about	   this	   and	  most	   disagreed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127 Author interview with Government official 2, 11 June 2015, Stockholm 
128	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  1,	  7	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm	  
129	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  10,	  12	  October	  2014	  Stockholm	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with	  the	  analogy	  of	  a	  Quisling	  government.	  One	  Parliamentarian	  from	  a	  liberal	  
party	  suggested	  that	  puppet	  government	  was	  more	  appropriate130.	  	  
	  
In	  any	  case,	  Sweden	  clearly	  felt	  apprehension	  about	  working	  with	  an	  occupied	  
government,	   as	   did	   other	   EU	   countries	   and	   embassies131,	   so	  working	   through	  
the	  UN	  provided	  Sweden	  a	  means	  of	  helping	  in	  the	  rebuilding	  of	  Iraq	  without	  
directly	   involving	   itself	   with	   the	   coalition.	   Swedish	   foreign	   policy	   and	  
development	   towards	   Iraq	   was	   thus	   directed	   largely	   through	   the	   United	  
Nations	  Mission	  in	  Iraq	  (UNAMI)	  and	  other	  UN	  agencies132.	  For	  instance	  after	  
the	   Canal	   Hotel	   bombing	   in	   August	   2003,	   which	   killed	   the	   UN	   Special	  
Representative	  in	  Iraq,	  Sergio	  Viera,	  the	  UN	  asked	  the	  Swedish	  Rescue	  Agency	  
for	  help,	  but	   as	  one	  Swedish	  Ambassador	   stated	  no	  official	   government	   team	  
was	  sent:	  
	   “The	  Swedish	  Rescue	  Agency	  was	  a	  request	   from	  the	  UN,	  they	  asked	   if	  
we	  could	  help.	  We	  need	  help	  to	  set	  up	  shop	  could	  you	  help	  us	  logistically?	  So	  
we	  did	  not	  send	  any	  Swedish	  official	  government	  team	  in	  that	  sense	  this	  was	  a	  
specific	  question	  from	  the	  UN	  officially,	  can	  you	  support	  us	  logistically?	  And	  of	  
course	  when	  the	  UN	  asks	  for	  help	  Sweden	  tries	  to	  help	  and	  this	  is	  what	  we	  did	  
in	  this	  specific	  case.133”	  
	  
Just	   as	   significantly,	   the	   Swedes	   did	   not	   have	   an	   embassy	   in	   Iraq	   during	   this	  
time.	  In	  2003	  the	  First	  Secretary	  was	  based	  in	  Amman,	  Jordan	  and	  it	  was	  only	  
once	   the	   IGC	   had	   regained	   its	   sovereignty	   under	   UN	   Security	   Council	  
Resolution	  1546	  that	  Sweden	  decided	  to	  have	  an	  Ambassador	  for	  Iraq	  and	  one	  
was	  sworn	  in.	  There	  was	  no	  embassy	  in	  Baghdad	  till	  2009	  when	  one	  was	  finally	  
established	  in	  the	  Red	  Zone	  134.	  The	  lack	  of	  a	  Swedish	  embassy	  in	  Iraq	  would	  act	  
as	  a	  hindrance	  to	  cooperation	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  seeing	  that	  there	  was	  
no	  Swedish	  representative	  on	  the	  ground	  to	  work	  with	  Iraqis	  or	  facilitate	  entry	  
into	  the	  country	  for	  Iraqi	  Swedes.	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  Author	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Consequently	  for	  the	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  in	  Sweden	  opportunities	  to	  engage	  directly	  
in	   institution-­‐building	   or	   governance	   in	   Iraq	  were	  minimal	   during	   this	   time.	  
Since	  the	  coalition	  was	  the	  governing	  body	  at	  the	  time,	  by	  not	  forming	  part	  of	  
this	   coalition	   the	   Swedish	   government	   distanced	   itself	   from	   occupation	   and	  
governance	  of	  Iraq,	  which	  limited	  the	  diaspora’s	  access	  to	  the	  political	  process	  
inside	   the	   country.	   Their	   anti-­‐war	   stance	   meant	   that	   very	   little	   political	  
collaboration	   was	   occurring	   between	   Sweden	   and	   Iraq	   whilst	   it	   was	   still	  
occupied.	   The	   author	   asked	   the	   former	   First	   Secretary	   to	   Iraq	  whether	   there	  
was	  any	  political	  work	  with	  Iraq	  during	  the	  period	  2003	  to	  28	  June	  2004	  and	  he	  
responded,	  “No.	  No	  new	  political	  initiatives,	  that	  is	  true.”135	  
	  
The	   anti-­‐war	   movement	   that	   swept	   the	   country	   prior	   to	   the	   Iraq	   war	   thus	  
influenced	   Sweden’s	   foreign	   policy.	   Large	   swathes	   of	   the	   Swedish	   public	   had	  
made	  their	  feelings	  towards	  the	  war	  quite	  clear	  as	  witnessed	  by	  the	  15	  February	  
2013	   global	   march,	   one	   of	   the	   biggest	   marches	   in	   Swedish	   history	   after	   the	  
Vietnam	   War.	   This	   influenced	   the	   Swedish	   government’s	   foreign	   policy	  
position,	   which	   was	   against	   intervention,	   and	   instead	   chose	   to	   follow	   UN	  
protocol,	  which	  weakened	  any	  real	  power	  to	  influence	  or	  be	  involved	  in	  pre	  and	  
post	  war	  state-­‐building	  plans.	  It	  is	  no	  surprise	  then	  that	  prior	  and	  post	  regime	  
change	   access	   to	   state-­‐building	   inside	   Iraq	   was	   inaccessible	   for	   the	   Iraqi	  
diaspora	  in	  Sweden.	  	  
	  
In	  fact,	  research	  amidst	  the	  Iraqi	  Swedish	  diaspora	  only	  pointed	  to	  one	  diaspora	  
individual	   who	   was	   able	   to	   return	   to	   Iraq	   during	   the	   occupation	   years	   and	  
successfully	  enter	  the	  political	  process.	  Respondent	  27,	  returned	  to	  Iraq	  in	  April	  
2003	  to	  run	  a	  democratic	  movement.	  When	  I	  asked	  him	  how	  he	  was	  able	  to	  do	  
this	  during	  occupation	  he	  stated	  that	  he	  was	  only	  allowed	  to	  enter	  through	  the	  
Jordanian	   border	   because	   he	   had	   a	   UN	   identity	   card	   through	   his	   work	   with	  
Swedish	  organisations.	  He	  stated	  that	  the	  Americans	  had	  asked	  the	   Jordanian	  
government	  not	  to	  let	  any	  one	  in	  and	  only	  Iraqi	  diasporans	  who	  had	  been	  part	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135 Author interview with Swedish Ambassador 1, 2 February 2015, London. On the 28 June 2004 
Iraq regained sovereign powers from the coalition forces. 
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of	   the	  opposition	  were	  able	   to	  enter	   the	  country	  during	   the	   time136.	  Although	  
this	   fact	   could	   not	   be	   triangulated,	   it	   remains	   the	   case	   that	   leading	   up	   to	  
intervention	  and	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  occupation,	  the	  Swedish	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  was	  
limited	  in	  what	  it	  could	  contribute	  to	  Iraq.	  Political	  activity	  was	  largely	  oriented	  
towards	  anti-­‐occupation	  protests	   in	  Sergels	  Torg137	  in	   central	   Stockholm	  or	   in	  
front	  of	  the	  Riksdag138.	  	  
	  
Swedish	  diasporic	  political	  activity	  from	  2004	  to	  2008139	  	  
Once	   intervention	  had	   taken	  place	   and	   the	   anti-­‐war	  movement	  declined,	   the	  
diaspora	  who	  were	  part	  of	   the	  anti-­‐war	  movement	   faced	  a	  new	  reality.	  Either	  
they	   could	   continue	   protesting	   against	   the	   coalition	   or	   start	   thinking	   about	  
how	  to	  contribute	   to	  rebuilding	   the	  country.	  Sweden’s	  anti-­‐occupation	  stance	  
had	  cut	  any	  links	  to	  the	  coalition	  and	  thus	  contributing	  to	  institution-­‐building	  
and	   governance	   in	   Iraq.	   Instead	   this	   channelled	   their	   political	   contributions	  
towards	   supporting	   the	   state	   through	   civil	   society	   by	   trying	   to	   support	  
democracy	  in	  Iraq.	  	  
	  
Knowing	   that	   Sweden’s	   foreign	   policy	   towards	   Iraq	   was	   directed	   towards	  
development	  through	  the	  United	  Nations,	  diaspora	  groups	  saw	  an	  opportunity	  
to	   urge	   Sweden’s	   democratic	   tradition	   to	   support	   Iraq’s	   transition	   to	  
democracy.	  One	  such	  organisation,	  the	  Federation	  of	  Iraqi	  Associations	  (FIA),	  
an	   umbrella	   organisation	   representing	   over	   60	   Iraqi	   organisations	   from	  
different	   ethnicities,	   sects	   and	   political	   persuasions,	   started	   to	   lobby	   in	   2004	  
the	  Swedish	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  (MFA).	  It	  called	  on	  the	  MFA	  to	  organise	  
a	  meeting	   alongside	   Sweden’s	   International	  Development	  Agency	   (SIDA)	   and	  
the	   Ministry	   of	   Democracy	   in	   order	   to	   encourage	   Sweden’s	   involvement	   in	  
supporting	   Iraq’s	   fledgling	   democracy.	   I	   questioned	   Respondent	   25	   what	   the	  
goal	   of	   the	   meeting	   was,	   “the	   goal	   was	   that	   the	   Swedish	   budget	   had	   some	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  28,	  19	  June	  2016,	  London	  137	  Literally	  means	  Sergel’s	  square	  in	  Swedish.	  It	  is	  a	  public	  square	  in	  central	  Stockholm	  138	  The	  Swedish	  Parliament	  is	  called	  the	  Riksdag	  139	  After	  2008,	  the	  Swedish	  government’s	  	  Iraq	  strategy	  was	  changed	  from	  working	  with	  diaspora	  groups	  to	  contracting	  work	  to	  international	  organizations	  working	  in	  Iraq.	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money	  to	  put	  towards	  supporting	  democracy	  in	  Iraq	  but	  it	  didn’t	  know	  what	  to	  
do	   with	   it	   so	   at	   least	   each	   person	   [from	   the	   federation]	   could	   present	   their	  
views	  and	  they	  have	  a	  general	  idea”140	  
	  
Indeed	  by	  2004,	  the	  Swedish	  government	  awoke	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  their	  midst	  
was	  a	  big	  Iraqi	  diaspora	   in	  Sweden	  they	  could	  tap	  into.	  Swedish	  politicians	  as	  
well	  as	  MFA	  officials	  started	  to	  meet	  and	  listen	  to	  diaspora	  groups141.	  	  
	   	  
	   “This	  unique	  relationship	  we	  have	  between	  our	  countries	  where	  so	  many	  
Swedes	  are	  of	   Iraqi	  origin.	   I	  mean	  Olof	  Palme,	  Swedish	  prime	  minister	  was	  a	  
negotiator	   in	   the	   Iraq–Iran	   war,	   and	   there	   were	   Swedish	   companies	   in	   Iraq	  
since	  the	  1950s.	  ABB	  built	  all	  the	  electricity	  basically	  that’s	  why	  the	  Americans	  
had	   difficulty	   with	   the	   electricity	   grid	   because	   basically	   it	   was	   all	   European	  
standards.	  And	  ASEA	  from	  Sweden	  and	  of	  course	  Erikson	  and	  these	  companies,	  
all	  things	  taken	  together	  it	  was	  a	  unique	  relationship.	  The	  government	  wanted	  
to	  move	  ahead	  on	  that.	  Mrs	  Roxman142	  had	  very	  clearly	  that	  task.143”	  
	  
Subsequently,	  the	  MFA’s	  response	  to	  helping	  rebuild	  Iraq	  was	  to	  contribute	  to	  
the	  long-­‐term	  development	  of	  a	  democratic	  Iraq.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  programme,	  the	  
Swedish	  government	  used	  the	  resource	  base	  of	  the	  Swedish-­‐Iraqi	  community	  in	  
Sweden	   to	   help	  with	   this	   strategy.	   Practically	   speaking,	   this	   policy	   translated	  
into	   collaborating	   with	   Iraqi-­‐Swedish	   diaspora	   organisations	   and	   their	   civil	  
society	  partners	   in	   Iraq144.	  The	  experiences	  and	  acquired	  value	   systems	  of	   the	  
Iraqi-­‐Swedish	  resource	  base	  were	  considered	  crucial	  and	  important	  for	  sharing	  
with	   local	   Iraqi	   civil	   society	   organisations.	   As	   one	   government	   report	   stated,	  
“Working	   through	   these	   Swedish-­‐Iraqi	   organisations	   thus	   constitutes	   the	  
immediate	  and	  main	  modality	  for	  providing	  support’	  145.	  
	  
Consequently,	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  member	  organisations	  that	  supported	  democracy	  
and	  human	   rights,	   and	   that	   operated	   a	  non-­‐sectarian	   agenda,	  were	   given	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  25,	  30	  June	  2015,	  Stockholm	  
141	  Author	  interview	  with	  Ambassador	  1,	  15	  February	  2015,	  London	  and	  Government	  official	  	  
142	  The	  first	  Ambassador	  to	  Iraq	  appointed	  by	  the	  Swedish	  Queen	  in	  2004.	  
143	  Author	  interview	  with	  Ambassador	  1,	  15	  February	  2015,	  London 
144	  Author	  interview	  with	  Senior	  SIDA	  Director,	  14	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm	  
145	  	  Evaluation	  of	  the	  Olof	  Palme	  International	  Centre’s	  support	  to	  Civil	  Society	  Organisations	  in	  
Iraq,	  2007,	  shared	  with	  the	  author	  by	  Senior	  SIDA	  Director	  via	  email	  exchange	  on	  7	  August	  2015	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opportunity	   to	   apply	   to	   receive	   funding	   for	   the	   rebuilding	   of	   Iraq’s	   state	   and	  
society146.	   The	  Olof	   Palme	   International	   Center	   (OPIC),	   the	   Social	   Democrat	  
Party’s	  International	  Organisation	  working	  for	  peace	  and	  human	  rights147,	  was	  
chosen	  to	  administer	  an	  Iraq	  Programme	  between	  mid-­‐2005	  and	  mid-­‐2008	  with	  
a	  total	  budget	  of	  SEK	  35	  million.148	  	  
	  
Table	  1.	  Diaspora	  co-­‐development	  projects	  in	  Iraq149.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  Interview	  with	  Senior	  SIDA	  Director	  
147	  	  Olof	  Palme	  International	  Center,	  www.palmecenter.se/en/about-­‐palmecentret/	  [Last	  
Accessed	  22	  October	  2015]	  
148	  Quoted	  from	  Swedish	  International	  Development	  Agency’s	  Mapping	  and	  Institutional	  
Analysis	  of	  Civil	  Society	  Groups	  in	  Iraq	  report,	  December	  2008	  shared	  with	  the	  author	  by	  
Senior	  SIDA	  Director	  via	  email	  exchange	  on	  7	  August	  2015.	  	  
149	  SIDA	  Evaluation	  Report.	  	  	  
	   Geographical	  
area	  in	  Iraq	  	  
Focus	  of	  activity	   Target	  
Group	  
Year	   of	  
Activity	  
1	   Baghdad	   Gender	   Equality	   -­‐	  
General	   Education	   and	  
Citizen	  Rights	  
Women	   2006-­‐2007	  




3	   Najaf	   General	   Education	   and	  
Citizen	  Rights	  








4	   Baghdad	   Media	   -­‐	   Political	   and	   Iraqi	   2006-­‐2007	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Citizen	  Rights	   Journalist
s	  
5	   Diwania	   Women’s	   Centre	   in	   a	  
new	  Democracy	  	  
Women	   2006	  
6	   Sadr	  City	   Democracy	   and	  
Equality	   through	   Sport	  













8	   Basra	   Gender	   equality	  
Education	  
Women	   2005-­‐2006	  











Sulaymaniyah	  	   Education	   Women	   2005-­‐2006	  
11	   Baghdad	   Democracy	   Children	   2005-­‐2007	  









Baghdad,	   Sadr	  
City	   and	  
Babylon	  
Education,	   Popular	  
movements	   and	  
Private	  sector	  
Men	   and	  
Women	  
2005-­‐2007	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14	   Kirkuk	   Gender	   Equality	   and	  
Human	  rights	  
Women	   2006-­‐2007	  
15	   Baghdad	   Developing	  Democracy	   Politicall
y	   active	  
people	  
particula
rly	   youth	  
and	  
women.	  
2005	  to	  2007	  
16	   Erbil,	   Dohuk,	  
Sulaymaniyah,	  
Mosul	   and	  
Kirkuk	  






17	   Sulaymaniyah	   Gender	   Equality	   and	  
Democracy	  
development	  
Women	   2005-­‐2006	  
18	   Amadiya	   Developing	  Democracy	  







19	   Basra	   Developing	  Democracy	  
–	   increasing	   political	  
participation.	   Capacity	  










20	   Baghdad	   Empowerment	   of	  
young	  Iraqis	  	  
Youth	   2005-­‐2007	  
21	   Nasiriyah	   Democracy	   and	   Girls	  
with	  special	  needs	  
Girls	   2006-­‐2007	  
182	  	   	  
	  
Table	   1	  above	  shows	   that	  diaspora	  projects	   selected	  by	  OPIC	   focussed	  heavily	  
on	   supporting	   the	   Iraqi	   state	   through	   civil	   society,	   with	   only	   one	   project	  
(number	   9)	   targeting	   state	   officials.	   Most	   of	   the	   projects	   are	   related	   to	  
democratic	  development,	   improving	   the	  political	   participation	  of	  women	  and	  
youth	  groups	  and	  human	  rights,	  whether	  labour	  rights	  or	  gender	  equality.	  	  
	  
One	  such	  project	  ‘The	  children’s	  library	  for	  the	  springboard	  to	  democracy’	  was	  
considered	   one	   of	   the	   most	   successful	   under	   the	   programme	   as	   it	  
simultaneously	   helped	   women’s	   participation	   and	   education	   whilst	   also	  
educating	   children	  about	  democracy	  and	   freedom.	  Using	   the	  books	  of	  one	  of	  
Sweden’s	   most	   celebrated	   children’s	   authors,	   Astrid	   Lindgren,	   the	   project	  
encouraged	   children	   to	   role-­‐play	   and	   use	   their	   imagination	   to	   help	   build	   a	  
better	   future	   for	   Iraq.	   The	   idea	  was	   that	   the	   process	   of	   building	   a	   new	   state	  
requires	  an	  imagination	  and	  a	  vision	  that	  for	  many	  Iraqis	  was	  repressed	  under	  
the	  Baath’s	  authoritarian	  regime.	  After	  funding	  from	  Olof	  Palme	  ceased	  in	  2008	  
the	  project	  continued	  with	  funding	  from	  other	  Swedish	  organisations	  including	  
Forum	   Syd 150 ,	   a	   non-­‐governmental	   member	   organisation,	   that	   works	   to	  
promote	   democracy,	   gender	   equality	   and	   sustainability,	   and	   also	  
Radiohjalpen 151 ,	   a	   foundation	   that	   also	   supports	   long-­‐term	   international	  
development.	  	  	  
	  
It	  is	  clear	  that	  Swedish	  foreign	  policy	  funded	  the	  diaspora	  to	  support	  a	  specific	  
kind	   of	   state	   in	   Iraq,	   one	   that	   respected	   democracy	   and	   human	   rights.	   This	  
criteria	   for	   selection	   has	   thus	   conditioned	   the	   type	   of	   state-­‐building	   that	   the	  
Swedish	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   could	   involve	   itself	   in,	   if	   they	   wanted	   institutional	  
support	  from	  the	  Swedish	  state.	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Sweden’s	   tradition	   of	   supporting	   democracy	   around	   the	   world	   also	   created	  
another	   avenue	   for	   funding	  democratisation	   in	   Iraq.	   In	   fact	   the	   tradition	  has	  
been	   institutionalised	   into	   Sweden’s	   political	   party	   system	   as	   each	   of	   the	  
established	   political	   parties	   has	   a	   corresponding	   foundation	   that	   works	   to	  
support	   democratisation	   in	   other	   countries.	   The	   practice	   of	   having	   political	  
foundations	  in	  Sweden	  commenced	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  wall	  as	  a	  means	  
to	  help	  spread	  democracy	  to	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union	  satellite	  states.	  Instead	  of	  
the	  Swedish	  government	   funding	  one	  party	   in	  each	  country	   it	  would	  be	  more	  
democratic,	   it	   was	   reasoned,	   for	   each	   party	   to	   support	   a	   sister	   party	   in	   the	  
chosen	   country152	  or	   the	  multi-­‐party	   democratic	   system153.	   Each	   foundation	   is	  
funded	   by	   SIDA	   in	   line	   with	   the	   number	   of	   seats	   each	   party	   has	   won	   in	  
Parliament.	  
	  
For	  one	  diaspora	  individual	  who	  was	  a	  member	  of	  parliament	  for	  the	  Swedish	  
Centre	   Party,	   this	   was	   an	   opportunity	   to	   gain	   funding	   for	   the	   promotion	   of	  
democracy	  in	  Iraq.	  Indeed	  Respondent	  13,	  worked	  alongside	  her	  father	  on	  two	  
political	  projects	  in	  Baghdad.	  The	  first,	  established	  in	  2004,	  was	  to	  create	  a	  new	  
political	  party	  called	  the	  National	  Democratic	  Alliance	  (NDA),	  built	  on	  liberal	  
and	   secular	   values.	  Funding	   for	   the	  project	  was	   to	  be	   spent	  on	   strengthening	  
politicians	   and	   parties	   to	   have	   a	   broader	   impact	   on	   democracy	   and	   gender	  
equality	  issues.	  	  	  
	  
The	   second	  project	   started	   in	  2007	   to	   encourage	   the	  political	  participation	  of	  
women	  and	  youth	  so	  that	  they	  form	  part	  of	  the	  debate	  in	  democracy	  and	  civil	  
society154.	  This	  was	  carried	  out	  by	  an	  organisation	  they	  created	  called	  the	  Iraqi	  
United	   Nations	   Association.	   The	   association	   focused	   on	   supporting	   human	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General	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  Author	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rights	  and	  civil	   society	   initiatives,	   including	  educating	  and	  training	  women	   in	  
computer	  skills	  and	  rights	  and	  youth	  political	  education155.	  
	  
Many	  other	  diaspora	  individuals	  and	  groups	  attempted	  to	  transport	  democratic	  
practices	  from	  their	  experiences	  in	  Sweden	  through	  civil	  society	  by	  promoting	  
gender	   equality.	   One	   successful	   initiative	   established	   by	   the	   FIA	   aimed	   to	  
generate	   democratisation	   through	   sport	   for	   young	   girls	   and	   boys.	   Unable	   to	  
return	   to	   Iraq,	   they	   instead	   invited	   29	   football	   coaches	   from	   Iraq	   over	   to	  
Sweden	   for	   a	   training	   workshop	   so	   that	   they	   can	   return	   to	   Iraq	   and	   create	  
football	   clubs	   in	  different	   cities.	  The	  organisation	  worked	  with	  Kista	  Football	  
club	  and	  the	  Swedish	  football	  association,	  who	  funded	  the	  project.	  Workshops	  
were	   held	   for	   50	   days	   in	   Stockholm	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   supporting	   democratic	  
practices	  and	  gender	  equality	  through	  boys	  and	  girls’	  sports	  education	  in	  Iraq.	  
In	  the	  end	  reportedly	  nine	  football	  clubs	  were	  established	  all	  over	  Iraq156.	  	  
	  
Many	   others	   in	   the	   diaspora	   worked	   through	   civil	   society	   organisations	   in	  
Sweden	  such	  as	  Qandil,	  Amnesty	  International,	  The	  Left	  Party	  (Vanster	  Partiet)	  
to	  raise	  awareness	  and	  funding	  for	  women	  and	  minority	  groups	  in	  Iraq.	  Some	  
even	   returned	   with	   the	   hope	   of	   re-­‐building	   Iraq	   or	   restarting	   political	  
organisations	  but	  returned	  traumatised	  from	  the	  destruction,	  culture	  shock	  and	  
violence.	  	  
	  
Assessing	  diaspora	  mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐building	  from	  2005-­‐	  2008	  
In	   choosing	   not	   to	   intervene	   in	   Iraq,	   Sweden’s	   foreign	   policy	   was	   directed	  
towards	  development.	  This	  created	  a	  different	  relationship	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  state,	  
which	   opened	   up	   different	   avenues	   for	   the	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   in	   Sweden	   to	  
influence	  Iraqi	  politics	  inside	  the	  country.	  The	  co-­‐development	  initiatives	  were	  
aimed	   at	   helping	   to	   raise	   awareness	   about	   democracy	   and	   human	   rights,	  
strengthening	   the	   organizational	   capacities	   of	   local	   non-­‐governmental	  
organisiations	   and	   supporting	   the	   training	   and	   education	   capacities	   of	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  2015,	  Stockholm	  
185	  	   	  
individuals157.	   All	   of	   which	   attempted	   to	   breed	   a	   participatory	   politics	   and	   a	  
new	  relationship	  with	  the	  state.	  
Yet	   despite	   the	   noble	   efforts	   of	   many,	   interviews	   with	   diaspora	   who	   were	  
recipients	  of	  hostland	  funding,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  programme	  managers	  and	  policy	  
makers	   involved	   in	   its	   implementation	   reveal	   that	   though	   there	   were	   issues	  
with	  diaspora	  capacity	   in	  development	  cooperation158,	   the	  major	  obstacle	   that	  
stood	  in	  the	  way	  was	  the	  security	  situation.	  	  This	  affected	  both	  participants	  and	  
policy	   implementers	   from	   carrying	   out	   their	  work.	   Security	   conditions	   posed	  
severe	   problems	   for	   diaspora	   participants,	   which	  meant	   that	   at	   times	   it	   was	  
hard	   to	   find	   personnel	   to	   carry	   out	   the	   work.	   As	   one	   respondent	   remarked,	  
diaspora	   women	   were	   not	   interested	   in	   risking	   their	   lives	   for	   a	   voluntary	  
position159.	  	  
For	  the	  Olof	  Palme	  Centre,	  the	  security	  situation	  made	  monitoring	  difficult	  to	  
carry	  out,	  hence	  many	  projects	   could	   simply	  not	  be	  monitored,	  which	  meant	  
funds	  were	   often	   hard	   to	   keep	   track	   of160.	   In	   the	   lawlessness	   environment	   of	  
Iraq	  this	  created	  opportunities	  for	  corruption,	  as	  there	  were	  no	  mechanisms	  for	  
accountability.	   For	   example,	   the	   National	   Democratic	   Alliance	   received	   SEK	  
600,000	   each	   year	   from	   the	   Centre	   Party	   International	   Foundation	   (CIS)	  
foundation,	   between	   2004	   to	   2010,	   before	   funding	   was	   eventually	   stopped161.	  
Similar	  to	  the	  situation	  faced	  by	  the	  Olof	  Palme	  Centre,	  the	  CIS	  could	  not	  verify	  
where	   funds	  had	  been	  spent	  by	  the	  diaspora	   individual	  carrying	  out	  the	  tasks	  
and	   what	   activities	   had	   actually	   occurred.	   This	   led	   to	   a	   government	  
investigation,	  which	  lasted	  over	  two	  years.	  Danish	  investigators	  were	  eventually	  
hired	   to	   carry	   out	   an	   evaluation	   but	   could	  not	   verify	   either	  way	  whether	   the	  
activities	   had	   taken	   place.	   Despite	   the	   investigation,	   the	   General	   Secretary	  
admitted	   that	   they	   were	   proud	   of	   the	   work	   they	   did	   in	   trying	   to	   support	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	  Auhtor	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  11	  	  
158	  SIDA	  Evaluation	  Report	  and	  Interview	  with	  Senior	  SIDA	  Director	  
159	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  10	  
160	  SIDA	  Evaluation	  Report.	  	  
161	  Author	  interview	  with	  Secretary	  General	  of	  CIS	  
186	  	   	  
fragile	  democracy	  in	  Iraq	  with	  Respondent	  13,	  but	  the	  lack	  of	  transparency	  and	  
accountability	  for	  spending	  meant	  that	  the	  project	  could	  not	  be	  sustained.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	   since	   no	   assessments	   could	   be	   made,	   no	   lessons	   could	   be	   learnt,	  
adapted	  or	  changed	  during	   the	  project	   cycles,	   and	   thus	  projects	   could	  not	  be	  
adequately	   supported.	   A	   Centre	   for	   Civil	   Society	   in	   Iraq	   was	   supposed	   to	   be	  
built	  in	  Baghdad	  to	  support	  the	  work	  of	  the	  projects,	  yet	  this	  was	  to	  be	  moved	  
eventually	   to	   Erbil	   due	   to	   the	   security	   situation162,	   which	   also	   impacted	   the	  
support	  offered	  to	  diaspora	  organisations	  outside	  of	  Northern	  Iraq.	  It	  is	  thus	  no	  
surprise	  that	  following	  this	  programme,	  diaspora	  co-­‐development	  projects	  were	  
not	  taken	  up	  by	  Sweden’s	  next	  government	  in	  2009	  and	  a	  new	  Iraq	  strategy	  was	  
developed	  that	  worked	  through	  international	  organisations	  and	  foundations	  to	  
support	  Iraqi	  institutions	  and	  civil	  society.	  	  
	  
What	   these	   collaborations	   show	   is	   that	   though	   good	   intentions	   existed,	   and	  
good	  ideas	  carried	  out,	  under	  conditions	  of	  continued	  violence	  and	  corruption,	  
as	  was	  the	  case	   in	  Iraq,	  there	  are	   limitations	  to	  what	  diaspora	  can	  do	  without	  
risking	   their	   lives	   and	   without	   failing	   the	   accountability	   and	   transparency	  
conditions	  needed	  by	  hostland	  donors.	  	  
Ultimately	  however	  Sweden’s	  non-­‐involvement	  in	  Iraq	  would	  stand	  Sweden	  in	  
good	   stead	   as	   they	   forged	   a	   very	   different	   relationship	   with	   the	   Iraqi	  
government	   and	   the	   Iraqi	   populace.	   So	   much	   so	   in	   fact	   that	   the	   Swedish	  
embassy	   was	   one	   of	   the	   few	  who	  was	   situated	   in	   the	   Red	   Zone	   and	   not	   the	  
heavily	   bordered	   and	   secured	   Green	   Zone.	   This	   enabled	   the	   embassy	   to	   be	  
more	   in	   touch	  with	   Iraqis	  and	   their	   lives	  as	  well	  as	  work	  more	  closely	  during	  
the	  elections163.	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In	  comparison	  to	  the	  UK	  and	  US,	  Swedish	  staff	  were	  more	  able	  to	  be	  engaged	  
on	  the	  ground	  because	  they	  were	  not	  perceived	  as	  occupiers	  but	  a	  country	  who	  
had	  come	  to	  help.	  Sweden’s	  positive	  reputation	  in	  Iraq	  actually	  pre-­‐dated	  their	  
development	   cooperation	   as	   Sweden	   had	   been	   taking	   large	   numbers	   of	   Iraqi	  
refugees	  since	  the	  1990s	  and	  even	  greater	  numbers	  since	  2003164.	  Consequently,	  
many	   Iraqis	   had	   relatives	   in	   the	   Swedish	   diaspora	   and	   were	   aware	   of	   the	  
support	  they’d	  received	  from	  the	  Swedish	  state	  in	  welcoming	  them	  and	  offering	  
them	   a	   new	  home.	   This	   legacy	  would	  have	   its	   impact	   after	   2003	   as	   Sweden’s	  
reputation	  appeared	  to	  provide	  more	  safety	  than	  any	  US	  or	  UK	  armoured	  truck.	  
A	   former	  Ambassador	   emphasized	   this	   fact	   and	   reflected	   on	   his	   time	   in	   Iraq	  
from	  2006	  to	  2010.	  
	  
	   “I	   can	   really	   stress	   at	   a	   number	   of	   occasions,	   especially	   during	   the	  
elections	   that	   we	   were	   covering,	   we	   were	   much	   more	   out	   in	   the	   field.	   I	  
remember	   during	   one	   of	   the	   elections,	   I	   had	   five	   different	   teams	   in	   five	  
different	   parts	   of	   the	   country	   out	   in	  my	   small	   embassy	   compared	   to	   the	   big	  
ones	   but	   we	   had	   different	   teams	   out	   in	   the	   country	   operating	   very	   well,	  
coordinating	  with	  other	  countries	  as	  well,	  while	  some	  of	  the	  bigger	  	  embassies	  
couldn’t	   leave	   the	   premises	   because	   of	   the	   security	   situation…[…]…	   the	   sheer	  
fact	  that	  everyone	  in	  Iraq	  from	  the	  President,	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  to	  the	  single	  
man	   in	   the	   street	   had	   a	   positive	   impression	   of	   Sweden	   because	   they	   had	  
relatives	   in	   Sweden	   they	  knew	  we	  had	  been	  helping	   them	  under	   the	  Saddam	  
years	   to	   take	   the	   refugees	   etc.	   and	  also	  helping	   them	   in	   the	   later	   stage	  when	  
people	   had	   to	   flee	   with	   the	   insurgency	   and	   terrorism.	   So	   every	   single	  
conversation	  I	  had	  in	  my	  four	  years	  in	  Iraq	  it	  started	  with	  them	  wanting	  to	  pay	  
their	  respects	  to	  me	  because	  I	  come	  from	  Sweden	  and	  so	  on	  and	  that	  helped	  us	  
both	  security	  wise	  and	  in	  facilitating	  contact.”	  165	  
	  
The	  relationship	  with	  Iraq	  after	  2008	  focused	  on	  development	  and	  investment,	  
and	   though	   the	   co-­‐development	   initiatives	   were	   stopped	   due	   to	   the	   security	  
situation,	  Sweden’s	  relationship	  with	  Iraq	  created	  further	  opportunities	  for	  the	  
diaspora	   in	  Sweden	   to	   act	   through	  civil	   society	   to	   influence	  politics.	   In	   2008,	  
Sweden	   hosted	   the	   first	   annual	   review	   of	   the	   International	   Iraq	   Compact	  
conference,	   an	   initiative	   by	   the	   Iraqi	   government	   to	   collaborate	   with	   the	  
international	   community	   on	   reform	   programmes	   related	   to	   Iraq’s	   political,	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economic	  and	  security	  sector166.	  Several	  diaspora	  organisations	  were	  invited	  to	  
the	  event	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  affairs	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  delegation167.	  
During	  this	  conference	  diaspora	  Iraqi	  grass-­‐roots	  organisations	  were	  invited	  to	  
raise	   issues	  with	   the	   Iraqi	   government	   about	  minority	   issues,	  women’s	   issues	  
and	   the	   elections168.	   For	   example,	   a	   representative	  of	   an	   Iraqi	  women’s	   group	  
was	   invited	   to	   the	   conference	   where	   a	   seminar	   on	  women’s	   issues	   was	   held.	  
Respondent	  15	  was	  consequently	  able	  to	  discuss	  women’s	  issues	  with	  Staffan	  de	  
Mistura,	  the	  former	  UN	  Special	  Representative	  to	  Iraq169.	  	  
	  
We	   have	   seen	   throughout	   this	   section	   that	   the	  migration	   waves	   of	   the	   Iraqi	  
diaspora	  have	  limited	  what	  they	  were	  able	  to	  give	  back	  to	  Iraq	  both	  before	  and	  
after	   intervention.	   Unlike	   the	   UK	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   that	   was	   established	   in	   the	  
1940s	  and	  1950s,	  and	  whose	  backgrounds	  were	  affluent	  and	  prominent	  political	  
and	   religious	   families,	   the	   Swedish	   Iraqi	   diaspora,	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   the	  
Kurds,	  is	  still	  relatively	  new.	  Most	  of	  the	  families	  who	  arrived	  in	  Sweden	  were	  
refugees	   with	   limited	   skills	   and	   education	   and	   were	   not	   from	   prominent	  
political	  or	  wealthy	  families.	  Consequently	  this	  shaped	  what	  they	  were	  able	  to	  
do	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  intervention	  as	  those	  who	  were	  integrated	  were	  few	  and	  far	  
between.	  The	  majority	  were	  still	  in	  the	  process	  of	  integration	  as	  most	  had	  only	  
been	  in	  the	  country	  for	  a	  decade	  and	  were	  still	  grappling	  with	  the	  language	  and	  
Swedish	  society	  at	  large.	  Just	  as	  importantly	  they	  lacked	  resources	  and	  political	  
networks	  for	  an	  organised	  opposition	  to	  form.	  	  
	  
It	   has	   also	  been	   argued	   in	   this	   section	   that	   Sweden’s	   anti-­‐war	   stance	  did	  not	  
create	   the	  means	   by	  which	   the	   Swedish	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   could	   involve	   itself	   in	  
institution-­‐building	   and	   governance.	   As	   explicated	   above,	   Sweden’s	   non-­‐	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involvement	   in	   military	   intervention	   meant	   that	   the	   diaspora	   could	   not	  
participate	   in	   institution-­‐building	  and	  governance	  because	  there	  was	  no	  entry	  
into	  Iraq	  during	  this	  time	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  and	  Sweden	  did	  not	  have	  an	  embassy	  
till	   2009.	   This	   channelled	   diaspora	   engagement	   towards	   supporting	   the	   state	  
through	  civil	  society	  where	  initiatives	  were	  undertaken	  to	  transport	  experiences	  
of	  democracy,	  human	  rights	  and	  capacity-­‐building	  from	  Sweden	  to	  Iraq.	  	  
	  
Following	   occupation	   and	   once	   regime	   change	   occurred,	   the	   diaspora	  
encouraged	   the	   Swedish	   government	   to	   support	   Iraq’s	   democratic	   transition.	  
This	   led	   to	   several	   collaborations,	   with	   the	   biggest	   funded	   by	   Sweden’s	  
International	   Development	   Agency,	   which	   helped	   fund	   co-­‐development	  
projects	   that	   encouraged	   democratic	   governance,	   political	   participation,	  
supporting	  political	  parties,	  human	  rights,	  women’s	  rights	  and	  youth	  groups.	  In	  
doing	   so,	   both	   the	   Swedish	   government	   and	   the	   diaspora	   were	   able	   to	  
contribute	  to	  state-­‐building	  whilst	  bypassing	  the	  occupation	  and	  the	  sectarian	  
government	  that	  followed	  by	  working	  through	  Iraq’s	  civil	  society	  organisations.	  	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  Iraqis	  in	  the	  diaspora	  were	  strongly	  motivated	  to	  help	  in	  
the	  rebuilding	  of	  their	  country	  of	  origin	  and	  many	  contributed	  greatly,	  or	  have	  
in	   the	   very	   least	   attempted	   to	   transport	   their	   experiences	   of	   democracy	   and	  
democratic	  practices	   in	  Sweden	  to	  Iraqis	   inside	  the	  country.	  By	  strengthening	  
civil	   society	   organisations	   and	   informing	   them	   about	   their	   rights,	   developing	  
capacity	  and	  helping	  minorities	   to	  participate	   in	   Iraq’s	   state-­‐building	  process,	  
they	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  process	  of	  Iraq’s	  democratisation	  but	  also,	  at	  the	  
very	  least,	  creating	  in	  the	  imaginations	  of	  the	  people	  they	  worked	  with	  a	  civic	  
and	  democratic	  vision	  for	  Iraq.	  	  
	  
Yet	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  one	  thing	  that	  neither	  policy	  makers	  nor	  the	  diaspora	  
could	  bypass	  was	   the	  escalating	  violence.	  Under	   the	  climate	  of	   insecurity	  and	  
violence	  in	  Iraq,	  participation	  in	  projects	  proved	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  sustain.	  
Not	   only	   were	   people	   risking	   their	   lives	   to	   contribute	   to	   rebuilding	   Iraq	   but	  
supporting	  and	  monitoring	  projects	  were	  near	  impossible	  due	  to	  the	  escalating	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violence.	   The	   instability	   that	   sectarian	   violence	   prevented	   projects	   from	  
evolving	   and	   long-­‐term	   partnerships	   from	   developing,	   which	   ultimately	  
hindered	  Iraq’s	  democratic	  process.	  	  
	  
Diaspora	  mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐building	  since	  2008	  	  	  
Ethno-­‐sectarian	   power	   dynamics	   in	   Iraq	   have	   shaped	   state-­‐building	  
opportunities	  in	  the	  diaspora.	  The	  consolidation	  of	  power	  in	  Baghdad	  by	  a	  Shi’a	  
government,	  and	  in	  the	  KRG	  by	  the	  KDP	  and	  the	  PUK,	  has	  meant	  that	  for	  these	  
two	  ethnic	  groups	  in	  the	  diaspora	  state-­‐building	  opportunities	  have	  increased.	  
This	   is	   because	   politics	   in	   the	  homeland	  have	   taken	   an	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   turn,	  
where	  political	  positions,	  policies	   and	  action	  are	   conducted	  via	   cronyism	  and	  
appealing	  to	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  audiences.	  	  
	  
Consequently	   this	   exclusionary	   politics	   in	   Iraq	   has	  marginalised	   a	   significant	  
portion	   of	   the	   population	   who	   do	   not	   fall	   within	   its	   framework.	   For	   Iraq’s	  
Assyrians,	   Yezidis,	   Turkmen,	   Sunnis	   and	   anyone	  with	   a	   liberal	   or	   alternative	  
political	   agenda,	   opportunities	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   political	   process	   is	   near	  
impossible.	  The	  diaspora	  who	  are	  on	  the	  peripheries	  of	  this	  political	  system	  are	  
therefore	   denied	   the	   opportunity	   to	   contribute	   to	   shaping	   domestic	   politics	  
inside	   the	   country.	   Lacking	   in	   representation	   and	   a	   voice	   within	   this	   ethno-­‐
sectarian	   politics,	   their	   state-­‐building	   efforts	   are	   directed	   towards	   political	  
activism	  associated	  with	  minority	  rights,	  women’s	   issues,	  democracy	  building,	  
and	  acting	  as	  a	  transnational	  civil	  society	  at	  large.	  	  
	  
Following	   Iraq’s	   first	   elections	   in	   2005,	   when	   state-­‐building	   was	   officially	  
handed	   over	   to	   the	   newly	   elected	   Iraqi	   politicians,	   it	   was	   evident	   that	   the	  
ethno-­‐sectarian	  power	  structures	  supported	  by	  the	  IGC	  and	  put	  in	  place	  by	  the	  
coalition	   government	   were	   consolidated.	   Shi’a	   and	   Kurdish	   groups	   had	  
successfully	   held	   their	   grip	   on	   power	   in	   their	   respective	   areas,	   while	   other	  
ethnicities	  and	  sects	  in	  Iraq	  were	  unable	  to	  make	  any	  serious	  impact	  on	  Iraq’s	  
now	  divisive	  and	  institutionalised	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  system.	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This	  political	  structure	  at	  home	  would	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  groups	  
in	   the	   diaspora	   to	   contribute	   to	   certain	   types	   of	   state-­‐building.	   For	   the	   Shi’a	  
and	  the	  Kurds,	  the	  ruling	  parties	  within	  this	  structure,	  this	  has	  been	  enabling.	  
It	  has	  further	  opened	  doors	  both	  at	  home	  and	  in	  the	  diaspora,	  allowing	  those	  
who	  are	  politically	  inclined	  to	  contribute	  to	  building	  political	  institutions	  in	  the	  
homeland	  and	  governance.	  	  	  
	  
In	   Sweden,	   the	   Iraqi	  Kurdish	  diaspora	  has	   enjoyed	   a	   strong	   relationship	  with	  
their	  hostland	  government.	  This	  has	  in	  large	  part	  been	  a	  result	  of	  the	  active	  and	  
strong	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  heterogeneous	  Kurdish	  groups	  in	  Sweden,	  who	  have	  
over	   the	   last	   30	   years	   been	   very	   driven	   in	   developing	   cultural	   and	   social	  
organisations,	  networks,	  online	  and	  off	  line,	  and	  various	  exchanges	  between	  the	  
two	  countries	  (Khayati	  and	  Dahlstedt,	  2014).	  In	  agreement	  with	  other	  scholars	  
(Portes	   and	   Rumbaut,	   2006;	   Van	  Houte	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Baser,	   2012)	   the	   Kurdish	  
case	   demonstrates	   how	   political	   mobilisation	   towards	   the	   homeland	   can	  
actually	   increase	   integration	  as	  the	  diaspora	  has	  to	  understand	  and	  be	  part	  of	  
the	  system	  to	  make	  any	  real	  impact.	  	  
	  
Just	  as	  importantly,	  it	  suggests	  that	  concepts	  of	  homeland	  for	  the	  Kurds	  are	  far	  
more	   fluid	   and	   occupy	   a	   transnational	   rather	   than	   a	   nationalistic	   space,	  
undermining	   a	   state-­‐centric	   approach	   (Khayati	   and	   Dahlstedt,	   2014).	   In	   fact,	  
concepts	  of	  homeland	  have	  also	   changed	   for	  Swedes,	  where	   the	  concept	  now	  
also	  includes	  citizens	  of	  other	  countries.	  As	  the	  former	  Social	  Democrat	  leader,	  
Mona	  Salhin	  reportedly	  declared,	   “Kurdistan	   is	  part	  of	  Sweden	  and	  Sweden	   is	  
part	  of	  Kurdistan”170.	  The	  Swedes	  have	  thus	  shown	  solidarity	  towards	  the	  large	  
Kurdish	   diaspora	   in	   their	  midst,	   as	  well	   as	   sensitivity	   towards	  Kurdish	   issues	  
related	  to	  independence	  and	  Halabja171.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  19,	  17	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  
171	  Halabja	  is	  a	  Kurdish	  town	  in	  Iraq	  that	  was	  the	  sight	  of	  a	  chemical	  gas	  attack	  by	  the	  Baathist	  
regime	  in	  1988.	  Over	  5,000	  people	  were	  killed	  and	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  fled	  to	  neighbouring	  
Turkey	  and	  Iran	  (Farouk-­‐Sluglett	  and	  Sluglett,	  2001) 
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This	  solidarity	  however,	  has	  manifested	  itself	  further	  since	  the	  2003	  war	  in	  Iraq,	  
and	  more	  specifically	  as	  Kurds	  have	  assumed	  further	  control	  and	  power	  of	  their	  
autonomous	  region.	  There	  now	  exists	  a	  KRG	  representative	  in	  Stockholm	  who	  
enjoys	   close	   ties	   with	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	   other	   Swedish	  
ministries.	   He	   explained	   that	   for	   Kurds	   Sweden	   was	   a	   “role	   model	   for	  
Kurdistan”,	   it	  thus	  gave	  the	  diaspora	  an	  opportunity	  to	  contribute	  their	   ideas,	  
experiences	  and	  skills	  to	  state-­‐building	  in	  multifaceted	  ways.	  This	  has	  included	  
over	  40	  visits	  for	  Swedish	  politicians	  to	  visit	  the	  region,	  collaboration	  with	  the	  
Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	   the	   Health	  ministry	   where	   they	   have	   sought	  
help	   with	   issues	   related	   to	   female	   representation	   in	   Kurdistan,	   courses	   on	  
organisation	  and	  leadership,	  democratic	  elections	  and	  gender	  equality172.	  	  
	  
Furthermore	   the	   Kurdish	   political	   parties,	   PUK	   and	   KDP,	   have	   actively	  
campaigned	  in	  the	  diaspora	  during	  Iraqi	  elections	  in	  2005	  and	  2010,	  where	  the	  
Kurdish	  Alliance	  received	  10,000	  votes	  from	  the	  diaspora	  for	  the	  2005	  elections	  
and	  where	  the	  opposition	  party,	  Change	  List,	  has	  grown	  in	  part	  due	  to	  support	  
from	   the	   Swedish	   diaspora	   (Khayati	   and	   Dahlstedt,	   2014:	   60).	   Furthermore,	  
there	   are	  many	  Swedish	  Kurds	   in	  Kurdistan	  who	  have	   returned	   and	  assumed	  
government	   positions	   in	   the	   KRG.	   A	   former	   Swedish	   Ambassador	   to	   Iraq	  
interviewed	   stated,	   “In	   the	   KRG	   I	   remember	   we	   had	   5	   ministers	   of	   Swedish	  
origin,	   so	   when	   I	   came	   I	   spoke	   Swedish	   to	   5	   of	   the	   ministers” 173 .	   The	  
Ambassador	   stressed	   the	   contribution	   of	   these	   Kurdish	   Swedes	   and	   the	  
important	  role	  they	  have	  played	  in	  building	  their	  country.	  	  
	  
As	   a	   result,	   Iraqi	   Kurds	   were	   better	   placed	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   a	   diaspora	  
engagement	  initiative	  created	  between	  Sweden’s	  Trade	  Council	  and	  Ministry	  of	  
Foreign	   Affairs.	   In	   2009	   they	   launched	   the	   ‘Kosmopolit	   project’	   designed	   to	  
encourage	   Iraqi	   diasporans	   to	   invest	   in	   Iraq	   and	   create	   trade	   partnerships	  
between	   Iraq	  and	  Sweden.	  Sweden’s	  Trade	  Minister	  at	   the	   time,	  Ewa	  Bjorling	  
was	  reportedly	  keen	  to	  encourage	  business	  networks	  between	  Iraqi	  Swedes	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  19,	  17	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm	  
173	  Author	  Interview	  with	  Swedish	  Ambassador	  2,	  12	  June	  2015,	  Sweden,	  Skype	  call	  to	  Budapest.	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Iraqi	  businessmen	  in	  Iraq	  and	  particularly	  the	  Kurdish	  region.	  It	  was	  confirmed	  
that	  the	  majority	  of	  partnerships	  nurtured	  during	  this	  time	  were	  those	  between	  
Iraqi	  Kurds	  in	  the	  diaspora	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  region.	  Though	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  
that	  security	  concerns	   in	   the	  rest	  of	   Iraq	   influenced	  this	  outcome,	   there	   is	  no	  
denying	   the	   important	   role	   and	   place	   of	   the	   Swedish	   Iraqi	   Kurds	   and	   the	  
important	  connections	  they	  have	  made	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  	  
	  
The	  Iraqi	  Shi’a	  population	  is	  the	  second	  group	  in	  Sweden	  to	  enjoy	  the	  fruits	  of	  
the	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   political	   structure.	   As	  mentioned	   in	   the	   last	   chapter,	   the	  
Shi’a	  parties	  won	  the	  majority	  of	  votes	  in	  both	  Iraqi	  elections,	  with	  the	  United	  
Iraqi	  Alliance	  in	  2005	  and	  later	  the	  State	  of	  Law	  Coalition	  leading	  the	  country,	  
despite	  gaining	   two	  seats	   less	   than	  the	   Iraqi	  National	  Movement.	  Though	  the	  
Iraqi	   Shi’a	   parties	   in	   Sweden	   have	   opportunities	   for	   involving	   themselves	   in	  
institution-­‐building	   and	   governance	   due	   to	   their	   power	   position	   inside	   the	  
country,	   their	   contributions	   have	   had	   less	   impact	   than	   the	   Kurds	   for	   several	  
reasons.	  	  
	  
Despite	   the	   strong	   connection	   to	   their	   homeland	   through	   the	   ruling	   Shi’a	  
parties	  and	  Shi’a	  culture	  that	  has	  flourished	  in	  the	  diaspora,	  the	  profile	  of	  the	  
Iraqi	   Shi’a	   as	   explained	   in	   the	   first	   section	   of	   this	   chapter	   differs	   in	   two	  
important	  ways.	  Firstly	  they	  are	  largely	  semi-­‐skilled	  or	  unskilled	  workers,	  with	  
a	   low	  education	  and	  very	   little	  money,	   and	   secondly	   they	  are	   still	   a	   relatively	  
new	  diaspora	  unlike	  the	  Kurds.	  While	  the	  Kurds	  have	  been	  in	  Sweden	  for	  over	  
40	  years,	  and	  where	  there	  are	  prominent	  Kurdish	  families,	  the	  Shi’a	  population	  
has	  only	  been	  settled	  in	  Sweden	  for	  half	  that	  length.	  	  	  
	  
This	  has	  not	  meant	  that	  they	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  contribute	  but	  rather	  that	  
the	  focus	  of	  their	  activities	  has	  differed.	  Their	  political	  engagement	  has	  centred	  
around	   two	   important	   areas:	   supporting	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   diaspora	   in	   the	  
hostland	  and	  helping	  to	  rebuild	  Iraq.	  Though	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  distinction	  in	  the	  
literature	   between	   immigrant	   politics,	   related	   to	   improving	   the	   situation	   and	  
rights	  of	  ethnic	  minorities	  and	  diaspora	  politics,	  related	  to	  political	  engagement	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towards	  the	  homeland	  (Østergaard-­‐Nielsen,	  2001),	  this	  study’s	  findings	  suggest	  
that	  these	  categories	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive.	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  
diaspora	   in	   Sweden,	   the	   more	   integrated	   a	   diaspora,	   the	   more	   it	   is	   able	   to	  
manoeuvre	  in	  the	  political	  system	  of	  its	  hostland	  and	  make	  an	  impact.	  This	  was	  
confirmed	  by	  Respondent	  16,	  who	  explained	  his	  political	  work	  as	  encompassing	  
integrating	   the	   Shi’a	   community,	   and	   especially	   encouraging	   the	   second	  
generation	  to	  be	  successful,	  so	  as	  to	  improve	  their	  ability	  to	  contribute	  towards	  
Iraq	  whether	  through	  skills	  or	  money	  transfers.	  He	  says,	  
	   	  
	   “We	  want	  them	  to	  work	  and	  live	  in	  this	  country	  but	  also	  to	  contribute	  to	  
their	   country.	   The	   important	   thing	   is	   that	   we	   provide	   the	   environment,	   the	  
guidance	   that	   they	   can	   work	   with	   so	   they	   find	   themselves	   in	   a	   better	  
position.”174	  
	  
Political	  and	  cultural	  engagement	  related	  to	  Iraq	  has	  been	  done	  through	  events	  
at	   Islamic	   centres	   and	   gatherings	   called	   husayniyat,	   that	   have	   now	   been	  
established	   all	   over	   Sweden175.	  The	   Islamic	   centres	  provide	   a	  platform	   for	   the	  
continuation	  of	   a	   Shi’a	   identity,	  which	   for	  decades	  was	   suppressed	  under	   the	  
Baath	  regime	  but	  has	  found	  a	  strong	  and	  growing	  voice	  in	  the	  diaspora.	  	  
	  
Increasingly	  however,	   and	  with	   the	  establishment	  of	   a	  political	   system	  whose	  
architecture	  has	  been	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  in	  nature,	  Shi’a	  identity	  has	  also	  come	  to	  
inadvertently	  signify	  a	  Shi’a	  political	  identity.	  For	  the	  Iraqi	  Shi’a	  who	  are	  part	  of	  
the	  political	  structure,	  maintaining	  Shi’a	  identity	  in	  the	  diaspora	  thus	  serves	  the	  
interests	   of	   Shi’a	   political	   parties	   at	   home.	   A	   prominent	   example	   is	   the	  
commemoration	   held	   by	   the	   Da’wa	   party	   every	   year	   on	   the	   9th	   April,	   for	  
Muhammad	   Baqir	   Al	   Sadr,	   the	   assassinated	   Iraqi	   Shi’a	   Cleric	   who	   was	   the	  
ideological	  founder	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Da’wa	  Party,	  “this	  is	  a	  commemoration	  of	  the	  
martyr	  Al	  Sadr,	  who	  was	  martyred	  in	  1980	  and	  remembrance	  of	  his	  ideas	  about	  
Iraqi	  affairs	  and	  our	  view	  of	   the	  new	  Iraq	  and	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  new	  Iraq.	  
Lots	  of	  ideas	  are	  presented.”176	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  17,	  15	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm	  
175	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  17,	  15	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm  
176	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  17,	  15	  October	  2014,	  Stockholm	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Shi’a	  identity	  has	  taken	  on	  further	  salience	  in	  reaction	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  ISIL	  and	  in	  
the	  Shi’a	  diaspora.	  Furthermore,	  since	  Iraqi	  Shi’a	  communities	  now	  constitute	  
hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  potential	  votes	  in	  national	  elections,	  they	  can	  make	  
quite	  an	  impact	  to	  votes	  at	  home.	  Indeed,	  during	  the	  2005	  elections,	  Shi’a	  votes	  
reportedly	   received	   the	   second	  highest	   total	  out	  of	   the	  56,000	  votes	  allegedly	  
cast	   in	   the	   Swedish	   Iraqi	   diaspora177.	   Furthermore,	   respondents	   belonging	   to	  
these	   political	   parties	   explained	   that	   gatherings	   are	   used	   to	   spread	   party	  
political	  messages	  and	  campaigns.	  	  
	  
When	   I	  asked	  Shi’a	  political	  party	   representatives	  what	   their	   relationship	  was	  
with	   their	   party	   inside	   the	   country	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   there	   was	   strong	  
communication	   between	   political	   figures	   in	   the	   diaspora	   and	   those	   on	   the	  
inside	  facilitated	  by	  mobile	  apps	  such	  as	  Whats’app	  and	  free	  calls	  using	  Viber	  
and	  Skype.	   	  Respondent	  16	  states,	  “There	  is	  constant	  communication	  with	  the	  
party,	  between	  Sweden	  and	  Iraq.	  We	  have	  an	  audience	  here	  who	  are	  political.	  
These	  people	  are	  in	  constant	  communication	  with	  the	  inside”.	   	  Respondent	  16	  
also	  highlighted	  that	  their	  political	  work	  involved	  disseminating	  policy	  ideas	  to	  
the	  party	  back	  in	  Iraq,	  “We	  also	  criticise	  and	  correct.	  The	  party	  is	  structured	  so	  
that	   the	   ideas	   go	  up	   and	   then	   they	   go	  down.	   So	   everyone	  participates	   in	   the	  
policies	  of	  the	  party	  and	  its	  ideas”.	  	  
	  
In	   this	   way	   domestic	   politics	   in	   the	   homeland	   is	   no	   longer	   confined	   to	   the	  
borders	   of	   the	   state,	   but	   is	   continuously	   being	   shaped	   by	   a	   network	   of	  
transnational	   actors	   across	   multiple	   borders.	   In	   fact	   Shi’a	   political	   party	  
branches	   are	   found	   all	   over	   the	  world,	   from	  Australia	   to	  Norway,	   due	   to	   the	  
migration	   of	   Iraq’s	   Shi’a	   population	   during	   the	   90s	  migration	   wave.	   Political	  
Shi’a	   networks	   are	   used	   for	   recruiting	   sectarian	   kin	   for	   positions	   in	   the	  
homeland,	   advocating	   or	   rejecting	   policy	   and	   disseminating	   political	   ideas	   in	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the	   hostland	   and	   a	   multitude	   of	   political	   and	   social	   activities	   that	   link	   the	  
diaspora	  to	  Iraq	  and	  vice	  versa.	  	  
	  
Yet	  while	   the	   Shi’a	   and	   the	   Kurds	   are	   able	   to	   contribute	   to	   various	   forms	   of	  
state-­‐building,	  both	   institutional	  and	  those	  related	  to	  civil	   society,	  other	   Iraqi	  
groups	   are	   limited	   due	   to	   their	   political	   exclusion	   in	   the	   homeland.	  As	   such,	  
their	   political	   engagement	   has	   been	   directed	   towards	   challenging	   the	   state	  
through	  civil	  society,	  holding	  the	  government	  accountable,	  fighting	  for	  political	  
rights	  and	  acting	  like	  Iraq’s	  transnational	  civil	  society.	  Lacking	  in	  faith	  and	  trust	  
in	  the	  new	  Iraqi	  state,	  Iraq’s	  others	  in	  the	  diaspora	  are	  resisting	  the	  politics	  of	  
division	   by	   supporting	   their	   former	   communities,	   their	   political	   parties,	   and	  
organisations	   through	   bottom-­‐up	   approaches.	   These	   invisible	   but	   present	  
networks	  are	  shaping	  the	  development	  and	  politics	  of	  Iraq	  and	  creating	  a	  state-­‐
building	  resource	  base	  that	  extends	  beyond	  borders.	  	  
	  
Though	  at	  first	  glance	  this	  redirection	  of	  transnational	  politics	  appears	  limited,	  
in	   the	   Swedish	   context,	   where	   the	   concept	   of	   civic	   engagement	   and	   social	  
capital	   is	  considered	  strong	  (Ersson	  and	  Milner,	  2000),	  those	  excluded	  in	  Iraq	  
have	   been	   able	   to	   organise	   and	   campaign	   in	   a	   very	   active	  way	   towards	   their	  
country	  of	  origin	  in	  the	  hostland	  through	  civil	  society.	  This	  is	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  
role	   of	   interest	   groups,	   such	   as	   the	   labour	   and	   trade	   unions,	   the	   prohibition	  
movement	   and	   women’s	   movements	   in	   Sweden’s	   history	   and	   their	   role	   in	  
shaping	   democracy	   and	   politics	   at	   large	   (Anton,	   1969).	   As	   one	   Swedish	  
politician	  declared,	  in	  Sweden	  politics	  happens	  at	  the	  grass-­‐root	  level178.	  	  
	  
As	  a	   result	  of	   this	  politics	  of	  associations	  diaspora	  civil	   society	   in	  Sweden	  has	  
thrived	  for	  those	  marginalised	  in	  the	  homeland	  due	  to	  their	  ability	  to	  organise,	  
create	  associations,	  and	   lobby	  as	   interest	  groups	   for	  minority	   issues,	  women’s	  
rights	   issues	   and	   human	   rights.	   According	   to	   the	   Federation	   of	   Iraqi	  
Associations	   in	   Sweden,	   as	   of	   June	   2015,	   there	   are	   63	   registered	   Iraqi	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178	  Author	  interview	  with	  Member	  of	  Parliament	  2,	  30	  June	  2015,	  Telephone	  call	  to	  Gothenburg	  
197	  	   	  
organisations	   under	   this	   umbrella	   group179.	  Many	  more	   exist	   in	   the	   diaspora	  
supporting	   their	   ethnic	   or	   sectarian	   or	   religious	   groups	   in	   the	   homeland	  
through	  invisible	  transnational	   links	  that	  support	  communities,	  organisations,	  
disenfranchised	  groups	  and	  much	  more.	  	  
	  
The	   establishment	   of	   diaspora	   organisations	   in	   the	   hostland	   has	   been	  
facilitated	  by	  Sweden’s	  liberal	  integration	  policy	  that	  financially	  supports	  ethnic	  
language	  classes	   and	  associations	   that	  preserve	  ethnic	   cultures,	  but	   also	   their	  
integration	   in	   the	   political	   decision-­‐making	   process	   in	   Sweden	   (Khayati	   and	  
Dahlstedt,	   2014;	   Khayati,	   2008).	   These	   are	   funded	   by	   various	   associations	  
mentioned	  by	  respondents	  such	  as	  the	  government’s	  Nämnden	  för	  statligt	  stöd	  
till	   trossamfund	   (SST)	   [the	   Swedish	   Commission	   for	   Government	   Support	   to	  
Faith	  Communities],	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  such	  as	  the	  Workers	  
Educational	   Association,	   Arbetarnas	   Bildningsförbund,	   (ABF),	   and	   SENSUS	  
found	   at	   Swedish	  municipalities180.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   stress	   that	   funding	   for	  
these	  associations	   is	  to	  aid	   integration	  in	  the	  hostland.	  However,	   though	  they	  
also	  provide	  platforms	  for	  raising	  issues	  about	  events	  in	  Iraq.	  	  
	  
A	   good	   example	   has	   been	   the	   work	   of	   the	   Mandean	   Society	   in	   Stockholm.	  
Marginalised	   and	   persecutied	   in	   Iraq,	   they	   have	   been	   able	   to	   politically	  
mobilise	   in	  Sweden	  to	  protect	   their	  communities	   through	  collaborations	  with	  
both	  government	  agencies	  and	  other	  civil	  society	  organisations	  in	  Sweden.	  	  
The	   Mandean	   society	   was	   established	   in	   1993	   to	   cater	   for	   the	   social	   and	  
religious	  needs	  of	  Mandeans,	  whose	  migration	  to	  Sweden	  saw	  a	  steady	  influx	  in	  
the	   90s	   and	   following	   the	   2003	   war.	   The	   organisation’s	   work	   steadily	   grew	  
following	  the	  2003	  intervention,	  when	  Mandeans	  in	  Iraq	  began	  to	  be	  kidnapped	  
and	   forced	   to	   convert	   to	   Islam	   by	   insurgents.	   This	   situation	   provoked	   the	  
Mandean	   Society	   to	   lobby	   Swedish	   and	   other	   international	   governments	   to	  
protect	  Mandeans	  from	  violence	  but	  also	  to	  grant	  their	  asylum	  in	  the	  hostland.	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The	  Mandean	  Society	  was	  effective	  in	  setting	  up	  a	  new	  organisation,	  Mandeans	  
in	  Sweden	  Facing	  Persecution,	  but	  also	  an	  international	  Mandean	  Associations	  
Union 181 	  to	   lobby	   the	   UN	   and	   other	   international	   governments.	   After	   a	  
concerted	   effort	   lobbying	   various	   political	   parties	   and	   meeting	   with	  
government	  ministries	  in	  Sweden,	  the	  organisation	  managed	  to	  work	  with	  the	  
Migration	  Ministry	  in	  Sweden	  to	  facilitate	  the	  asylum	  of	  persecuted	  Mandeans	  
arriving	  at	  the	  time.	  The	  collaboration	  with	  the	  Ministry	  reportedly	  lasted	  from	  
2003	   to	   2010,	   and	   was	   also	   confirmed	   by	   the	   Mandean	   religious	   cleric	   who	  
authenticated	  the	  papers182.	  Respondent	  8	  described	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  he	  faced	  
when	  lobbying	  the	  Swedish	  government,	  	  
	   	  
	   “R8:	   “We	   achieved	   something.	   For	   example,	   one	   of	   our	   initiatives	  was	  
targeting	  the	  Migration	  Ministry,	  we	  put	  a	  lot	  of	  pressure	  on	  them	  so	  much	  so	  
we	   had	   many	   meetings	   with	   senior	   staff	   related	   to	   refugees	   and	   especially	  
Iraqs’.	  The	  thing	  we	  could	  achieve	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  is	  raising	  awareness	  about	  
the	   fact	   that	   there	   is	   a	  minority	   group	   in	   Iraq	   called	   the	  Mandeans	   and	   that	  
Mandeans	  are	  facing	  extinction.”	  
	  
Author:	  What	  was	  the	  Swedish	  government’s	  response	  to	  this?	  
R8:	  “Swedes	  are	  the	  type	  who	  take	  their	  time	  to	  reach	  a	  decision.	  They	  are	  very	  
careful.	   For	   example	  when	   there	  was	   a	  mass	   immigration	   of	  Mandeans,	   they	  
sent	  a	  team	  of	  Swedes	  to	  Iraq	  to	  fact	  check	  this	  situation.	  In	  the	  end	  they	  stood	  
in	   solidarity	   with	   us.	   Then	   I	   was	   the	   President	   of	   the	   Mandean	   Council	   in	  
Sweden	  and	  I	  had	  a	  meeting	  with	  the	  Migration	  Ministry.	  They	  had	  a	  problem	  
whereby	   they	  couldn’t	   tell	  whether	   Iraqis	   coming	   in,	  who	  were	  claiming	   they	  
were	   persecuted,	  were	   really	  Mandeans	   or	   Christians.	   In	   order	   to	   distinguish	  
between	   people	   they	   asked	   us	   to	   help	   them	   by	   authenticating	   their	   identity.	  
They	  asked	  us	  how	  we	  would	  know	  who	  was	  Mandean	  if	  they	  depended	  on	  us	  
to	  verify	   their	   identity.	  So	  we	  agreed	  on	  a	  number	  of	  details	   surrounding	  this	  
issue	  with	  the	  Migration	  Ministry.	  This	  was	  a	  positive	  result	  for	  us,	  those	  who	  
arrive	   and	   receive	   a	   verified	   identity	   paper	   from	   us	  would	   have	   their	   asylum	  
claim	  facilitated.”183	  	  
	  
The	  above	  example	  is	  interesting	  on	  several	  levels	  because	  it	  demonstrates	  how	  
minority	  groups	  who	  are	  denied	  protection	  from	  their	  homeland	  governments	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have	  sought	  protection	  from	  the	  hostland	  government	  of	  where	  their	  kin	  group	  
migrated.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   Mandaens	   in	   Sweden,	   their	   political	  
engagement	  towards	  the	  homeland	  has	  been	  to	  call	  on	  the	  hostland	  to	  protect	  
the	   lives	  of	  their	  ethnic	  kin	  whose	  protection	  has	  not	  been	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  
homeland	   state.	   By	   yielding	   to	   the	   appeals	   of	   the	   Mandean	   society	   and	  
facilitating	  their	  asylum	  claims,	  Sweden	  is	  also	  participating	  in	  a	  transnational	  
politics	  by	  granting	  protection	  and	  rights	  to	  non-­‐citizens	  who	  do	  not	  fall	  under	  
its	  sovereignty.	  As	  such	  it	  is	  not	  only	  diasporas	  who	  are	  practicing	  a	  transborder	  
citizenship	   by	   “reshaping	   the	   workings	   of	   several	   systems	   of	   law	   and	  
governance”	   (Schiller,	   2005;	   52),	   but	   states	   too	   are	   shaping	   transnational	  
citizenship	   by	   conferring	   rights	   to	   vulnerable	   communities	   due	   to	   pressure	  
from	   their	   immigrant	   populations.	   This	   example	   also	   further	   highlights	   the	  
false	  dichotomy	  between	  immigrant	  politics	  and	  diaspora	  politics.	  
	  
Iraq’s	  other	  minorities	  in	  the	  diaspora	  have	  directed	  their	  political	  mobilisation	  
towards	   the	   hostland	   because	   they	   have	   been	   excluded	   from	   Iraq’s	   divisive	  
politics.	   Their	   political	   engagement	   has	   focussed	   on	   raising	   awareness	   and	  
funds	  for	  their	  communities	  in	  Iraq,	  lobbying	  MPs	  and	  ministries	  and	  in	  some	  
cases	  trying	  to	   launch	  opposition	  parties	   from	  afar	   in	  trying	  to	  support	  a	  new	  	  
Iraqi	  	  state.	  	  
	  
Yet	   even	   for	   Iraq’s	  others,	  opportunities	   to	  engage	   towards	   state-­‐building	  has	  
also	   varied	  not	  only	  because	  of	   positionality	   vis	   a	   vis	   the	  homeland	   state	  but	  
also	   their	   positionality	   in	   the	  hostland	   (Koinova,	   2012).	   Those	  who	   are	   better	  
educated	  and	  integrated	  have	  been	  more	  able	  to	  engage	  in	  political	  activity	  as	  
Guarnizo	   and	   colleagues	   have	   previously	   highlighted	   (Guarnizo	   et	   al.,	   2003).	  
For	   instance,	   Iraqi	   Christians	   (Assyrians,	   Chaldeans	   and	   Syriacs),	   whose	  
mobilisation	   was	   encouraged	   after	   the	   2003	   war,	   have	   been	   able	   to	   take	  
advantage	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  6	  members	  of	  parliament	   in	  the	  Riksdag.	  
This	  has	  facilitated	  mobilisation184	  as	  despite	  only	  one	  of	  them	  being	  Iraqi,	  the	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  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  5,	  8	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  2015	  and	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  6,	  8	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issues	   they	   face	   as	   Christian	   minorities	   cut	   across	   boundaries.	   For	   the	  
Christians	  of	   Iraq,	   their	  political	   engagement	  on	   the	  outside	   is	   also	  necessary	  
because	  the	  majority	  of	   them	  no	   longer	  reside	   in	   Iraq	  due	  to	  persecution	  and	  
instability.	  	  
	   “Our	  role	   is	   linking	  our	  diaspora	  and	  our	  organisations	   inside	  Iraq	  and	  
between	  our	  community	  here	  and	  there.	  And	  don’t	  forget	  we	  are	  not	  the	  same	  
as	  Arabs	  and	  Kurds.	  Arabs	  and	  Kurds	  the	  majority	  is	  in	  Iraq.	  Our	  majority	  is	  in	  
the	  diaspora	  so	  those	  on	  the	  outside	  have	  a	  role.”185	  	  
	  
It	  is	  estimated	  that	  out	  of	  1.5	  million	  Iraqi	  Christians,	  only	  300-­‐600,000	  remain	  
in	   Iraq186.	   The	   political	   engagement	   of	   Iraqi	   Christians	   in	   the	   diaspora	   has	  
consequently	   thrived	   in	   Sweden	   where	   currently	   five	   political	   parties	   exist	  
representing	   all	   the	  different	  Christian	   sects187.	  Conferences	   in	   Stockholm	  are	  
held	   every	   two	   years	   and	   there	   are	   constant	   liaisons	   with	   the	   parties	   inside.	  
Furthermore,	  speaking	  to	  one	  active	  member,	  in	  2003	  there	  was	  an	  initiative	  to	  
unite	  all	   the	   sects	  under	  one	  council	   called	   the	  Council	  of	  Chaldeans,	  Syriacs	  
and	  Assyrians188.	  Though	  the	  party	  was	  created	  in	  Iraq,	  they	  held	  a	  conference	  
in	  2005	  in	  Stockholm	  and	  later	  the	  diaspora	  attended	  a	  conference	  in	  Erbil	  with	  
the	  aim	  of	  forming	  a	  political	  party	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
	  
Yet	  while	  Iraqi	  Assyrians’	  have	  gained	  influence	  in	  hostland	  domestic	  politics,	  
conflict	  with	  Kurds	   in	  relation	  to	   land	  grabs	   in	   the	  Ninewa	  plains	  where	   they	  
have	  traditionally	  resided	  continues.	  This	  has	  meant	  that	  their	  ability	  to	  affect	  
Swedish	  politicians	   is	   limited	  because	  Kurds	  outnumber	   them	  and	   also	   enjoy	  
good	   relations	  with	   the	  Swedish	  government.	  This	   is	   a	  problem	  also	   faced	  by	  
Turkmen	  and	  Yezidis	  who	  face	  persecution	  and	  land	  grabs	  by	  Kurds	  in	  Kirkuk	  
(Parkinson,	   2014)	   and	   in	   Yezidi	   areas	   (Hudson,	   2014).	   Their	   political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  5,	  8	  October	  2015,	  Stockholm 
186	  Author	  interview	  with	  Respondent	  5,	  8	  October	  2015	  and	  Repondent	  6,	  8	  October	  2015,	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  The	  other	  parties	  mentioned	  were:	  Nahrain	  democratic	  party	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  al	  Sha3bi	  al	  Kildani	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  Syriani	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  ul	  watani	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  Ashuri	  
Majlis	  Al	  Qawmi	  al	  Kildani	  
Mumbar	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  mesrah)	  al	  Democrati	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  In	  Arabic	  the	  name	  is	  Majlis	  il	  Kildani	  il	  Syriani	  	  il	  Ashuri	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mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐building	   has	   therefore	   focussed	   on	   raising	   awareness,	  
lobbying,	  protests,	  petitions	  and	  collaborations	  with	  other	  civil	  society	  groups,	  
which	   are	   the	   only	   avenues	   open	   to	   them.	   Their	   problems	   in	   the	   homeland	  
have	   thus	   been	   compounded	   in	   the	   hostland	   because	   a	   more	   powerful,	  
influential	   and	   populous	   diaspora	   group,	   they	   are	   in	   conflict	   with	   in	   the	  
homeland,	  is	  also	  residing	  in	  the	  hostland.	  For	  these	  minorities	  this	  has	  led	  to	  a	  
steady	  decline	  in	  political	  engagement	  in	  the	  hostland	  and	  the	  homeland.	  
	  
As	  for	  Iraq’s	  secular	  and	  liberal	  diaspora	  individuals	  and	  groups,	  many	  of	  whom	  
were	  or	   still	   are	  Communist	   sympathisers,	   there	   is	   very	   little	  hope	   left.	  Many	  
see	   the	   Islamization	   and	   corruption	   rife	   in	   Iraq’s	   political	   system	   a	   real	  
impediment	   to	   democracy.	   Yet	   in	   the	   face	   of	   sectarianism	   and	  muhasasa	   in	  
Iraq,	   the	   seeds	   of	   a	   new	   democratic	   party,	   the	   Iraqi	   Democratic	   Movement	  
(IDM),	   was	   born	   in	   the	   diaspora	   in	   Stockholm	   in	   2011	   that	   would	   eventually	  
establish	   itself	   in	   Iraq	   in	   2012.	  One	   of	   the	   founders	   explained	   how	   the	   party	  
came	  to	  be	  established,	  
	   “There	  was	  muhasasa,	   sectarianism	  and	  corruption,	  democracy	  became	  
just	   a	   token.	   All	   these	   groups	   that	  were	   taking	   over	   everything	   and	   between	  
themselves	  dividing	  everything	  up	  and	  controlling	  everything.	  There	  was	  more	  
destruction	  than	  anything	  else.	  A	  group	  of	  us	  representatives	  of	  ICP,	  and	  other	  
Iraqi	   democratic	   organisations	   such	   as	   the	   Mandeans,	   14	   July	   club,	   Iraqi	  
Women’s	  League,	  Union	  of	  Iraqi	  writers	  ,	  Association	  of	  artists.	  
	  
Author:	  So	  not	  just	  political	  groups?	  
	  
“Parties,	   civic	   associations	   and	   democratic	   personalities.	   Because	   there	   are	  
personalities	   who	   are	   not	   members	   of	   any	   party	   or	   organisation.	   A	  
representative	   of	   each	   sat	   down	   developed	   the	   idea	   and	   we	   had	   the	   idea	   of	  
holding	  a	  conference.	  We	  created	  the	  internal	  organisation	  and	  a	  programme.	  
The	  conference	  created	  the	  formation	  and	  a	  managing	  committee	  was	  selected.	  
And	   afterwards	   committees	   were	   created	   in	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   world	   and	  
especially	  after	  the	  Democratic	  Wave	  was	  created	  in	  Iraq.”189	  
	  
The	  above	  demonstrates	  that	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  ability	  to	  penetrate	  the	  political	  
system	   in	   Iraq,	   liberals	   and	   secular	   Iraqis	   in	   the	   diaspora	   have	   been	   more	  
successful	   in	   creating	   an	   opposition	   party	   in	   Sweden.	   While	   the	   diaspora	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literature	   has	   stressed	   how	   homeland	   political	   parties	   are	   recreated	   in	   the	  
diaspora	   (Fennema	   and	   Tillie,	   1999;	   Østergaard-­‐Nielsen,	   2000,	   2001),	   in	   this	  
case	   the	   reverse	   has	   been	   true.	   Lacking	   the	   political	   space	   in	   Iraq,	   politically	  
engaged	   liberals	   in	   the	   diaspora	   have	   used	   their	   experience	   of	   democracy	   in	  
Sweden	  to	  create	  a	  political	  party	  that	  was	  later	  transported	  inside	  the	  country.	  
The	  party	  now	  enjoys	  party	  branches	   all	   over	   the	  world	   that	  help	   support	   its	  
political	  campaign	  from	  the	  outside	  in;	  
	   “We	   did	   a	   lot	   of	   work	   with	   the	   Iraqi	   elections.	   Lots	   of	   media	   work,	  
handed	  out	  flyers,	  events,	  met	  with	  candidates,	  had	  meetings	  over	  the	  Internet,	  
such	  as	  through	  Viber,	  we	  invited	  people	  to	  vote.	  We	  brought	  over	  the	  IDM’s	  
slogans	   and	   goals	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   context	   of	   Iraq	   now.	   To	   support	   the	  
Democratic	  Movement	  to	  gain	  in	  the	  elections	  and	  support	  the	  IDM	  inside.”190	  
	  
And	  yet	  despite	  the	  success	  of	  the	  IDM	  in	  transporting	  their	  democratic	  ideas	  
to	   Iraq	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   diaspora	   activists	   on	   the	   fringes	   of	   Iraq’s	   political	  
system	  have	  largely	  given	  up	  hope.	  The	  respondents	  of	  all	  the	  ethnic,	  political	  
and	  religious	  parties,	  and	  organisations	  interviewed	  for	  this	  study	  talked	  of	  the	  
hope	   and	   enthusiasm	   in	   2003,	   which	   gradually	   gave	   way	   to	   disillusion	   and	  
despair	   as	   the	   country	   descended	   into	   sectarian	   politics	   and	   violence.	  
Furthermore,	  with	   the	  exception	  of	   the	  Kurds	  and	   the	  Shi’a,	   all	   lamented	   the	  
second	  generation’s	  disinterest	  in	  Iraq	  or	  in	  attending	  diasporic	  events.	  This	  is	  
pertinent	  especially	  for	  Iraq’s	  minorities	  who	  no	  longer	  have	  family	  residing	  in	  
Iraq	  and	  therefore	  have	  no	  familial	  links	  left	  in	  the	  country.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
As	  shown	  above,	  after	  the	  period	  of	  foreign	  intervention	  and	  state-­‐building	  in	  
Iraq,	  a	  new	  era	  dawned	  when	  Iraqis	  took	  over	  and	  dictated	  the	  new	  rules	  of	  the	  
game.	  Those	  connected	  to	  powerful	  groups	  and	  parties	  in	  Iraq	  have	  been	  able	  
to	   take	   advantage	   of	   their	   political	   positions	   both	   in	   the	   hostland	   and	   the	  
homeland	   to	  affect	  political	   change	  and	  mobilise	   towards	   institution-­‐building	  
and	   governance	   inside	   Iraq.	   As	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Kurdish	   Iraqi	   diaspora	  
demonstrates,	  opportunities	   to	   contribute	   to	  various	  aspects	  of	   state-­‐building	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have	  been	  possible	  due	  to	  their	  powerful	  position	  in	  the	  homeland,	  which	  has	  
opened	  up	  doors	  with	  hostland	  governments	  to	  transport	  knowledge,	  ideas	  and	  
systems	   to	   be	   enacted	   in	   Kurdistan.	   Furthermore,	   as	   the	   Kurdish	   diaspora	  
included	  intellectuals	  and	  middle	  class	  professionals,	  the	  Kurds	  were	  also	  able	  
to	   transport	   professionals	   back	   to	   Iraq	   who	   have	   since	   gone	   on	   to	   become	  
ministers	  or	  work	  in	  government.	  	  
	  
In	  contrast,	  while	  the	  Shi’a	  have	  been	  the	  true	  rulers	  of	  Iraq	  in	  the	  post-­‐Saddam	  
era,	   their	   contributions	   to	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance	   have	   been	  
limited	   due	   to	   their	   profile.	   In	   theory	   they	   enjoy	   the	   same	   opportunities	   to	  
politically	   engage	   both	   in	   the	   homeland	   and	   hostland.	   Yet	   the	   difference	  
remains	  in	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  profile	  of	  those	  who	  arrived	  as	  the	  majority	  were	  
impoverished	  and	  had	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  education.	  Only	  a	  few	  have	  been	  able	  to	  
return	  and	  assume	  political	  positions	  due	  to	  their	  ethnic	  or	  sectarian	  links.	  This	  
of	  course	  became	  a	  lot	  easier	  once	  the	  Shi’a	  consolidated	  their	  power	  and	  as	  the	  
practice	   of	   muhasasa	   in	   Iraq	   opened	   doors	   for	   those	   connected	   to	   the	  
leadership.	   Consequently	   their	   contributions	   to	   state-­‐building	   have	   been	  
largely	   advisory	   in	   nature,	   sharing	   ideas	   from	   Sweden’s	   democratic	   tradition,	  
critiquing	  and	  supporting	  certain	  policy	  positions	  back	  home.	  
	  
As	   for	   the	   rest	   of	   Iraq’s	   minorities	   and	   those	   marginalised	   by	   the	   political	  
process	  in	  the	  homeland,	   indeed	  their	  political	  engagement	  has	  been	  directed	  
towards	   challenging	   the	   status	   quo	   by	   supporting	   democratisation	   in	   Iraq,	  
fighting	   for	   rights,	   land	   and	   an	   opportunity	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   political	  
process.	   Like	   a	   transnational	   civil	   society	   they	   have	   held	   protests,	   petitions,	  
conferences,	   marches,	   raised	   money	   and	   funds	   for	   their	   impoverished,	  
supported	  communities	  and	  organisations,	  lobbied	  the	  hostland	  and	  homeland	  
to	  speak	  on	  their	  behalf.	  	  
	  
There	   is	   no	  doubt	   that	   the	   Swedish	   Iraqi	   diaspora	  has	   been	   very	   active	   since	  
2003,	   contributing	   and	   supporting	   Iraq’s	   state-­‐building	   process	   through	  
translocal	   and	   transnational	   links	   that	   are	  occurring	   in	   ad	  hoc	  but	   consistent	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ways.	   Yet	  with	   time	  political	   activities	   have	   declined	   and	  many	  have	   lost	   the	  
will	   and	  hope.	  Not	  only	  has	  political	   engagement	   reduced	   and	  been	   replaced	  
with	   more	   cultural	   and	   social	   activities,	   but	   gradually	   since	   the	   new	   ethno-­‐
sectarian	   system	   put	   in	   place,	   their	   political	   engagement	   has	   reflected	   the	  
politics	   inside	   Iraq	   characterised	   by	   fragmentation.	   Most	   Iraqi	   ethnic	   or	  
sectarian	  groups	  no	  longer	  mobilise	  for	  Iraq	  but	  for	  their	  kin	  inside	  the	  country,	  
with	  only	  a	  minority	  of	   liberals	  raising	  their	  voices	   for	  all	   Iraqis.	  The	  majority	  
have	  consequently	  accepted	  their	  future	  will	  not	  reside	  in	  Iraq	  but	  will	  continue	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CHAPTER	  7-­‐	  CONCLUSION	  
	  
This	   study	   has	   attempted	   to	   look	   at	   a	   relatively	   little	   discussed	   area	   in	   the	  
diaspora	  and	  state-­‐building	  literature	  related	  to	  diaspora	  mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐
building.	   Using	   the	   methodological	   tools	   of	   social	   science,	   it	   has	   sought	   to	  
compare	   the	   state-­‐building	   contributions	  of	   Iraq’s	   largest	  diaspora	   in	  Europe,	  
the	   UK	   and	   Sweden,	   and	   attempted	   to	   provide	   answers	   to	   how	   both	   have	  
attempted	   to	   mobilise	   towards	   this	   endeavour	   and	   why	   their	   contributions	  
have	  been	  directed	  to	  different	  forms.	  	  
	  
The	  thesis	  commenced	  by	  outlining	  the	  puzzle	  of	   this	  study,	  which	  sought	  to	  
investigate	   how	   the	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   in	   the	  UK	   and	   Sweden	  mobilised	   towards	  
state-­‐building	  following	  the	  2003	  Iraq	  war	  and	  why	  there	  was	  variation	  in	  their	  
approaches.	  In	  order	  to	  delineate	  my	  subject	  matter	  and	  the	  dependent	  variable	  
of	   this	   study,	   the	   second	   chapter	   of	   this	   thesis	   discussed	   the	   concept	   of	  
diaspora	   and	  defined	  how	   it	  was	   to	   be	   used	   and	  understood	   throughout	   this	  
thesis.	  	  
	  
Next,	  I	  explored	  the	  concept	  of	  diaspora	  mobilisation	  past	  and	  present,	  for	  an	  
overview	  of	  what	   this	  has	  entailed	  within	   the	  diaspora	  politics	   literature	  over	  
the	   past	   20	   years.	   We	   saw	   that	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   has	   involved	   ethnic	  
lobbying,	   diaspora-­‐development	   projects,	   sending	   remittances,	   organising	  
protests	   and	   many	   other	   political	   actions	   so	   that	   a	   clearly	   demarcated	  
definition	  of	  diaspora	  mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐building	  was	  necessary	  before	  the	  
study	  could	  proceed.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this	  I	  analysed	  the	  state	  and	  state-­‐building	  
literature	  for	  clarity	  on	  the	  concepts	  of	  the	  state	  and	  state-­‐building.	  	  
	  
Using	   Migdal’s	   helpful	   definition,	   it	   was	   clear	   to	   see	   that	   the	   state	   was	   an	  
amalgam	  of	  both	   the	  apparatus	  of	   the	   state	  and	   its	  meeting	  with	   its	  multiple	  
parts	  in	  society	  (Migdal,	  2001).	  Contrary	  to	  the	  state-­‐building	  literature,	  which	  
only	  stressed	  the	  need	  to	  build	  state	  institutions	  of	  governance	  and	  legitimacy,	  
I	  argued	  that	  state-­‐building	  needs	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  two-­‐level	  process	  that	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involves	  both	  building	  state	   institutions	  of	  governance	  and	  legitimacy,	  as	  well	  
as	   civil	   society.	   The	   important	   role	   of	   civil	   society	   and	   how	   its	   interactions	  
shape	  the	  type	  of	  state	  that	  is	  being	  built	  has	  been	  neglected	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  
	  
I	   thus	   developed	   and	   put	   forward	   two	   categories	   of	   state-­‐building	   related	   to	  
institution-­‐building	   and	   governance	   and	   supporting/challenging	   the	   state	  
through	  civil	  society.	  The	  first	  relates	  to	  building	  state	  institutions,	  governance,	  
and	   involvement	   in	   the	  political	  apparatus	  of	   the	  state.	  As	  much	  of	   the	  state-­‐
building	   literature	   has	   emphasised,	   this	   requires	   building	   the	   institutional	  
capacity	  of	   the	   state	   so	   that	   the	   rule	  of	   law	   can	  be	   enacted,	   authority	   can	  be	  
imposed	  and	  governance	  can	  take	  place	  (Fukuyama,	  2004,	  2005;	  Chesterman	  et	  
al.,	   2005;	   Sisk,	   2013).	   A	  much-­‐overlooked	   aspect	   of	   this	   process	   in	   the	   state-­‐
building	  literature	  was	  the	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  state-­‐building.	  While	  gaining	  
legitimacy	   is	   emphasised	   through	   local	   ownership	   and	   security	   provision	  
(Diamond,	  2005;	  Chesterman,	  2004;	  Lake,	  2010)	  little	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  
the	   bottom-­‐up	   approaches	   related	   to	   the	   political	   participation	   of	   citizens	   in	  
contributing	  to	  state	  policy	  (Andersen,	  2012;	  Paris	  and	  Sisk,	  2009).	  	  I	  therefore	  
proposed	   a	   second	   category	   of	   state-­‐building,	   which	   addresses	   bottom-­‐up	  
political	  practices	  that	  also	  shape	  states	  and	  their	  evolution.	  Civil	  society	  actors,	  
as	  is	  argued	  in	  this	  study,	  are	  necessary	  for	  holding	  governments	  accountable,	  
giving	  a	  political	  voice	  to	  citizens	  and	  providing	  quasi-­‐state	  services,	  which	  are	  
often	   lacking	   in	   weak	   or	   post	   conflict	   states.	   This	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   for	  
countries	  attempting	  to	  transition	  from	  authoritarian	  rule,	  such	  as	  Iraq,	  which	  
need	  the	   full	  participation	  of	   the	  public	   for	  putting	  pressure	  on	  governments,	  
informing	  their	  policy-­‐making	  and	  holding	  them	  to	  account	  (O’Donnell	  et	  al.,	  
2013)	  
	  
I	   applied	   these	   two	   categories	   of	   state-­‐building	   to	   the	   diaspora	   literature.	   I	  
explored	  the	  ways	  that	  diaspora	  have	  contributed	  to	  each	  political	  process,	  but	  
also	   drew	   out	   from	   within	   the	   limited	   diaspora/state-­‐building	   literature	   an	  
understanding	   of	   the	   factors	   that	   may	   account	   for	   why	   some	   diasporas	   may	  
have	   more	   opportunities	   to	   mobilise	   towards	   institution-­‐building	   and	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governance,	   while	   others	   may	   mobilise	   towards	   supporting/challenging	   the	  
state.	  	  As	  well	  as	  inductive	  reasoning,	  I	  also	  deductively	  extrapolated	  from	  the	  
case	   of	   Iraq,	   as	   the	   literature	   was	   rather	   limited	   in	   helping	   me	   explore	   my	  
research	   question.	   Therefore	   I	   developed	   three	   hypotheses	   for	   investigating	  
throughout	  my	  thesis:	  	  
	  
H1:	  Diaspora	  who	  were	  connected	  to	  elite	  socio-­‐political	  networks	  in	  2003	  and	  
had	   monetary	   resources	   had	   more	   opportunities	   to	   engage	   in	   state-­‐building	  
through	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance,	   while	   those	   who	   were	   not	  
connected	   to	   elite	   political	   networks	   and	   had	   insufficient	   resources	   were	  
directed	  to	  supporting	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society.	  	  
H2:	  If	  a	  diaspora	  hostland’s	  foreign	  policy	  supported	  militarily	  intervention	  and	  
occupation	  then	  there	  will	  be	  more	  opportunities	  for	  diaspora	  to	  contribute	  to	  
institution-­‐building	   and	   governance	   where	   as	   if	   the	   hostland’s	   foreign	   policy	  
supported	  development	   than	   it	  will	   create	  more	  opportunities	   for	  diaspora	   to	  
contribute	  to	  state-­‐building	  through	  civil	  society.	  	  
	  
H3:	   Diaspora	   connected	   to	   ruling	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   political	   parties	   will	   have	  
more	   opportunities	   to	   support	   the	   state	   through	   institution-­‐building	   and	  
governance	  where	   as	   those	  unconnected	   to	   the	   ruling	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  parties	  
will	   have	   more	   opportunities	   to	   support/challenge	   the	   state	   through	   civil	  
society.	  	  	  
	  
I	  argued	  throughout	  this	  study	  that	  all	  three	  variables	  affected	  the	  capabilities	  
and	   thus	   the	   forms	   of	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐building	   in	   which	  
diaspora	   in	  each	  of	  my	  case	  studies	  could	  engage	  at	  different	  periods	   in	  time.	  
Profiles	   mattered	   before	   intervention	   took	   place	   as	   this	   affected	   who	   could	  
influence	  US/UK	  policy	  makers	  and	  insert	  themselves	  in	  Iraq’s	  pre-­‐intervention	  
state-­‐building	  plans.	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It	   was	   clear	   to	   see	   from	   the	   data	   gathered	   that	   the	   two	   diasporas	   differed	  
significantly.	   The	   UK	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   was	   formed	   from	   older	  migration	   waves	  
that	  were	   initially	   connected	   to	   Iraq’s	   colonial	   past.	  Thus	   those	  who	   came	   to	  
Britain	   in	   the	   1940s	   and	   1950s	   were	   those	   supported	   by	   the	   British	   colonial	  
powers	   in	   Iraq	   and	  who	  were	   able	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   this	   colonial	   link	   to	  
migrate	  to	  the	  UK	  once	  the	  political	  situation	  in	  Iraq	  worked	  against	  them.	  This	  
included	   the	  Monarchists,	   who	   were	   ejected	   during	   the	   1958	   revolution,	   the	  
Assyrian	   levies,	   who	   no	   longer	   felt	   welcome	   due	   to	   their	   close	   ties	   to	   the	  
colonial	   powers,	   and	   finally	   the	   Jews	   of	   Iraq	   who	   found	   a	   shelter	   in	   Britain	  
during	  their	  expulsion	  as	  anti-­‐Zionist	  feeling	  spread	  across	  the	  Middle	  East.	  In	  
the	   1960s	   and	   early	   1970s,	   professional	   and	   middle-­‐class	   Iraqis	   followed	  
bringing	   intellectuals,	   political	   leaders,	   doctors,	   lawyers	   and	   businessmen.	  
Their	   political,	   material	   and	   educational	   backgrounds	   facilitated	   their	  
integration	   into	   the	   hostland	   and	   afforded	   them	   the	   time	   and	   resources	   to	  
mobilise	   towards	   Iraq’s	   political	   affairs.	   This	   mix	   of	   intellectuals,	   political	  
leaders	   and	  wealthy	   individuals	   gave	   rise	   to	   a	   burgeoning	   social	   and	   cultural	  
scene,	   as	  Arab	  media	   outlets	   spread	   and	   London	  became	   the	  Middle	   Eastern	  
capital	   in	   Europe.	   In	   time,	   an	   opposition	   centre	   grew	   with	   a	   mix	   of	   secular	  
Arabs,	  Shiite	  and	  Kurdish	  leaders	  and	  ex-­‐Baathists	  who	  were	  able	  to	  influence	  
and	   lobby	  UK	   and	  US	   governments	   using	   their	   political	   and	   social	   networks	  
both	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  country	  and	  importantly	  those	  having	  the	  material	  
resources	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	  
	  
By	  comparison,	  the	  Swedish	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  is	  still	  relatively	  new.	  The	  first	  large	  
wave	  arrived	  in	  Sweden	  in	  the	  1990s	  following	  the	  first	  1990	  Gulf	  War	  and	  the	  
1991	   Shi’a	   uprisings.	   The	   profile	   of	   the	   diaspora	   was	  markedly	   different	   from	  
that	   of	   the	   UK.	   These	   were	   largely	   conflict-­‐generated,	   discriminated	   against,	  
impoverished,	   less	   educated	   Iraqis	   who	   lived	   through	   the	   Iraq-­‐Iran	   war,	  
economic	   sanctions	   and	   the	   first	   Gulf	   war.	   They	   were	   the	   products	   of	   the	  
contexts	  they	  lived	  through	  in	  Iraq,	  where	  jobs	  were	  hard	  to	  come	  by	  leading	  to	  
a	   rapid	   decline	   of	   living	   standards	   and	   plummeting	   education	   levels.	   For	   the	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Shi’a	   this	   also	   meant	   sectarian	   discrimination,	   while	   other	   minorities	   faced	  
discrimination	  based	  on	  their	  ethnicity,	  religion	  or	  practices.	  	  
	  
In	  any	  case,	  their	  integration	  and	  settlement	  in	  Sweden	  was	  prolonged	  by	  their	  
lack	  of	  skills	  and	  material	  wealth.	  It	  took	  at	  least	  a	  decade	  before	  many	  had	  the	  
language	  skills,	  and	  societal	  know-­‐how	  to	  become	  politically	  active	  towards	  the	  
hostland	   public.	   By	   the	   time	   the	   2003	   Iraq	   war	   was	   imminent,	   their	   activity	  
increased	   but	   was	   directed	   to	   grass-­‐roots	   activity	   because	   they	   lacked	   the	  
networks	  and	  material	  resources	  to	  mount	  any	  serious	  opposition	  to	  influence	  
Swedish,	  UK	  or	  US	  policy	  makers	  or	  be	  approached	  by	  them.	  	  
	  
During	  intervention	  and	  occupation,	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  hostland	  towards	  
the	  homeland	  affected	  the	  capabilities	  of	  the	  diaspora	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  state-­‐
building	   in	   Iraq	   as	   the	   UK	   case	   study	   shows,	   military	   intervention	   created	  
various	   openings	   for	   the	   UK	   diaspora	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   the	   pre	   and	   post-­‐
intervention	   state-­‐building	   process,	   where	   as	   the	   Swedish	   diaspora	   had	   no	  
access	  to	  Iraq	  since	  their	  government	  did	  not	  form	  part	  of	  the	  occupation.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   first	   instance,	   we	   have	   seen	   that	   prior	   to	   intervention	   the	   coalition’s	  
decision	   to	  militarily	   intervene	  meant	   that	   it	   needed	   diaspora	   individuals	   to	  
provide	   sorely	   needed	   intelligence,	   formulate	   a	   post-­‐intervention	   plan	   and	  
legitimate	   the	   case	   for	   regime	  change.	  This	   collaboration	  with	   the	  opposition	  
diaspora	  individuals	  and	  groups	  opened	  the	  door	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  governance	  
and	   building	   state	   institutions	   once	   the	  Anglo-­‐American	   coalition	   intervened	  
and	  regime	  change	  had	  taken	  place.	  Diaspora	  leaders	  who	  had	  worked	  with	  the	  
coalition	   were	   able	   to	   enter	   the	   country	   during	   this	   time	   and	   one	   of	   the	  
foremost	   protagonists	   of	   the	   diaspora	   leaders,	   Ahmed	   Chalabi,	   was	   even	  
famously	  flown	  in	  by	  a	  US	  fighter	  plane	  (Bonin,	  2011).	  	  
	  
Once	  intervention	  turned	  into	  occupation	  the	  coalition	  sorely	  needed	  political	  
leaders	   to	  govern	   the	   country,	  opening	  opportunities	   for	   the	  diaspora	   leaders	  
they	  had	  worked	  with	  before	   the	  war.	  An	   Iraqi	  Governing	  Council	  was	  hence	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set	  up	  based	  on	  ethnic	  and	  sectarian	  quotas	  reflecting	  the	  opposition	  groups	  in	  
London,	  which	  led	  to	  their	  recruitment	  (Allawi,	  2007).	  This	  event	  would	  mark	  a	  
critical	   turning	   point	   in	   the	   history	   of	   Iraq’s	   new	   state	   as	   the	   IGC	   helped	   to	  
establish	  an	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  system	  in	  the	  country.	  Seeing	  that	  many	  leaders	  on	  
the	  council	  were	  from	  the	  UK	  diaspora,	  this	  provided	  a	  transnational	  recruiting	  
ground	   from	  within	   the	  UK	   diaspora	   as	   each	   leader	  was	   tasked	   to	   appoint	   a	  
minister,	  and	  further	  political	  appointments	  as	  the	  political	  process	  wore	  on.	  	  
	  
The	   recruitment	   of	   diaspora	   from	   the	   UK	   for	   political	   positions	   was	   further	  
exacerbated	   following	   the	   controversial	   and	   devastating	   policy	   of	   de-­‐
baathification,	  which	  saw	  the	  four	  top	  tiers	  of	  Iraq’s	  military	  civil	  service	  staff,	  
as	  well	  as	  teachers	  and	  professional	  staff	  sacked	  from	  government.	  The	  vacuum	  
created	   by	   this	   policy	   created	   a	   desperate	   need	   for	   civil	   servants,	   which	   the	  
coalition	   governments	   looked	   to	   the	   diaspora	   to	   fill.	   Finding	   skilled	   native	  
Iraqis	  proved	  difficult	   as	   Iraq’s	   state	  apparatus	  was	   run	  by	  Baathists	   and	  only	  
those	   who	   were	  members	   were	   able	   to	   gain	   government	   jobs	   irrespective	   of	  
their	  loyalty	  to	  the	  party.	  Additionally,	  many	  Iraqis	  did	  not	  want	  to	  work	  for	  an	  
occupation	  government,	  which	  made	  the	  task	  of	  finding	  Iraqi	  substitutes	  even	  
harder.	   Consequently,	   political	   staff	   were	   recruited	   directly	   by	   the	   diaspora	  
leaders	   from	  members	   of	   their	   own	   party,	   breeding	   once	   again	   a	   politics	   of	  
patronage	  and	  cronyism	  witnessed	  throughout	  Iraq’s	  history	  (Tripp,	  2007).	  This	  
time	  however	  it	  was	  tainted	  by	  ethno-­‐sectarianism,	  the	  new	  order	  of	  the	  day.	  	  
	  
Coalition	   programmes,	   such	   as	   the	   Iraq	   Reconstruction	   and	   Development	  
Council	  meanwhile	  recruited	  others	  from	  the	  diaspora,	  specifically	  experts	  and	  
highly	  skilled	  Iraqis	  to	  supposedly	  run	  Iraqi	  governorates.	  	  In	  the	  end	  diaspora	  
leaders’	   role	   were	   downgraded	   but	   they	   worked	   in	   various	   ministries	   and	  
government	   institutions	   supporting	   Iraq’s	   fledgling	   democratic	   state	   (Allawi,	  
2007).	  Intervention	  also	  created	  opportunities	  for	  the	  diaspora	  in	  the	  hostland	  
to	  contribute	  from	  afar	   ideas	  and	  influence	  policy	  makers	  now	  in	  power.	  This	  
was	  witnessed	   through	   the	  policy	   conferences	  held	   in	  London,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  
opportunities	   that	   Iraqi	   women	   had	   in	   the	   diaspora	   to	   influence	   UK	   policy	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makers	   with	   regards	   to	   women’s	   rights	   and	   threats	   to	   Iraq’s	   1959	   personal	  
status	  law.	  	  
	  
On	   the	   other	   hand	   the	   Swedish	   government’s	   position	   on	   the	   Iraq	   war	   was	  
mixed,	  as	  has	  been	  shown,	  though	  ultimately	  public	  sentiment	  against	  the	  war	  
prevented	  the	  government	  of	  Goran	  Persson	  from	  intervening	  in	  Iraq.	  Sweden	  
thus	  distanced	  itself	  from	  the	  coalition	  and	  its	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  Iraq	  was	  
to	   support	   the	   work	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   through	   the	   United	   Nations	  
Assistance	  Mission	  for	  Iraq	  (UNAMI).	  Sweden’s	  position	  not	  to	  involve	  itself	  in	  
military	   intervention	  and	  subsequent	  occupation	  meant	  that	  the	  diaspora	  had	  
no	  access	  into	  the	  country	  and	  no	  stake	  in	  its	  future	  political	  process.	  Only	  in	  
2004,	   once	   Iraqis	   reclaimed	   full	   powers	   of	   sovereignty,	   did	   the	   Swedish	  
government	   and	   Iraqis	   in	   the	   diaspora	   move	   to	   help	   Iraq’s	   democratisation	  
process.	   Sweden’s	   foreign	   policy	   towards	   Iraq	   during	   this	   time	   was	   to	   offer	  
development	  support.	  	  
	  
This	   opened	   up	   an	   opportunity	   for	   the	   diaspora	   to	   influence	   the	   Swedish	  
government	  and	  to	  collaborate	  on	  democracy-­‐building	  initiatives	  through	  civil	  
society	   in	   Iraq.	   A	   diaspora	   co-­‐development	   project	   was	   launched	   by	   the	  
Swedish	  International	  Development	  Agency	  under	  the	  management	  of	  the	  Olof	  
Palme	  Centre,	  the	  Social	  Democrat’s	  political	  foundation.	  Twenty-­‐two	  diaspora	  
organisations	  were	   selected	   to	  work	   on	   issues	   related	   to	   democracy-­‐building,	  
human	   rights	   and	   women’s	   rights	   across	   Iraq	   but	   predominantly	   in	   the	  
Northern	  region	  of	  Kurdistan.	  	  
	  
Working	   from	   the	   bottom-­‐up	  with	   Iraqis	   on	   the	   ground,	   these	   organisations	  
worked	   to	   strengthen	   democratic	   governance,	   and	   the	   capacity	   of	   Iraqi	   non-­‐
governmental	  organisations	  and	  individuals.	  Other	  hostland	  organisations	  also	  
funded	   political	   projects	   in	   Iraq	   that	   supported	   the	   political	   development	   of	  
Iraq’s	  civil	  society.	  Effectively,	  Sweden’s	  choice	  not	  to	  intervene	  in	  Iraq	  carved	  a	  
different	  path	  for	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  which	  directed	  the	  Iraqi	  
diaspora’s	  contribution	  towards	  supporting	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society.	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Empirical	   evidence	   from	   my	   case	   studies	   finds	   a	   conjunctural	   account	   that	  
incorporates	  both	  Hypothesis	   1	   and	  Hypothesis	  2	   for	  explaining	   the	  puzzle	  of	  
why	   there	   were	   differences	   in	   the	   state-­‐building	   approaches	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   UK	  
diaspora	  and	  the	  Iraqi	  Swedish	  diaspora	  up	  until	  Iraq’s	  2005	  elections.	  We	  have	  
seen,	   for	   example	   that	  both	   the	   elite	  networks	   and	   resources	   available	   to	   the	  
UK	  diaspora,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  intervention	  in	  the	  UK,	  facilitated	  
their	   involvement	   in	  governance	  and	  building	   state	   institutions.	  Meanwhile	   a	  
lack	   of	   networked	   elites	   and	   resources,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   foreign	   policy	   of	   non-­‐
intervention	   diverted	   the	   Swedish	   Iraqi	   diaspora’s	   engagement	   towards	   civil	  
society	  and	  grass	   roots	  activism.	  This	  conjunctural	  explanation	  may	  well	  hold	  
for	  the	  two	  cases	  under	  study.	  However,	  uncovering	  which	  of	  the	  two	  variables	  
holds	  more	   explanatory	  power	  would	   require	  us	   to	   test	   the	  data	  with	   a	   third	  
case	  study	  that	  either	  had	  elite	  diaspora	  profiles	  and	  non-­‐intervention	  or	  non-­‐
elites	  in	  a	  hostland	  that	  did	  intervene	  in	  Iraq.	  	  
	  
Throughout	  my	   analysis	   I	   have	   argued	   and	   stressed	   that	   there	   is	   the	   issue	  of	  
temporality,	   which	   also	   was	   a	   significant	   factor	   to	   how	   things	   developed	   in	  
Iraq.	  With	  each	  new	  phase	   in	   Iraq’s	  development,	  before	   intervention,	  during	  
intervention,	   during	   occupation,	   following	   Iraq’s	   2005	   elections	   and	   beyond,	  
there	  were	  different	  political	  dynamics	  at	  play	  which	  also	  influenced	  what	  each	  
diaspora	  was	  capable	  or	  not	  capable	  of	  becoming	  involved	  in.	  	  For	  instance,	  we	  
have	   seen	   that	   during	   occupation,	   the	   Swedish	   Foreign	   Ministry	   worked	  
through	   the	   United	   Nations	   and	   distanced	   itself	   from	   the	   coalition,	   which	  
limited	   opportunities	   for	   engagement	   during	   this	   phase.	   Nonetheless,	   when	  
there	   was	   a	   clear	   Iraq	   strategy	   put	   in	   place	   in	   2004,	   after	   Iraq	   regained	   its	  
sovereignty,	  this	  then	  opened	  up	  opportunities	  for	  development	  projects	  for	  the	  
diaspora	   in	   collaboration	   with	   the	   Swedish	   development	   agency.	   As	   such,	  
understanding	  how	  and	  why	  there	  are	  divergences	  in	  diaspora	  mobilisation	  for	  
state-­‐building	   during	   conflict	   or	   intervention	   requires	   also	   looking	   at	   the	  
political	   dynamics	   between	   the	   hostland	   and	   the	   powers	   governing	   the	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homeland.	  These	  are	   liable	  to	  change	  in	  time,	  and	  with	  each	  change	  different	  
opportunities	  may	  arise	  or	  be	  inhibited	  as	  seen	  in	  Iraq.	  	  
	  
This	  was	  particularly	  felt	  following	  Iraq’s	  first	  democratic	  elections,	  politics	  was	  
seized	  by	  a	  new	  political	  elite	  that	  was	  fragmented	  along	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  lines	  
so	   that	   those	   who	   had	   connections	   to	   these	   groups	   were	   able	   to	   mobilise	  
towards	   state-­‐building,	   where	   as	   those	   who	   were	   unconnected	   to	   it	   where	  
excluded	   and	   were	   directed	   to	   challenging	   the	   state	   by	   acting	   as	   an	   Iraqi	  
transnational	  civil	  society.	  	  
	  
As	   we	   have	   seen,	   when	   Iraqis	   took	   over	   the	   state-­‐building	   process,	   ethno-­‐
sectarianism	   had	   become	   institutionalised	   in	   Iraq	   under	   the	   CPA.	   The	   head	  
start	   the	  diaspora	   leaders	  had,	  as	  part	  of	   the	   Iraqi	  Governing	  Council	  and	  the	  
quick	  turnaround	  towards	  Iraq’s	  first	  elections,	  meant	  that	  new	  political	  figures	  
and	  native	  Iraqi	  parties	  had	  very	  little	  time	  to	  establish	  themselves	  and	  make	  an	  
impact	  (Dodge,	  2005).	  	  
	  
Consequently,	   it	  mattered	   little	   whether	   one	   had	   expertise,	   skills	   or	   political	  
acumen	   if	   you	   wanted	   to	   contribute	   to	   Iraqi’s	   institution-­‐building	   and	  
governance.	  Rather,	  what	  took	  precedence,	  was	  whether	  you	  were	  connected	  to	  
the	  ruling	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  political	  parties	  or	  not.	  Indeed,	  in	  both	  countries	  the	  
empirical	  evidence	  supports	  Hypothesis	  3	  that	  those	  connected	  to	  ruling	  ethno-­‐
sectarian	  political	  parties	  had	  more	  opportunities	  to	  contribute	  to	   institution-­‐
building	   and	  governance	  while	   others	   excluded	  by	   virtue	  of	  not	   belonging	   to	  
Iraq’s	  new	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  political	  elites	  were	  directed	  towards	  challenging	  the	  
state	  through	  civil	  society.	  
	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  Iraq,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  this	  meant	  increased	  opportunities	  for	  
the	  Kurds	   and	  Shi’a	   in	   the	  diaspora	   to	   contribute	   to	  both	  categories	  of	   state-­‐
building,	   as	   their	   majority	   status	   in	   the	   country	   led	   to	   their	   empowerment.	  
Opportunities	   to	   contribute	   were	   increased	   both	   in	   the	   homeland	   and	   the	  
hostland	   as	   their	   position	   of	   power	   not	   only	   increased	   domestically,	   but	   also	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transnationally	   impacting	   the	   opportunities	   for	   their	   diaspora	   to	   impact	  
hostland	  policy.	  
	  
Many	  were	  also	  able	  to	  return	  to	  assume	  political	  positions	  in	  ministries	  or	  as	  
Members	  of	  Parliament	   through	   their	   links	   to	  parties	   including	   the	  KDP,	   the	  
PUK,	   ISCI	   and	  Da’wa.	  A	   transnational	   resource	  base	  was	   thus	  opened	   for	   the	  
recruitment	   of	   political	   staff,	   with	   only	   loyalty	   to	   the	   party	   and	   leader	   in	  
question	  as	  prerequisite.	  Simultaneously,	   those	   in	  the	  hostland	  were	  also	  able	  
to	   help	   their	   kin	   back	   home	   through	   collaboration	   with	   hostland	   parties,	  
investment	  opportunities,	  state-­‐capacity	  building,	  transporting	  ideas	  and	  acting	  
as	   lobbyists	   for	   their	   political	   parties	   at	   home.	   Power	   at	   home	   thus	   created	  
power	  in	  the	  hostland,	  which	  has	  further	  entrenched	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  positions	  
back	  home	  and	  	  reinforced	  the	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  political	  party	  system.	  	  
	  
As	   has	   been	   evidenced	   through	   the	   empirical	   chapters,	   those	   excluded	   from	  
this	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   conception	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   state;	   Turkmen,	   Assyrians,	  
Chladeans,	   Syriacs,	   Mandeans,	   Shabaks,	   Sunnis,	   Yezidis	   or	   those	   holding	   a	  
different	   view	   of	   politics,	   have	   been	   unable	   to	   enter	   Iraq’s	   political	   process	  
through	   formal	   politics	   and	   thus	   their	   engagement	   in	   Iraq’s	   state-­‐building	  
process	   has	   been	   directed	   to	   challenging	   the	   state.	   With	   no	   effective	  
representation	   for	   several	   minorities	   in	   Iraq,	   the	   diaspora	   has	   sought	   to	  
challenge,	  hold	  the	  government	  to	  account	  and	  contest	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  Iraq’s	  
political	  system.	  
	  
This	   has	   entailed	   supporting	   local	   communities	   and	   projects	   by	   providing	  
quasi-­‐state	   services	   through	   civil	   society	   organisations	   or	   challenging	   the	  
political	   development	   of	   Iraq	   through	   grass-­‐roots	   activism.	   Various	  
organisations	  and	  groups,	   in	  a	  bid	   to	  hold	   the	  government	  accountable,	  have	  
championed	  political	  rights,	  minority	  rights,	  women’s	  rights,	  labour	  rights	  and	  
democracy.	  The	  very	  system	  put	  in	  place	  by	  the	  coalition	  and	  supported	  by	  the	  
diaspora	  leaders	  has	  also	  been	  opposed	  by	  Iraq’s	  others	  who	  continue	  to	  fight	  
and	   campaign	   for	   a	   more	   civic	   and	   truly	   democratic	   Iraqi	   state.	   In	   many	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respects,	   the	  diaspora	  has	   returned	   to	   its	  opposition	  politics	   from	  afar,	  as	   the	  
window	  of	  opportunity	   for	   real	  democratic	   change	  opened	   in	  2003	  but	   firmly	  
closed	  down	  in	  2004.	  	  
	  
Though	  homeland	  political	  parties	  have	  impacted	  who	  in	  the	  diaspora	  is	  able	  to	  
contribute	  to	  state-­‐building	  processes	  inside	  the	  country,	  the	  two	  country	  cases	  
demonstrate	   that	   the	  UK	  diaspora	   remains	  a	  bigger	   recruiting	  ground	   for	   the	  
Shi’a	  where	  many	  senior	  politicians	  including	  Iraq’s	  Prime	  Minister,	  Haider	  Al	  
Abadi	  and	  current	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Ibrahim	  Al	  Jaafari	  formerly	  resided.	  	  Seeing	  
that	  few	  Shi’a	  elites	  resided	  in	  Sweden,	  returnees	  are	  fewer	  in	  number	  than	  the	  
UK	  diaspora.	  	  As	  such,	  elite	  networks	  still	  matter	  but	  only	  for	  those	  connected	  
to	  the	  ruling	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  parties	  in	  the	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  political	  system.	  	  
	  
Homeland	   political	   parties	   have	   thus	   not	   only	   shaped	  who	   can	   contribute	   to	  
state-­‐building	   but	   has	   also	   shaped	   the	   politics	   of	   state-­‐building.	  While	   Iraq’s	  
minorities	  and	  others	  have	  struggled	  to	  build	  a	  civil	  society	  that	  advocates	  for	  
rights	  and	  tolerance	  for	  all	  Iraqis,	  it	  has	  eventually	  also	  led	  to	  a	  fragmentation	  
of	   Iraq’s	   imagined	   community.	   As	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   violence,	   land	   grabs	   and	  
repression	   torments	   communities	   in	   Iraq,	   including	   the	  Mandeans,	   Turkmen	  
and	  Assyrians,	  protectionist	  and	  isolationist	  attitudes	  are	  spreading	  within	  the	  
diaspora,	   as	   groups	   have	   come	   to	   identify	  more	  with	   their	   religion	   or	   ethnic	  
kin,	   rather	   than	   an	   Iraqi	   identity.	   For	   example,	   violent	   episodes	   against	  
Christian	  Iraqis	  have	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  Christian	  army	  (BBC	  News,	  2016)	  
and	  Turkmen	  in	  Iraq	  have	  looked	  to	  Turkey	  for	  assistance	  (Ataman	  and	  Owens,	  
2015).	  These	  developments	  affect	  politics	  of	  the	  diaspora	  as	  those	  on	  the	  outside	  
attempt	   to	   support	   their	   kin	   inside	   the	   country	   through	   lobbying	   regional	   or	  
hostland	   domestic	   governments	   leading	   to	   the	   further	   fragmentation	   of	   Iraq	  
and	  its	  state-­‐building	  project.	  	  
	  
There	  are	  of	  course	  those	  who	  are	  fighting	  for	  a	  civic	  conception	  of	  the	  state,	  as	  
we	   have	   seen.	   A	   new	   civil	   society	   is	   emerging	   in	   Iraq	   and	   networks	   of	  
organisations	   including	   labour	   unions,	   women’s	   groups,	   and	   various	   non-­‐
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governmental	   organisations	   are	   collaborating	   in	   a	   bid	   to	   overturn	   the	   ethno-­‐
sectarian	  system	  (Issa,	  2015).	  Al	  Tethamun	  al	  Medeni,	  loosely	  translated	  as	  civic	  
solidarity,	  a	  new	  network	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  has	  been	  established.	  In	  
the	   last	   few	  years	   there	  have	  been	  continuous	  protests	   in	  Baghdad,	  Basra	  and	  
various	  Iraqi	  cities	  against	  the	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  state,	  the	  corruption,	  muhasasa	  
and	  the	  political	  class	  that	  has	  not	  delivered	  on	  its	  promises.	  The	  marches	  and	  
protests	  have	  been	  supported	   through	   transnational	  networks	   in	   the	  diaspora	  
who	  stand	   in	  solidarity	  by	  spreading	   the	  word	  through	  writing	  and	  critiquing	  
the	  government	  in	  Arab	  media	  outlets	  and	  social	  media,	  but	  also	  by	  joining	  in	  
parallel	  protests	  in	  the	  diaspora.	  	  
	  
In	   summary,	   what	   this	   study	   has	   shown	   is	   how	   diaspora	   profiles,	   hostland	  
military	   intervention	  and	  links	  to	  homeland	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  parties	  can	  affect	  
diaspora	   mobilisation	   for	   state-­‐building	   albeit	   in	   different	   forms.	   Materially	  
resourceful	   diaspora	   and	   those	   connected	   to	   powerful	   social	   and	   political	  
networks,	  a	  hostland	  foreign	  policy	  of	  intervention	  in	  a	  diaspora	  homeland	  and	  
links	   to	   ruling	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   parties	   create	  more	   opportunities	   for	   diaspora	  
mobilisation	  for	  institution-­‐building	  and	  governance.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  through	  
the	   case	   study	   of	   the	   UK	   Iraqi	   diaspora,	   it	   can	   create	   opportunities	   for	  
mobilisation	   towards	   both	   categories	   of	   state-­‐building,	   both	   institution-­‐
building	  and	  governance	  as	  well	  as	   supporting	   the	  state	   through	  civil	   society.	  
Meanwhile,	   insufficient	   resources	  and	  a	   lack	  of	  powerful	  political	  networks,	  a	  
hostland	   foreign	   policy	   of	   non-­‐intervention	   and	   no	   links	   to	   ethno-­‐sectarian	  
parties	   in	   the	   homeland	   will	   likely	   steer	   diaspora	   mobilisation	   towards	  
supporting/challenging	  the	  state	  through	  civil	  society	  and	  grass-­‐roots	  activity,	  
as	  has	  largely	  been	  the	  case	  in	  Sweden.	  	  
	  
Conceptual,	  theoretical	  and	  methodological	  implications	  	  
The	  study’s	   findings	  have	   several	   theoretical	   implications.	  While	   the	  diaspora	  
literature	  has	  stressed	  the	  difference	  between	  immigrant	  politics	  and	  diaspora	  
politics	   (Østergaard-­‐Nielsen,	  2001),	  my	  study	  has	   found	   that	   there	   is	   in	   fact	  a	  
false	   dichotomy	   between	   these	   two	   supposedly	   distinct	   processes.	  Often,	   the	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two	  processes	  worked	  in	  tandem.	  As	  Iraqi	  immigrants	  put	  pressure	  on	  hostland	  
government	  for	  rights	  for	  their	  compatriots	  in	  the	  hostland,	  they	  were	  also	  able	  
to	  highlight	  and	  raise	  awareness	  about	  their	  situation	  back	  home,	  as	  the	  case	  of	  
the	   Mandeans	   in	   Sweden	   has	   shown.	   Similarly,	   the	   rights	   granted	   to	   Iraqi	  
immigrants	   to	   enjoy	   their	   social	   and	   cultural	   events	   in	   the	   diaspora	   through	  
funding	   in	   Sweden,	   often	   opened	   a	   space	   to	   discuss	   homeland	   politics	   with	  
fellow	  Swedes	   and	   thus	   raise	   awareness	   about	  homeland	   issues	   through	   their	  
social	  and	  cultural	  events.	  More	  attention	  needs	  to	  be	  paid	  in	  the	  literature	  to	  
this	   relationship	   and	   how	   the	   two	   processes	   are	   linked	   and	   reinforce	   one	  
another.	  
	  
As	   demonstrated	   throughout	   this	   study	   understanding	   the	   profile	   of	   the	  
diaspora	  in	  the	  hostland	  is	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  the	  links	  that	  people	  have	  
with	  their	  country	  of	  origin.	  We	  have	  seen	  that	   the	  different	  migration	  waves	  
between	  the	  UK	  and	  Sweden	  affected	  what	  the	  diaspora	  were	  able	  to	  do	  leading	  
up	   to	   the	   Iraq	   war	   and	   beyond.	   The	   findings	   from	   this	   study	   support	   the	  
findings	   of	   Guarnizo	   and	   colleagues	   that	   those	   who	   are	   better	   educated	   and	  
integrated	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  contribute	  to	  political	  transnationalism	  (Guarnizo	  
et	  al.,	  2003).	  The	  higher	  socio-­‐economic	  position	  of	  those	  who	  fled	  in	  the	  early	  
waves	  meant	  that	  integration	  was	  facilitated,	  leading	  to	  a	  smoother	  integration	  
process	   in	   the	   hostland.	   Ultimately	   in	   the	   diaspora,	   those	   who	   were	   most	  
successfully	  integrated	  were	  the	  ones	  who	  were	  able	  to	  give	  back	  more	  to	  their	  
country	   of	   origin,	   whether	   through	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance	   or	  
through	   civil	   society.	   This	   study	   however	   extends	   this	   literature	   by	   showing	  
that	  the	  backgrounds	  of	  diaspora	  actors	  upon	  exiting	  the	  country	  of	  origin	  can	  
play	   an	   important	  part	   in	  who	  becomes	  politically	   active	  but	   also	   the	   type	   of	  
political	  activity	  they	  are	  able	  to	  engage	  in.	  	  
	  
While	   the	   case	   has	   been	   made	   that	   conflict-­‐generated	   diaspora’s	   emotional	  
bonds	   to	   the	   country	   of	   origin	   encourages	   their	   transnational	   mobilisation	  
(Lyons,	   2007,	   2006;	   Portes,	   1999;	   Bloch,	   2008),	   this	   study	   shows	   that	   the	  
concept	  of	  conflict	  –generated	  is	  too	  broad	  a	  term	  to	  capture	  the	  relationships	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of	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  diaspora	  who	  may	  react	   to	  conflict	   in	  different	  ways.	  The	  
majority	   of	   diaspora	   in	   Iraq	   were	   conflict-­‐generated,	   yet	   what	   mattered	   was	  
their	   profile	   upon	   exiting	   Iraq.	   This	   includes	   their	   socio-­‐economic	   position,	  
past	  political	  activities	  and	  whether	  they	  had	  been	  personally	  persecuted	  by	  the	  
regime	  before	  they	  left.	  	  
	  
Many	  who	  left	  in	  the	  50s	  to	  70s	  were	  also	  conflict-­‐generated	  diaspora	  but	  had	  a	  
rose–tainted	   memory	   of	   Iraq.	   They	   left	   during	   its	   Golden	   Age,	   when	   the	  
economy	  was	  starting	  to	  boom	  due	  to	  Iraq’s	  growing	  oil	  revenues,	  and	  society	  
at	   its	  most	   liberal	   with	   progressive	   personal	   status	   laws	   and	  women’s	   higher	  
education	   and	   work	   in	   the	   labour	   force	   (Al-­‐Ali,	   2007;	   Efrati,	   2012).	   Their	  
memories	  and	  emotional	  links	  to	  Iraq	  are	  thus	  from	  this	  period,	  which	  created	  
a	   strong	   myth	   of	   return	   narrative	   throughout	   their	   lives,	   propelling	   their	  
political	   mobilisation.	   Similarly	   those	   expelled	   or	   left	   during	   this	   time	   were	  
political	   leaders	   and	   activists	   from	   prominent	   families	   who	  maintained	   their	  
links	   with	   the	   parties	   and	   organisations	   they	   were	   members	   of.	   Some	   were	  
lucky	  to	  escape	  unscathed	  while	  others	  were	  personally	  persecuted,	  tortured,	  or	  
had	  family	  members	  executed	  by	  various	  regimes	  and	  so	  their	  links	  to	  Iraq	  are	  
indelible.	   Past	   traumas,	   nostalgia	   and	   strong	   political	   links	   were	   the	   key	  
ingredients	  that	  made	  for	  a	  political	  transnationalism	  of	  yearning,	  to	  return	  to	  
the	  Iraq	  that	  should	  have	  been.	  	  	  
	  
By	   contrast	   those	   who	   fled	   from	   conflict	   in	   search	   of	   a	   better	   life,	   as	   in	   the	  
majority	  of	  those	  who	  left	  for	  Sweden,	  had	  a	  very	  different	  relationship	  to	  Iraq.	  
They	  did	  not	  leave	  with	  the	  hope	  of	  coming	  back.	  They	  were	  conflict-­‐generated,	  
impoverished	  refugees	  seeking	  asylum	  and	  settlement	  in	  a	  new	  hostland.	  Many	  
did	  not	  have	  a	  desire	  to	  return	  but	  were	  seeking	  a	  better	  life	  elsewhere	  for	  their	  
families	  and	  children.	  Thus	  while	  both	  sets	  of	  diaspora	  were	  conflict-­‐generated	  
what	   mattered	   more	   was	   their	   links	   to	   the	   country	   upon	   exiting	   and	   their	  
socio-­‐economic	  backgrounds	  and	  networks.	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Understanding	   the	   profiles	   of	   diaspora	   in	   the	   hostland	   is	   also	   important	   for	  
understanding	  the	  type	  of	  transnational	  links	  that	  are	  made.	  We	  know	  from	  the	  
literature	  that	  migrations	  and	  the	  diaspora	  communities	  they	  create	  tie	  people	  
to	   transnational	   social	   fields	   between	   their	   real	   or	   perceived	   homelands	   and	  
their	  hostlands	  (Adamson,	  2002;	  Levitt,	  2001;	  Faist,	  2000).	  Yet	  what	  we	  need	  to	  
see	  more	   from	   the	   literature	   is	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   types	   of	   social	   fields	  
and	   networks	   that	   are	   created	   by	   people	   occupying	   different	   positions	   in	  
society	   and	   the	   power	   bases	   they	   tap	   into.	   My	   study	   has	   furthered	   our	  
understanding	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  while	  elite	  networks	  
span	  across	  political,	  religious	  and	  business	  elite	  worlds	  in	  more	  than	  one	  state	  
to	   influence	   domestic	   and	   international	   governments,	   grassroots	   political	  
transnational	   networks	   operate	   more	   locally	   between	   diaspora	   and	   their	  
familial	   locales	   or	   former	   political	   associations.	   The	   fields	   tap	   into	   different	  
networks	  and	  their	  sources	  of	  power	  are	  constituted	  differently.	  This	  not	  only	  
affects	  what	   they	   can	  do	  but	  how	   they	  contribute	   to	   their	   countries	  of	  origin	  
and	   the	   politics	   they	   can	   shape.	   Elites	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   pursue	   positions	   of	  
power	   while	   grassroots	   activities	   respond	   to	   needs	   and	   injustices.	   In	   state-­‐
building	   missions,	   both	   top-­‐down	   and	   bottom-­‐up	   approaches	   are	   important	  
and	  necessary	  for	  state	  formation	  in	  transition	  societies.	  	  
	  
There	  are	  also	  implications	  for	  understanding	  how	  opportunities	  and	  obstacles	  
shape	   the	   mobilisation	   of	   diaspora	   towards	   state-­‐building	   processes	   both	  
during	   foreign	   interventions	   and	   during	   domestic	   state-­‐building	  missions.	   In	  
the	   first	  phase,	   the	   foreign	  policy	  of	   each	  hostland	  affected	   the	   type	  of	   state-­‐
building	  that	  diaspora	  could	  engage	  in,	  as	  UK	  intervention	  and	  Sweden’s	  non-­‐
intervention	  in	  Iraq	  presented	  different	  political	  opportunities	  for	  the	  diaspora	  
in	  the	  UK	  and	  Sweden.	  In	  the	  second	  phase,	  it	  was	  dictated	  by	  the	  ruling	  ethno-­‐
sectarian	  ruling	  class	  in	  Iraq.	  Ultimately	  those	  in	  power	  and	  their	  state-­‐building	  
agendas	   for	   the	  homeland	  decreed	   it,	  whether	  neo-­‐liberal	   or	   ethno-­‐sectarian.	  
Each	   created	   inclusivity	   criteria	   for	   who	   could	   become	   involved	   while	   those	  
excluded	  re-­‐directed	  their	  work	  outside	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  state.	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Certainly	   hostland	   states	   and	   their	   citizenship	   and	   integration	   policies	   may	  
account	  for	  why	  some	  diasporas	  are	  more	  active	  towards	  homeland	  states	  than	  
others	   as	   the	   literature	   has	   previously	   demonstrated	   (Koopmans,	   2004;	  
Koopmans	   and	   Statham,	   2001;	   Odmalm,	   2009;	   Van	   Houte	   et	   al.,	   2013;	  
Østergaard-­‐Nielsen,	   2001;	   Baser,	   2015).	  Only	   a	   few	   studies	   have	   looked	   at	   the	  	  
the	  position	  of	  diasporas	  vis	  à	  vis	  their	  homeland	  states	  and	  how	  this	  impacts	  
the	   transnational	   channels	   they	   use	   (Koinova,	   2014;	   Lampert,	   2009),	   but	   the	  
body	  of	  literature	  has	  largely	  neglected	  how	  homeland	  contexts	  can	  also	  shape	  
who	  can	  be	  involved	  in	  certain	  forms	  and	  the	  type	  of	  political	  transnationalism.	  	  
	  
	  This	   study	   has	   explored	   a	   new	   hypothesis	   and	   brought	   new	   insights	   to	   this	  
area	  arguing	  that	  homeland	  politics	  and	  political	  parties	  are	  also	  necessary	  for	  
understanding	  which	  diasporas	  can	  contribute	  to	  state-­‐building	  and	  how.	  It	  is	  
no	  good	  looking	  simply	  at	  the	  open	  political	  spaces	  to	  mobilise	  in	  the	  hostland	  
if	  the	  diaspora	  individual	  in	  question	  is	  excluded	  or	  lacking	  in	  representation	  in	  
his	  or	  her	  homeland	  state.	  	  
	  
As	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  through	  the	  case	  of	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  divisions	  in	  Iraq,	  
homeland	  politics	   can	   shape	  political	   transnationalism	   creating	   opportunities	  
for	   some	   while	   denying	   them	   for	   others.	   For	   those	   denied	   a	   place	   in	   the	  
homeland,	   the	   hostland	   takes	   greater	   salience	   as	   a	   political	   space	   for	  
contestation,	  as	  has	  been	  witnessed	  in	  both	  the	  UK	  and	  Sweden	  among	  Iraq’s	  
excluded	  others.	  Yet	  we	  have	  also	  seen	  that	  the	  politics	  of	  exclusion	  in	  Iraq	  has	  
been	   reflected	   back	   into	   the	   diaspora	  where	   identities	   and	  mobilisation	   have	  
also	  been	  fragmented	  along	  ethnic	  and	  sectarian	  lines.	  This	  reality	  is	  reflective	  
of	  the	  crumbling	  Iraqi	  state,	  which	  has	  privileged	  the	  few	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  
majority	  who	  have	  relied	  on	  their	  ethnic	  and	  sectarian	  compatriots	  in	  Iraq	  and	  
abroad	  for	  support	  and	  survival.	  	  
	  
Homeland	  political	  parties	  also	  elucidate	  differences	  in	  the	  political	  behaviour	  
of	   diaspora	   groups	   from	   the	   same	   country	   of	   origin.	   If	   minority	   groups	   are	  
excluded	   from	   participating	   in	   the	   political	   process	   and	   feel	   they	   have	   no	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avenue	  to	  express	  their	  concerns,	  political	  transnationalism	  may,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  
of	   Iraq,	   lead	  to	  other	   forms	  of	  engagement	  outside	  the	  structures	  of	  power	  or	  
lead	   to	   a	   weakening	   of	   political	   engagement	   as	   has	   been	   exemplified	   in	   this	  
study.	  As	  such	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  understand	  perhaps	  why	  some	  diasporas	  outlive	  
others	  if	  their	  connections	  to	  their	  former	  homelands	  are	  obstructed	  or	  denied,	  
such	  as	  the	  Mandeans	  of	   Iraq,	  whose	  numbers	  outside	  Iraq	  now	  exceed	  those	  
inside.	  Diaspora	  politics	  can	  only	  be	  viable	   for	  those	  who	  have	  representation	  
in	   the	  country	  of	  origin.	  For	   those	  diasporas	  who	  do	  not	  have	  active	  political	  
links	   in	   the	  homeland,	   raising	  political	   issues	   from	   the	  hostland	  becomes	   yet	  
more	   difficult.	   In	   these	   cases	   diasporic	   connections	   may	   retreat	   into	   the	  
imagination,	   the	   symbolic,	   or	   gradually	   lead	   to	   assimilation	   in	   the	   country	  of	  
settlement,	  especially	  for	  second	  and	  third	  generations.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  my	  research	  confirms	  the	  need	  to	  treat	  diaspora	  communities	  not	  
as	  homogenous	  groups	  but	  rather	  as	  heterogeneous	  individuals	  or	  groups	  with	  
diverse	   links	   to	   their	   country	   of	   origin.	   There	   is	   no	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   but	  many	  
Iraqi	  diasporas	  linked	  to	  different	  political	  periods,	  migration	  waves,	  towns	  and	  
cities	   and	   just	   as	   importantly	   imaginations	   and	  memories	   of	   what	   Iraq	   is	   to	  
people	  today.	  In	  approaching	  diaspora	  in	  this	  way	  we	  can	  better	  assess	  diaspora	  
individuals	   and	   groups’	   point	   of	   departure	   for	   why,	   how	   and	   what	   they	  
politically	  mobilise	  for.	  	  
	  
We	  can	  also	  thus	  avoid	  simply	  focusing	  on	  the	  hegemonic	  diaspora	  discourses	  
or	  seeing	  them	  as	  the	  legitimate	  voice	  of	  the	  community	  if	  we	  can	  understand	  
how	  transnational	  politics	  is	  constituted	  and	  who	  it	  privileges.	  This	  is	  especially	  
the	  case	   for	  ethnic	  diaspora	  groups	   in	   the	  hostland	  who	  are	   in	  conflict	   in	   the	  
homeland,	   such	   as	   the	   Turkmen	   and	   Assyrians,	   who	   are	   in	   dispute	   with	   the	  
Kurds	   about	   land	   rights.	   The	   power	   asymmetry	   at	   home	   has	   impacted	   their	  
power	   to	   mobilise	   in	   the	   diaspora	   as	   their	   political	   and	   financial	   resources	  
cannot	  compete	  with	  the	  Kurds.	  Nor	  can	  they	  offer	  the	  same	  level	  of	  political	  
and	  economic	  interests	  that	  the	  Kurds	  can	  leverage	  for	  their	  own	  political	  gain	  
with	  hostland	  governments	  since	  being	  in	  power.	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Finally,	   an	   important	   theoretical	   contribution	   of	   this	   study	   is	   understanding	  
the	  temporalities	  of	  different	  variables.	  Different	  time	  periods,	  and	  the	  political	  
dynamics	  that	  shape	  them,	  can	  impact,	  elevate,	  or	  influence	  specific	  variables,	  
which	   may	   create	   positions	   of	   power	   during	   one	   time	   period	   but	   be	  
meaningless	   in	   another.	   For	   example,	   elite	   networks	   and	   resources	   created	  
opportunities	   for	   the	  UK	  diaspora	   to	  be	   involved	   in	   state-­‐building	  plans	  both	  
prior	   and	   post	   intervention.	   Their	   profiles	   were	   agreeable	   to	   the	   coalition	   in	  
power,	   which	   elevated	   their	   status	   and	   opportunities	   to	   be	   involved	   in	  
governance	   during	   occupation.	   However,	   this	   variable	   mattered	   very	   little	  
following	   Iraq’s	   2005	   elections	   when	   a	   different	   political	   dynamic	   was	  
instituted.	   The	   new	   state	   of	   Iraq	   was	   founded	   on	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   grounds,	  
which	  directed	  power	  away	  from	  skilled,	  resourced	  or	  technically	  able	  persons	  
to	   those	  who	  had	   links	   and	   supported	   their	   ethnic	  or	   sectarian	  kin	   and	   their	  
vision	  for	  the	  country.	  	  
	  
This	  finding	  suggests	  that	  in	  times	  of	  military	  intervention,	  conflict	  and	  where	  
political	   dynamics	   are	   unstable	   and	   undergoing	   change,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  
consider	   how	   different	   variables	   are	   affected	   and	   in	   turn	   affect	   diaspora	  
mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐building.	  The	  temporalities	  of	  variables	  are	  an	  important	  
consideration	   for	   understanding	   why	   some	   groups	   are	   successful	   and	   others	  
aren’t	  and	  why	  some	  diasporic	  initiatives	  are	  successful,	  while	  others	  fail.	  	  
	  
Conceptually	   for	   the	   state-­‐building	   literature	   the	   implications	   of	   this	   study	  
suggest	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	  states	  that	  are	  engaging	  in	  external	  interventions	  and	  
state-­‐building	   missions.	   Whether	   on	   the	   back	   of	   foreign	   intervention,	  
individually	   or	   through	   hostland	   collaborations,	   state-­‐building	   in	   developing	  
and	   weak	   states	   such	   as	   Iraq’s	   is	   also	   being	   shaped	   by	   diasporic	   non-­‐state	  
actors.	   Through	   top-­‐down	   and	   bottom-­‐up	   approaches	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	  
Iraqi	   state	   has	   been	   subject	   to	   a	   plethora	   of	   political	   forces	   that	   are	   shaping	  
state	   formation.	  Diaspora	   individuals	   constitute	  one	   such	  partner	   that	   can	  be	  
used	  in	  state-­‐building,	  especially	  in	  weak	  states.	  	  
223	  	   	  
	  
Nonetheless,	   we	   have	   seen	   through	   the	   empirical	   evidence	   the	   perils	   of	  
parachuting	  diaspora	   leaders	  to	  take	  positions	  of	  power.	   It	   is	   clear	   to	   see	   that	  diasporic	   interventions	   to	   institution-­‐building	   and	   governance	   during	  occupation	   have	   been	   problematic	   to	   say	   the	   least.	   The	   diaspora	   lacked	  legitimacy	   and	   were	   seen	   as	   collaborators	   with	   the	   Coalition	   Provisional	  Authority,	  who	  became	  the	  occupiers	  of	  Iraq.	  The	  diaspora	  leaders	  supported	  the	  CPA’s	  state-­‐building	  plans	  and	  lost	  all	  credibility	  with	  the	  native	  population	  who	  did	  not	  see	  them	  as	  either	  acting	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  Iraq,	  representing	  the	  voices	  of	  the	  population,	  but	  rather	  motivated	  by	  self	  interest.	  	  	  Iraq’s	   state-­‐building	  project	   thus	   confirms	   the	   importance	   of	   legitimacy,	  which	  ultimately	  means	  that	  local	  actors	  are	  key	  to	  driving	  any	  state-­‐building	  mission	  and	   not	   merely	   supporting	   it	   as	   much	   of	   the	   literature	   has	   underlined	  (Chesterman,	  2004;	  Diamond,	  2005;	  Lake,	  2010).	   	  Neither	  foreign	  nor	  diasporic	  interveners	  can	   impose	  this,	  but	  rather	  can	  only	  play	  supporting	  roles	   towards	  this	   endeavour.	   In	   this	   regard,	   there	   is	   a	   place	   for	   diaspora	   to	   be	   involved	   in	  state-­‐building	   once	   political	   conditions	   have	   stabilised.	   Diaspora	   skills	   and	  resources,	   as	  we	   have	   seen,	   can	  be	  utilised	  to	  support	  native	  political	   leaders,	  
policies	   as	   well	   as	   civil	   society	   initiatives	   in	   times	   of	   political	   stability	   and	  
peace.	  	  
	  
The	   state-­‐building	   literature’s	   focus	   on	   institution-­‐building	   (Fukuyama,	   2004,	  
2005;	  Chesterman	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  has	  largely	  neglected	  the	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  as	  a	  
component	  of	  state-­‐building.	  In	  post-­‐conflict	  or	  conflict	  contexts	  like	  Iraq,	  civil	  
society	  is	  paramount	  for	  the	  inclusion	  and	  political	  participation	  of	  the	  public	  
in	   the	   decision	   making	   process,	   and	   for	   engendering	   legitimacy	   (Andersen,	  
2012).	   Furthermore	   in	   weak	   and	   fragile	   states	   it	   is	   often	   civil	   society	   that	  
supports	   local	   communities	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   effective	   state	   services.	   In	   the	  
Middle	  East	  civil	  society	  can	  and	  often	  does	  play	  necessary	  quasi-­‐state	  services	  
(Clark,	  2013),	  defending	  and	  supporting	  the	  vulnerable,	  developing	  democratic	  
norms,	   as	   well	   as	   encouraging	   the	   ideals	   of	   tolerance	   between	   competing	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interest	   groups	   (Norton,	   2005).	   All	   of	   which	   are	   necessary	   for	   democratic	  
governance,	   especially	   for	   countries	   like	   Iraq	   transitioning	   from	  authoritarian	  
rule.	  	  
	  
Therefore,	   conceptually,	   beyond	   a	   normative	   ideal,	   or	   a	   description	   of	  
associational	   life,	  or	  a	  public	  sphere	  where	  public	  policy	   is	  debated	  (Edwards,	  
2004),	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  case	  shows	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  
must	   not	   be	   understood	   in	   isolation	   of	   the	   state	   but	   rather	   intrinsic	   to	   its	  
formation.	  This	  is	  especially	  the	  case	  in	  countries	  facing	  contested	  sovereignty,	  
regime	  change	  or	  transitioning	  from	  authoritarian	  rule	  such	  as	  Iraq.	  As	  the	  case	  
of	   the	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   shows,	   civil	   society	   has	   performed	   quasi-­‐state	   services,	  
filling	  out	  the	  gaps	  that	  the	  state	  cannot	  fill.	  Essentially,	  civil	  society	  has	  played	  
the	   part	   of	   a	   de	   facto	   emergency	   state	   that	   provides	   in	   times	   of	   need	   to	  
communities,	  to	  infrastructure	  projects,	  and	  to	  vulnerable	  minorities.	  	  
	  
This	   has	   been	  witnessed	   through	   various	   diaspora	   initiatives	   to	   support	   local	  
community	   needs,	   provide	   public	   services	   and	   strengthen	   democratic	  
governance	   amidst	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   social	   organisations	   and	   actors.	   	   The	  
diaspora	  has	  acted	  like	  a	  transnational	  civil	  society,	  utilising	  the	  public	  spaces	  
of	  the	  hostland	  to	  support	  the	  homeland	  by	  challenging	  its	  politics	  and	  the	  very	  
system	  the	  new	  Iraq	  was	  founded	  on.	  	  
	  
Simultaneously,	   civil	   society	   in	   Iraq	   has	   also	   come	   to	   mean	   a	   political	  
opposition	   movement,	   which	   is	   being	   supported	   transnationally	   by	   the	  
diaspora.	   Much	   like	   the	   governance	   structures	   of	   two	   party	   parliamentary	  
democracies,	   Iraq’s	   civil	   society	   is	   performing	   the	   functions	   of	   an	   official	  
opposition,	  by	  holding	  the	  government	  to	  account,	  challenging	  its	  policies	  and	  
attempting	  to	  shape	  its	  very	  foundations.	  
	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  Iraqi	  transnational	  civil	  society	  has	  been	  able	  to	  counter	  
the	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   structures	   and	   corruption	   that	   are	   so	   pervasive	   in	   Iraqi	  
society.	   The	   power	   differentials	   between	   those	   in	   power	   and	   those	   outside	   it	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still	   remain	   unequally	   balanced.	  However,	   a	   transnational	   civil	   society	   under	  
such	   conditions	   can	   still	  make	   a	   difference	   by	   showing	   solidarity	   with	   social	  
movements	   that	   counter	   the	   status	   quo	   inside	   the	   country,	   supporting	   local	  
initiatives	   transnationally,	   spreading	   new	   ideas	   and	   democratic	   norms	   and	  
maintaining	  pressure	  on	  the	  Iraqi	  government.	  	  
	  
The	  case	  of	   Iraq	  thus	  shows	  that	   in	  different	  political	  contexts	  and	  periods	  of	  
regime	  transition,	  civil	  society	  can	  and	  does	  plays	  different	  roles,	  which	  are	  in	  
direct	   response	   to	   not	   only	   the	   level	   of	   social,	   economic	   and	   political	  
development	  of	  a	  state	  but	  to	  the	  shaping	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  state	  that	  is	  being	  built.	  
The	   balance	   of	   power	   may	   be	   uneven,	   yet	   civil	   society	   remains	   a	   key	   and	  
important	  component	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  state,	  its	  players	  and	  its	  values.	  As	  
Migdal	  has	  rightly	  stated,	  the	  state	  is	  in	  a	  constant	  state	  of	  flux,	  it	  is	  not	  fixed	  
and	  its	  partners,	  allies,	  and	  rules	  change	  continuously	  (Migdal,	  2001).	  	  
	  
For	   the	   diaspora	   literature	   this	   study	   also	   raises	   several	   methodological	  
implications.	   Firstly,	   the	   study	   shows	   that	   a	   wide	   spectrum	   of	   Iraqi	   diaspora	  
individuals	   and	   groups	   have	   actively	   been	   engaging	   in	   the	   state-­‐building	  
process	  in	  Iraq	  in	  various	  multi-­‐level	  ways.	  Many	  of	  these	  efforts	  are	  under	  the	  
radar,	  and	  operate	  through	  familial,	  social	  and	  political	  transnational	  networks	  
and	  associations,	  which	  are	  contributing	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  new	  ideas,	  avenues	  of	  
funding,	   solidarity	  and	  ultimately	   to	   the	  vision	  of	  a	  new	  state.	  Understanding	  
state-­‐building	  processes	  for	  countries	  in	  transition,	  such	  as	  Iraq,	  thus	  requires	  
looking	  more	   closely	   at	   the	   transnational	   links	  being	  made	  between	  diaspora	  
communities	   and	   their	   countries	   of	   origin,	   especially	   bottom-­‐up	   approaches	  
that	  are	  difficult	  to	  detect	  or	  understand	  without	  qualitative	  research.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  without	  qualitative	  research	  methods,	  and	  particularly	  interview	  
methods,	  whether	  semi-­‐structured	  or	  open	  ended,	  depending	  on	  the	  research	  
question	   at	   hand,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   appreciate	   the	   variation	   and	   divergent	  
experiences,	  links,	  relationships	  that	  individuals	  in	  the	  diaspora	  have	  with	  their	  
homeland	   and	   amongst	   each	   other	   in	   the	   diaspora.	   This	   would	   prevent	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homogenising	  accounts	  of	  diaspora	  and	  their	  political	  mobilisation	  and	  instead	  
capture	  the	  nuances	  and	  power	  dynamics	  at	  play	  that	  affect	  diasporic	  lives	  and	  
political	  attachments	  to	  the	  homeland.	  	  
	  
Policy	  implications	  
There	   are	   also	   practical	   policy	   implications	   that	   this	   study	   can	   offer	   policy	  
makers	   in	   engaging	   diaspora	   in	   state-­‐building	   missions.	   First,	   it	   is	   in	   the	  
interests	  of	  governments	  to	  have	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  diaspora	  in	  their	  
hostland,	   so	   as	   to	   assess	   if	   and	  how	   they	   can	  help	   in	   the	   re-­‐building	  of	   their	  
former	   homelands.	   In	   doing	   so	   policy	   makers	   will	   be	   better	   placed	   to	  
understand	  the	  political	  dynamics	  within	  groups	  and	  between	  groups	  and	  the	  
relations	  that	  each	  have	  towards	  their	  country	  of	  origin.	  	  
	  
Organisations	   like	   the	   International	   Organisation	   for	   Migration	   (IOM)	   have	  
conducted	  mapping	  exercises	  of	  diaspora	  organisations	  for	  some	  time	  to	  better	  
understand	   the	   capabilities	   within	   diaspora	   communities.	   These	   have	  
encouraged	   various	   capacity-­‐building	  projects	   in	  Africa	   and	  beyond.	   It	  would	  
be	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   governments	   to	   do	   a	   similar	   exercise	   and	   to	   work	   with	  
individuals	  and	  groups	  who	  are	  already	  actively	  engaged	  with	  their	  homelands.	  
This	  would	  facilitate	  co-­‐development	  projects,	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  allow	  policy	  
makers	   to	   build	   the	   capacity	   of	   diaspora,	   who	   are	   already	   involved	   in	   the	  
development	   of	   their	   homelands,	   but	   who	   may	   lack	   expertise,	   capacity	   or	  
resources	  as	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Swedish	  case	  study	  has	  demonstrated.	  	  
	  
Perhaps	   more	   significantly,	   the	   diverging	   state-­‐building	   attempts	   by	   the	   UK	  
and	  Swedish	  governments	  to	  help	  Iraq	  offer	  an	  interesting	  insight	  into	  the	  best	  
use	   of	   diaspora	   in	   cases	   of	   foreign	   intervention.	   As	   has	   been	   shown,	   the	  UK	  
government’s	  support	  for	  diaspora	  leaders	  during	  the	  occupation	  was	  premised	  
on	  those	  who	  it	  could	  work	  with,	  who	  supported	  its	  goals	  and	  not	  necessarily	  
individuals	   that	   were	   welcomed	   and	   certainly	   not	   those	   who	   had	   any	   real	  
legitimacy	  within	  Iraq.	  The	  legacy	  of	  the	  UK	  and	  other	  diaspora	  leaders	  can	  still	  
be	   felt	   today,	   where	   corruption	   and	   ethno-­‐sectarianism	   has	   thrived	   and	   Iraq	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remains	  a	  fragmented	  and	  weak	  state	  unable	  to	  provide	  safety	  or	  even	  the	  most	  
basic	  services	  to	  a	  still	  suffering	  population.	  	  
	  
Under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  the	  UK	  and	  US	  military,	  the	  diaspora	  leaders	  were	  able	  
to	   insert	   themselves	   into	   Iraq’s	   state-­‐building	   project	   but	   in	   doing	   so	   they	  
acquiesced	   to	   a	  neo-­‐liberal	   vision	   and	   a	   politics	   of	   exclusion.	  An	  opportunity	  
dreamt	  of	   in	  opposition	  was	  realised	  but	  tragically	  wasted	  by	  those	  supported	  
by	   the	   coalition.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   reputation	   of	   those	   who	   led	   Iraq	   has	   been	  
forever	   tarnished;	   the	   UK	   and	   the	   US	   have	   lost	   credibility	   with	   the	   Iraqi	  
population,	   which	   ultimately	   compromised	   their	   security	   and	   state-­‐building	  
plans.	  Any	  further	  efforts	  to	  affect	  change	  in	  the	  country	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  met	  
with	  hostility	  at	  best	  and	  violence	  at	  worst	  as	  the	  recent	  past	  has	  shown.	  	  
	  
In	  Sweden,	   the	   lack	  of	   involvement	   in	  military	   intervention	   led	   to	   a	  different	  
outcome.	   The	   Swedes	   took	   their	   time	   in	   formulating	   a	   strategy	   for	   Iraq	   and	  
Iraqis	   that	   aimed	   to	  help	  develop	   their	   fledgling	  democracy	   and	   civil	   society.	  
The	  choice	  to	   follow	  the	  United	  Nations,	  and	  not	  occupy	  Iraq	  meant	  that	  the	  
Iraqi	  population	  welcomed	  Swedish	  efforts	  to	  aid	  the	  country’s	  progress.	  Many	  
interviews	  with	  diaspora,	  diplomatic	  and	  government	  officials	  repeated	  this	  fact	  
when	  they	  met	  with	  Iraqis	  in	  Iraq	  who	  vocalised	  their	  appreciation	  of	  the	  role	  
Sweden	  played	   in	  welcoming	   Iraqi	   refugees	   in	  Sweden.	  Especially	  as	   they	  had	  
been	  welcoming	  refugees	  since	  the	  1990s	  and	  they	  took	  on	  more	  Iraqi	  refugees	  
than	  both	  the	  UK	  and	  US	  combined	  following	  intervention	  (Milne,	  2015).	  This	  
positive	   reputation	   thus	   aided	   the	   relative	   safety	   of	   Swedish	   diplomatic	   staff	  
and	   their	  work	   in	   Iraq,	   because	   several	   people	  had	   relatives	   in	   Sweden.	  Thus	  
they	  were	   able	   to	   do	  more	   for	   Iraq,	   for	   Iraqis	   and	  with	   Iraqis	   on	   the	   ground	  
during	  elections	  and	  beyond.	  	  
	  
	  
Reflections	  on	  this	  study	  and	  its	  limitations	  
In	  this	  study	  I	  set	  out	  to	  show	  the	  external	  state-­‐building	  contributions	  of	  the	  
Iraqi	   diaspora	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   Sweden	   towards	   Iraq	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	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intervention.	  The	  aim	  was	  to	  investigate	  how	  Iraqis	  in	  the	  diaspora	  have	  been	  
contributing	  to	  the	  state-­‐building	  process	  of	  Iraq	  and	  to	  show	  how	  their	  actions	  
have	  had	   far	   reaching	  consequences	   for	   the	   Iraqi	  state	  and	  society.	  For	  better	  
and	   for	  worse,	   the	  diaspora	  has	  been	  part	  of	   Iraq’s	   state-­‐building	  project	   and	  
have	  contributed	  to	  its	  political	  trajectory	  both	  on	  the	  macro	  and	  micro	  level.	  	  
	  
The	  study	  achieved	  its	  goals	   in	  gaining	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  both	  the	  
UK	   and	   Swedish	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   have	   attempted	   to	   help	   in	   the	   rebuilding	   of	  
their	   homelands.	   It	   was	   also	   able	   to	   answer	   why	   the	   two	   diaspora	   cases	  
contributed	  in	  different	  ways	  by	  looking	  at	  their	  profile,	  hostland	  foreign	  policy	  
and	  the	  homeland	  political	  system,	  for	  understanding	  diasporic	  state-­‐building	  
both	  during	  foreign	  intervention	  and	  endogenous	  phases.	  	  
	  
This	  posed	  some	  difficulties	  initially	  as	  most	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  Iraq	  dealt	  with	  
how	  and	  why	  foreign	  intervention	  failed.	  Very	  little	  existed	  about	  the	  diaspora,	  
particularly	   about	   the	   Iraqi	   Arab	   diaspora	   in	   Sweden.	   Thus	   this	   thesis	   relied	  
heavily	   on	   the	   interviews	   conducted	  with	  diaspora	   individuals,	   policy	  makers	  
and	  diplomatic	  staff	  for	  understanding	  the	  story	  of	  the	  diaspora	  and	  their	  state-­‐
building	   initiatives,	  as	  well	  as	  drawing	  out	  the	  arguments	  made	   in	  this	  thesis.	  
This	   posed	   its	   own	   problems	   at	   times	   since	   intervention	   occurred	   over	   ten	  
years	   ago	   and	   interviewees	   struggled	   to	   remember	   dates,	   and	   the	   order	   of	  
events,	  which	  I	  had	  to	   triangulate	  via	  other	   interviews,	  policy	  documents	  and	  
literature	  to	  be	  certain.	  	  
	  
Another	  unforeseen	  obstacle	  faced	  in	  this	  research	  was	  the	  UK	  Chilcot	  Inquiry,	  
which	  was	   a	   public	   Inquiry	   looking	   into	   the	   country’s	   role	   into	   the	   Iraq	  war.	  
The	  inquiry	  made	  it	  harder	  to	  meet	  with	  top	  senior	  politicians	  and	  diplomats	  in	  
the	  UK.	  Many	  were	  afraid	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  Iraq	  War,	  which	  meant	  that	  much	  
time	  and	  persistence	  was	  needed	  	  (several	  months	  and	  years	  in	  some	  cases),	  to	  
convince	   leading	   figures	   to	  participate	  by	   reassuring	   them	  about	   the	   focus	  of	  
this	  study	  and	  the	  anonymity	  of	  their	  testimonials.	  Though	  I	  was	  successful	  in	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gaining	   access	   to	   leading	   figures	   at	   the	   FCO,	   the	   CPA	   and	   diplomatic	   staff,	  
some	  politicians	  refused	  to	  meet	  with	  me.	  	  
	  
One	   of	   the	   key	   limitations	   of	   this	   study,	   however,	   has	   been	   the	   inability	   to	  
return	  to	  Iraq	  due	  to	  security	  concerns	  and	  meet	  with	  diaspora	  returnees	  about	  
their	   involvement	   in	   state-­‐building.	  Though	   I	  was	  able	   to	  meet	   several	   in	   the	  
diaspora	  who	   returned	   regularly	   to	   the	  UK,	  my	   study	  would	   have	   benefitted	  
greatly	   from	  seeing	   their	   involvement	  on	   the	  ground	  and	  meeting	  with	  other	  
individuals	   who	   had	   returned	   to	   Iraq	   to	   contribute	   towards	   Iraq’s	   political	  
process.	  	  	  
	  
Similarly,	   it	  would	  have	  been	  useful	  to	  visit	  the	  organisations	  and	  groups	  that	  
diaspora	   individuals	  worked	  with	   in	   Iraq,	   so	   as	   to	   be	   able	   to	   assess	   not	   only	  
their	   contributions	   and	   work,	   but	   how	   Iraqi	   organisations	   and	   individuals	  
perceived	  them.	   In	  what	   instances	  were	  they	  considered	  a	  hindrance	  or	  help?	  
How	  do	  they	  view	  the	  role	  of	  the	  diaspora	  in	  state-­‐building	  processes?	  
	  
Future	  Research	  
An	   obvious	   continuation	   of	   this	   research	   would	   be	   to	   further	   test	   the	  
hypotheses	  developed	  in	  this	  thesis	  on	  cases	  of	  mobilisation	  for	  state-­‐building	  
of	  other	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  communities	  around	  the	  world,	  especially	  the	  US	  Iraqi	  
diaspora	   whose	   government	   was	   the	   principal	   architect	   of	   the	   Iraq	   war.	   It	  
would	   be	   interesting	   to	   see	   whether	   military	   intervention	   created	   more	  
opportunities	  for	  the	  US	  Iraqi	  diaspora	  to	  be	  involved	  and	  whether	  the	  profile	  
of	   the	   US	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   played	   a	   part.	   This	   study	   has	   found	   supporting	  
evidence	   for	   this	   in	   initiatives	   such	   as	   the	   IRDC	   and	   the	   Local	   Governance	  
programmes	   (Brinkerhoff	   and	   Taddesse,	   2008).	   What	   other	   opportunities	  
presented	   themselves	   for	   the	  US	   Iraqi	   diaspora	   to	   become	   involved	  with	   the	  
coalition?	  	  
	  
Similarly,	   research	   into	   other	   diaspora	   communities,	   whose	   homelands	   have	  
undergone	  foreign	  interventions,	  such	  as	  Afghanistan	  and	  Libya,	  would	  also	  be	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interesting	  to	  compare	  with	  Iraq.	  How	  did	  the	  profiles	  of	  diaspora	  from	  these	  
countries	   shape	   types	  of	  contribution	   to	   state-­‐building?	  Did	  opportunities	   for	  
diaspora	  from	  hostlands	  that	  intervened	  differ	  with	  others	  who	  did	  not?	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	   understanding	   how	   homeland	   political	   parties	   impact	   the	  
political	   transnationalism	   of	   diaspora	   from	   plural	   or	   divided	   societies	   is	   still	  
lacking,	  and	  my	  study	  offers	  the	  first	  comprehensive	  look	  at	  how	  this	  variable	  
affects	   diasporic	   contributions	   to	   state-­‐building.	  This	   study’s	   findings	  may	  be	  
tested	  in	  other	  cases	  in	  the	  African	  continent	  and	  the	  wider	  Middle	  East	  where	  
tribal,	   clan	   and	   religious	   divisions	   exist.	   How	   do	   ethno-­‐sectarian	   or	   ethno-­‐
national	  dynamics	  play	  out	  in	  the	  diaspora	  and	  affect	  how	  and	  which	  diaspora	  
are	   able	   to	   mobilise	   for	   state-­‐building	   in	   their	   countries	   of	   origin?	   How	   do	  
ethnic	   conflicts	   in	   the	   homeland	   affect	   the	   capabilities	   of	   competing	   ethnic	  
diaspora	  groups	  and	   interests	   in	   the	  hostland?	  Hopefully	   these	  questions	  will	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UK	  Interviews	  with	  diaspora	  conducted	  between	  October	  2013	  to	  August	  
2015	  
	  
Respondent	  1,	  22/10/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  2,	  24/10/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  3.	  24/10/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  4,	  24/10/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  5,	  31/10/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  6,	  01/11/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  7,	  01/11/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  8,	  05/11/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  9,	  05/11/2013,	  London,	  UK	  	  
Respondent	  10,	  06/03/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  11,	  06/03/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  12,	  07/03/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  13,	  08/03/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  14,	  10/11/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  15,	  11/11/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  16,	  12/11/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  17,	  13/11/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  18,	  14/11/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  19,	  14,	  11/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  20,	  18/11/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  21,	  20/11/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  22,	  21/11/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  22,	  21/11/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  24,	  23/11/2013,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  25,	  06/01/2014,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  26,	  13/01/2014,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  27,	  13/01/2014,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  28,	  14/01/2014,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  29,	  22/04/2015,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  30,	  06/05/2015,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  31,	  01/05/2015,	  Skype	  call	  to	  Iraq	  
Respondent	  32,	  01/05/2015,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  33,	  01/05,	  2015,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  34,	  13/08/2015,	  London,	  UK	  
Respondent	  35,	  25/08/2015,	  Skype	  call	  to	  Canada	  
Respondent	  36,	  28/08/2015,	  Birmingham,	  UK	  
Respondent	  37,	  30/08/2015,	  London,	  UK	  
	  
Interviews	  with	  British	  diplomats,	  government	  officials	  and	  NGOs	  
	  
Interview	  with	  Arab-­‐British	  NGO	  Director,	  06/03/2015,	  London,	  UK	  
Interview	  with	  Director	  of	  Media	  Strategy	  in	  Iraq,	  07/04/2015,	  London,	  UK	  
Interview	  with	  British	  Diplomat	  1,	  09/04/2015,	  Cambridge,	  UK	  
Interview	  with	  FCO	  official	  1,	  08/04/2015,	  London,	  UK	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Interview	  with	  British	  Special	  Representative	  in	  Iraq	  1,	  14/04/2015,	  London,	  UK	  
Interview	  with	  British	  Special	  Representative	  in	  Iraq	  2,	  28/04/2015,	  London,	  UK	  
Interview	  with	  FCO	  official	  2,	  30/04/2015,	  London,	  UK	  
	  
Sweden	  Interviews	  with	  diaspora	  conducted	  between	  October	  2014	  to	  
July	  2015	  
	  
Respondent	  1,	  07/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  
Respondent	  2,	  08/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  
Respondent	  3,	  09/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  4,	  10/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  5,	  11/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  6,	  12/10/2014,Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  7,	  13/10/2014,Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  8,	  14/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  9,	  15/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  10,	  16/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  11,	  17/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  12,	  18/10/14,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  13,	  19/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  14,	  20/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  15,	  21/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  16,	  22/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  17,	  23/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  18,	  24/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  19,	  25/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  20,	  16/06/2015,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  21,	  22/06/2015,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  22,	  22/06/2015	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  23,	  23/06/2015,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  24,	  23/06/2015,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  25,	  30/06/2015,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  26,	  05/11/2015,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  	  
Respondent	  27,	  17/06/2016,	  London,	  UK	  	  
	  	  
Interviews	  with	  Swedish	  diplomats,	  politicians,	  government	  officials	  and	  
NGO	  Directors.	  
	  
Interview	  with	  Head	  of	  Iraq	  Unit,	  Swedish	  International	  Development	  Agency,	  
16/10/2014,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  
Interview	  with	  Swedish	  Ambassador	  to	  Iraq	  1,	  02/02/2015,	  London,	  UK	  
Interview	  with	  government	  official	  1,	  11/06/2015,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  
Interview	  with	  Swedish	  Ambassador	  to	  Iraq	  2,	  11/06/2015,	  Call	  from	  Sweden	  to	  
Hungary	  
Interview	  with	  Politician	  1,	  11/06/2015,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  
Interview	  with	  Government	  official	  1,	  24/06/2015,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  
Interview	  with	  Government	  official	  at	  Swedish	  Migration	  Board,	  24/06/2015	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Interview	  with	  Government	  official	  2,	  25/06/2015,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  
Interview	  with	  General	  Secretary	  of	  Swedish	  Political	  Party,	  25/06/2015,	  
Stockholm,	  Sweden	  
Interview	  with	  Government	  official	  3,	  25/06/2015,	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  
Interview	  with	  Politician	  2,	  30/06/2015,	  phone	  call	  to	  Gothenburg	  from	  
Stockholm	  
Interview	  with	  former	  Head	  of	  Gulf	  Section	  at	  Swedish	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  
30/06/2015,	  phone	  call	  to	  Buenos	  Aires	  from	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	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1. Tell	  me	  about	  yourself	  and	  how	  you	  came	  to	  migrate	  to	  the	  UK?	  
2. Why	  did	  you	  choose	  to	  come	  to	  the	  UK?	  
3. What	  has	  been	  your	  experience	  of	  the	  UK	  immigration	  system?	  
4. Do	  you	  feel	  integrated	  into	  UK	  society	  socially?	  	  
5. Do	  you	  feel	  integrated	  into	  UK	  society	  economically?	  	  
6. Do	  you	  feel	  integrated	  into	  UK	  society	  politically?	  	  
7. Do	  you	  feel	  integrated	  into	  UK	  society	  institutionally?	  	  
8. Has	   any	   institution,	   organisation	   or	   group	   helped	   or	   hindered	   your	  
integration?	  
9. Which	  country	  do	  you	  identify	  with?	  Iraq,	  the	  UK/Sweden	  or	  any	  other?	  
10. When	  and	  why	  did	  you	  get	  involved	  in	  political	  activism	  towards	  Iraq?	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11. Were	  you	  politically	  active	   in	  your	  homeland?	  If	  not	  what	   influenced	  your	  
involvement	  now?	  
12. Describe	  the	  political	  activities	  you	  have	  been	  involved	  in?	  
13. Why	  do	  you	  mobilise	  for	  …	  issue?	  Was	  your	  choice	  inspired	  by	  the	  hostland	  
or	  homeland?	  	  
14. What	  is	  the	  aim/goal	  of	  your	  political	  mobilisation?	  
15. Do	  you	  feel	  you	  are	  reaching	  your	  goal?	  If	  not	  what	  obstacles	  are	  standing	  in	  
your	  way?	  Are	  they	  Institutional,	  Resources,	  Societal,	  Leadership?	  
16. Have	  any	  policies	  (state	  level,	  local,	  foreign	  policy)	  influenced	  your	  political	  
choices	  or	  your	  choice	  of	  activities?	  If	  so	  in	  what	  way?	  
17. Do	  you	  get	  help	  from	  the	  government	  or	  other	  organisations?	  
18. Do	  you	  work	  with	  other	  transnational	  or	  supranational	  organisations?	  
19. Do	  you	  work	  with	  other	  European	  branches	  of	  your	  organisation?	  
20. Where	  does	  your	  funding	  come	  from?	  
21. How	  did	  you	  feel	  about	  the	   intervention	   in	  Iraq	   in	  2003?	  How	  do	  you	  feel	  
about	  it	  now?	  
22. How	  did	  the	  2003	  intervention	  affect	  your	  ability	  to	  mobilise?	  Did	  the	  war	  
create	  opportunities/obstacles?	  	  
23. Were	  you	  mobilised	  in	  2003	  or	  later?	  What	  affected	  your	  choice?	  
	  
	  
	  
